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Add wacore-recordstore: a byte-level RecordStore and LeaseStore that a database adapter implements, and RecordSignalStore, which builds the full SignalStore on top of them. Every write carries the fence of the lease that authorised it and is applied only while that generation is current, so a node that lost its lease cannot overwrite its successor. Every value is sealed by a Sealer (AES-256-GCM by default) with scope, namespace and key in the AAD, so a record cannot be moved to another slot. Prekey upload marks use an update-only write and never resurrect a consumed key. Includes a conformance suite for adapters, the in-memory reference store, and a wasm32 CI build.
do_pair_crypto only uses the identity key and the ADV secret, but takes a DeviceState that also carries the noise key pair. Add do_pair_crypto_with, which takes just the two secrets it uses, and delegate to it. A Signal store that holds the identity key but never the noise key can now complete pairing. Behaviour is unchanged.
Add wacore-signal-ops: the operations a WhatsApp client needs from a Signal store it does not hold the private keys for. Decrypt pkmsg/msg, encrypt, establish a session from a fetched bundle, sender-key distribution and group encrypt/decrypt, one-time prekey generation, signed prekey rotation, and the pairing device signature. The pairing operation verifies the primary's container and signs only the ADV device-identity message it builds itself, never caller-chosen bytes. A consumed one-time prekey is deleted only after the promoted session is written. Records use wacore's for-store encodings with a per-process incarnation, so a failover reload skips past possibly used chain positions. wacore-recordstore gains a sealed Device namespace for the local key blob. End-to-end tests run two devices over sealed, fenced record stores: both directions, group sender keys, signed prekey rotation, pairing, and a node failover in which the superseded node is fenced out.
Add wacore-signal-wasm, a wasm-bindgen wrapper around wacore-signal-ops. The page supplies a RecordBackend (IndexedDB in a browser) and a Sealer (WebCrypto, so the data key can stay non-extractable); SignalDevice takes the scope's lease and exposes decrypt/encrypt, session setup, sender keys, prekeys, signed prekey rotation, pairing and lease renewal. Errors carry a code: fence_lost, lease_held, pairing_refused, invalid_input, signal, store. The crate compiles only for wasm32. CI builds it, generates Node glue with the wasm-bindgen CLI pinned to Cargo.lock, and runs two devices end to end from JavaScript with a WebCrypto sealer, including a second tab being refused and then fencing out the first.
Decrypt now runs against a staged view of the record store: the ratchet advance, the consumed one-time prekey's removal, any sender-key distribution carried in the message and the buffered result are sealed and written as one fenced batch. A node fenced out mid-receive commits nothing, so its successor still decrypts the same ciphertext. SignalOps::receive decrypts, buffers and classifies a payload with wacore's process_decrypted_plaintext. Redelivery before mark_delivered returns the buffered result; after it, AlreadyDelivered. App-state key shares are surfaced only from the account's own devices, as WA Web gates them. prune_decrypt_buffer drops old entries. wacore-recordstore gains staged views (RecordSignalStore::staged/commit) and DecryptBuffer/SentMessage namespaces reachable through a separate aux API. The wasm bindings expose receive, markDelivered and pruneDecryptBuffer.
SignalOps::send_direct takes the app's waE2E.Message and builds the finished <message> stanza with wacore's prepare_dm_stanza: padding, own-device copies, per-device encryption and session setup from bundles. The WhatsApp client only answers device-list and prekey queries through SendContextResolver and transmits the bytes, so it never sees plaintext. Session changes and the sent-message record (for retry receipts) commit before the stanza is returned. DeviceKeys moves to format 2, adding the paired ADVSignedDeviceIdentity and own PN/LID JIDs; format 1 still decodes. sign_pairing persists the signed identity and set_own_jids records the JIDs after pair success. Every state-changing operation now holds one lock per device: staged views commit whole batches, so concurrent views on the same session would lose a ratchet step.
SignalOps::send_group builds the group stanza with wacore's prepare_group_stanza: the skmsg plus, for devices that do not hold this device's sender key yet, the key encrypted pairwise. Membership and addressing come from the resolver, and LID-mode members are queried by phone number then mapped back, as the client does. A missing own chain forces distribution to every member device. Otherwise only devices not marked warm receive the key, and a companion counts as warm only when its primary does (WA Web's primary-device gate). mark_sender_key_distributed records devices after the server acks, never this account's own devices (WA Web's !isMeDevice); forget_sender_key_devices resets a group after membership changes. Marks live in a sealed SenderKeyDevices namespace.
