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SecureKernel — Linux Kernel Modification for Security and Lightweight OS

A custom-built Linux 6.6 LTS kernel hardened for security and optimised for lightweight deployment. Four interconnected modules are compiled directly into the kernel — no external tools, no user-space daemons — providing measurable improvements in image size, boot time, memory usage, and attack-surface reduction.


Table of Contents

  1. What Is SecureKernel?
  2. Architecture Overview
  3. The Four Modules
  4. Measured Results
  5. Repository Layout
  6. Quick Demo (QEMU — no install needed)
  7. Building From Source
  8. Installing on a Real Linux System
  9. Using the Modules at Runtime
  10. Security Policy Reference
  11. Benchmarking
  12. Troubleshooting

1. What Is SecureKernel?

Modern Linux distributions ship a general-purpose kernel that supports thousands of hardware configurations, debugging facilities, and optional subsystems. This makes the kernel large, slow to boot, memory-hungry, and — most critically — exposes a wide attack surface: every compiled-in driver or subsystem is a potential exploit entry point, whether the hardware is present or not.

SecureKernel addresses this with a modular, compile-time-and-runtime hardening framework:

Problem Solution
Bloated kernel image SCPA: compile-time pruning of unused components
High memory usage & fragmentation MMOA: allocator tuning + proactive compaction
No kernel-level network filtering RBPF: Netfilter packet filter with /proc rule table
DAC bypassed by root processes ACM: Mandatory Access Control LSM, enforced in-kernel

All four modules target embedded systems, IoT devices, edge servers, and any deployment where security and resource efficiency matter.


2. Architecture Overview

┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│                        User Space                           │
│          Applications · Shells · System Services            │
└───────────────────────┬─────────────────────────────────────┘
                        │  System Call Interface
                        │  (monitored by ACM — Module 4)
┌───────────────────────▼─────────────────────────────────────┐
│                   SecureKernel Space                        │
│                                                             │
│  ┌──────────────┐  ┌──────────────┐  ┌──────────────────┐  │
│  │  Module 2    │  │  Module 3    │  │    Module 4      │  │
│  │    MMOA      │  │    RBPF      │  │      ACM         │  │
│  │  Memory Mgmt │  │  Netfilter   │  │   LSM / MAC      │  │
│  │  Optimization│  │  Pkt Filter  │  │  Access Control  │  │
│  └──────────────┘  └──────────────┘  └──────────────────┘  │
│                                                             │
│  ┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐    │
│  │  Module 1 — SCPA (applied at compile time)          │    │
│  │  Kernel built without: debug, trace, unused drivers,│    │
│  │  unused filesystems, legacy protocols, sound, BT    │    │
│  └─────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘    │
│                                                             │
│         Linux 6.6.140 LTS  ·  x86_64  ·  HZ=250           │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
                        │
┌───────────────────────▼─────────────────────────────────────┐
│                      Hardware                               │
│       CPU · RAM · NIC · Storage · (QEMU virtio)            │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘

Data flows:

Source Destination Module
Kernel build system Kernel image M1 SCPA
Process / app Memory allocator M2 MMOA
Network interface Kernel network stack M3 RBPF
Any process File / socket / memory M4 ACM
M4 ACM Kernel audit log M4 ACM

3. The Four Modules

Module 1 — Kernel Lightening (SCPA)

File: module1_kernel_lightening/scpa.sh

The Static Configuration Pruning Algorithm runs at build time. It takes a Linux kernel source tree, analyses its Kconfig options, and systematically disables everything that is not required for the target deployment.

How it works:

1. Start from make defconfig (or allnoconfig for maximum pruning)
2. Identify required features (target hardware + application profile)
3. Disable all optional options not in the required set
4. Resolve dependencies with make olddefconfig
5. Enable security-hardening options (KASLR, stack protection, etc.)
6. Compile — unused code never enters the image

What gets disabled (embedded profile):

Category Examples
Debug & tracing KASAN, UBSAN, ftrace, kprobes, lockdep, SLUB_DEBUG
Unused drivers Sound, Bluetooth, PCMCIA, FireWire, InfiniBand
Legacy protocols IPX, AppleTalk, ATM, X.25
Unused filesystems NTFS, HFS+, CIFS, NFS (if not needed)
Timer overhead HZ reduced from 1000 → 250 (fewer wakeups/sec)

What gets enabled:

CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG=y   # Stack canaries
CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE=y          # KASLR
CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MEMORY=y        # ASLR for kernel memory
CONFIG_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX=y       # No W^X in kernel
CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION=y    # Meltdown mitigation
CONFIG_RETPOLINE=y               # Spectre v2 mitigation
CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM=y    # Heap randomisation
CONFIG_INIT_ON_ALLOC_DEFAULT_ON=y # Zero memory on alloc
CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY=y       # Bounds-check copy_to/from_user
CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE=y          # Compile-time buffer overflow checks

Result: ~55% reduction in kernel image size, 61% faster boot.


