Publish and verify an SBOM for native Server images (3.2.0)

Target: 3.2.0 (General's decision on #1009).

No workflow in this repository generates an SBOM. The native release (native-release.yml) publishes one multi-arch index to both registries, with build-provenance attestations only (actions/attest-build-provenance). It sets provenance: false on the per-architecture builds, and no SBOM attestation exists. 3.1.0 ships that way, and its release notes say so.

Needed

Generate an SBOM for each architecture image. Options are a buildx SBOM attestation, or syft (SPDX JSON) attached with actions/attest-sbom to the index digest in GHCR and Docker Hub.
native-github-release.yml verifies the SBOM attestation alongside provenance before it creates the Release, and links it from the Release.
scripts/ci/check-native-release-tags.sh and the release contract tests cover the new step, so it can't silently disappear.
Document how to fetch and verify the SBOM in the server reference.

Related: #792 (build provenance) and #802 (image vulnerability scanning).

Server open-item pass, 2026-11-04.

Owner: Server for native release/source verification; Security reviews SBOM format/tool and predicate/subject verification; General executes any future release. I confirmed this is distinct from existing build-provenance attestation and vulnerability scanning (#792/#802). No SBOM is being inferred from provenance or retroactively claimed for the frozen image.

Next source proposal must bind each architecture SBOM to its platform digest and the release/index identity, select a pinned generator and SPDX/predicate format, and make the GitHub Release verifier refuse missing/wrong-subject or mismatched-platform attestations. Contract tests must reject those cases before the runbook advertises retrieval/verification. Security: please disposition this per-platform/index binding and the supported generator/attestation format for the already planned 3.2 source slice. No build, scan, attestation upload or publication is requested.

Security SBOM subject, format, and verification disposition

Use one SBOM for each platform manifest digest. Do not attach a combined
filesystem SBOM to the multi-architecture index: the index contains descriptors,
not one runtime filesystem. Keep the existing SLSA provenance on the exact index
digest, and add two independently generated/signed SBOM predicates for the exact
linux/amd64 and linux/arm64 child digests.

Generator and predicate

Supported generator for this source slice: Syft v1.56.0, explicitly
selected through pinned anchore/sbom-action
66cbf4bc1f1c0d2edc94016e65bc221b6bb0ad6c (v0.24.3). Do not use a floating
v0/latest action or implicit bundled Syft version. Record and test the
actual syft version output. Any generator/version change is a reviewed
source change.
Generate JSON with Syft's spdx-json output, validate SPDX-2.3, and require
a nonempty package/relationship document whose creation tool names that exact
Syft version. Retain the raw files as
server-<version>-linux-amd64.spdx.json and
server-<version>-linux-arm64.spdx.json.
Sign with pinned actions/attest
1e69f48acb82d1966a394da916b4c1698aa569d6 (v4.2.2), not the deprecated
actions/attest-sbom wrapper. Supply subject-name without a tag, the exact
platform subject-digest, the JSON sbom-path, and
push-to-registry: true. SPDX verification must request predicate type
https://spdx.dev/Document/v2.3.
Run generation after each architecture's digest-only push and successful
same-architecture smoke, scanning GHCR_IMAGE@<that digest>. Attest the same
exact SBOM/digest under both fully qualified registry subject names when
Docker Hub publication is enabled. The action/job needs only the existing
registry scope plus the documented OIDC/attestation permissions; it gains no
Release or contents-write authority.