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SignalOps::resend answers a retry receipt from the sent-message store with wacore's prepare_pairwise_retry_stanza, using the client's routes: direct to the requesting device, or to the group/list with the requester as participant. Keys carried by the receipt start a fresh session; without a session or keys, a bundle is fetched through the resolver, as the client does. Status retransmission is not handled here. establish_session now stages and commits atomically through a shared establish_into. Tests cover a lost delivery and a device reset, with the pairing helper moved to tests/common.
The bindings expose setOwnJids, sendDirect, sendGroup, markSenderKeyDistributed and forgetSenderKeyDevices. The page supplies a SendResolver that relays device-list, prekey and group-routing queries to the WhatsApp client; a PageRuntime runs wacore's spawned work on the JS event loop and times out through setTimeout. Messages travel as encoded waE2E.Message bytes and stanzas come back marshaled, ready to transmit. RemoteBundle::to_prekey_bundle is now public so the bindings validate JS bundles the same way the service does.
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| aad.extend_from_slice(scope); | ||
| aad.push(0); | ||
| aad.extend_from_slice(tag); | ||
| aad.push(0); | ||
| aad.extend_from_slice(key.as_bytes()); |
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Because the AAD concatenates attacker-influenced strings with NUL separators, it is not an injective encoding: for example, (scope="a", ns=session, key="b\0session\0c") and (scope="a\0session\0b", ns=session, key="c") produce identical AAD. The APIs neither reject NULs nor constrain scope strings, and some auxiliary keys deliberately contain NULs, so an untrusted backend can relocate a valid sealed record between crafted scopes/keys without authentication failing. Encode lengths or otherwise escape each component before sealing.
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Fixed in e3cc9ac: every AAD component (domain, scope, namespace, key) is now length-prefixed. Added a test with the colliding pair from this comment.
| if store.load_device_keys().await?.is_some() { | ||
| return Err(OpsError::InvalidInput( | ||
| "scope already has device keys".into(), | ||
| )); |
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When two initializers use the same scope and holder concurrently, LeaseStore::acquire intentionally gives both the same generation, so both can observe no device keys here, generate different identities, and successfully overwrite the same device record. Both SignalOps instances then return as valid while only one identity is durable, silently unlinking the other instance despite this method's stated refusal to replace existing keys. Creation needs an atomic insert-if-absent or equivalent per-scope serialization.
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Fixed in e3cc9ac: device creation now writes through a new exclusive WriteOp::Insert, which fails the whole batch with RecordExists if the key exists. SignalOps::create maps that to the existing refusal. The conformance suite checks that an insert is exclusive and atomic.
| let encoded = waproto::codec::message_to_vec(&message.content.message); | ||
| set(&out, "message", &Uint8Array::from(encoded.as_slice())); |
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For a non-own sender, key_share() correctly leaves ReceivedMessage::app_state_key_share empty, but process_decrypted_plaintext leaves the original protocol_message.app_state_sync_key_share inside content.message, and this line serializes that full message to JavaScript. A peer can therefore surface an app-state key share through message despite the is_from_me gate; remove the gated field from the generic message or return only the separately gated value.
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Fixed in e3cc9ac: for non-own senders, receive now clears app_state_sync_key_share and app_state_sync_key_request from the delivered message itself, not only from the gated field. The receive test asserts the share no longer appears inside the message.
| let ops = match SignalOps::open(store.clone()).await { | ||
| Ok(ops) => ops, | ||
| Err(OpsError::NotInitialised) if create => { | ||
| SignalOps::create(store).await.map_err(ops_error)? | ||
| } | ||
| Err(e) => return Err(ops_error(e)), |
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If loading, decoding, or creating device keys fails after acquire succeeds—for example because the sealer key is wrong or the stored blob is corrupt—this branch returns the error without releasing the newly acquired lease. Since no SignalDevice is returned, the caller cannot release it later, and a healthy holder remains blocked until the TTL expires. Release the acquired lease on every initialization error path.
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Fixed in e3cc9ac: open releases the acquired lease on every failure after acquire. The Node test opens with the wrong key, then confirms another holder can take the scope straight away.
| session_lock: Arc<Mutex<()>>, | ||
| sender_key_locks: Arc<KeyedLocks>, |
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This single device-wide mutex serializes Signal work for every unrelated recipient and group, and send operations hold it while stanza preparation may await prekey resolution, so one slow peer can block all encryption and decryption for the device. Use keyed locks per protocol address (and deterministic multi-address acquisition for fanout) rather than a global session lock.
