fix(env): keep secret stores and project env secrets readable under one key (HACK-2169) by roodboi · Pull Request #766 · hack-dance/hack

roodboi · 2026-11-13T07:10:13Z

Fixes HACK-2169 (env/secret audit items F7, F8, F9 and S3) and HACK-2036 (key file hygiene), and adds a hack doctor migration path for setups those bugs already damaged.

What changes

Encrypted secret store (encrypted_file, and the cloud shim)

F7: a store that exists but cannot be read is never treated as empty. Every reader classifies the store through one no-follow read: a symlinked, non-regular or oversized store is refused, and any other read failure raises SecretStoreUnreadableError. So a set can never replace an unreadable store.
F9: the process-wide key cache holds only keychain material. A key read from one store's key file, or from the environment, never stands in for another store's key.
HACK-2036: the key file is read without following a link. It is refused when group or other users can read or write it (mode 0600 is required), or when git tracks it.
- The tracking check runs git ls-files --literal-pathspecs --error-unmatch with a 5 s bound, and only when the key's real directory (symlinks resolved, as git does) is inside a work tree.
- Inside a work tree where git cannot answer, the key is refused rather than guessed untracked.
S3, explicit provisioning (hack env backend --provision-key with HACK_SECRETS_FILE_KEY):
- It never replaces a different existing key, or one it cannot read. A key path can serve more than one store (the default one is shared), and a key that does not open one store may be the only key for another. Changing a key is a rotation, which re-encrypts; the refusal says to move a key file aside yourself, keeping a copy, only once no store needs it.
- With no key file, it writes the key only when the configured store is absent or empty, or opens under that key. An unreadable or symlinked store is refused, because a new key file could shadow the key that opens it today.
- Every key writer (explicit provisioning, keychain persistence and the first-use key) holds the key file's own <key>.lock, and each write checks the file again just before it lands. A concurrent writer's key is kept, never overwritten.

Project env layers

F8: hack env add --secret and hack env set --secret refuse, before writing anything, in two cases:
- HACK_ENV_SECRET_KEY is set but no .hack.secret.key exists (a new key file would shadow the environment key);
- a secret already in the layer does not open under the key readers use.
Replacing the one entry being set is allowed. Legacy env migration refuses the same way instead of creating a shadowing key.

hack doctor: new secret integrity check

It reports, without values:
- a store that is unreadable or refused;
- a store key that is missing or refused;
- a key that does not open its store;
- an env layer with no available key, or the wrong key;
- a layer with secrets under more than one key.
It inspects every layer runtime can read, each read the way runtime reads it: committed and machine-local layers, local-only overlays, in-project symlinked layers, and, in a linked worktree, the primary checkout's inherited local layers.
For a mixed layer it names the secrets that do not open, with the --service, --env and --local options needed to address them. Recovery: read those values with the old key, hack env unset each one (unset needs no key), then hack env set --secret again. For inherited layers it says to run those steps in the primary checkout, and to fix a divergent key first (the "worktree keys" check).
Anything it cannot inspect is an error, never success: a layer that exists but cannot be read or parsed, a directory that cannot be listed, inheritance that cannot be resolved, or an inspection that throws.

Behavior changes to note in the release

An encrypted_file key file that group or other users can read is now refused until someone runs chmod 600. Hack has always written 0600, so this affects only key files made or changed by hand.
--provision-key with a different HACK_SECRETS_FILE_KEY no longer overwrites an existing key file; it refuses.
A key file inside a git work tree whose git cannot report tracking (git fails, is missing, or takes more than 5 s) is refused.

Shared files

src/lib/project-env-config.ts. All of these are outside fix(env): contain child keys and env diagnostics (HACK-2163) #756's areas and HACK-2165's local-layer writes:
- the secret branch of setProjectEnvValue, which now uses the hydration key rules;
- the new read-only inspector and its helpers;
- a pre-write check in migrateLegacyProjectEnv.
src/commands/doctor.ts: one new check (secret integrity), not in the hygiene section.
shell.ts, the env parse errors and the ignore list are untouched.
HACK-2172 (fix(env): verify cleanup receipts and deletion outcomes (HACK-2171) #768): this PR adds no key-deletion path, so it has no "can this key still decrypt something" predicate to share. If fix(env): verify cleanup receipts and deletion outcomes (HACK-2171) #768 needs one, the read-only store listing here (listFileSecretStoreEntries, with its new reason) is the building block.

Follow-up (not in this PR)

The project env key's own git-tracking check (the .hack.secret.key helper in project-env-config.ts) still passes the file name without --literal-pathspecs. The name is fixed, so the risk is low, but it should match the store key check.

Validation

An independent persistent reviewer was clean after 9 rounds. The lead's second-family review then ran three rounds and found the issues fixed in the last four commits; its final round is clean on the code at 9fc9e26f.
Every Codex finding (5) is fixed with a regression test, replied to and resolved.
Tests:
- tests/secret-store.test.ts:
  - F7, F9, HACK-2036 (mode, symlink, tracked, a key reached through a symlinked directory, a git that cannot answer);
  - provisioning refusals, including a different key shared with another store, and unreadable or refused stores;
  - three concurrent provisions writing exactly one key;
  - a first-use bootstrap that waits for the key lock and adopts the key written meanwhile.
- tests/project-env-secret-key-integrity.test.ts: F8.
- tests/doctor-secret-integrity.test.ts, isolated from the real home and global config:
  - every finding is value-free;
  - mixed-key recovery runs end to end, with the old values read under the old key;
  - local-only, symlinked, legacy and inherited layers;
  - unreadable, unparseable and unlistable layers reported as errors.
- tests/env-migration-safety.test.ts: the migration refusal.
Local gates (Bun 1.4.4): bun run typecheck; bun run check at the 39-warning baseline; privacy:check; gitleaks over origin/next..HEAD. 574 tests across the related env, secret, doctor, inheritance, migration, hermeticity and CI-selection suites pass.

stateDiagram-v2
    [*] --> Locked: --provision-key with HACK_SECRETS_FILE_KEY (holds <key>.lock)
    Locked --> Refused: key file unreadable
    Locked --> Refused: a different key is there
    Locked --> CheckStore: no key file, or an empty one
    Locked --> Write: the same key (0600 rewrite)
    CheckStore --> Refused: store unreadable or refused
    CheckStore --> Refused: store has entries the key does not open
    CheckStore --> Write: store absent or empty, or opens under the key
    Write --> Written: file unchanged just before the write lands
    Write --> Refused: another key landed meanwhile

🤖 Generated with Claude Code

…e key (HACK-2169) From the env/secrets security audit (F7, F8, F9, S3; HACK-2036): - F7: an encrypted store that exists but cannot be read is never treated as empty; reads and writes refuse it (SecretStoreUnreadableError) instead of letting the next set replace it and lose every entry. - F8: env add/set --secret use hydration's key rules: refused when only HACK_ENV_SECRET_KEY is set (a new key file would shadow it) and when a secret already in the layer does not open under the readers' key; the entry being replaced is exempt. Checked before any key or layer write. - F9: the process-wide key cache holds only keychain material, used where a keychain lookup happens; a key read from one store's key file never stands in for another store's configured key. - S3: explicit --provision-key refuses to replace a different existing key while the store has entries (that is a rotation). - HACK-2036: the encrypted_file key and store are read without following a link; the key is refused when others can read or write it or git tracks it. - Migration path: hack doctor's new "secret integrity" check reports an unreadable store, a missing or refused store key, a key that does not open the store, and an env layer holding secrets under more than one key, each with value-free recovery steps. Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>

…r's recovery steps that work (HACK-2169) - Key provisioning with HACK_SECRETS_FILE_KEY publishes exclusively when no key file exists, refuses a key file it cannot read, and replaces a different key only as a repair: under the store lock, when the store's entries open under the environment key and not the existing one. - Doctor lists the secrets in a layer under more than one key and says to unset then set them, which works even when several do not open. - The store listing reads the store the way use does, so a symlinked store is reported as refused; key_refused is reported only for the key file's own refusals. - Legacy env migration refuses to create a key file that would shadow HACK_ENV_SECRET_KEY. - git ls-files uses literal pathspecs for the key file name. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

… a key that shadows the store's (HACK-2169) - The doctor's env layer check inspects the effective machine-local default layer, including hack.env.default.local.yaml beside a legacy local overlay, so the --local it suggests acts on the file it reported. - Provisioning HACK_SECRETS_FILE_KEY into an absent key file refuses when the store has entries that key does not open (an older keychain-key setup), since readers would use the new file instead. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

vercel · 2026-11-13T07:10:16Z

The latest updates on your projects. Learn more about Vercel for GitHub.