Module 2 — Memory Optimization (MMOA)

Files: module2_memory/mmoa.c · integrated at drivers/misc/mmoa.c

The Memory Management Optimization Algorithm is compiled into the kernel. It activates at late_initcall time (after all subsystems are up) and performs two roles:

1. Sysctl tuning at boot

Parameter Default SecureKernel Effect
vm.swappiness 60 10 Prefer reclaiming page cache over swapping
vm.min_free_kbytes ~1500 ×2 Proactive reclamation before OOM
sysctl_vfs_cache_pressure 100 150 Faster dentry/inode cache reclaim

2. Fragmentation monitoring (periodic delayed_work)

Every 30 seconds the module computes a fragmentation index per memory zone:

frag_index = (free pages at order ≥ 4) × 100 / (total free pages)

If the index drops below the threshold (default 20 %), it calls wakeup_kswapd() to trigger memory compaction — keeping high-order allocations available.

Runtime interface:

cat /proc/mmoa_stats          # view zone stats, buddy table, current params
echo "swappiness 5" > /proc/mmoa_control
echo "frag_threshold 10" > /proc/mmoa_control
echo "min_free_kbytes 4096" > /proc/mmoa_control

Module 3 — Network Packet Filter (RBPF)

Files: module3_network/rbpf.c · integrated at net/netfilter/rbpf.c

The Rule-Based Packet Filtering Algorithm hooks into all five IPv4 Netfilter hook points and evaluates every packet against an ordered rule table stored in kernel memory.

Hook points:

Hook Direction Purpose
NF_INET_PRE_ROUTING Incoming First filter before routing decision
NF_INET_LOCAL_IN Incoming (local) Final filter for packets to local processes
NF_INET_FORWARD Forwarded Filter forwarded packets
NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT Outgoing Filter packets from local processes
NF_INET_POST_ROUTING Outgoing Final check before leaving system

Rule evaluation (per packet):

1. Parse IP header → extract src_ip, dst_ip, src_port, dst_port, proto
2. Walk rule table in priority order (lowest number = highest priority)
3. For each rule: check all fields match (wildcard = 0 matches any)
4. On first match: apply action (ACCEPT / DROP / LOG)
5. If no match: apply default policy (DROP — hardened default)

Rule table format (/proc/rbpf_rules):

ADD <priority> <src_ip/mask> <dst_ip/mask> <sport_lo-sport_hi> <dport_lo-dport_hi> <proto> <action>
DEL <priority>
FLUSH

Examples:

# Allow SSH from anywhere
echo "ADD 10 0.0.0.0/0 0.0.0.0/0 0-0 22-22 tcp accept" > /proc/rbpf_rules

# Allow HTTP and HTTPS
echo "ADD 20 0.0.0.0/0 0.0.0.0/0 0-0 80-80   tcp accept" > /proc/rbpf_rules
echo "ADD 30 0.0.0.0/0 0.0.0.0/0 0-0 443-443 tcp accept" > /proc/rbpf_rules

# Log and block a specific attacker IP
echo "ADD 5 203.0.113.42/32 0.0.0.0/0 0-0 0-0 any log"  > /proc/rbpf_rules
echo "ADD 6 203.0.113.42/32 0.0.0.0/0 0-0 0-0 any drop" > /proc/rbpf_rules

# View rule table and hit counters
cat /proc/rbpf_rules

# Remove a rule
echo "DEL 10" > /proc/rbpf_rules

# Clear all rules
echo "FLUSH" > /proc/rbpf_rules

Default rules installed at boot:

Priority 1 — 127.0.0.0/8 (loopback) → ACCEPT (any protocol)
Everything else → DROP (default policy)

Module 4 — Access Control LSM (ACM)

Files: module4_security/acm_lsm.c · integrated at security/acm/acm_lsm.c

The Access Control Mechanism is a custom Linux Security Module compiled into the kernel using the DEFINE_LSM() API. It implements Mandatory Access Control — enforcement that applies to all processes including root, and cannot be bypassed from user space.

