CDP and noVNC can operate an authenticated browser. Access to either can imply access to cookies, pages, account actions, and session authority.
The base deployment therefore publishes no host ports.
Preferred order:
- Docker sibling network
- host loopback
- SSH / WireGuard / Tailscale tunnel
Do not bind CDP or noVNC directly to a public interface.
Production/base behavior:
CHROME_DISABLE_SANDBOX=0
CHROME_ALLOW_SANDBOX_FALLBACK=0
The local overlay can arm a narrow fallback because Docker Desktop under Apple-Silicon amd64 emulation has been observed to reject Chrome's namespace setup.
Local behavior:
- start Chrome with sandbox;
- if startup specifically reports
Failed to move to new namespace; - retry with
--no-sandbox.
Disable even that local fallback with:
LOCAL_CHROME_ALLOW_SANDBOX_FALLBACK=0 \
docker compose -f compose.yaml -f local.yaml up --build -dAny --no-sandbox execution weakens Chrome isolation.
VNC_PASSWORD is optional. Legacy VNC password authentication is not the primary security boundary and must not replace network isolation.
A profile contains durable browser authority.
- keep
/data/chromescoped to the workload that owns it; - never concurrently mount the same profile into two Chrome instances;
- never assume a macOS/Windows profile is authentication-portable to Linux;
- back up host-bound profiles before experimental migrations.