Project	Deployment	Actions	Updated
hack-docs	Ready	Preview	Nov 13, 2026 12:38pm UTC

roodboi · 2026-11-13T07:10:19Z

@codex review

linear-code · 2026-11-13T07:10:20Z

HACK-2169

chatgpt-codex-connector · 2026-11-13T07:10:42Z

Codex Review Summary: ✅ Completed

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Review	Status	Commit	Review trigger
📝 Code Review	✅ Completed 2026-11-13T12:40:10.317469Z	`680e9ad`	Manual request
🔒 Security Review	✅ Completed 2026-11-13T12:44:54.973935Z	`680e9ad`	Manual request

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chatgpt-codex-connector · 2026-11-13T07:16:25Z

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…er (HACK-2169) `hack env set --env <name> --local` can create hack.env.<name>.local.yaml with no committed overlay beside it; the secret integrity inspection only visited local layers of committed overlays, so mixed or wrong keys there went unreported. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

…er (HACK-2169) The integrity inspector keeps the first label for each layer path, so the default local layer is never reported with --env local advice. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

roodboi · 2026-11-13T07:19:28Z

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…CK-2169) The integrity inspection discovers overlay names from layer files and in-project symlinks alike, and reads each layer with the runtime's layer read, so a layer linked from inside the project is checked and one that leads outside it is skipped as runtime would refuse it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

chatgpt-codex-connector · 2026-11-13T07:28:12Z

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…layer's advice alone (HACK-2169) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

roodboi · 2026-11-13T07:29:46Z

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chatgpt-codex-connector · 2026-11-13T07:39:34Z

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…ee inherits (HACK-2169) In a linked worktree that inherits local inputs, runtime also reads the primary checkout's local default and overlay layers. The integrity inspection now lists those too, read with the same inheritance guards (path assertion, no redirection, primary-local read), and the doctor says such a layer lives in the primary checkout, where the hack env steps must run. Also routes the key-tracking test's git through the hermetic fixture helper, which fixture-hermeticity requires. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

… from the primary's (HACK-2169) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

roodboi · 2026-11-13T07:43:47Z

@codex review

chatgpt-codex-connector · 2026-11-13T07:46:12Z

Codex Review: Didn't find any major issues. Swish!

Reviewed commit: 621b93b388

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chatgpt-codex-connector · 2026-11-13T07:52:45Z

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roodboi · 2026-11-13T08:03:38Z

Ready for lead: head 621b93b388a82b2805fdf6a238c26ddc109ca632

Review: the persistent reviewer took 9 rounds and is clean at 621b93b.

Round 1: 4 should-fix and 5 nits. Round 2: 2 nits. Rounds 4, 6 and 8: one nit each, all on the Codex follow-ups below.
Codex found 3 P2s; each is fixed with a regression test that fails without the fix, replied to and resolved:
- local-only overlays (hack.env.<name>.local.yaml) were not inspected;
- in-project symlinked layers were not inspected;
- a linked worktree's inherited primary local layers were not inspected.
Codex's code review of 621b93b388 reported "Didn't find any major issues", and its automatic security review found nothing. computer pr review-status: CLEAR at 621b93b388, 0 unresolved bot threads. The tool lists Codex as having reviewed an earlier commit, but Codex's own comment names 621b93b388 as the reviewed commit.

Linux gates green at this head: Config compiler (ubuntu-latest: typecheck and lint), test shards 4 to 8, linux-process-lifetime, Runtime state models, Change scope, test focus, secret-scan, runtime-images and docs site.

Still pending: test shards 1 to 3 (macOS) and docker-e2e shards 1 to 4.

Changes since the PR description:

The doctor's layer inspection covers every layer runtime can read, each read the way runtime reads it:
- local-only overlays;
- in-project symlinked layers (links that lead outside the project, dangle or point to non-files are skipped);
- a linked worktree's inherited primary local layers, read with the same inheritance guards. Findings on these say to run the hack env steps in the primary checkout, and to fix a divergent key first (the "worktree keys" check).
A test fix: the key-tracking test spawned git directly, which made fixture-hermeticity fail on shard 5 at 58fa9f6a. It now uses the hermetic fixture helper.

Shared files (unchanged from the description):

project-env-config.ts: the secret branch of setProjectEnvValue, the new read-only inspector and its helpers, and a pre-write check in the migration.
doctor.ts: one new secret integrity check, not in the hygiene section.
shell.ts, the env parse errors and the ignore list are untouched.

Follow-up (not in this PR): the project env key's own git-tracking check still lacks --literal-pathspecs.

You planned one more independent review before merge.

🤖 Generated with Claude Code

…ed layers as fine (HACK-2169) Second-family review of #766: - Provisioning never replaces a different existing key: a key path can serve several stores, and failing to open one is no evidence a key is unused. The repair branch is gone. - Every provisioning branch holds the key file's own lock, and each key write (provisioning, keychain persistence, first-use bootstrap of an empty file) re-checks the file in beforeRename, so a stale observation never overwrites a key written meanwhile. - With no key file, the key is written only when the store is confirmed absent or empty, or opens under it; an unreadable or refused store is refused. - The integrity check reports an existing layer it cannot read or parse, a directory it cannot list, and unresolvable inheritance as errors, and the doctor check reports a thrown inspection as an error. - The doctor tests run with their own HOME, HACK_HOME, global config and no key variables or keychain. - Follow-ups: the git tracking probe is bounded (5 s), skipped outside any work tree, and refuses when git cannot answer inside one; the mixed-layer test reads the old values with the old key before re-entering them. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

roodboi · 2026-11-13T09:15:08Z

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…th check refuses (HACK-2169) Resolving the primary checkout's local default layer checks its path; a failure there is now an inspection failure, not an absent layer. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

roodboi · 2026-11-13T09:21:04Z

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chatgpt-codex-connector · 2026-11-13T09:41:25Z

Codex Review: Didn't find any major issues. 👍

Reviewed commit: 9fc9e26fc6

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chatgpt-codex-connector · 2026-11-13T09:46:47Z

🛡️ Codex Security Review · Automatically triggered

Security review completed. No security issues were found in this pull request.

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…et-store-integrity # Conflicts: # src/lib/secret-store.ts # tests/secret-store.test.ts

roodboi · 2026-11-13T11:00:55Z

@codex review

roodboi · 2026-11-13T11:00:56Z

Ready for lead: head 207150574f840d8e05c6a3f24399ec76b5bf9335

What this head is: 9fc9e26f, whose second-family review closed with nothing left to change before merge, plus a real merge of next at c96c4441aa (#769 HACK-2172 and #756 HACK-2163), with no rebase and no force-push. The conflicts were small:

src/lib/secret-store.ts imports: kept fix(env): contain child keys and env diagnostics (HACK-2163) #756's envParseDiagnostic, dropped two imports this PR no longer uses.
tests/secret-store.test.ts: kept both sides, including fix(env): contain child keys and env diagnostics (HACK-2163) #756's malformed-JSON diagnostic test.

Every line #756 and #769 added to the shared files (secret-store.ts, project-env-config.ts, doctor.ts, docs/env.md) is still present, so #756's containment and #769's live-input guard are intact.

Review:

The second-family reviewer is clean on the merge resolution at 20715057. Its earlier rounds on this PR (five must-change items, then two, then one PR-description path cleanup) are all closed.
The accepted follow-up, outside this PR, is broader native filesystem concurrency and full CLI-subprocess recovery qualification.
Codex's code and security reviews were clean at 9fc9e26f. I've requested a re-review of the merge head.
computer pr review-status: CLEAR at 207150574f, with 0 unresolved bot threads. next has since moved again, only on files this PR doesn't touch.

Hosted checks at this head:

Passed: test shards 1 to 8, docker-e2e, Change scope, test focus, secret-scan, docs site, and both required checks.
Skipped by change scope on this run: Config compiler, Candidate core, linux-process-lifetime, runtime-images and Runtime state models.

