fix(security): restrict settings.json permissions and stop caching the raw apiKey

packages/core/src/common/openai-client.ts

@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+import { createHash } from "crypto";
 import * as fs from "fs";
 import * as os from "os";
 import * as path from "path";
@@ -72,7 +73,9 @@ export function createOpenAIClient(projectRoot: string = process.cwd()): {
     };
   }
 
-  const cacheKey = `${connection.apiKey}::${connection.baseURL}`;
+  // Cache key hashes the apiKey so the raw secret never lingers in module
+  // state (a heap dump / crash report would otherwise contain it verbatim).
+  const cacheKey = `${createHash("sha256").update(connection.apiKey).digest("hex").slice(0, 16)}::${connection.baseURL}`;
   if (cachedOpenAI && cachedOpenAIKey === cacheKey) {
     return {
       client: cachedOpenAI,

packages/core/src/common/private-storage.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,138 @@
+/**
+ * User-private filesystem helpers for DeepCode runtime state.
+ *
+ * DeepCode stores API keys and session data under the user's home directory.
+ * POSIX callers should rely on explicit mode bits (0600/0700) rather than the
+ * process umask, which is commonly permissive on desktop systems.  Windows
+ * ignores POSIX mode bits, so we additionally restrict the NTFS ACL to the
+ * current user — matching the 0600 intent.
+ */
+
+import childProcess from "child_process";
+import * as fs from "fs";
+import * as os from "os";
+import * as path from "path";
+
+/** POSIX mode for private files: owner read/write only. */
+export const PRIVATE_FILE_MODE = 0o600;
+/** POSIX mode for private directories: owner rwx only. */
+export const PRIVATE_DIRECTORY_MODE = 0o700;
+
+/**
+ * Resolve the current Windows user as a fully-qualified principal
+ * (``DOMAIN\user``) so ACL grants are unambiguous across machines/domains.
+ *
+ * ``USERDOMAIN``/``USERNAME`` win when present: they are set by Windows for
+ * every process, whereas under MSYS/Git-Bash a POSIX ``whoami`` earlier in
+ * PATH answers with a bare, ambiguous name.
+ *
+ * Returns null when the identity cannot be resolved (callers no-op).
+ */
+export function windowsIdentity(): string | null {
+  if (process.platform !== "win32") {
+    return null;
+  }
+  const { USERDOMAIN, USERNAME } = process.env;
+  if (USERDOMAIN && USERNAME) {
+    return `${USERDOMAIN}\\${USERNAME}`;
+  }
+  try {
+    const stdout = childProcess.execFileSync("whoami", {
+      encoding: "utf8",
+      timeout: 5000,
+      windowsHide: true,
+      stdio: ["ignore", "pipe", "ignore"],
+    });
+    const principal = stdout.trim();
+    return principal || null;
+  } catch {
+    return null;
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Restrict an NTFS path to the current user (Windows only; no-op elsewhere).
+ *
+ * Two idempotent steps, ordered fail-safe — grant before strip:
+ *  1. ``icacls /grant:r`` grants the current user exclusive full control
+ *     (``:r`` replaces, does not append).  For a directory the grant carries
+ *     ``(OI)(CI)`` so it is inherited by existing and future children.
+ *  2. ``icacls /inheritance:r`` removes inherited ACEs so a permissive parent
+ *     (e.g. the profile root granting ``Authenticated Users``) no longer
+ *     applies.  For a directory this propagates to children, which is why the
