[ralyodio]

Any c0mpute node can now be a public gateway (nodes announce gateway on /api/nodes, and the edge's GatewayPool already discovers and load-balances them). This makes the edge refuse to trust a stranger's gateway.

Trust

• Trusted, proxied as before: the C0MPUTE_GATEWAYS seeds (our dev2 gateways) and the new C0MPUTE_TRUSTED_GATEWAYS.
• Everything discovered from /api/nodes is untrusted and gives verified reads only. C0MPUTE_VERIFY_ALL=1 verifies ours too.

Verified read (new lib/c0mpute-verify.ts, mirrors c0mpute hosting/site.rs)

• GET {gw}/hosting/v1/sites/{site}/resolve?path= (c0mpute >= 0.3.5) gives the record, the manifest (and v2 parts) and the gateway's resolution.
• Checks: ed25519 over the v1/v2 signing bytes; site_id = first 20 hex of blake3(c0mpute-site\n{owner}\n{name}) and equal to the requested site; blake3 of the manifest and each part; manifest name; candidate resolution recomputed locally (first present candidate, then 404.html as a 404; a gateway cannot skip a candidate that exists or leave out a part it needs); entry must equal the manifest's; chunk count, and each chunk's blake3 and length.
• Chunks come from any gateway (/hosting/v1/sites/{site}/chunks/{hex}), are cached on disk by hash ($EDGE_CERT_DIR/chunks, re-hashed on read).
• Rollback guard: highest verified seq per site, in memory and in $EDGE_CERT_DIR/site-seqs.json; a lower seq from any gateway is refused.
• A gateway that answers 404 (no routes yet) sits out verified reads for 5 min, one that fails a check for 10 min. It is never proxied unverified. The first chunk is fetched before the status line so an unavailable file falls through to the next gateway and then the stale copy; a later chunk that cannot be had cuts the response short.
• Verified responses carry x-c0mpute-verified: 1, the gateway's ETag (304 on If-None-Match), cache-control: public, max-age=60, nosniff.

blake3: @noble/hashes 2.4.0, vendored unmodified under vendor/noble-hashes (MIT) so the dev2 checkout keeps running with a plain git pull, no npm install (dev2 has no npm).

Tests: node --test tests/*.test.ts: 132 pass (18 new). Fixtures generated in TS in the Rust formats (ed25519 key, serde_json/BTreeMap manifests, v2 parts), plus golden records signed by the Rust node. Covers tampered chunk, wrong signature, forged record, wrong site id, rollback (pure and across gateways), v2 parted site (missing and tampered part), candidate skipping (foo.html claimed when foo exists, also across parts), 404.html, an old gateway without routes (never sent a /s/ request), and C0MPUTE_VERIFY_ALL. I also checked every record, manifest and chunk in a local Rust node's hosting catalog (4 v1 + 2 v2 records); all verify.

Smoke against the live network: with verifyAll, every current gateway (dev2 and the dev3/vienna nodes) answers 404 on the resolve route, so all of them are skipped and the edge answers 503 instead of serving unverified bytes. Without it, cloud.killer serves from the trusted dev2 gateway exactly as before.

🤖 Generated with Claude Code

[github-actions]

vu1nz Security Review

0 finding(s) in PR #?

No security issues found.