Local gates at the merge (Bun 1.4.4, after bun install --frozen-lockfile; next adds jsonc-parser):

bun run typecheck is clean.
bun run check: 40 warnings. The files this PR touches keep only their baseline warnings; the extra one came in from next.
privacy:check and gitleaks over origin/next..HEAD are clean.
664 tests pass across this PR's suites and fix(env): preserve live keys during migration cleanup (HACK-2172) #769's and fix(env): contain child keys and env diagnostics (HACK-2163) #756's test files.

Behavior changes for the release note are listed in the PR description:

an encrypted_file key file that other users can read is refused;
--provision-key never replaces a different key;
a key inside a git work tree whose git cannot answer is refused.

🤖 Generated with Claude Code

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…eck (HACK-2169) A directory or other non-regular entry named like an env layer is an existing layer runtime refuses; the integrity inspection now discovers it and reports the failed read instead of skipping it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

roodboi · 2026-11-13T11:06:11Z

@codex review

roodboi · 2026-11-13T11:06:24Z

Superseded head: the ready note above was for 20715057. Codex then raised a P2 on that head: an overlay that exists only as a non-regular entry, such as a directory, was not discovered. It is fixed in 9e86ed6ac297c4a56ab02cc8ede057fc6e9e2bc5, with a regression test, and the thread is replied to and resolved. The second-family reviewer is checking this head now. I will post a new ready note once it is clean and the Linux jobs are green.

chatgpt-codex-connector · 2026-11-13T11:08:34Z

Codex Review: Didn't find any major issues. Keep it up!

Reviewed commit: 9e86ed6ac2

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chatgpt-codex-connector · 2026-11-13T11:11:16Z

🛡️ Codex Security Review · Automatically triggered

Security review completed. No security issues were found in this pull request.

Reviewed commit: 9e86ed6ac2

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roodboi · 2026-11-13T11:20:02Z

Ready for lead: head 9e86ed6ac297c4a56ab02cc8ede057fc6e9e2bc5

This replaces the note for 20715057.

What changed since that note: Codex raised a P2 on the merge head. An overlay that existed only as a non-regular entry (for example a directory named hack.env.staging.local.yaml) was not discovered, so the doctor reported success for a layer runtime refuses. Fixed in 9e86ed6a:

discovery takes matching layer names of any entry type;
the existing runtime-compatible strict read reports such an entry as an error;
a regression test covers it and fails without the fix.

The thread is replied to and resolved.

Review:

The second-family reviewer is clean at 9e86ed6a. It had also been clean on the next merge resolution at 20715057, which kept fix(env): contain child keys and env diagnostics (HACK-2163) #756's containment and fix(env): preserve live keys during migration cleanup (HACK-2172) #769's live-input guard intact.
Codex's code review ("Didn't find any major issues") and its automatic security review (no issues) are both clean at 9e86ed6ac2.
computer pr review-status: CLEAR at 9e86ed6ac2, 0 unresolved bot threads. next has moved since, but only on files this PR doesn't touch.

Hosted checks at this head:

Passed: test shards 4 to 8, the test fan-in, docker-e2e, Change scope, test focus, secret-scan, docs site, and the required checks.
Skipped by change scope on this run: test shards 1 to 3, Config compiler, Candidate core, linux-process-lifetime, runtime-images and Runtime state models.

Local gates (Bun 1.4.4):

bun run typecheck is clean.
bun run check: 40 warnings. The files this PR touches keep their baseline warnings; the extra one came in from next.
privacy:check and gitleaks over origin/next..HEAD are clean.
The related suites pass, including fix(env): preserve live keys during migration cleanup (HACK-2172) #769's and fix(env): contain child keys and env diagnostics (HACK-2163) #756's tests.

Behavior changes for the release note are listed in the PR description:

an encrypted_file key file that other users can read is refused;
--provision-key never replaces a different key;
a key inside a git work tree whose git cannot answer is refused;
the doctor reports anything it cannot inspect as an error.

Accepted follow-ups:

broader native filesystem concurrency and full CLI-subprocess recovery qualification;
--literal-pathspecs for the project env key's own tracking check.

🤖 Generated with Claude Code

…et-store-integrity

…k after completed repairs (HACK-2169) With #767's malformed-layer fixture, doctor --migrate-env-config now exits non-zero: the layer runtime refuses is a failing secret integrity check. The test keeps #767's intent (completed repairs kept, the plaintext inventory says it could not inspect names, the malformed file's text is never printed) and asserts the named check and that no output, notes or terminal, echoes the file. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

roodboi · 2026-11-13T12:37:58Z

@codex review

chatgpt-codex-connector · 2026-11-13T12:40:09Z

Codex Review: Didn't find any major issues. Bravo.

Reviewed commit: 680e9ad7c6

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chatgpt-codex-connector · 2026-11-13T12:44:53Z

🛡️ Codex Security Review · Automatically triggered

Security review completed. No security issues were found in this pull request.

Reviewed commit: 680e9ad7c6

View security finding report

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A regular code review gets triggered (for example, "@codex review" or when a PR is opened), and you’re opted in so security review runs alongside code review

Once complete, Codex will leave suggestions, or a comment if no findings are found.

roodboi · 2026-11-13T12:49:08Z

Ready for lead: head 680e9ad7c625f89a4844bb13810621e8eaf2d9fd

This replaces the note for 9e86ed6a.

What changed since that note:

e7d6048c is a real merge of next at 0c0fba2617 (including fix(env)!: restrict value exposure and protect plaintext entries (HACK-2166) #767) into 9e86ed6a. There were no conflicts, and nothing was rebased or force-pushed.
680e9ad7 updates fix(env)!: restrict value exposure and protect plaintext entries (HACK-2166) #767's test "doctor keeps completed repairs when the optional plaintext inventory is unreadable", per your decision that a layer the runtime refuses is a doctor failure. The test now:
- expects doctor --migrate-env-config --no-interactive to exit non-zero;
- checks the completed repairs are kept on disk: the compose env_file entry is removed and .hack/.gitignore is created;
- keeps the "Could not inspect plaintext env names" note assertion;
- captures doctor's stdout and stderr and asserts the secret integrity check names .hack/hack.env.qa.yaml;
- asserts the malformed file's sentinel appears neither in the notes nor in the terminal output, which covers this PR's finding message too.

Review:

The second-family reviewer is clean on the merge and the test change at 680e9ad7.
Codex's code review ("Didn't find any major issues") and automatic security review (no issues) are both clean at 680e9ad7c6.
computer pr review-status: CLEAR at 680e9ad7c6, 0 unresolved bot threads. The head contains next at 0c0fba2617.

Hosted checks at this head:

Passed: both required checks, test shards 4 to 8, the test fan-in, docker-e2e, Change scope, test focus, secret-scan and docs site.
Skipped by change scope on this run: test shards 1 to 3, Config compiler, Candidate core, linux-process-lifetime, runtime-images and Runtime state models.

Local gates (Bun 1.4.4, after bun install --frozen-lockfile):

bun run typecheck is clean.
bun run check: 43 warnings repo-wide, with none new in the files this PR touches; project-env-config.ts shows the same 4 as next's copy.
privacy:check and gitleaks over origin/next..HEAD are clean.
tests/doctor-fix-noninteractive.test.ts passes 31/31.
486 tests pass across this PR's suites and the test files of fix(env)!: restrict value exposure and protect plaintext entries (HACK-2166) #767 and fix(env): preserve live keys during migration cleanup (HACK-2172) #769.