+ *     grant above must already name this user.
+ *
+ * The order matters: if the grant is issued first and fails, the inherited
+ * ACEs are still in place and the path stays usable.  Stripping first can
+ * leave the path (and, via inheritance, its children) with no ACE at all — the
+ * next open then throws ``EPERM`` and the state file becomes unreachable.
+ *
+ * Returns whether the ACL now grants the current user alone.  Failures are
+ * reported, never thrown: callers decide whether an unprotected path is
+ * acceptable.  Note the argv must not repeat the program name — passing
+ * ``icacls icacls <path>`` makes icacls exit with ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER (87)
+ * and leave the ACL untouched, which is how this helper silently no-opped
+ * before.
+ */
+export function restrictWindowsAcl(targetPath: string, isDirectory = false): boolean {
+  if (process.platform !== "win32") {
+    return true;
+  }
+  const identity = windowsIdentity();
+  if (!identity) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  const grantee = isDirectory ? `${identity}:(OI)(CI)F` : `${identity}:F`;
+  const runIcacls = (args: string[]): boolean => {
+    try {
+      childProcess.execFileSync("icacls", args, {
+        encoding: "utf8",
+        timeout: 15000,
+        windowsHide: true,
+        stdio: ["ignore", "pipe", "ignore"],
+      });
+      return true;
+    } catch {
+      return false; // best-effort: keep the caller moving, but do not pretend
+    }
+  };
+  // Grant first: if this fails the inherited ACEs are still in place, so the
+  // path stays usable.  Stripping first could leave a path with no ACE at all.
+  if (!runIcacls([targetPath, "/grant:r", grantee])) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  // Then drop the inherited ACEs.  For a directory this propagates to
+  // children, which is why the grant above must already name this user.
+  if (!runIcacls([targetPath, "/inheritance:r"])) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  return true;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Write a private file with user-only permissions on every platform.
+ *
+ * - POSIX: mode 0600 (applied by the write itself, subject to umask).
+ * - Windows: mode bits are ignored by the OS, so we grant the current user
+ *   exclusive full control first and then remove inherited ACEs.
+ *
+ * Returns true when the platform's permission model was applied as requested.
+ */
+export function writePrivateFile(targetPath: string, contents: string): boolean {
+  fs.writeFileSync(targetPath, contents, { encoding: "utf8", mode: PRIVATE_FILE_MODE });
+  return process.platform === "win32" ? restrictWindowsAcl(targetPath) : true;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Ensure a directory exists with user-only permissions (0700 on POSIX;
+ * current-user-only ACL on Windows).  Returns true when applied as requested.
+ */
+export function ensurePrivateDirectory(dirPath: string): boolean {
+  fs.mkdirSync(dirPath, { recursive: true, mode: PRIVATE_DIRECTORY_MODE });
+  return process.platform === "win32" ? restrictWindowsAcl(dirPath, true) : true;
+}
+
+/** Home directory used for DeepCode user state. */
+export function deepcodeHome(): string {
+  return path.join(os.homedir(), ".deepcode");
+}

