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fix(apps): signed host allowlist per app; e2e tests never join a live network; v0.3.5 - #228
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… network; v0.3.5
Found live on dev2: apps_e2e's loopback nodes discovered the real network
over mDNS, took copies of a real app (they had no owner allowlist), received
its sealed secrets from the real holder as legitimate newcomers, promoted at
higher epochs and published "snapshots" of the test's fake state encrypted
with the real app key. The real node then restored those ("tar: invalid tar
magic") and the demo app's state was lost.
- AppRecord.hosts (signed; omitted when empty so existing records verify):
peers allowed to hold the app. Each app sees a view scoped to its list, so
nodes off it never take a copy, are never elected, are never sealed
secrets and are never a snapshot source; a holder dropped from the list
lets go. `c0mpute apps deploy --host <peer>`, `hosts = [...]` in
c0mpute.toml, `hosts` in the MCP deploy tool. Docs say plainly that
without it every holder gets the app's secrets.
- apps_e2e and hosting_parts_e2e set C0MPUTE_DISABLE_MDNS: loopback peers only.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
ThreatCrush Security Scan13 finding(s) HIGH/CRITICAL: 1 | MEDIUM: 8 | LOW: 4
Snippets are redacted; ThreatCrush never prints matched credential material. |
This was referenced Nov 9, 2026
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Found live on dev2:
apps_e2e's loopback test nodes discovered the real network over mDNS, took copies of a real app, received its sealed secrets from the real holder, and published fake "snapshots" encrypted with the real app key, which the real node then restored (tar: invalid tar magic).AppRecord.hosts: a signed allowlist of peers that may hold an app (omitted when empty, so existing records still verify). Each app sees a view scoped to that list: nodes off it never take a copy, are never elected, never receive secrets and are never a snapshot source. Exposed asapps deploy --host,hosts = [...]in c0mpute.toml, and in the MCP tool.apps_e2eandhosting_parts_e2esetC0MPUTE_DISABLE_MDNS, so they talk to loopback peers only.Local verification was
cargo checkonly (dev2's disk is at 99%), so CI runs the tests.🤖 Generated with Claude Code