🤖 Generated with Claude Code

…ent; close threat-model gaps 17 and 18 isKeyFileTrackedByGit (from #766) spawned git with the full environment, so HACK_ENV_SECRET_KEY and other Hack key material reached the child. It now passes childEnvironment(), as #756 requires for tool children. Regression: a fresh process with a recording git first on PATH checks a key inside a work tree with a sentinel project key set; git sees no Hack key variable. It fails without the change. The threat model's gaps 17 (HACK-2169, closed by #766) and 18 (HACK-2165, closed by #762 and this branch) now describe the implemented guards and their remaining limits, and the rows that pointed at them as open agree. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

Conflict in docs/security/env-secrets-threat-model.md gaps 16-19 only: next's wording for gaps 17 (#766) and 19 (#768, HACK-2171) is kept; gap 18 takes next's #762 text plus this branch's mode tightening, read warning, ACL/umask limits and markerless-work-tree note; gap 16 keeps the doctor reference, and the two table rows that pointed at gaps 17/18 say "narrowed". #768's cleanup receipts merge cleanly with this branch's strictGit live-input collector (its new caller keeps the non-strict path). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

@codesmith-bot

… where the store is read (HACK-2177) (#779) Fixes HACK-2177. A machine can have an old global encrypted store (`~/.hack/secrets.enc.json`) whose key file is gone. Since #766, `hack doctor` then failed in every project, saying not to provision a new key, but offering no other way forward. ## What changes - **`hack secrets retire-store`**: a deliberate, reversible way forward when the key is gone for good. - It acts on the store this project selects (`--path` or the current directory), or the global store outside a project. - It moves the store into a new directory `<store>.retired-<UTC time>/` beside it, keeping its name. Under the store's lock: - it creates that directory exclusively (0700; refused if the name exists); - it hard-links the store into it (a link never replaces a file); - it renames whatever is at the store path into the same directory under an unpredictable, checked-free name, and removes that extra name only when it is the archived file. A replacement put at the store path meanwhile is kept beside the archive. Every rename target and the only name ever removed are inside the new directory, and failure cleanup is `rmdir`, which refuses unless the directory is empty. - It only retires a file that holds a Hack encrypted-store envelope (the configured path is project input), never the key file itself (same device and inode), and refuses when the config that selects the store cannot be read or does not parse. It classifies the store again under the lock, and the prompt names the resolved store path. - It never deletes, reads or prints an entry, and leaves the key file alone. - It prints what moved and the `mv` command to put it back. - Without a terminal it is refused with `E_INTERACTIVE_REQUIRED` unless `--yes` is passed, as `hack secrets delete` is. - It refuses a store that opens with the key in use, an absent store, and a store unreadable for another reason (a refused key, an unreadable or linked store); for those, doctor says what to fix instead. - It refuses a store that another registered checkout's key file or the OS keychain still opens. It also refuses, unless `--allow-unchecked` is passed, when coverage is incomplete: an unreadable registry, an unavailable checkout, or an unreadable key. `HACK_SECRETS_FILE_KEY` overrides key files and the keychain at runtime and may be set in another project's shell, which the command cannot check, so in practice retiring needs `--allow-unchecked` as the explicit confirmation that none does. Doctor's recovery text says so. - **Doctor's `secret integrity` finding** for a store with a missing or wrong key: - **Error** only in a project whose runtime reads the store: its legacy env contract declares a store-backed (`source: "keychain"`) value, or plaintext is kept in the backend. This is the same condition the runtime uses before it opens the store; an unreadable contract counts as reading it. In every other project it is a **warning**, so a machine-wide store no longer fails unrelated projects. - It says the store's **entries cannot be counted without the key**. The envelope is a single encrypted payload, so there is no count to read; I kept that honest rather than estimating. - It names the **registered projects that read it** (names only, from configuration; no store is opened for that). Store files are compared by device and inode, so a reader reaching the store through a symlinked directory is found. When the registry or a project's config cannot be read, it says the list may be incomplete instead of claiming no project reads it. - A key file that exists but cannot be read is reported as such (fix its permissions), not as missing, and is not retirable. - It gives the two choices: restore the key, or retire the store. "Do not provision a new key" stays. - **Retired files** are listed as information (the check stays `ok`), with an `mv` command using absolute paths. A quoted `~` would not expand. - **Recovery workflow**: a new "Choose one" step names both choices whenever that finding is present. - **Docs**: the env guide, a short upgrade-guide section "An old global secret store whose key is gone", and the regenerated CLI reference. ```mermaid flowchart TD D[hack doctor in a project] --> L{global/project store: key opens it?} L -- yes --> OK[ok] L -- missing or wrong key --> U{does this project's runtime read the store?} U -- yes --> E[error + users + two choices] U -- no --> W[warning + users + two choices] E --> C{choose} W --> C C -- restore the key --> OK C -- hack secrets retire-store --> R[store renamed .retired-UTC, nothing deleted] R --> I[doctor: retired file listed as info, check ok] I -- mv it back --> L ``` ## On the severity rule (c) I agree with the rule. The predicate is the runtime's own condition for opening the store, not merely "the configured backend is encrypted_file". A global backend setting is inherited by every project, so that would fail them all again. ## Tests (fake homes only) `tests/secret-store-retire.test.ts` sets HOME, HACK_HOME and the global config inside a temp root, and uses two registered projects sharing the global store: `app-a` reads it (a legacy contract with a store-backed value), and `app-b` does not. - Store present, key missing: `app-a` gets an error, `app-b` a warning. The warning names `app-a`, says the entries cannot be counted, gives both choices, and contains no value or key. The recovery block shows "Choose one" with both. - Retire through the real CLI (a subprocess with a private env): - Non-interactive without `--yes`: `E_INTERACTIVE_REQUIRED`, and the store is byte-identical. - Without `--allow-unchecked`: refused, naming `HACK_SECRETS_FILE_KEY`; the store is byte-identical. - With `--yes --allow-unchecked`: the store is gone from its name, and exactly one `.retired-*` file holds identical bytes. The output names both paths and the `mv` back, and contains no value. - Doctor afterwards: one `info` finding in both projects, with the absolute `mv`. - Restore by moving the file back: the bytes are identical, the warning is back, and with the key restored the store opens and the synthetic value reads back. Nothing was lost. - Refusals: a store that opens, a refused (0644) key, and an absent store. Nothing moves in any of them. - `tests/missing-project-error-code.test.ts` pins `secrets retire-store` as a command that works without a project (it uses the global store). Local gates (Bun 1.4.4): - `bun run typecheck` is clean. - `bun run check`: 43 warnings, the baseline on `next`; none in the touched files. - `privacy:check` and gitleaks are clean. - 256 tests pass across the new file, doctor secret integrity, secret store, doctor --fix, missing-project and the recovery/CLI suites. - `bun run docs:check` could not run locally (the docs site's dependencies are not installed here); the hosted docs job covers it. No real store, key, keychain or registry was touched on any host. 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)  --- <a href="https://backend.blacksmith.sh/track/run-proof?expires=1797170835&installation_model_id=17053&pr_number=779&ref=codesmith_pr_footer&repository=hack-dance%2Fhack&return_to=https%3A%2F%2Fgithub.com%2Fhack-dance%2Fhack%2Fpull%2F779&variant=proof_this_pr&signature=5ef87b200e768cb167158adc51217589d16c03a6e192b50c422d6cdc77325255"><picture><source media="(prefers-color-scheme: dark)" srcset="https://pr-comments-assets.blacksmith.sh/codesmith/proof-proof-this-pr-dark.svg"><source media="(prefers-color-scheme: light)" srcset="https://pr-comments-assets.blacksmith.sh/codesmith/proof-proof-this-pr-light.svg"><img alt="Proof this PR" src="https://pr-comments-assets.blacksmith.sh/codesmith/proof-proof-this-pr-dark-3x.png" width="121" height="28"></picture></a> <sup><a href="https://app.blacksmith.sh/hack-dance/codesmith/hack/pr/779?autoLogin=true&ref=codesmith_pr_footer">Open in [code]smith</a> · Need help on this PR? Tag <code>@codesmith-bot</code> with what you need.</sup>   --------- Co-authored-by: Kit <344842+roodboi@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