packages/core/src/settings.ts

@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ import { DEEPSEEK_V4_MODELS, defaultsToThinkingMode, type MultimodalMode } from
 import * as fs from "fs";
 import * as os from "os";
 import * as path from "path";
+import { ensurePrivateDirectory, writePrivateFile } from "./common/private-storage";
 
 export type DeepcodingEnv = Record<string, string | undefined> & {
   MODEL?: string;
@@ -820,8 +821,8 @@ export function readProjectSettings(projectRoot: string = process.cwd()): Deepco
 }
 
 function writeSettingsFile(settingsPath: string, settings: DeepcodingSettings): void {
-  fs.mkdirSync(path.dirname(settingsPath), { recursive: true });
-  fs.writeFileSync(settingsPath, `${JSON.stringify(settings, null, 2)}\n`, "utf8");
+  ensurePrivateDirectory(path.dirname(settingsPath));
+  writePrivateFile(settingsPath, `${JSON.stringify(settings, null, 2)}\n`);
 }
 
 export function writeSettings(settings: DeepcodingSettings): void {

packages/core/src/tests/private-storage.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,201 @@
+import { afterEach, describe, it, type TestContext } from "node:test";
+import assert from "node:assert/strict";
+import childProcess from "child_process";
+import * as fs from "fs";
+import * as os from "os";
+import * as path from "path";
+import {
+  PRIVATE_FILE_MODE,
+  PRIVATE_DIRECTORY_MODE,
+  ensurePrivateDirectory,
+  restrictWindowsAcl,
+  windowsIdentity,
+  writePrivateFile,
+} from "../common/private-storage";
+
+const tempDirs: string[] = [];
+
+function tempDir(prefix: string): string {
+  const dir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), prefix));
+  tempDirs.push(dir);
+  return dir;
+}
+
+afterEach(() => {
+  for (const dir of tempDirs.splice(0)) {
+    fs.rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true });
+  }
+});
+
+/**
+ * Pretend to be Windows and record every execFileSync call.  The platform
+ * property is patched so these regression tests run on every OS upstream CI
+ * uses — the icacls ordering bug is Windows-only and would otherwise get zero
+ * coverage off-Windows.  ``restore()`` puts platform/env back; the mock itself
+ * is unwound by node:test at test end.
+ */
+function pretendWindows(
+  t: TestContext,
+  impl: (cmd: string, args: string[]) => string
+): { calls: string[][]; restore: () => void } {
+  const platformDesc = Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor(process, "platform");
+  Object.defineProperty(process, "platform", { value: "win32", configurable: true });
+  const prevDomain = process.env.USERDOMAIN;
+  const prevUser = process.env.USERNAME;
+  process.env.USERDOMAIN = "TESTDOM";
+  process.env.USERNAME = "testuser";
+  const calls: string[][] = [];
+  t.mock.method(childProcess, "execFileSync", (cmd: string, args: string[] = []) => {
+    calls.push([cmd, ...args]);
+    return impl(cmd, args);
+  });
+  return {
+    calls,
+    restore: () => {
+      if (platformDesc) {
+        Object.defineProperty(process, "platform", platformDesc);
+      }
+      if (prevDomain === undefined) delete process.env.USERDOMAIN;
+      else process.env.USERDOMAIN = prevDomain;
+      if (prevUser === undefined) delete process.env.USERNAME;
+      else process.env.USERNAME = prevUser;
+    },
+  };
+}
+
+describe("private-storage", () => {
+  it("writes files with 0600 mode on POSIX", () => {
+    if (process.platform === "win32") {
+      return; // mode bits are ignored on Windows
+    }
+    const dir = tempDir("dc-priv-posix-");
+    const file = path.join(dir, "secret.json");
+    // The strict return value is part of the contract: true means the caller
+    // has a private file, false must never masquerade as success.
+    assert.equal(writePrivateFile(file, "{}"), true, "writePrivateFile must report success");
+    const mode = fs.statSync(file).mode & 0o777;
+    assert.equal(mode, PRIVATE_FILE_MODE, "file must be 0600");
+  });
+
+  it("creates directories with 0700 mode on POSIX", () => {
+    if (process.platform === "win32") {
+      return;
+    }
+    const base = tempDir("dc-priv-dir-");
+    const dir = path.join(base, ".deepcode", "nested");
+    assert.equal(ensurePrivateDirectory(dir), true, "ensurePrivateDirectory must report success");
+    const mode = fs.statSync(dir).mode & 0o777;
+    assert.equal(mode, PRIVATE_DIRECTORY_MODE, "directory must be 0700");
+  });
+
+  it("restricts the Windows ACL to the current user (Windows only)", (t) => {
+    if (process.platform !== "win32") {
+      return;