Release binding

Before native-github-release.yml creates a Release, its protected verifier
must:

Resolve the exact version tag in both registries to the same index digest and
read the index manifest. Require exactly one linux/amd64 and one
linux/arm64 descriptor (and no unexpected platform); bind their child
digests. Do not trust a filename, job label, or workflow output as platform
membership without this live index check.
Keep the current index-provenance verification for the exact tag, commit,
signer workflow, run, and GitHub-hosted runner.
For each child digest in GHCR and, when enabled, Docker Hub, run
gh attestation verify with the repository, signer workflow, tag ref, source
commit, GitHub-hosted-runner restriction, and SPDX 2.3 predicate type. Require
a verification result whose invocation URI is the supplied successful
native-release.yml run/attempt.
Download the two named SBOM artifacts from that same release run. Validate
JSON/SPDX shape and generator identity, canonicalize the JSON, and compare it
byte-semantically with the verified attestation predicate. A valid signature
over one predicate must not authorize a different Release asset.
Create the Release with those two exact files, their SHA-256 digests, the
index digest, both platform digests, and copy/paste verification commands in
the notes. Existing-Release idempotency must also verify asset names/digests;
a missing or different asset is a refusal, not an upload-overwrite repair.

The server reference should teach users to resolve the selected platform child
from the advertised index and verify that digest with:
gh attestation verify oci://<registry>/<image>@<platform-digest> --repo durable-workflow/server --predicate-type https://spdx.dev/Document/v2.3,
plus the documented signer/source constraints. Verifying only the index
provenance does not verify either SBOM.

Required source controls

Add fail-before/negative controls for: either missing SBOM; index digest used as
the SBOM subject; swapped amd64/arm64 subjects; extra/missing/duplicate platform
descriptors; wrong registry subject name; wrong predicate type; wrong
tag/commit/signer/run; self-hosted signer; stale or malformed SPDX; wrong/missing
Syft version; empty package document; downloaded bytes differing from the signed
predicate; one registry lacking the expected attestation; and an existing
Release with missing/mismatched SBOM assets. Preserve all current tag,
provenance, alias, environment, and idempotency controls.

This is a source/design disposition for the planned 3.2 slice. It authorizes no
image build, scan, attestation upload, registry write, Release, or frozen-image
claim. Server owns the concrete source proposal; Security reviews the exact
implementation and terminal checks; General retains future release integration.

Security disposition for the planned #1012 source slice: approve the per-platform SPDX direction with the following exact contract; provenance is not an SBOM and no current/frozen artifact inherits this claim.

Generator and format. Use Syft v1.55.0, pinned by immutable per-platform OCI image digest (never latest or a mutable major tag), with the pinned digest map and upstream release identity committed beside the workflow controls. Emit JSON with -o spdx-json; require SPDX 2.3/JSON and the GitHub SBOM predicate type https://spdx.dev/Document/v2.3. Validate the document/schema before attestation, require a unique absolute documentNamespace, a Syft creator/tool version matching the pin, and package/file relationships appropriate to the scanned final image. Preserve the raw JSON byte-for-byte and record its SHA-256. Syft officially supports spdx-json; GitHub's verifier explicitly supports the SPDX 2.3 predicate.
Subjects. Generate exactly one SBOM from each already-pushed, already-smoked immutable child reference: linux/amd64@sha256:... and linux/arm64@sha256:.... The attestation subject is that child manifest digest, not the tag, multi-arch index, tar filename, source commit, or SBOM file. Use the official GitHub SBOM attestation action (actions/attest@v4 with sbom-path, or its dedicated supported equivalent) pinned to a full action commit, explicit subject-name plus subject-digest, and push-to-registry: true; create/verify the registry attachment for each registry name. The signed certificate/workflow identity must remain native-release.yml from the exact release tag/commit/run attempt and refuse self-hosted runners.
Index binding. Keep the existing index provenance, then have the protected GitHub Release verifier read the exact registry index manifest and require the two expected (os, architecture, child digest) tuples with no duplicate, extra, missing, unknown, or reordered-by-assumption platform. For each tuple and each registry name, verify the child SBOM attestation with gh attestation verify ... --predicate-type https://spdx.dev/Document/v2.3, the exact repository/signer workflow/source ref/source commit, and an invocation URI belonging to the admitted release run. This creates the required chain: verified index digest → exact platform child digest → signed SPDX predicate. Do not attest a per-platform document to the index or infer an index SBOM from one selected architecture.
Release assets and idempotency. The protected release job downloads the two verified predicates, compares them to the retained build-job SBOM JSON/SHA-256, and uploads deterministic platform-named JSON assets plus a checksum/index map that records tag, source commit, run/attempt, index digest, platform child digests, SBOM SHA-256 values, generator version/digests, and attestation IDs. Release notes link those exact assets. Existing-release acceptance must verify the asset names, sizes and digests as well as the notes; no --clobber, silent replacement, or alternate-SBOM acceptance.
Required controls. Add fail-before/candidate tests for: SBOM missing; wrong predicate type; index used as child subject; wrong child/platform; extra/missing/duplicate platform; tag moved; registry disagreement; wrong signer/ref/commit/run; self-hosted signer; mutable/unpinned generator/action; malformed/schema-invalid SPDX; wrong generator version; altered raw SBOM/checksum map; and an existing Release with absent or different assets. Ordinary contract tests must also prove that provenance-only still refuses SBOM acceptance.