@codesmith-bot

Add next.17 “what changed and what to do” notes to the release summary, both upgrade guides and the env guide. Users get concrete script migrations for hidden env values and native followed logs, the next.16 key-backup warning, and recovery guidance for partial cleanup. These describe merged source changes intended for next.17; they do not claim a release is published. The docs site remains pinned to next.16. #764 and #779 remain explicitly pending, and the recorded next.16 trials keep their original limits. | Subject | Merged contract checked at base `0a0bfdb8` | | --- | --- | | #747: native plain followed logs, streams, timestamps and structured session results | [native-log-follow.ts](https://github.com/hack-dance/hack/blob/0a0bfdb8d1ee818d89bb49a2109bd88b0a9fea1b/src/backends/native-log-follow.ts), [followed-service-log contract](https://github.com/hack-dance/hack/blob/0a0bfdb8d1ee818d89bb49a2109bd88b0a9fea1b/docs/reference/native-authored-commands.md#followed-service-logs) | | #767: metadata/`has_value`, scoped plaintext reads, terminal-only reveal, stdin secret writes, `env protect`, global-only lifecycle hooks/processes and YAML daemon API | [canonical prerelease wording](https://github.com/hack-dance/hack/blob/0a0bfdb8d1ee818d89bb49a2109bd88b0a9fea1b/scripts/prerelease-plan.ts#L158), [env command](https://github.com/hack-dance/hack/blob/0a0bfdb8d1ee818d89bb49a2109bd88b0a9fea1b/src/commands/env.ts), [env routes](https://github.com/hack-dance/hack/blob/0a0bfdb8d1ee818d89bb49a2109bd88b0a9fea1b/src/daemon/routes/env.ts), [env contract](https://github.com/hack-dance/hack/blob/0a0bfdb8d1ee818d89bb49a2109bd88b0a9fea1b/docs/env.md) | | #769 / HACK-2172 and #768/#783: protect live keys/config/YAML including filesystem aliases; cleanup receipts, partial removal and config-pointer reconciliation | [project-env-config.ts](https://github.com/hack-dance/hack/blob/0a0bfdb8d1ee818d89bb49a2109bd88b0a9fea1b/src/lib/project-env-config.ts), [Doctor cleanup](https://github.com/hack-dance/hack/blob/0a0bfdb8d1ee818d89bb49a2109bd88b0a9fea1b/src/commands/doctor.ts), [canonical cleanup note](https://github.com/hack-dance/hack/blob/0a0bfdb8d1ee818d89bb49a2109bd88b0a9fea1b/scripts/prerelease-plan.ts#L164) | | #766: Doctor refuses unusable env layers | [doctor-secret-integrity.ts](https://github.com/hack-dance/hack/blob/0a0bfdb8d1ee818d89bb49a2109bd88b0a9fea1b/src/lib/doctor-secret-integrity.ts) | | #773: loopback proxy ports, diagnosis without automatic repair | [proxy-loopback.ts](https://github.com/hack-dance/hack/blob/0a0bfdb8d1ee818d89bb49a2109bd88b0a9fea1b/src/lib/proxy-loopback.ts), [Doctor](https://github.com/hack-dance/hack/blob/0a0bfdb8d1ee818d89bb49a2109bd88b0a9fea1b/src/commands/doctor.ts) | | #770: inferred route readiness, 240-second grace, HTTP 200–499 limits and `service_healthy` exclusion | [http_probe.rs](https://github.com/hack-dance/hack/blob/0a0bfdb8d1ee818d89bb49a2109bd88b0a9fea1b/packages/runtime-core/src/provider/http_probe.rs), [probe contract](https://github.com/hack-dance/hack/blob/0a0bfdb8d1ee818d89bb49a2109bd88b0a9fea1b/docs/guides/native-candidate.md#native-http-readiness-probe) | | #778: bridge connection readiness after pool restart | [bridge.rs](https://github.com/hack-dance/hack/blob/0a0bfdb8d1ee818d89bb49a2109bd88b0a9fea1b/packages/runtime-core/src/provider/bridge.rs) | | #758 and #776: merged startup fix and newer optional-daemon behavior, kept separate from next.16 | [project command](https://github.com/hack-dance/hack/blob/0a0bfdb8d1ee818d89bb49a2109bd88b0a9fea1b/src/commands/project.ts), [Doctor](https://github.com/hack-dance/hack/blob/0a0bfdb8d1ee818d89bb49a2109bd88b0a9fea1b/src/commands/doctor.ts) | Validation at `f1d0d72fede5db6ce46f56039ba22a47911aa308`: - Persistent reviewer: clean after round 2. - Pinned Bun 1.4.4: docs prepare/check/typecheck and production site build pass. - Production-mode HTTP smoke: 95 docs, isolated searches/exports, redirects/refusals, 37 diagram blocks / 74 SVGs and 183 recipe links/anchors pass. The rendered upgrade guide returns 200 and contains the new guidance. - Privacy check, diff check and full-history Gitleaks pass (1,295 commits, no leaks). - Source citations and documented command forms checked against the merged base. Documentation only: no runtime, workflow, site pin, snapshot or global client changes. No live migration, keys, daemon, Docker or native VM tests were run. Lead owns batch integration and deployment.  --- <a href="https://backend.blacksmith.sh/track/run-proof?expires=1797183263&installation_model_id=17053&pr_number=785&ref=codesmith_pr_footer&repository=hack-dance%2Fhack&return_to=https%3A%2F%2Fgithub.com%2Fhack-dance%2Fhack%2Fpull%2F785&variant=run_proof_on_this_pr&signature=b04dd421a08341f70e804e671fd68678f102d1c4152146bdea18adf6de909981"><picture><source media="(prefers-color-scheme: dark)" srcset="https://pr-comments-assets.blacksmith.sh/codesmith/proof-run-proof-on-this-pr-dark.svg"><source media="(prefers-color-scheme: light)" srcset="https://pr-comments-assets.blacksmith.sh/codesmith/proof-run-proof-on-this-pr-light.svg"><img alt="Run Proof on this PR" src="https://pr-comments-assets.blacksmith.sh/codesmith/proof-run-proof-on-this-pr-dark-3x.png" width="168" height="28"></picture></a> <sup><a href="https://app.blacksmith.sh/hack-dance/codesmith/hack/pr/785?autoLogin=true&ref=codesmith_pr_footer">Open in [code]smith</a> · Need help on this PR? Tag <code>@codesmith-bot</code> with what you need.</sup>   --------- Co-authored-by: Kit <344842+roodboi@users.noreply.github.com>

