Audit what destroys data and what changes who can reach it - #24
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The log recorded credential, user, quota and upload-limit changes, but deleting a bucket — and everything in it — left no trace, and neither did making one anonymously readable. "Who made this public, and when" is the first question an incident asks and the one thing this log could not answer. Adds bucket.create, bucket.delete, bucket.access, bucket.cors, bucket.policy, object.upload and object.delete. The access and policy entries record the resulting visibility read back from the bucket record rather than what was requested, so the reader is not left re-evaluating a stored policy document months later — and a policy that replaces an earlier toggle shows up as the exposure it actually produced. Session events already existed; they now carry the source address, which is the field that makes a sign-in record useful. Peer address, never X-Forwarded-For: that header is written by whoever spoke to us last, and recording an attacker's chosen value as the source of a sign-in is worse than recording none. kAuditCapacity 5000 -> 20000, because object events arrive per click rather than per account change and the window in time is what the number really chooses. S3 signature failures stay unlogged and the write discipline is unchanged — no fsync, dropped when the I/O queue is full.
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The log recorded credential, user, quota and upload-limit changes, but deleting a bucket — and everything in it — left no trace, and neither did making one anonymously readable. "Who made this public, and when" is the first question an incident asks and the one thing this log could not answer.
Adds bucket.create, bucket.delete, bucket.access, bucket.cors, bucket.policy, object.upload and object.delete. The access and policy entries record the resulting visibility read back from the bucket record rather than what was requested, so the reader is not left re-evaluating a stored policy document months later — and a policy that replaces an earlier toggle shows up as the exposure it actually produced.
Session events already existed; they now carry the source address, which is the field that makes a sign-in record useful. Peer address, never X-Forwarded-For: that header is written by whoever spoke to us last, and recording an attacker's chosen value as the source of a sign-in is worse than recording none.
kAuditCapacity 5000 -> 20000, because object events arrive per click rather than per account change and the window in time is what the number really chooses. S3 signature failures stay unlogged and the write discipline is unchanged — no fsync, dropped when the I/O queue is full.