AGENTS.md reference: AGENTS.md:L44-L44
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Fixed in e3cc9ac: the device-wide lock is gone. Each operation locks the state it writes, in sorted order: the peer session, the sender-key chain, or the group's distribution marks. Sends compute encryption addresses first, so the locks cover exactly the sessions the fan-out writes. A new test shows a receive completing while an unrelated send is stuck on a prekey fetch.
| staged | ||
| .put_aux( | ||
| Namespace::SentMessage, | ||
| &sent_key(to, message_id), | ||
| &encode_sent(&encoded, prepared.message_secret.as_ref()), | ||
| ) |
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Every successful direct or group send stores the complete plaintext message under a normally unique message ID, but the only read path, sent_message, neither consumes nor deletes it, and there is no sent-message pruning API anywhere in these crates. A long-running scope therefore retains all sent plaintext indefinitely and grows its backing store without bound; add age-based pruning or atomic consumption after the retry window.
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Fixed in e3cc9ac: sent-message records now carry an insert time, and prune_sent_messages(cutoff_ms) matches prune_decrypt_buffer.
| pub fn address(user: &str, device: u32) -> ProtocolAddress { | ||
| ProtocolAddress::new(user, DeviceId::from(device)) | ||
| } |
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The binding interprets the WhatsApp companion device as libsignal's DeviceId, so (user="222@s.whatsapp.net", device=1) is stored as 222@s.whatsapp.net.1. Everywhere else in wacore, JidExt::to_protocol_address encodes that same device as 222:1@s.whatsapp.net.0; consequently sessions created through these bindings are invisible to send_direct, send_group, and existing wacore stores, causing duplicate session establishment or missing-session failures when the same sealed store is used across interfaces. Construct a device JID and convert it with the canonical helper instead.
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Fixed in e3cc9ac: the bindings now parse the user JID, apply the device, and use JidExt::to_protocol_address. Sessions made through the bindings are the same records the send and receive paths use.
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Inline comments:
Review comments at @wacore/signal-ops/src/inbound.rs:
- Around line 239-248: Update receive so ordinary errors from
process_sender_key_distribution_into are non-fatal: continue processing the
pairwise message and allow staged.commit() to preserve the ratchet advance and
message contents. Continue propagating fence-loss errors so the staged state is
not committed after losing the fence.
Review comments at @wacore/signal-ops/src/ops.rs:
- Around line 493-504: Add the per-device session lock in
SignalOps::process_sender_key_distribution before accessing the stores or
writing the sender-key record. Hold the lock through
process_sender_key_distribution_message so this direct update cannot race with
staged commits.
Review comments at @wacore/signal-ops/src/outbound.rs:
- Around line 47-59: Update encode_sent and sent_message to include and decode
an insertion timestamp in the sent-message record header, preserving the secret
and message fields. Add prune_sent_messages(cutoff_ms) using the same pruning
pattern as prune_decrypt_buffer so expired Namespace::SentMessage records can be
removed.
Review comments at @wacore/signal-wasm/src/lib.rs:
- Around line 114-120: Update the SignalDevice.open flow around SignalOps::open
so every failure from opening, the create=false uninitialized case, or
SignalOps::create releases the acquired lease via records.release before
returning the original error; ignore release failures.
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📒 Files selected for processing (28)
.github/workflows/wasm.ymlCargo.tomlwacore/recordstore/Cargo.tomlwacore/recordstore/src/conformance.rswacore/recordstore/src/lib.rswacore/recordstore/src/memory.rswacore/recordstore/src/record.rswacore/recordstore/src/seal.rswacore/recordstore/src/signal.rswacore/signal-ops/Cargo.tomlwacore/signal-ops/src/device.rswacore/signal-ops/src/error.rswacore/signal-ops/src/inbound.rswacore/signal-ops/src/lib.rswacore/signal-ops/src/ops.rswacore/signal-ops/src/outbound.rswacore/signal-ops/src/stores.rswacore/signal-ops/tests/common/mod.rswacore/signal-ops/tests/end_to_end.rswacore/signal-ops/tests/receive.rswacore/signal-ops/tests/send.rswacore/signal-wasm/Cargo.tomlwacore/signal-wasm/src/adapters.rswacore/signal-wasm/src/convert.rswacore/signal-wasm/src/lib.rswacore/signal-wasm/src/send.rswacore/signal-wasm/tests/node.test.mjswacore/src/pair.rs
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- recordstore: length-prefix every AAD component so no two (scope, namespace, key) slots seal alike; NUL-joined fields were ambiguous. - recordstore: add WriteOp::Insert (exclusive, fails the batch with RecordExists); SignalOps::create uses it, so concurrent initialisers cannot both write device keys. Covered by the conformance suite. - signal-ops: replace the device-wide lock with keyed locks on the state each operation writes (peer session, sender-key chain, group marks), taken in sorted order. Sends fix encryption addresses up front so the locks cover the sessions they write. A slow prekey fetch no longer blocks unrelated decrypts; process_sender_key_distribution now locks. - signal-ops: strip app-state key shares and requests from non-own senders out of the delivered message, not only the gated field. - signal-ops: a malformed sender-key distribution no longer aborts receive; the message commits and reports sender_key_rejected. - signal-ops: timestamp sent-message records and add prune_sent_messages. - signal-wasm: build protocol addresses with JidExt::to_protocol_address, release the lease when open fails, map insert/record_exists, and drop a rustdoc link that cannot resolve on native targets.