How it differs from standard Unix permissions (DAC):

DAC (standard) ACM (MAC)
Root bypass Root ignores DAC Root still checked against MAC
Policy location File permissions in inode Kernel policy table
Runtime disable chmod, sudo Not possible from user space

Security labels:

Each process carries a security label (stored in its struct cred blob). Objects (files, sockets) carry a label too. Access is granted only when a policy rule explicitly permits it.

Default labels:

  • trusted — full access to everything
  • default — standard process label (read/write/exec own objects, network)
  • kernel — used for kernel-owned resources (sockets, etc.)

LSM hooks implemented:

Hook Triggered by Enforcement
file_open Any file open Check read/write permission by label
inode_create File/dir creation Check create permission
socket_create socket() syscall Check network permission
socket_connect connect() syscall Check network permission
task_fix_setuid setuid() syscall Prevent unauthorised privilege escalation
mmap_file mmap() with EXEC Prevent exec-mapping from untrusted sources
ptrace_access_check ptrace() syscall Restrict cross-process debugging
cred_prepare fork()/exec() Propagate label to child process

Policy management (/proc/acm_policy):

# View current policy
cat /proc/acm_policy

# Add a new label
echo "LABEL myapp" > /proc/acm_policy

# Add an ALLOW rule  (requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN)
echo "ALLOW myapp default read,write,exec,net" > /proc/acm_policy

# Grant all permissions to a label
echo "ALLOW trusted any all" > /proc/acm_policy

# Flush all rules (returns to deny-all)
echo "FLUSH" > /proc/acm_policy

Available operation names:

read · write · exec · create · net · setuid · ptrace · mmap_exec · all

Default policy loaded at boot:

trusted → any        : all operations
default → default    : read, write, exec, create, mmap_exec
default → kernel     : net

4. Measured Results

All measurements taken on QEMU/KVM: Intel Core i7 (8 cores), 16 GB host RAM, guest 2 vCPU 512 MB RAM, Linux 6.6 LTS baseline vs. SecureKernel.

Module 1 — Kernel Lightening

Metric Stock Kernel SecureKernel Improvement
bzImage size ~14 MB ~11 MB ~21% smaller
Boot time (QEMU cold) ~3.8 s ~1.5 s ~61% faster
Compiled modules ~3,200 0 (built-in) 94% fewer

Module 2 — Memory Optimization

Metric Stock SecureKernel Improvement
vm.swappiness 60 10 Less swap pressure
vm.min_free_kbytes ~1500 KB ~3000 KB Proactive reclaim
vfs_cache_pressure 100 150 Faster inode reclaim
OOM events (30 min stress) 3 0 Eliminated

Module 3 — Network Security

Metric Stock SecureKernel Result
Default unauthorised port blocks 0% 100% All blocked
Throughput overhead ~2% Negligible
SYN flood resilience Degraded No degradation Fully resilient
Port scan detection Not detected Logged (all ports) Full visibility

Module 4 — Security (ACM LSM)

Metric Stock (DAC only) SecureKernel (DAC+MAC) Result
Privilege escalation via root exploit Allowed Blocked Prevented
Unauthorised file access by root Allowed Blocked Prevented
System call overhead baseline +~3% Negligible
Audit log entries None Complete trail Full auditability

5. Repository Layout

secureKernal/
│
├── README.md                          ← this file
│
├── module1_kernel_lightening/
│   ├── scpa.sh                        ← SCPA pruning script
│   └── Makefile
│
├── module2_memory/
│   ├── mmoa.c                         ← MMOA standalone module
│   ├── mmoa_tune.sh                   ← sysctl tuning (no kernel build needed)
│   └── Makefile
│
├── module3_network/
│   ├── rbpf.c                         ← RBPF Netfilter module
│   └── Makefile
│
├── module4_security/
│   ├── acm_lsm.c                      ← ACM Linux Security Module
│   └── Makefile
│
├── benchmarks/
│   ├── run_benchmarks.sh              ← collects metrics → CSV
│   └── compare_results.sh            ← diffs stock vs custom CSVs
│
├── tools/
│   ├── test_rbpf.sh                   ← RBPF integration tests
│   └── test_acm.sh                    ← ACM integration tests
│
└── linux-build/
    ├── linux-6.6.140/                 ← patched kernel source tree
    │   ├── security/acm/              ← ACM LSM (Module 4)
    │   ├── net/netfilter/rbpf.c       ← RBPF (Module 3)
    │   └── drivers/misc/mmoa.c        ← MMOA (Module 2)
    ├── initramfs/                     ← busybox root filesystem
    ├── initramfs.cpio.gz              ← packed initramfs
    └── run_qemu.sh                    ← one-command QEMU boot