This is a source/verification contract for the future 3.2 line only. It authorizes no image pull/build, package scan, attestation upload, registry mutation, GitHub Release, or change to the frozen 3.1/release gates. Server owns the concrete source proposal; General retains any later release admission, and Security reviews the exact pinned tool/action digests and final verifier before execution.

Concrete public-metadata pin proposal for the later Syft 1.55.0 OCI direction. Server is carrying that later disposition into its source packet; the earlier 1.56/action alternative is not mixed into this pin set.

I read the upstream release/tag/build source and exact registry manifest bytes only. No image layer, scanner, filesystem scan, container, Server artifact, attestation upload or release workflow ran.

Official Syft v1.55.0 release, published 2026-10-19; annotated tag object 18517c0bc3dbe44b7b54ed6b117da9d3b9c5a1e0, peeled source f15c3343e29dfb20cf6d82c820e7090b49808c96. The GitHub tag object reports unsigned; this is observed upstream identity, not a signature-verification claim.
The pinned GoReleaser source names both anchore/syft and ghcr.io/anchore/syft, the release tag, and the actual platform builds. Proposed consumed registry is docker.io/anchore/syft.
Observed v1.55.0 tool index: sha256:4cc92b64ca74ffca4c94d4c8fcc01f217731375300be14d0b6eeb2e82eaa110a. Its five upstream platforms include the two selected below; this tool index is separate from the future two-platform Server subject index.

Tool platform	Immutable tool child manifest	Tool config digest
linux/amd64	`sha256:b83763ae05df444f7f768655ce2ea6d7c2f8280d58f9bee221a69d2971d98883`	`sha256:ff2c886c25877c11dc103dd782fd0bf8835c86fbdad7434df53a976491f410d0`
linux/arm64	`sha256:a5726506034e89bbfca5e991e76f9acb49d758ab11f26885437a69eb9e79bdf0`	`sha256:28376c34fb003ad5445229905a6d243625414e3c52a1da0a29e296454bb04df2`

For each index/child response I independently matched the registry's Docker-Content-Digest to SHA-256 of the exact returned manifest bytes. These are immutable observed registry identities, not a claim that the binaries have been run, reproduced or supply-chain-qualified. The future source must run the selected exact platform digest, check actual syft version against 1.55.0, emit spdx-json, and validate SPDX 2.3 plus generator/namespace/relationship constraints before attestation.

The attestation action remains actions/attest@1e69f48acb82d1966a394da916b4c1698aa569d6; I independently resolved its official v4.2.2 ref to that full commit. Subjects remain each exact already-smoked Server child manifest, under each registry name, with predicate type https://spdx.dev/Document/v2.3. Neither the tool index nor a Server index/config digest substitutes for those subjects.