A group retry receipt means the requester may have lost this device's sender key. resend now forgets the requester's distribution mark for the group, so the next group send gives it the key again, matching WA Web and whatsapp-rust's mark_requester_for_fresh_skdm. The group test covers a retry followed by redistribution.
SignalOps::forget_user drops the stored identity and session of every device of one user (matching user and server exactly), under the session locks, in one fenced batch. Exposed to JS as forgetUser. This is the store side of HyperMeow's RemoteSignal.ForgetIdentity.
- SignalOps::migrate_pn_to_lid moves a user's sessions and identities from phone-number to LID addresses, for regular and hosted devices, in one fenced batch under the session locks. PN session wins, LID identity wins, sender keys stay (as whatsapp-rust and WA Web do). Exposed to JS as migratePnToLid. - forget_user also covers the user's hosted (or hosted LID) devices, matching HyperMeow's local identity-change cleanup. - Address matching requires a numeric device suffix, so 'hosted' no longer matches 'hosted.lid' addresses.
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Review comments at @wacore/signal-ops/src/outbound.rs:
- Around line 597-613: Update prune_sent_messages to handle decode_sent failures
without aborting the pruning loop: treat undecodable records as expired or skip
them, so later expired records can still be processed. Keep the change scoped to
this function.
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wacore/recordstore/src/conformance.rswacore/recordstore/src/lib.rswacore/recordstore/src/memory.rswacore/recordstore/src/record.rswacore/recordstore/src/signal.rswacore/signal-ops/Cargo.tomlwacore/signal-ops/src/inbound.rswacore/signal-ops/src/ops.rswacore/signal-ops/src/outbound.rswacore/signal-ops/tests/end_to_end.rswacore/signal-ops/tests/receive.rswacore/signal-ops/tests/send.rswacore/signal-wasm/src/adapters.rswacore/signal-wasm/src/convert.rswacore/signal-wasm/src/lib.rswacore/signal-wasm/tests/node.test.mjs
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| /// Delete sent-message records inserted before `cutoff_ms`; a retry | ||
| /// receipt for an older message can no longer be answered. Returns how | ||
| /// many were removed. | ||
| pub async fn prune_sent_messages(&self, cutoff_ms: u64) -> Result<usize, OpsError> { | ||
| let store = self.store(); | ||
| let mut expired = Vec::new(); | ||
| for key in store.scan_aux(Namespace::SentMessage, "").await? { | ||
| if let Some(record) = store.load_aux(Namespace::SentMessage, &key).await? | ||
| && decode_sent(&record)?.0 < cutoff_ms | ||
| { | ||
| expired.push(key); | ||
| } | ||
| } | ||
| let refs: Vec<&str> = expired.iter().map(String::as_str).collect(); | ||
| store.delete_aux(Namespace::SentMessage, &refs).await?; | ||
| Ok(expired.len()) | ||
| } |
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🩺 Stability & Availability | 🟡 Minor | ⚡ Quick win
One corrupt record stops all pruning.
decode_sent(&record)? returns early when one record is corrupt. No later expired records are deleted after that point. Storage then grows without limit until someone removes the record by hand. Treat records that do not decode as expired, or skip them, so the prune can finish. prune_decrypt_buffer in inbound.rs Line 337 has the same pattern.
Proposed fix
- if let Some(record) = store.load_aux(Namespace::SentMessage, &key).await?