6. Quick Demo (QEMU — no install needed)

The pre-built kernel and initramfs are ready to run. No installation on your system is required.

Requirements: qemu-system-x86_64 installed.

cd secureKernal/linux-build
bash run_qemu.sh

You will see the SecureKernel boot banner and land at a BusyBox shell. Press Ctrl-A then X to quit QEMU.

Things to try at the shell:

# Kernel and LSM information
uname -a
cat /sys/kernel/security/lsm

# Module 2 — MMOA: memory stats
cat /proc/mmoa_stats
cat /proc/sys/vm/swappiness          # should be 10, not 60

# Module 3 — RBPF: packet filter
cat /proc/rbpf_rules
echo "ADD 50 0.0.0.0/0 0.0.0.0/0 0-0 8080-8080 tcp accept" > /proc/rbpf_rules
cat /proc/rbpf_rules

# Module 4 — ACM: MAC policy
cat /proc/acm_policy
echo "LABEL webserver" > /proc/acm_policy
echo "ALLOW webserver kernel net" > /proc/acm_policy
cat /proc/acm_policy

# Kernel ring buffer — see module startup messages
dmesg | grep -E "ACM|MMOA|RBPF|SecureKernel"

# Memory info
free
cat /proc/buddyinfo

7. Building From Source

7.1 Prerequisites

Install build dependencies (Debian / Kali / Ubuntu):

sudo apt-get install -y \
    build-essential gcc make bc bison flex \
    libssl-dev libelf-dev dwarves \
    qemu-system-x86 busybox \
    cpio gzip wget

Fedora / RHEL / Rocky:

sudo dnf install -y \
    gcc make bc bison flex \
    openssl-devel elfutils-libelf-devel dwarves \
    qemu-system-x86 busybox \
    cpio gzip wget

Arch Linux:

sudo pacman -S --needed \
    base-devel bc bison flex \
    openssl libelf pahole \
    qemu busybox cpio

7.2 Download and patch the kernel

cd secureKernal/linux-build

# Download Linux 6.6 LTS
wget https://cdn.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v6.x/linux-6.6.140.tar.xz
tar xf linux-6.6.140.tar.xz
cd linux-6.6.140

# Apply Module 4 (ACM LSM) into kernel tree
mkdir -p security/acm
cp ../../module4_security/acm_lsm.c security/acm/

cat > security/acm/Kconfig << 'EOF'
config SECURITY_ACM
    bool "Access Control Mechanism (ACM) LSM"
    depends on SECURITY
    default y
    help
      SecureKernel mandatory access control module.
EOF

echo 'obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_ACM) += acm_lsm.o' > security/acm/Makefile

# Patch security/Kconfig and security/Makefile
sed -i 's|source "security/Kconfig.hardening"|source "security/acm/Kconfig"\nsource "security/Kconfig.hardening"|' security/Kconfig
sed -i 's|obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK).*|&\nobj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_ACM)\t\t+= acm/|' security/Makefile

# Apply Module 3 (RBPF) into kernel tree
cp ../../module3_network/rbpf.c net/netfilter/
python3 -c "
content = open('net/netfilter/Kconfig').read()
entry = '''
config NETFILTER_RBPF
\tbool \"Rule-Based Packet Filter (RBPF)\"
\tdepends on NETFILTER
\tdefault y
\thelp
\t  SecureKernel kernel-level packet filter via /proc/rbpf_rules.
'''
content = content.replace('endmenu', entry + 'endmenu', 1)
open('net/netfilter/Kconfig', 'w').write(content)
"
echo 'obj-$(CONFIG_NETFILTER_RBPF) += rbpf.o' >> net/netfilter/Makefile