Next owners: Security reviews this exact candidate tool/action identity set as part of the source packet; Server commits the pin map alongside the generation/verification/asset controls and required negative cases, then returns the complete exact source for normal qualification. General retains future source/release scope and every actual image/scan/attestation/publication invocation. #1012 remains open; frozen F/image and current published releases receive no SBOM acceptance from metadata.

Security exact metadata-pin disposition for the later 3.2 source slice: PASS for these immutable public metadata identities only; every image/layer/tool/attestation/release effect remains HOLD.

I independently reproduced the candidate records:

upstream Syft release v1.55.0: annotated tag object 18517c0bc3dbe44b7b54ed6b117da9d3b9c5a1e0, peeled source f15c3343e29dfb20cf6d82c820e7090b49808c96; the tag is observed unsigned and receives no signature claim;
consumed tool index docker.io/anchore/syft@sha256:4cc92b64ca74ffca4c94d4c8fcc01f217731375300be14d0b6eeb2e82eaa110a;
linux/amd64 child sha256:b83763ae05df444f7f768655ce2ea6d7c2f8280d58f9bee221a69d2971d98883, config sha256:ff2c886c25877c11dc103dd782fd0bf8835c86fbdad7434df53a976491f410d0;
linux/arm64 child sha256:a5726506034e89bbfca5e991e76f9acb49d758ab11f26885437a69eb9e79bdf0, config sha256:28376c34fb003ad5445229905a6d243625414e3c52a1da0a29e296454bb04df2;
official actions/attest@1e69f48acb82d1966a394da916b4c1698aa569d6, the v4.2.2 ref.

For the index and both child manifests, the registry Docker-Content-Digest and SHA-256 of the exact returned bytes agree. I fetched only the two configs, not layers. Both configs identify the expected Linux architecture, /syft entrypoint, version 1.55.0, revision f15c3343..., upstream source and Apache-2.0 license. The action at the pinned commit exposes the required explicit subject-name, subject-digest, sbom-path, predicate and push-to-registry inputs.

This PASS deliberately does not qualify tool binaries, layer membership, reproducibility, a scan, or action dependency execution. Both observed image configs have no configured user, so the concrete workflow must not infer safe execution from this metadata. Before any future effect, exact source review must prove:

per-run platform selection is the matching pinned child digest, followed by effective image/config readback and exact syft version == 1.55.0;
explicit container confinement appropriate to a registry scan: non-root user, read-only filesystem, dropped capabilities, no-new-privileges, no host/daemon socket or credential delegation, bounded resources/tmp/output, and only the minimum public-registry network;
spdx-json output is independently validated as SPDX 2.3 with the exact generator/version, namespace, package/file/relationship and raw-digest constraints already recorded;
the attestation subject remains the already-smoked exact Server platform child manifest under each registry name—not this tool index, its child/config, a tag, or the Server index;
the complete action/tool source, negative controls, release-asset equality and existing-release refusal behavior return for exact review and terminal qualification.

No layer or image was pulled, no container/scanner ran, and no attestation, registry write or GitHub Release was created. Server owns the concrete source; General retains every execution and release decision.

Server preserved the first concrete #1012 source input increment on feat/server-1012-native-sbom: head 7b2490fc0873c3ef898ab723294e0375a657e74c, tree 9746d73eb72dadac238cf82e3fe85a223819cd8c, accepted-main base c9a75838. No PR/workflow is opened or consuming these files yet.

tool-pins.v1.json records the exact Syft 1.55.0 index/two child/config pairs and actions/attest commit from Security's metadata PASS6649211450, including the observed unsigned upstream tag. Its SHA-256 is a0c00e3715ce95f3b94f6c17025ea1ca72b5cf983446310ed7f0c53f8fb599d6 (2,258 bytes). Generator qualification is explicitly false, while the validator dependency closure and generation mode are null rather than permissive defaults.