- && decode_sent(&record)?.0 < cutoff_ms
+ if let Some(record) = store.load_aux(Namespace::SentMessage, &key).await?
+ && decode_sent(&record).map_or(true, |(t, _)| t < cutoff_ms)📝 Committable suggestion
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Carefully review the code before committing. Ensure that it accurately replaces the highlighted code, contains no missing lines, and has no issues with indentation. Thoroughly test & benchmark the code to ensure it meets the requirements.
| /// Delete sent-message records inserted before `cutoff_ms`; a retry | |
| /// receipt for an older message can no longer be answered. Returns how | |
| /// many were removed. | |
| pub async fn prune_sent_messages(&self, cutoff_ms: u64) -> Result<usize, OpsError> { | |
| let store = self.store(); | |
| let mut expired = Vec::new(); | |
| for key in store.scan_aux(Namespace::SentMessage, "").await? { | |
| if let Some(record) = store.load_aux(Namespace::SentMessage, &key).await? | |
| && decode_sent(&record)?.0 < cutoff_ms | |
| { | |
| expired.push(key); | |
| } | |
| } | |
| let refs: Vec<&str> = expired.iter().map(String::as_str).collect(); | |
| store.delete_aux(Namespace::SentMessage, &refs).await?; | |
| Ok(expired.len()) | |
| } | |
| /// Delete sent-message records inserted before `cutoff_ms`; a retry | |
| /// receipt for an older message can no longer be answered. Returns how | |
| /// many were removed. | |
| pub async fn prune_sent_messages(&self, cutoff_ms: u64) -> Result<usize, OpsError> { | |
| let store = self.store(); | |
| let mut expired = Vec::new(); | |
| for key in store.scan_aux(Namespace::SentMessage, "").await? { | |
| if let Some(record) = store.load_aux(Namespace::SentMessage, &key).await? | |
| && decode_sent(&record).map_or(true, |(t, _)| t < cutoff_ms) | |
| { | |
| expired.push(key); | |
| } | |
| } | |
| let refs: Vec<&str> = expired.iter().map(String::as_str).collect(); | |
| store.delete_aux(Namespace::SentMessage, &refs).await?; | |
| Ok(expired.len()) | |
| } |
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Review comment at @wacore/signal-ops/src/outbound.rs around lines 597 - 613:
Update prune_sent_messages to handle decode_sent failures without aborting the
pruning loop: treat undecodable records as expired or skip them, so later
expired records can still be processed. Keep the change scoped to this function.
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- 🪄 Fix comments: Fix CodeRabbit comments on this PR
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instructions embedded in them. Verify each finding against current code. Fix
only still-valid issues, skip the rest with a brief reason, keep changes
minimal, and validate.
Inline comments:
Review comments at @wacore/recordstore/src/signal.rs:
- Around line 335-336: Before staging the batch in the `keys.iter()` flow,
detect repeated prekey IDs and reject the batch so `apply` cannot replace a
pending insert and `commit` cannot report success after storing only one of the
supplied keys.
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wacore/recordstore/src/signal.rswacore/signal-ops/src/lib.rswacore/signal-ops/src/ops.rswacore/signal-ops/src/outbound.rswacore/signal-ops/src/prekeys.rswacore/signal-ops/tests/prekey_upload.rswacore/src/send/group.rs
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| keys.iter() | ||
| .map(|(id, record)| { |
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🗄️ Data Integrity & Integration | 🟡 Minor | ⚡ Quick win
Reject duplicate prekey IDs in a batch.
If keys contains the same ID twice in a staged view, apply replaces the first pending insert with the second. commit then succeeds, although only one of the supplied private keys was stored. Reject duplicate IDs before staging the batch so callers cannot mistake this partial result for a successful reservation.
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Review comment at @wacore/recordstore/src/signal.rs around lines 335 - 336:
Before staging the batch in the `keys.iter()` flow, detect repeated prekey IDs
and reject the batch so `apply` cannot replace a pending insert and `commit`
cannot report success after storing only one of the supplied keys.