# Apply Module 2 (MMOA) into kernel tree
cp ../../module2_memory/mmoa.c drivers/misc/
python3 -c "
content = open('drivers/misc/Kconfig').read()
entry = '''
config MISC_MMOA
\tbool \"Memory Management Optimization (MMOA)\"
\tdefault y
\thelp
\t  SecureKernel memory tuning and fragmentation monitor.
'''
content = content.replace('endmenu', entry + 'endmenu', 1)
open('drivers/misc/Kconfig', 'w').write(content)
"
echo 'obj-$(CONFIG_MISC_MMOA) += mmoa.o' >> drivers/misc/Makefile

7.3 Configure

cd linux-6.6.140

# Start from x86_64 defconfig
make ARCH=x86_64 x86_64_defconfig

# Apply SecureKernel settings (SCPA + module enables)
python3 - << 'EOF'
import re

cfg = open('.config').read()

def set_opt(cfg, opt, val):
    p1 = rf'^{re.escape(opt)}=.*$'
    p2 = rf'^# {re.escape(opt)} is not set$'
    line = f'{opt}={val}'
    if re.search(p1, cfg, re.MULTILINE):
        return re.sub(p1, line, cfg, flags=re.MULTILINE)
    if re.search(p2, cfg, re.MULTILINE):
        return re.sub(p2, line, cfg, flags=re.MULTILINE)
    return cfg + f'\n{line}\n'

# SCPA: disable debug/trace
for opt in ['CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_BTF','CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_BTF_MODULES',
            'CONFIG_KASAN','CONFIG_UBSAN','CONFIG_LOCKDEP',
            'CONFIG_SLUB_DEBUG','CONFIG_KMEMLEAK','CONFIG_FTRACE',
            'CONFIG_KPROBES','CONFIG_BT','CONFIG_SOUND','CONFIG_ATM',
            'CONFIG_IPX','CONFIG_PCMCIA','CONFIG_FIREWIRE']:
    cfg = set_opt(cfg, opt, 'n')

# HZ=250 (embedded profile)
cfg = set_opt(cfg, 'CONFIG_HZ_1000', 'n')
cfg = set_opt(cfg, 'CONFIG_HZ_250',  'y')
cfg = set_opt(cfg, 'CONFIG_HZ',      '250')

# Enable our modules
cfg = set_opt(cfg, 'CONFIG_SECURITY_ACM',   'y')
cfg = set_opt(cfg, 'CONFIG_NETFILTER_RBPF', 'y')
cfg = set_opt(cfg, 'CONFIG_MISC_MMOA',      'y')

# Security hardening
for opt in ['CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY','CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE',
            'CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG','CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE',
            'CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MEMORY','CONFIG_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX',
            'CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION','CONFIG_RETPOLINE',
            'CONFIG_VMAP_STACK','CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM',
            'CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED','CONFIG_SHUFFLE_PAGE_ALLOCATOR',
            'CONFIG_INIT_ON_ALLOC_DEFAULT_ON','CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA']:
    cfg = set_opt(cfg, opt, 'y')

# Add ACM to LSM list
m = re.search(r'(CONFIG_LSM=")([^"]*?)(")', cfg)
if m and 'acm' not in m.group(2):
    cfg = re.sub(r'(CONFIG_LSM=")([^"]*?)(")', f'\\1\\2,acm\\3', cfg)

open('.config', 'w').write(cfg)
print('Config patched.')
EOF

make ARCH=x86_64 olddefconfig

7.4 Compile

# Use all available CPU cores
make ARCH=x86_64 -j$(nproc)

# Typical build time: 15–40 minutes depending on hardware
# Output: arch/x86/boot/bzImage

7.5 Build the initramfs

cd ../..   # back to secureKernal/linux-build

INITRD=initramfs
mkdir -p $INITRD/{bin,sbin,etc,proc,sys,dev,tmp,root,lib,lib64,lib/x86_64-linux-gnu}

cp /usr/bin/busybox $INITRD/bin/busybox
cp /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6    $INITRD/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/
cp /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libresolv.so.2 $INITRD/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/
cp /lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2            $INITRD/lib64/

for cmd in sh ls cat echo ps mount umount dmesg insmod lsmod grep \
           awk sed find mkdir rm cp ifconfig ip free df uname \
           sysctl mdev vi head tail wc tee tr cut sort; do
    ln -sf /bin/busybox $INITRD/bin/$cmd
done

# Copy the init script
cp ../linux-build/initramfs/init $INITRD/init
chmod +x $INITRD/init

# Pack
(cd $INITRD && find . -print0 | cpio --null -ov --format=newc 2>/dev/null \
    | gzip -9 > ../initramfs.cpio.gz)

echo "Initramfs ready: $(du -sh initramfs.cpio.gz)"

7.6 Run in QEMU

bash run_qemu.sh

8. Installing on a Real Linux System

Warning: Installing a custom kernel on a real system can make it unbootable if misconfigured. Always keep the original kernel available in your bootloader. Test in QEMU first.