+    }
+    const dir = tempDir("dc-priv-acl-");
+    const file = path.join(dir, "credentials.json");
+    const applied = writePrivateFile(file, "{}");
+    if (!applied) {
+      // Say "not verified" out loud instead of passing vacuously: a file that
+      // icacls could not touch must never look like a green ACL test.
+      t.skip("icacls could not restrict the ACL in this environment");
+      return;
+    }
+
+    const out = childProcess.execFileSync("icacls", [file], {
+      encoding: "utf8",
+      windowsHide: true,
+    });
+
+    // 1. /inheritance:r really ran: not one inherited ACE may survive.  This is
+    //    the assertion that catches a silent no-op, where the file keeps the
+    //    permissive ACEs it inherited from its parent directory.
+    assert.ok(!out.includes("(I)"), `inherited ACEs still apply:\n${out}`);
+
+    // 2. The current user keeps full control.  icacls prints `DOMAIN\user:(F)`
+    //    for an explicit ACE and `DOMAIN\user:(I)(F)` when it is inherited, so
+    //    read the exact principal back instead of matching a loose pattern.
+    const identity = windowsIdentity();
+    assert.ok(identity, "windowsIdentity() must resolve the current user");
+    assert.ok(out.includes(`${identity}:(F)`), `${identity} must keep (F):\n${out}`);
+
+    // 3. No broad principal keeps access.  These are the English Windows names;
+    //    a localized build passes this trivially, which assertion 1 covers.
+    for (const broad of ["Authenticated Users", "Everyone"]) {
+      assert.ok(!out.includes(broad), `must not grant ${broad}:\n${out}`);
+    }
+  });
+
+  it("is idempotent when called repeatedly", () => {
+    const dir = tempDir("dc-priv-again-");
+    const file = path.join(dir, "x.json");
+    const first = writePrivateFile(file, "1");
+    const second = writePrivateFile(file, "2");
+    assert.equal(fs.readFileSync(file, "utf8"), "2", "last write must win");
+    assert.equal(second, first, "repeated writes must report the same outcome");
+  });
+
+  it("grants the user before stripping inheritance (fail-safe order)", (t) => {
+    // Regression: when the strip ran first, a failed grant left the path with
+    // no ACE at all and the next write threw EPERM (errno -4048).
+    const { calls, restore } = pretendWindows(t, () => "");
+    try {
+      assert.equal(restrictWindowsAcl("C:\\state\\settings.json"), true, "clean run must report success");
+    } finally {
+      restore();
+    }
+    assert.deepEqual(
+      calls.map((args) => args.slice(1)),
+      [
+        ["C:\\state\\settings.json", "/grant:r", "TESTDOM\\testuser:F"],
+        ["C:\\state\\settings.json", "/inheritance:r"],
+      ],
+      "the grant must be issued before the inheritance strip"
+    );
+  });
+
+  it("keeps the inherited ACEs when the grant fails (no lockout)", (t) => {
+    const { calls, restore } = pretendWindows(t, (_cmd, args) => {
+      if (args.includes("/grant:r")) {
+        throw Object.assign(new Error("icacls: Access is denied."), { status: 5 });
+      }
+      return "";
+    });
+    try {
+      assert.equal(restrictWindowsAcl("C:\\state\\settings.json"), false, "a failed grant must report failure");
+    } finally {
+      restore();
+    }
+    // Negative control: stripping after a failed grant is the lockout.  The
+    // inherited ACEs must stay untouched so the path remains usable.
+    assert.ok(
+      calls.some((args) => args.includes("/grant:r")),
+      "the grant must have been attempted"
+    );
+    assert.ok(
+      calls.every((args) => !args.includes("/inheritance:r")),
+      `inheritance must not be stripped after a failed grant: ${JSON.stringify(calls)}`
+    );
+  });
+
+  it("directory grants are inheritable so children keep access", (t) => {
+    // Root cause companion: /inheritance:r on a directory propagates to its
+    // children, so the grant must already reach them ((OI)(CI)) or the state
+    // files inside become unopenable.
+    const { calls, restore } = pretendWindows(t, () => "");
+    const dir = tempDir("dc-priv-dir-acl-");
+    try {
+      assert.equal(ensurePrivateDirectory(path.join(dir, "deep")), true, "directory must report success");
+    } finally {
+      restore();
+    }
+    assert.deepEqual(
+      calls.map((args) => args.slice(1)),
+      [
+        [path.join(dir, "deep"), "/grant:r", "TESTDOM\\testuser:(OI)(CI)F"],
+        [path.join(dir, "deep"), "/inheritance:r"],
+      ],
+      "directory grants must be inheritable and come first"
+    );
+  });
+});