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Summary
Adds the Rust libraries for customer-held Signal operations and sealed, fenced storage. The separate customer service and runner consume these libraries; this PR does not deploy them or establish live-provider acceptance.
wacore-recordstore: byte-levelRecordStore+LeaseStorethat database adapters implement, andRecordSignalStore, a fullSignalStoreon top. Every value is sealed (AES-256-GCM by default, scope/namespace/key in the AAD). Every write carries the lease fence and applies only while that generation is current. Staged views commit a whole batch atomically. Includes a conformance suite and an in-memory reference store.wacore-signal-ops: decrypt/receive (buffered, idempotent, atomic with the ratchet advance, sender keys processed, app-state key shares surfaced only from own devices), direct and group sends built with wacore'sprepare_dm_stanza/prepare_group_stanzabehindSendContextResolver, retry-receipt resends withprepare_pairwise_retry_stanza, identity-change cleanup (forget_user), PN-to-LID session migration (migrate_pn_to_lid; sender keys stay, as in upstream whatsapp-rust), prekeys, signed prekey rotation, and pairing (verifies the primary's container, signs only the ADV message it builds).wacore-signal-wasm: wasm-bindgen bindings with a JSRecordBackendand a WebCryptoSealer.wacore::pair:do_pair_crypto_withtakes only the identity key and ADV secret;do_pair_cryptodelegates, behaviour unchanged.Design:
internal/docs/superpowers/specs/2026-10-04-customer-owned-data-and-zero-knowledge-sessions.mdin polymorfa/polymorfa (A2 boundary).Impact
Impact table
wacore/recordstore,wacore/signal-ops,wacore/signal-wasm,wacore/src/pair.rs.github/workflows/wasm.ymlNo impact table
cargo test -p wacore --lib pair: 86 passedDurable prekey upload checkpoint (2026-10-15)
Core commit
673bd4c058375eaa41a36a5eadd268756bdc3424, followed by separate lint-only commit47fa2ee9d3701e4d4d51db72e3a462c0c0269017:prepare_prekey_upload(count)publishes a random batch ID and public keys only after counter, exclusive private-key inserts and sealed pending metadata commit atomically. Reopening returns the same live batch; repeated requests do not allocate more keys.acknowledge_prekey_upload(batch_id, exact_ids)accepts unique batch members covering every live key. Previously consumed members may remain in an in-flight ACK. Conditional updates cannot resurrect consumed keys. One sealed last-ACK receipt makes the most recent exact acknowledgment replayable after restart without clearing a newer pending batch.generate_prekeysremains for retry receipts. It now commits counter/private keys atomically, skips existing private records, and reserves every active upload ID even after consumption and 24-bit wrap.SignalOpsinstance per held scope. Its device mutex serializes prepare, ACK and fresh generation; independent instances sharing one lease are not supported.!same && !hostedbecomes!(same || hosted)and!hosted && !same && !warmbecomes!(hosted || same || warm). Device exclusions and short-circuit behavior are preserved.At exact head
47fa2ee9, Rust 1.94 checks passed:cargo clippy --locked -p wacore-signal-ops -p wacore-recordstore --all-targets -- -D warnings(dependencies included; no lint suppressions).cargo test --locked -p wacore-signal-ops -p wacore-recordstore --all-targets: 55 native tests, comprising 18 recordstore, 4 ops unit, 10 end-to-end, 12 prekey-upload, 6 receive and 5 send tests.cargo test --locked -p wacore-signal-ops -p wacore-recordstore --doc: 0 doctests, passed.cargo fmt --all --checkandgit diff --check: passed.The 12 new integration tests cover commit/sealing failures without public-key exposure, reopen/bounded retries, concurrency, exact ACK replay, wrap/consumption/reservation, stale fences, malformed/foreign/incomplete ACKs, corrupted state, allocation limits, exclusive collision rollback, and actual two-device encrypted consumption. They use the in-memory record backend through the real AES-GCM sealed store; no live provider, SQL deployment, browser runtime or registry publication was exercised in this checkpoint.
Six-part checkpoint assessment: API/library updated; SDK/service/WASM consumers blocked on the next exact-pinned producer/consumer steps; CLI unaffected because this adds no command or entrypoint; crate rustdocs updated, coordinated product docs pending with the owner; feature release unchanged and unavailable through this source checkpoint alone; Admin unaffected because this adds only customer-private record state and no staff/platform authority. ZK private keys remain customer held. QuickLink admission and the browser tunnel are unchanged.
Shipped-client evidence: Cellar
whatsapp-1049950004,WAWebUploadPreKeysJob.js:16,34-59(812 upload ceiling and key retrieval),WAWebSignalStoreApi.js:271-287,308-318(pending-key reuse and the shipped range marker). The durable batch token, exact-ID ACK and scan bound are this library's explicit storage contract; this evidence does not prove live-server behavior. The separate codegen IR lock is unchanged.WASM export checkpoint, 2026-10-15
Producer: polymorfa/whatsapp-rust PR5, branch polymorfa/recordstore, starting 47fa2ee. Commit
73891458contains this checkpoint.Exports now include durable preparePrekeyUpload/acknowledgePrekeyUpload, uploadedPrekeyCount, resend and pruneSentMessages. Fresh generatePrekeys remains a separate retry operation. ReceiveResult preserves senderKeyRejected and surfaces appStateKeyShare separately only with explicit boolean consent and own-device evidence; consent defaults off. Canonical application protobuf omits processed app-state and sender-key distribution fields. Generated TypeScript declares the union and retry route types.