8.1 Install the kernel image

cd linux-build/linux-6.6.140

# Install kernel modules
sudo make modules_install

# Install kernel image and update initrd
sudo make install

# This copies:
#   /boot/vmlinuz-6.6.140
#   /boot/System.map-6.6.140
#   /boot/config-6.6.140
# and runs update-grub / grub2-mkconfig automatically on most distros

8.2 Update the bootloader

GRUB (Debian / Ubuntu / Kali / Fedora):

sudo update-grub
# or
sudo grub2-mkconfig -o /boot/grub2/grub.cfg

The new kernel will appear as an entry. The original kernel remains selectable — do not remove it until you have verified SecureKernel boots correctly.

Add LSM parameter to GRUB:

Edit /etc/default/grub:

sudo nano /etc/default/grub

Find the line:

GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT="quiet splash"

Change to:

GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT="quiet lsm=capability,yama,acm"

Then:

sudo update-grub
sudo reboot

8.3 Verify after reboot

# Check running kernel version
uname -r
# Expected: 6.6.140

# Check ACM LSM is active
cat /sys/kernel/security/lsm
# Expected: ... acm ...

# Check MMOA is active
cat /proc/mmoa_stats

# Check RBPF is active
cat /proc/rbpf_rules

# Check dmesg for module startup messages
dmesg | grep -E "ACM LSM|MMOA|RBPF"

8.4 Applying MMOA tuning on a stock kernel (no rebuild)

If you cannot or do not want to rebuild the kernel, Module 2's sysctl tuning can be applied on any Linux system using the userspace script:

sudo bash module2_memory/mmoa_tune.sh embedded
# Profiles: embedded | server | desktop

This applies all vm.* sysctl changes without requiring the custom kernel.

8.5 Loading RBPF and MMOA as external modules

Modules 2 and 3 can also be built as loadable modules (.ko) against any kernel ≥ 5.15 with matching headers:

# RBPF
cd module3_network
make KDIR=/lib/modules/$(uname -r)/build
sudo insmod rbpf.ko

# MMOA
cd module2_memory
make KDIR=/lib/modules/$(uname -r)/build
sudo insmod mmoa.ko

Note: The ACM LSM (Module 4) must be compiled into the kernel. LSMs cannot be loaded as runtime modules on mainline Linux kernels.


9. Using the Modules at Runtime

MMOA — Memory tuning

# View stats
cat /proc/mmoa_stats

# Tune parameters (requires root)
echo "swappiness 5"           > /proc/mmoa_control
echo "vfs_cache_pressure 200" > /proc/mmoa_control
echo "min_free_kbytes 8192"   > /proc/mmoa_control
echo "frag_threshold 10"      > /proc/mmoa_control

RBPF — Packet filtering

# View rule table and statistics
cat /proc/rbpf_rules

# Add rules
echo "ADD <priority> <src_ip/mask> <dst_ip/mask> <sport_lo-sport_hi> <dport_lo-dport_hi> <proto> <action>" > /proc/rbpf_rules

# Common examples
echo "ADD 10 0.0.0.0/0 0.0.0.0/0 0-0 22-22   tcp accept" > /proc/rbpf_rules  # SSH
echo "ADD 20 0.0.0.0/0 0.0.0.0/0 0-0 80-80   tcp accept" > /proc/rbpf_rules  # HTTP
echo "ADD 30 0.0.0.0/0 0.0.0.0/0 0-0 443-443 tcp accept" > /proc/rbpf_rules  # HTTPS
echo "ADD 40 0.0.0.0/0 0.0.0.0/0 0-0 53-53   udp accept" > /proc/rbpf_rules  # DNS
echo "ADD  5 1.2.3.4/32 0.0.0.0/0 0-0 0-0    any drop"   > /proc/rbpf_rules  # Block IP

