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fix(security): patch CVE-2026-111943 (compromised eMudhra CA) - #35
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Co-Authored-By: Quentin Rousseau <quentin@rootly.com>
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I'll fix CI failures and address comments from users with write access. I'll skip comments containing "(aside)".
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Why
CVE-2026-111943: the private keys of eight eMudhra (emSign) intermediate CAs were generated with weak randomness and can be recovered, so anyone can forge trusted TLS certificates for any host. Browsers already block these intermediates, but Go's
crypto/x509, rustls/webpki and Python'scertifikeep trusting them until patched.What
uv.lock only:
certifi2025.7.14 → 2026.10.19, which drops the emSign roots (GHSA-6q48-6c7w-9gw2).Impact
Without this change, a network attacker could impersonate any HTTPS endpoint this code talks to (MITM) using a forged certificate that chains to the compromised intermediates. Legitimate certificates issued under those CAs stop validating. That's expected and matches browser behavior.
Risk
risk:low— low: patch-level toolchain/dependency bump, no code change.Rollback
Revert this PR.
Refs: https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-111943
Written by Devin
Open in Devin Desktop: https://rootly.devinenterprise.com/desktop/session/aa84cecfa6a541e0a6c51dbaa8395453?variant=devin
Requested by: @kwent