Use an initialized wasm-bindgen module exposing SignalDevice, not a bare WebAssembly.Instance. Keep one SignalDevice/SignalOps per held scope. The customer supplies durable fenced atomic RecordBackend storage and an authenticated-AAD Sealer, lease renewal, transport and history consent. Persist application content before markDelivered. App-state sharing permits contact-name, label and mute/archive/pin metadata decryption; message plaintext custody does not imply metadata opacity. uploadedPrekeyCount is surviving local upload state, not provider pool confirmation.
Verification with Rust1.94, wasm-bindgen0.2.128, Node24.15.0 and TypeScript6.0.3:
--no-deps) -Dwarnings passed. Full-dependency wasm32 Clippy -Dwarnings is blocked by4 existing arc_with_non_send_sync warnings in unchanged wacore/src/types/events.rs:538,588,616,717. No suppression or unrelated event-handler change was made.Artifacts, hashes and the Node log are recorded in the external agent handoff.
node/is the executed binding artifact;web/is generated glue only, not browser execution. SHA256SUMS records the release input and Node artifact hashes. Receipts contain synthetic test data only. The native fixture accepts synthetic signing material on stdin and emits only public signed containers or ciphertext stanza metadata; no provider secrets are used.Six-part assessment:
14-layer dependency assessment: core and customer recordstore updated for local uploaded count; WASM updated. Service protocol, HyperMeow, runner, backend, native SDKs, TypeScript wrapper, CLI, Console, Admin, Inspector and browser transport are unchanged or blocked on exact producer integration. QuickLink admission, tunnel authority, Temporal workflows, usage/billing, logging and consent policy remain unchanged. Browser IndexedDB persistence, authenticated grant/reconnect lifecycle, full runtime/browser acceptance, SQL/service deployment, live WhatsApp pairing/provider send, publication and licensing approval were not exercised. A browser build or Node test must not be presented as browser customer support.
Protocol mapping follows existing core APIs, without new Signal algorithms. Existing shipped-client evidence is Cellar whatsapp-1049950004: WAWebUploadPreKeysJob.js:16,34-59; WAWebSignalStoreApi.js:271-287,308-318; WAWebSendRetryMsgJob.js:100-147. This is shipped-client evidence, not live-server proof. The codegen IR lock was not regenerated.
Fresh-only legacy prekey marking checkpoint
Base
7389145852023f3b3fa0750091322ee012724213, branch polymorfa/recordstore, existing whatsapp-rust PR5. Checkpoint4b3b13cais pushed; worktree clean and implementation stopped. This checkpoint changes core authority only; it does not implement the later service wire plan.SignalOps::mark_prekeys_uploadednow delegates to a prekeys-module helper under the same device_write mutex as prepare, ACK and fresh generation. It decodes the existing sealed pending record, rejects the entire legacy request if any ID belongs to the original pending batch (even an already-consumed member), then marks only unrelated fresh IDs through the existing store path. Corrupt pending metadata fails closed. No service-side private-format parsing, store ABI, namespace, wire field or generated export was added. Exact batch ACK still calls staged.store.mark_prekeys_uploaded directly while holding its existing mutex, without recursion or weakening its atomic receipt/retirement transaction.Regression first failed against
73891458on a pending ID. Three new native tests pass: pending and mixed requests perform zero writes; consumed originals remain reserved after filtered recovery; unrelated fresh keys mark successfully; exact batch ACK still works without resurrection/deadlock; corrupt pending state and stale fences reject; a gated pending read proves prepare cannot allocate between the legacy check and flag update. Existing WASM tests now also reject mixed/consumed legacy IDs and successfully mark a fresh retry ID.Checks at this source: 58 native tests (18 recordstore, 4 ops unit, 10 end-to-end, 15 upload, 6 receive, 5 send), 0 doctests; native all-target Clippy -Dwarnings; release WASM build; actual wasm-bindgen0.2.128/Node24 tests18/18; strict generated TypeScript6.0.3 positives and5 negative fixtures; fmt/diff checks. Scoped WASM Clippy -Dwarnings and WASM rustdoc -Dwarnings passed. Prior full-dependency WASM Clippy remains blocked by four unchanged events.rs Arc warnings; this narrow guard does not change them.