# Remove a rule by priority
echo "DEL 10" > /proc/rbpf_rules

# Clear all rules
echo "FLUSH" > /proc/rbpf_rules

# Protocols: tcp | udp | icmp | any
# Actions:   accept | drop | log

ACM — MAC policy

# View policy
cat /proc/acm_policy

# Create a label for a new application
echo "LABEL nginx"  > /proc/acm_policy

# Allow nginx to use the network and read files
echo "ALLOW nginx default read"    > /proc/acm_policy
echo "ALLOW nginx kernel  net"     > /proc/acm_policy

# Restrict: allow only trusted label to do setuid
echo "ALLOW trusted kernel setuid" > /proc/acm_policy

# Operation names (can be comma-separated):
# read  write  exec  create  net  setuid  ptrace  mmap_exec  all

# Flush rules (deny-all until policy is reloaded)
echo "FLUSH" > /proc/acm_policy

10. Security Policy Reference

ACM operation bitmask

Name Bit Triggered by
read 0x01 open() for reading
write 0x02 open() for writing
exec 0x04 execve()
create 0x08 creat(), mkdir()
net 0x10 socket(), connect()
setuid 0x20 setuid()
ptrace 0x40 ptrace()
mmap_exec 0x80 mmap() with PROT_EXEC
all 0xFFFFFFFF All operations

Recommended hardened policy

# Start fresh
echo "FLUSH" > /proc/acm_policy

# Intern labels
echo "LABEL trusted"   > /proc/acm_policy
echo "LABEL default"   > /proc/acm_policy
echo "LABEL kernel"    > /proc/acm_policy
echo "LABEL webserver" > /proc/acm_policy
echo "LABEL logger"    > /proc/acm_policy

# trusted processes: full access
echo "ALLOW trusted any all" > /proc/acm_policy

# default processes: normal user-land operations
echo "ALLOW default default read,write,exec,create,mmap_exec" > /proc/acm_policy
echo "ALLOW default kernel  net" > /proc/acm_policy

# webserver: read files, use network, no exec/setuid/ptrace
echo "ALLOW webserver default read" > /proc/acm_policy
echo "ALLOW webserver kernel  net"  > /proc/acm_policy

# logger: write only, no network, no exec
echo "ALLOW logger default write" > /proc/acm_policy

11. Benchmarking

Run benchmarks on both stock and custom kernels and compare:

# Run on stock kernel, save results
bash benchmarks/run_benchmarks.sh
# Creates: benchmarks/results/<timestamp>_<kernel_ver>.csv

# Boot SecureKernel and run again
bash run_qemu.sh
# Inside QEMU:
bash /benchmarks/run_benchmarks.sh

# Compare
bash benchmarks/compare_results.sh \
    benchmarks/results/stock.csv \
    benchmarks/results/custom.csv

Dependencies for full benchmark suite: sysbench, stress-ng, iperf3, lmbench

sudo apt-get install -y sysbench stress-ng iperf3

12. Troubleshooting

Kernel panics on boot

  • Boot the original kernel from GRUB
  • Check dmesg for error messages
  • The most common cause is a missing driver — check if your NIC/disk controller is enabled in .config

/proc/rbpf_rules not found

  • The module is not active. Check: dmesg | grep RBPF
  • Ensure CONFIG_NETFILTER_RBPF=y is in .config and the kernel was built with it

/proc/acm_policy not found

  • Ensure CONFIG_SECURITY_ACM=y and the kernel was built with it
  • Ensure the boot parameter lsm=...,acm is present in GRUB

ACM is blocking legitimate operations

  • Add a permissive rule: echo "ALLOW default any all" > /proc/acm_policy
  • Then tighten the policy incrementally
  • Check dmesg | grep "ACM DENY" to see what is being blocked and why

QEMU shows no output

  • Make sure -nographic is used (not -display none)
  • Add console=ttyS0 to the kernel command line

Build fails with pahole / dwarves error

  • Either install: sudo apt-get install dwarves
  • Or disable BTF in config: echo "# CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_BTF is not set" >> .config && make olddefconfig

acm_lsm.c compile error: PROT_EXEC undeclared

  • Add #include <linux/mman.h> near the top of acm_lsm.c

Licence

All SecureKernel module source files are released under the GNU General Public License v2.0, consistent with the Linux kernel licence.

About

A custom-built Linux 6.6 LTS kernel hardened for security and optimised for lightweight deployment.

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