The next.17 section omitted the tmux breaking-change warning that already existed at the page tail. Move it into the release section and put its v4 stop procedure before the v5 trial. The env breaking entry was already correct; keep its scoped single-key/terminal/stdin migration guidance. Audit all **71 commits** from `v5.0.0-next.16` (`b21c3b1898`) through candidate **`5002cf87bb50686b17ceae8a4c835f524ee1b3a5`** against merged code and PR text. Add missing upgrade-assistant, activity, observe/plan/version, interactive exec, recovery, background-command and host/secret-custody notes. Preserve the complete native env-file behavior table and mark the four new JSON contracts **shape may change before 5.0.0**, with the planned HACK-2238 envelope migration. Correct stale native interactive-exec/network/metadata/Ctrl-C claims and the short upgrade assistant wording. Credit the publisher-shutdown fix to #719, already in next.16; keep next.17 lifecycle-command retirement separate. Retake a private stopped-state backup after v4 stops zellij, keeping the first copy too. Keep next.16 warnings scoped to that bundle. Keep original-key backups before older Doctor migrations and distinguish file rollback from runtime/data recovery. Only eight Markdown files change. Runtime, tests, workflows, generated CLI reference, diagrams, immutable snapshots and the site pin are unchanged. No diagram changed, so a new visual would add nothing. The site re-pin remains a separate release follow-up. Merge timing: respect the lead's candidate freeze; intended for the batch immediately after next.17 publication and the site re-pin. The moved tmux breaking-change notice is called out for the lead's pre-cut decision. This PR does not merge or publish anything. Validation at **`d95cfc554fabc4a0d70e3ba6caeb6746f63a198c`**: - Bun 1.4.4, frozen dependencies. Docs prepare/check/typecheck/build and site tests (2 passed, 25 assertions) pass. Production-mode HTTP smoke: 97 docs, 82 SVGs, 217 local links/anchors; task server stopped. - All 50 Hack commands named anywhere in the notes exist in the current generated CLI reference; 19 option contracts checked. CLI-reference regeneration has no diff. - All 71 commits have one row below, including the test commit and merge for #786. All 70 source evidence paths exist at the fixed candidate. Source release-note local links/anchors pass. - Privacy and complete reachable-history Gitleaks pass (1,330 commits, no findings). Persistent Claude Opus second-family review is CLEAN at this exact head. Hosted run 43585059152 passed docs site, secret scan and every planned Linux unit shard (4–8), plus the required test fan-in. Typecheck/privacy/quality ran on shard 8. Focus had no selected tests. Compiler, native core, runtime images/models, process-lifetime and Docker execution were out of scope; a green Docker fan-in is not Docker execution evidence. All bot comments were read; CLEAR at d95cfc5, zero unresolved threads/change requests. Codex code/security reviews found no issues. - No real install, migration, daemon/DNS/trust change, Docker or native VM run was performed for this documentation audit. Native acceptance and the candidate's hosted release qualification remain separate. ## Candidate commit coverage `entry present` means the behavior already had an entry within the next.17 section (some now have fuller detail). `added` means missing behavior or migration guidance was added there; #824 moves the existing warning into that section. `not user-visible` means no shipped CLI/runtime change: documentation, test/CI/repository housekeeping or the internal desktop preview. Source links pin the candidate, rather than a moving branch. | Commit / PR | Coverage | Entry or reason | Audited source | | --- | --- | --- | --- | | [70d328e](70d328e) [#743](#743) | added | Host setup: privileged/NSS safeguards | [src/lib/linux-trust-setup.ts](https://github.com/hack-dance/hack/blob/5002cf87bb50686b17ceae8a4c835f524ee1b3a5/src/lib/linux-trust-setup.ts) | | [51f15c8](51f15c8) [#746](#746) | not user-visible | Docs-only upgrade checklist and site generation; no installed behavior | [scripts/docs/prepare.ts](https://github.com/hack-dance/hack/blob/5002cf87bb50686b17ceae8a4c835f524ee1b3a5/scripts/docs/prepare.ts) | | [c14f3f5](c14f3f5) [#744](#744) | added | Native setup JSON accounting | [packages/runtime-core/src/provider/setup.rs](https://github.com/hack-dance/hack/blob/5002cf87bb50686b17ceae8a4c835f524ee1b3a5/packages/runtime-core/src/provider/setup.rs) | | [b0c6bcd](b0c6bcd) [#705](#705) | added | Retained background exec/run and cursor tools | [src/commands/background-command-start.ts](https://github.com/hack-dance/hack/blob/5002cf87bb50686b17ceae8a4c835f524ee1b3a5/src/commands/background-command-start.ts) | | [c89f4fd](c89f4fd) [#745](#745) | added | Linux daemon query/home refusals | [src/commands/daemon-systemd.ts](https://github.com/hack-dance/hack/blob/5002cf87bb50686b17ceae8a4c835f524ee1b3a5/src/commands/daemon-systemd.ts) | | [cce4b59](cce4b59) [#752](#752) | not user-visible | Site pin/snapshots and editorial pages only | [scripts/docs/versions.json](https://github.com/hack-dance/hack/blob/5002cf87bb50686b17ceae8a4c835f524ee1b3a5/scripts/docs/versions.json) | | [56676fc](56676fc) [#754](#754) | added | Setup reuse/offline accounting; pin-watch changes are internal | [packages/runtime-core/src/provider/setup.rs](https://github.com/hack-dance/hack/blob/5002cf87bb50686b17ceae8a4c835f524ee1b3a5/packages/runtime-core/src/provider/setup.rs) | | [7a496f1](7a496f1) [#755](#755) | added | MCP registered selectors and background tool guidance | [src/mcp/server.ts](https://github.com/hack-dance/hack/blob/5002cf87bb50686b17ceae8a4c835f524ee1b3a5/src/mcp/server.ts) | | [e7a7039](e7a7039) [#747](#747) | entry present | Native follow text shape; added session ends/restart recovery | [src/backends/native-log-follow.ts](https://github.com/hack-dance/hack/blob/5002cf87bb50686b17ceae8a4c835f524ee1b3a5/src/backends/native-log-follow.ts) | | [87a6df5](87a6df5) [#758](#758) | added | Compose short one-shot startup | [src/lib/compose-startup-state.ts](https://github.com/hack-dance/hack/blob/5002cf87bb50686b17ceae8a4c835f524ee1b3a5/src/lib/compose-startup-state.ts) | | [2afb5c4](2afb5c4) [#761](#761) | added | Native Hack networks and inert generated labels | [src/lib/native-hack-compose-conventions.ts](https://github.com/hack-dance/hack/blob/5002cf87bb50686b17ceae8a4c835f524ee1b3a5/src/lib/native-hack-compose-conventions.ts) | | [342a585](342a585) [#771](#771) | not user-visible | Docs-only next.16 trial record | [docs/versions/v5/guides/upgrade-from-v4.md](https://github.com/hack-dance/hack/blob/5002cf87bb50686b17ceae8a4c835f524ee1b3a5/docs/versions/v5/guides/upgrade-from-v4.md) | | [6f0acf1](6f0acf1) [#769](#769) | entry present | Migration live-key/alias preservation | [src/lib/project-env-config.ts](https://github.com/hack-dance/hack/blob/5002cf87bb50686b17ceae8a4c835f524ee1b3a5/src/lib/project-env-config.ts) | | [c96c444](c96c444) [#756](#756) | added | Child key filtering, fixed diagnostics, legacy ignore/YAML API refusals | [src/lib/child-environment.ts](https://github.com/hack-dance/hack/blob/5002cf87bb50686b17ceae8a4c835f524ee1b3a5/src/lib/child-environment.ts) | | [e2c73c6](e2c73c6) [#748](#748) | not user-visible | Contributor CI selection/coalescing, outside product release notes | [scripts/ci-change-scope.ts](https://github.com/hack-dance/hack/blob/5002cf87bb50686b17ceae8a4c835f524ee1b3a5/scripts/ci-change-scope.ts) | | [ebf794e](ebf794e) [#760](#760) | added | Agent/output custody warning; runtime unchanged | [src/agents/instruction-source.ts](https://github.com/hack-dance/hack/blob/5002cf87bb50686b17ceae8a4c835f524ee1b3a5/src/agents/instruction-source.ts) | | [021b16b](021b16b) [#763](#763) | added | One-pass background redaction scan; no public benchmark claim | [src/lib/background-command/output-scanner.ts](https://github.com/hack-dance/hack/blob/5002cf87bb50686b17ceae8a4c835f524ee1b3a5/src/lib/background-command/output-scanner.ts) | | [8564ec4](8564ec4) [#765](#765) | added | Shared preflight/start admission and detached failure reporting | [src/backends/native-project-review.ts](https://github.com/hack-dance/hack/blob/5002cf87bb50686b17ceae8a4c835f524ee1b3a5/src/backends/native-project-review.ts) | | [0c0fba2](0c0fba2) [#767](#767) | entry present | Breaking env exposure/protect/stdin/scope/API guidance | [src/commands/env.ts](https://github.com/hack-dance/hack/blob/5002cf87bb50686b17ceae8a4c835f524ee1b3a5/src/commands/env.ts) | | [9435da9](9435da9) [#762](#762) | added | Local Git/link refusals and no-follow dotenv | [src/lib/project-env-config.ts](https://github.com/hack-dance/hack/blob/5002cf87bb50686b17ceae8a4c835f524ee1b3a5/src/lib/project-env-config.ts) | | [edf23ae](edf23ae) [#753](#753) | added | Daemon stop proves the live Hack home | [src/commands/daemon-systemd.ts](https://github.com/hack-dance/hack/blob/5002cf87bb50686b17ceae8a4c835f524ee1b3a5/src/commands/daemon-systemd.ts) | | [573ceec](573ceec) [#766](#766) | entry present | Doctor layer/integrity error; added store/key write refusals | [src/lib/secret-store.ts](https://github.com/hack-dance/hack/blob/5002cf87bb50686b17ceae8a4c835f524ee1b3a5/src/lib/secret-store.ts) | | [a0e9760](a0e9760) [#757](#757) | added | Orphan output truncation and final-sync evidence | [src/lib/background-command/recovery.ts](https://github.com/hack-dance/hack/blob/5002cf87bb50686b17ceae8a4c835f524ee1b3a5/src/lib/background-command/recovery.ts) | | [10e1958](10e1958) [#759](#759) | added | Private lifecycle logs/FIFO and expiring mux payloads | [src/lib/private-file.ts](https://github.com/hack-dance/hack/blob/5002cf87bb50686b17ceae8a4c835f524ee1b3a5/src/lib/private-file.ts) | | [bd899ee](bd899ee) [#775](#775) | not user-visible | Portable test fixtures only | [tests/single-file-tar.test.ts](https://github.com/hack-dance/hack/blob/5002cf87bb50686b17ceae8a4c835f524ee1b3a5/tests/single-file-tar.test.ts) | | [80dae3d](80dae3d) [#776](#776) | added | Candidate missing-daemon diagnosis is optional/healthy | [src/commands/doctor.ts](https://github.com/hack-dance/hack/blob/5002cf87bb50686b17ceae8a4c835f524ee1b3a5/src/commands/doctor.ts) | | [5b2a2d0](5b2a2d0) [#772](#772) | added | Bounded attaching-network retry; strict saved reads remain | [src/lib/native-compose-ownership.ts](https://github.com/hack-dance/hack/blob/5002cf87bb50686b17ceae8a4c835f524ee1b3a5/src/lib/native-compose-ownership.ts) | | [ab29d49](ab29d49) [#777](#777) | not user-visible | CI scheduling only | [docs/reference/ci-test-selection.md](https://github.com/hack-dance/hack/blob/5002cf87bb50686b17ceae8a4c835f524ee1b3a5/docs/reference/ci-test-selection.md) | | [31339c7](31339c7) [#770](#770) | entry present | Native inferred