Six-part assessment:
14-layer assessment: core updated; recordstore ABI unchanged; WASM inherits guarded semantics with docs/tests; service blocked on exact source repin/additive batch wire; HyperMeow blocked on explicit batch interface; runner blocked on that consumer; backend blocked on wire/vendor and authorized main library pin; native SDK application HTTP unaffected; TypeScript browser wrapper blocked on exact producer integration; CLI unaffected; Console unchanged; Admin unchanged; Inspector unchanged; browser transport/IndexedDB/grant acceptance blocked and unexercised. Customer key custody, explicit app-state metadata exception, QuickLink admission, tunnel grants, Temporal, billing/metering, logging and hosted retention boundaries remain unchanged. No live WhatsApp acceptance, service SQL deployment, package publication or licensing approval was claimed.
Downstream source impact: service must repin ALL wacore/wacore-binary/wacore-recordstore/wacore-signal-ops/waproto dependencies to the final successor of
73891458together. The existing pinnedb69service lacks both durable batch methods and this guard; changing only service parsing is not an acceptable substitute. HyperMeow fresh retry generation/legacy marks remain supported, while ordinary uploads need explicit prepare/ACK with the exact opaque token and full returned membership. See durable-prekey-wire-plan-20261015.md for owning dependency order. No merge, tag, publication, upstream push or automated review was requested.Earlier verification at b69bc85
Tested revision:
b69bc85bonpolymorfa/recordstore(base upstreammainedaa64b6).cargo test -p wacore-recordstore -p wacore-signal-ops: 43 passed (18 store, 4 device unit, 10 end-to-end, 6 receive, 5 send).forget_userdrops every device of one user, including hosted devices, and keeps1234, the same user onlidandhosted.lid;migrate_pn_to_lidmoves regular and hosted devices to the LID (PN session wins, LID identity wins) and is a no-op when repeated.cargo clippy -p wacore-recordstore -p wacore-signal-ops --all-targets -- -D warnings: clean. wasm32 clippy (--no-deps) on all three crates: clean.node --test wacore/signal-wasm/tests/node.test.mjs: 9 passed (WebCrypto sealer, lease takeover between tabs, receive/markDelivered, sends through a JS resolver,forgetUser,migratePnToLid).cargo fmt --all -- --check: clean.RUSTDOCFLAGS=-D warnings cargo doc --no-depson the three crates: clean.e3cc9ac1; each thread has a reply naming the change.33a440e3addsforget_user, the store side of HyperMeow'sRemoteSignal.ForgetIdentity(raised by Codex on Remote Signal keys for zero-knowledge linked devices hypermeow#48).b69bc85baddsmigrate_pn_to_lid, covers hosted devices inforget_user, and fixes address matching sohostedno longer matchedhosted.lidaddresses.The earlier snapshot reported CI blockers (not refreshed for this checkpoint):
E2E TestsandRun CodSpeed integration benchmarksfail before running any code becauseBARTENDER_GHCR_TOKENis not configured in this repository (.github/workflows/e2e.yml:43,.github/workflows/codspeed.yml:196). They need that secret and pull access to the mock-server image. The other CodSpeed jobs fail uploading results with401 Unauthorizedbecause no CodSpeed token is configured here. This PR does not touch those workflows.Not verified here: real WhatsApp acceptance, the new upload operations over the service wire or a full browser runtime, registry publication or deployment. The earlier WASM report measured 675 KB before wasm-opt; the core-only checkpoint did not rebuild that artifact; the newer WASM checkpoint below does.
Session provenance and UI evidence
internal/agent-sessions/with the monorepo backend PR.e3cc9ac1; no published checkpoint yet.Rollout and rollback
Library source only, with unmerged companion consumers. Merge/publication/deployment need separate authorization and exact consumer pins. The new durable batch methods now reach WASM, but still need the service wire and exact-pinned browser wrapper before claiming deployed upload retry recovery. Before deployment, rollback can revert these source commits; any later consumer rollback must preserve device/private-key/auxiliary records and verify pin compatibility. Licensing note: the repository is public;
wacore-libsignalcarries AGPL-3.0 Signal files despite its MIT manifest, and the AGPL legal review in the spec is still open.Summary by CodeRabbit