Expose caller authorization for extension requests - #415
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lcbill
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Oct 1, 2026
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Some extension actions require the authenticated caller's permissions, but the generic CLI request command could not select the SDK's existing caller authorization path. Add explicit
extension request --impersonateforwarding; requests continue to omit caller identity unless selected. Help and the CLI reference explain the flag.Validation: all 4,664 unit and microbenchmark correctness tests pass (5 existing skips). Actual Click invocation tests cover both default and selected behavior through the real SDK request builder; disabling forwarding fails the selected authorization assertion while the default control still passes. An authenticated action requiring caller identity refused the default request and accepted the flagged request.
Risk: selecting the flag intentionally sends the current caller identity through the existing authenticated SDK path; it grants no additional permissions. No token is printed or persisted by this change. Live check: invoke a caller-authorized action with and without the flag and verify only the flagged request supplies the existing identity; unexpected permissions or identity forwarding by default falsify the change.
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