readiness, 240 s, HTTP/service_healthy limits | [packages/runtime-core/src/project/compose/service.rs](https://github.com/hack-dance/hack/blob/5002cf87bb50686b17ceae8a4c835f524ee1b3a5/packages/runtime-core/src/project/compose/service.rs) | | [156ee7f](156ee7f) [#773](#773) | entry present | Loopback proxy port/Doctor/open checks | [src/lib/proxy-loopback.ts](https://github.com/hack-dance/hack/blob/5002cf87bb50686b17ceae8a4c835f524ee1b3a5/src/lib/proxy-loopback.ts) | | [a7ec3c7](a7ec3c7) [#768](#768) | entry present | Cleanup receipts/partial outcomes and tracked-file wording | [src/lib/project-env-config.ts](https://github.com/hack-dance/hack/blob/5002cf87bb50686b17ceae8a4c835f524ee1b3a5/src/lib/project-env-config.ts) | | [ceb3e23](ceb3e23) [#778](#778) | entry present | Native bridge socket readiness | [packages/runtime-core/src/provider/bridge.rs](https://github.com/hack-dance/hack/blob/5002cf87bb50686b17ceae8a4c835f524ee1b3a5/packages/runtime-core/src/provider/bridge.rs) | | [af91049](af91049) [#783](#783) | entry present | Pointer reconciliation after partial cleanup | [src/commands/doctor.ts](https://github.com/hack-dance/hack/blob/5002cf87bb50686b17ceae8a4c835f524ee1b3a5/src/commands/doctor.ts) | | [0a0bfdb](0a0bfdb) [#780](#780) | not user-visible | Site-only Linux guide publication; no CLI behavior | [scripts/docs/versions.json](https://github.com/hack-dance/hack/blob/5002cf87bb50686b17ceae8a4c835f524ee1b3a5/scripts/docs/versions.json) | | [d0cf767](d0cf767) [#786](#786) | not user-visible | Consent test wording only (both commits) | [tests/env-migration-tracked-consent.test.ts](https://github.com/hack-dance/hack/blob/5002cf87bb50686b17ceae8a4c835f524ee1b3a5/tests/env-migration-tracked-consent.test.ts) | | [7e2e630](7e2e630) [#786](#786) | not user-visible | Consent test wording only (both commits) | [tests/env-migration-tracked-consent.test.ts](https://github.com/hack-dance/hack/blob/5002cf87bb50686b17ceae8a4c835f524ee1b3a5/tests/env-migration-tracked-consent.test.ts) | | [91c311e](91c311e) [#779](#779) | entry present | Restore or reversible retire; missing store keys scoped to readers | [src/lib/secret-store-retire.ts](https://github.com/hack-dance/hack/blob/5002cf87bb50686b17ceae8a4c835f524ee1b3a5/src/lib/secret-store-retire.ts) | | [6ab1ace](6ab1ace) [#785](#785) | not user-visible | Docs-only release/upgrade/env notes | [docs/guides/v5-release-notes.md](https://github.com/hack-dance/hack/blob/5002cf87bb50686b17ceae8a4c835f524ee1b3a5/docs/guides/v5-release-notes.md) | | [25bd63c](25bd63c) [#764](#764) | entry present | Doctor hygiene, local modes, ignored staging and live-input protection | [src/lib/secrets-hygiene.ts](https://github.com/hack-dance/hack/blob/5002cf87bb50686b17ceae8a4c835f524ee1b3a5/src/lib/secrets-hygiene.ts) | | [d9df57c](d9df57c) [#784](#784) | not user-visible | Resolver/proxy and consent test corrections only | [tests/project-open-loopback.test.ts](https://github.com/hack-dance/hack/blob/5002cf87bb50686b17ceae8a4c835f524ee1b3a5/tests/project-open-loopback.test.ts) | | [2c1f665](2c1f665) [#791](#791) | added | Detached failure names, open DNS hint, init placeholder; prune guidance | [src/commands/project.ts](https://github.com/hack-dance/hack/blob/5002cf87bb50686b17ceae8a4c835f524ee1b3a5/src/commands/project.ts) | | [f6fe55f](f6fe55f) [#787](#787) | not user-visible | Docs-only retirement/hygiene follow-up | [docs/guides/v5-release-notes.md](https://github.com/hack-dance/hack/blob/5002cf87bb50686b17ceae8a4c835f524ee1b3a5/docs/guides/v5-release-notes.md) | | [7f9548c](7f9548c) [#792](#792) | not user-visible | Start-here docs, navigation and contributor rule only | [docs/versions/v5/install.md](https://github.com/hack-dance/hack/blob/5002cf87bb50686b17ceae8a4c835f524ee1b3a5/docs/versions/v5/install.md) | | [a0cfc73](a0cfc73) [#793](#793) | added | Verified updater publication, backups and reversible candidate removal | [src/lib/self-update.ts](https://github.com/hack-dance/hack/blob/5002cf87bb50686b17ceae8a4c835f524ee1b3a5/src/lib/self-update.ts) | | [292d312](292d312) [#782](#782) | added | Lock-free native ps and proved failed-start down | [src/backends/native-project-observe.ts](https://github.com/hack-dance/hack/blob/5002cf87bb50686b17ceae8a4c835f524ee1b3a5/src/backends/native-project-observe.ts) | | [b1e123b](b1e123b) [#796](#796) | added | Doctor reader count/worktree grouping in store recovery | [src/lib/doctor-secret-integrity.ts](https://github.com/hack-dance/hack/blob/5002cf87bb50686b17ceae8a4c835f524ee1b3a5/src/lib/doctor-secret-integrity.ts) | | [286d00f](286d00f) [#789](#789) | added | Foreground command-before-wrapper retirement | [src/lib/project-lifecycle-processes.ts](https://github.com/hack-dance/hack/blob/5002cf87bb50686b17ceae8a4c835f524ee1b3a5/src/lib/project-lifecycle-processes.ts) | | [bb6a7d1](bb6a7d1) [#788](#788) | not user-visible | Linux qualification runbook only | [docs/guides/linux-host-qualification.md](https://github.com/hack-dance/hack/blob/5002cf87bb50686b17ceae8a4c835f524ee1b3a5/docs/guides/linux-host-qualification.md) | | [a262d42](a262d42) [#800](#800) | not user-visible | Internal desktop design; outside supported CLI release scope | [apps/desktop/DESIGN.md](https://github.com/hack-dance/hack/blob/5002cf87bb50686b17ceae8a4c835f524ee1b3a5/apps/desktop/DESIGN.md) | | [6b161ba](6b161ba) [#774](#774) | added | Native interactive exec, finite fallback and receipt recovery | [src/backends/native-project-exec.ts](https://github.com/hack-dance/hack/blob/5002cf87bb50686b17ceae8a4c835f524ee1b3a5/src/backends/native-project-exec.ts) | | [1249272](1249272) [#799](#799) | not user-visible | Portable output-contract CI selection only | [scripts/test-shard-plan.ts](https://github.com/hack-dance/hack/blob/5002cf87bb50686b17ceae8a4c835f524ee1b3a5/scripts/test-shard-plan.ts) | | [fa3f03d](fa3f03d) [#790](#790) | added | Read-only upgrade check, snapshot and rollback | [src/commands/upgrade.ts](https://github.com/hack-dance/hack/blob/5002cf87bb50686b17ceae8a4c835f524ee1b3a5/src/commands/upgrade.ts) | | [c3b79bc](c3b79bc) [#807](#807) | added | Observe-only global status and unknown evidence | [src/commands/global-status-observe.ts](https://github.com/hack-dance/hack/blob/5002cf87bb50686b17ceae8a4c835f524ee1b3a5/src/commands/global-status-observe.ts) | | [29be043](29be043) [#812](#812) | added | Read-only local CA trust diagnosis | [src/lib/ca-trust-status.ts](https://github.com/hack-dance/hack/blob/5002cf87bb50686b17ceae8a4c835f524ee1b3a5/src/lib/ca-trust-status.ts) | | [f0102fd](f0102fd) [#814](#814) | not user-visible | Prepared-base verifier test fixture only | [tests/qualify-provider-pin.test.ts](https://github.com/hack-dance/hack/blob/5002cf87bb50686b17ceae8a4c835f524ee1b3a5/tests/qualify-provider-pin.test.ts) | | [b4ebfec](b4ebfec) [#815](#815) | added | Compact upgrade plan, snapshot-backed apply/resume | [src/lib/upgrade-apply.ts](https://github.com/hack-dance/hack/blob/5002cf87bb50686b17ceae8a4c835f524ee1b3a5/src/lib/upgrade-apply.ts) | | [c44b266](c44b266) [#801](#801) | not user-visible | Internal optional desktop preview; not shipped CLI behavior | [apps/desktop/Cargo.toml](https://github.com/hack-dance/hack/blob/5002cf87bb50686b17ceae8a4c835f524ee1b3a5/apps/desktop/Cargo.toml) | | [56d1d0f](56d1d0f) [#804](#804) | added | Automatic mux sweep preserves live/retired config inputs | [src/lib/live-inputs.ts](https://github.com/hack-dance/hack/blob/5002cf87bb50686b17ceae8a4c835f524ee1b3a5/src/lib/live-inputs.ts) | | [1958363](1958363) [#805](#805) | added | MCP timedOut result and Codex installer timeout | [src/mcp/server.ts](https://github.com/hack-dance/hack/blob/5002cf87bb50686b17ceae8a4c835f524ee1b3a5/src/mcp/server.ts) | | [e6207e8](e6207e8) [#810](#810) | added | Lifecycle activity writes including handler refusals; activity JSON | [src/commands/lifecycle-activity.ts](https://github.com/hack-dance/hack/blob/5002cf87bb50686b17ceae8a4c835f524ee1b3a5/src/commands/lifecycle-activity.ts) | | [23fe08f](23fe08f) [#825](#825) | added | Read-only batch review and permission-only key repair | [src/lib/upgrade-review.ts](https://github.com/hack-dance/hack/blob/5002cf87bb50686b17ceae8a4c835f524ee1b3a5/src/lib/upgrade-review.ts) | | [cab596c](cab596c) [#781](#781) | entry present | Full native env-file behavior table; added support/precedence summary | [src/backends/native-compose-environment.ts](https://github.com/hack-dance/hack/blob/5002cf87bb50686b17ceae8a4c835f524ee1b3a5/src/backends/native-compose-environment.ts) | | [1e84684](1e84684) [#798](#798) | not user-visible | Rust test process isolation/nextest; internal qualification only | [scripts/test-runtime-core.sh](https://github.com/hack-dance/hack/blob/5002cf87bb50686b17ceae8a4c835f524ee1b3a5/scripts/test-runtime-core.sh) | | [518af29](518af29) [#817](#817) | not user-visible | Remove accidental empty checkout files; no installed CLI change | [.gitignore](https://github.com/hack-dance/hack/blob/5002cf87bb50686b17ceae8a4c835f524ee1b3a5/.gitignore) | | [07192f7](07192f7) [#824](#824) | added | BREAKING warning moved from page tail into next.17; v4 stop procedure retained | [src/mux/mux-config.ts](https://github.com/hack-dance/hack/blob/5002cf87bb50686b17ceae8a4c835f524ee1b3a5/src/mux/mux-config.ts) | | [fe09a5b](fe09a5b) [#816](#816) | added | Read-only install/trust admin plans and exits | [src/commands/global.ts](https://github.com/hack-dance/hack/blob/5002cf87bb50686b17ceae8a4c835f524ee1b3a5/src/commands/global.ts) | | [8977676](8977676) [#827](#827) | added | Registry-preserving project observe, runtime opt-in | [src/commands/projects.ts](https://github.com/hack-dance/hack/blob/5002cf87bb50686b17ceae8a4c835f524ee1b3a5/src/commands/projects.ts) | | [5965b23](5965b23) [#828](#828) | added | Running CLI version identity JSON | [src/lib/version-report.ts](https://github.com/hack-dance/hack/blob/5002cf87bb50686b17ceae8a4c835f524ee1b3a5/src/lib/version-report.ts) | | [2922210](2922210) [#830](#830) | added | Upgrade safe/admin/manual action kinds | [src/lib/upgrade-action-kind.ts](https://github.com/hack-dance/hack/blob/5002cf87bb50686b17ceae8a4c835f524ee1b3a5/src/lib/upgrade-action-kind.ts) | | [51b55c0](51b55c0) [#820](#820) | not user-visible | Archive/plan/shared-helper verification fixtures only | [tests/python-free-download.test.ts](https://github.com/hack-dance/hack/blob/5002cf87bb50686b17ceae8a4c835f524ee1b3a5/tests/python-free-download.test.ts) | | [5002cf8](5002cf8) [#809](#809) | added | Retirement read retry, second Ctrl-C and native cancellation cleanup | [src/lib/project-lifecycle-processes.ts](https://github.com/hack-dance/hack/blob/5002cf87bb50686b17ceae8a4c835f524ee1b3a5/src/lib/project-lifecycle-processes.ts) | --------- Co-authored-by: Kit <344842+roodboi@users.noreply.github.com>

