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10 changes: 7 additions & 3 deletions server/attester_trust.go
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -267,9 +267,13 @@ const (
// only while it can't put that identity in a certificate: with
// anchors shared between attesters — a trust list, one anchor pool
// for every client — any attester that runs a CA under any of the
// anchors (or holds an intermediate without name constraints) can
// issue itself a certificate naming another attester, and attest for
// that attester's clients. Choose AttesterIssuerBoundToAnchor for
// anchors can issue itself a certificate naming another attester,
// and attest for that attester's clients. Name constraints confine
// that only if they are uniformResourceIdentifier constraints, on the
// attester's CA or one above it, and then only a URI's host: RFC 5280
// §4.2.1.10 applies each constraint to names of its own type, so a
// CA constrained to the dNSName attester-a.example can still certify
// https://attester-b.example. Choose AttesterIssuerBoundToAnchor for
// shared trust lists; this mode suits anchors that issue only to
// attesters they have vetted for every identifier they certify.
AttesterIssuerInCertificate
Expand Down
46 changes: 46 additions & 0 deletions server/attester_trust_test.go
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -43,6 +43,8 @@ type certOptions struct {
keyUsage x509.KeyUsage
key crypto.Signer // nil: fresh P-256
uris []string // URI subject alternative names
permittedDNS []string // dNSName name constraints
permittedURI []string // uniformResourceIdentifier name constraints
extKeyUsage []x509.ExtKeyUsage
unknownExtKeyUsage []asn1.ObjectIdentifier
}
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -82,6 +84,8 @@ func newTestCert(t *testing.T, name string, o certOptions) testCert {
IsCA: o.isCA,
ExtKeyUsage: o.extKeyUsage,
UnknownExtKeyUsage: o.unknownExtKeyUsage,
PermittedDNSDomains: o.permittedDNS,
PermittedURIDomains: o.permittedURI,
}
for _, raw := range o.uris {
u, err := url.Parse(raw)
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -511,6 +515,48 @@ func TestX5CAttesterChainIssuerInCertificate(t *testing.T) {
}
}

// TestX5CAttesterChainIssuerInCertificateNameConstraints pins what name
// constraints do for AttesterIssuerInCertificate under a shared anchor:
// attester A's CA, constrained to A's host, issues a certificate naming
// the client's attester. A dNSName constraint doesn't confine a URI SAN
// (RFC 5280 §4.2.1.10), so A attests for the client; only a
// uniformResourceIdentifier constraint stops it.
func TestX5CAttesterChainIssuerInCertificateNameConstraints(t *testing.T) {
sharedRoot := newTestCert(t, "trust list CA", certOptions{isCA: true})
cases := map[string]struct {
constraints certOptions
wantOK bool
}{
"dNSName constraint doesn't confine a URI SAN": {certOptions{permittedDNS: []string{"attester-a.example"}}, true},
"uniformResourceIdentifier constraint does": {certOptions{permittedURI: []string{"attester-a.example"}}, false},
}
for name, tc := range cases {
t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
opts := tc.constraints
opts.parent, opts.isCA = &sharedRoot, true
attesterACA := newTestCert(t, "attester A CA", opts)
leaf := newTestCert(t, "attester", certOptions{parent: &attesterACA, uris: []string{testAttesterIssuer}})
h := newHarnessWithAttesterTrust(t, nil, server.X5CAttesterChain{
Revocation: server.NoClientCertificateRevocationCheck{},
TrustAnchors: server.StaticAttesterTrustAnchors{Roots: poolOf(sharedRoot)},
IssuerBinding: server.AttesterIssuerInCertificate,
})
instanceKey := generateKey(t)
attestation := createX5CAttestation(t, leaf.key, x5cOf(leaf, attesterACA), "", &instanceKey.PublicKey, h.now)
err := requestWithAttestation(t, h, attestation, instanceKey)
if tc.wantOK {
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("RequestClientCredentialsToken: %v", err)
}
return
}
if code := serverErrorCode(t, err); code != server.ErrorInvalidClient {
t.Fatalf("error code = %q, want %q", code, server.ErrorInvalidClient)
}
})
}
}

// TestRegisteredAttesterKeysIgnoresClientKeys proves an attestation
// verifies only against the attester's own key source: a client whose
// own key is in Dependencies.ClientKeys — as keys/ephemeral or
Expand Down
6 changes: 5 additions & 1 deletion storage/client_repository.go
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -129,7 +129,11 @@ const (
// of ExpectedSANURI against one of the presented certificate's
// subjectAltName uniformResourceIdentifier entries — RFC 8705
// §2.1's "tls_client_auth_san_uri". Same chain-trust posture as
// ClientAuthMethodTLSClientAuth — see its own doc comment.
// ClientAuthMethodTLSClientAuth — see its own doc comment. Where the
// trusted CAs are shared, any CA under them that may issue a URI SAN
// can name this client's value: only uniformResourceIdentifier name
// constraints confine URI SANs (RFC 5280 §4.2.1.10), dNSName ones
// don't.
ClientAuthMethodTLSClientAuthSANURI

// ClientAuthMethodTLSClientAuthSANIP authenticates by match of
Expand Down
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