roodboi and others added 3 commits November 13, 2026 06:43

chatgpt-codex-connector Bot reviewed Nov 13, 2026

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Comment thread src/lib/project-env-config.ts Resolved

roodboi and others added 2 commits November 13, 2026 07:16

fix(env): an overlay named local never relabels the local default lay…

d256b3b

…er (HACK-2169) The integrity inspector keeps the first label for each layer path, so the default local layer is never reported with --env local advice. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

chatgpt-codex-connector Bot reviewed Nov 13, 2026

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Comment thread src/lib/project-env-config.ts Resolved

test(env): describe why a stray local.local layer leaves the default …

58fa9f6

…layer's advice alone (HACK-2169) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

chatgpt-codex-connector Bot reviewed Nov 13, 2026

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Comment thread src/lib/project-env-config.ts Resolved

roodboi and others added 2 commits November 13, 2026 07:41

fix(env): point inherited-layer advice at a worktree key that differs…

621b93b

… from the primary's (HACK-2169) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

chatgpt-codex-connector Bot reviewed Nov 13, 2026

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Comment thread src/lib/project-env-config.ts Resolved

Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/next' into claude/hack-2169-secr…

2071505

…et-store-integrity # Conflicts: # src/lib/secret-store.ts # tests/secret-store.test.ts

chatgpt-codex-connector Bot reviewed Nov 13, 2026

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Comment thread src/lib/project-env-config.ts Resolved

roodboi and others added 2 commits November 13, 2026 12:28

Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/next' into claude/hack-2169-secr…

e7d6048

…et-store-integrity

roodboi merged commit 573ceec into next Nov 13, 2026
21 checks passed

roodboi deleted the claude/hack-2169-secret-store-integrity branch November 13, 2026 13:27

roodboi mentioned this pull request Nov 13, 2026

feat(secrets): retire a store whose key is gone, and fail doctor only where the store is read (HACK-2177) #779

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roodboi mentioned this pull request Nov 13, 2026

fix(env): verify cleanup receipts and deletion outcomes (HACK-2171) #768

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This was referenced Nov 13, 2026

docs: add next.17 upgrade notes (HACK-1977) #785

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fix(env): secrets at rest: ignored staging, tightened modes, expiring mux payloads, doctor secrets hygiene (HACK-2165) #764

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roodboi mentioned this pull request Nov 14, 2026

docs: audit next.17 release notes and upgrade guidance #839

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