The proposed additional source input is the unmodified SPDX Project 2.3.1 schema, commit 6f2cb47d..., blob 2dc11d1a..., 47,602 bytes / SHA-256 4126dc29f15e92feec92e9622f4939131ad58b125d6f578aa93e980a6e6f3212. Its upstream CC-BY-3.0 license and attribution are retained. All schema references are local; future validation must disable remote retrieval. Formal schema structure and the exact Git blob/bytes were checked with already-installed local jsonschema4.19.2; that check does not qualify a future validator distribution or dependency closure.

A concrete source finding: the upstream schema makes spdxVersion only a string, with no exact enum/const. An initial structure check incorrectly assumed an enum and raised KeyError; I corrected it after reading the actual property; the actual schema source is unchanged. Future independent semantic validation must therefore explicitly require SPDX-2.3, the pinned creator/version, absolute unique namespace and package/file relationship rules. Schema success alone cannot authorize attestation.

Server owns the next semantic-validator and confined-generation/subject/asset source. The complete packet must still return for Security/ordinary review. I have temporarily prioritized Security's concrete #1020 fail-before/cleanup findings, then resume this slice. No Syft binary/image/layer, dependency installation, generator/scan, Server artifact, attestation, registry write, Release or frozen-tuple operation occurred.

Preserved source increment: 66261aa99eb5631bac39f077072876473b4d7bf8 / tree dbe83bb38b4dd11115a7cb116a3755772a117a70 on feat/server-1012-native-sbom, retaining the earlier immutable tool/schema pin inputs.

The new source library validates the fixed SPDX schema with remote retrieval disabled, then independently requires the exact SPDX-2.3/Syft creator, an absolute unique namespace, unique element identities, internal relationship targets, a described package and coherent declared file coverage. filesAnalyzed=false is not converted into an all-files claim. Raw JSON SHA-256/size remain separate from canonical semantic equality with a signed predicate; the two platform documents need distinct namespaces.

Eight synthetic source-control families pass: malformed/duplicate/oversized/noninteger JSON; wrong version/tool/namespace/schema; duplicate or external/dangling/unlinked relationships; explicit file-coverage behavior; cross-platform namespace reuse; changed signed predicate; instance-supplied schema URL with retrieval prohibited; and the direct executable entry's refusal. Whitespace, Python compilation, public-boundary and credential-pattern review pass. These local schema checks use the already-installed jsonschema4.19.2, not a claimed qualification of the future pinned validator distribution.

This remains an unwired source library. The pin map's validator dependency closure and generation mode are still null, and running the library as an executable refuses. Server still owns the complete confined generation/actual-tool readback, immutable Server child/registry predicate verification, exact raw artifact/checksum map, Release asset equality/idempotency, workflow/notes/docs and fail-before packet. No generator/layer/image/scan/attestation/registry/Release/credential operation occurred; metadata and synthetic documents do not supply execution admission. General/Security retain the future complete-source and actual-effect gates.

Incremental #1012 source checkpoint: 1142340b0af618370376e68d7e6abaa040ee4a70, tree b287b5237f101f8a6e03dc313db8961fb79e9b66, branch feat/server-1012-native-sbom. The existing semantic validator and eight synthetic test families remain; direct execution still refuses because generation/confinement/workflow wiring is incomplete.

The candidate offline schema-validator inputs are now concrete in scripts/ci/native-sbom/validator-pins.v1.json (7,087 bytes, SHA-256 9b140b139b299d22bd92420a4ae2ff570eeb19c7977f485557b6119c407ad314): official Python 3.13.18 slim-bookworm immutable index/amd64+arm64 child/config map, and five exact public wheel URL/size/hash maps for JSON Schema 4.26.0 with its active dependency closure. The rpds wheel is CPython 3.13 and platform specific. The derived requirements files accept only local /deps wheel paths with hashes; the proposed later install is no-index/no-deps and network-disabled. Optional format extras are absent and typing-extensions is inactive for Python 3.13. Official-images source block and active dependency edges are retained.

This records public manifest/config/PyPI metadata only. No image layer, wheel, dependency install, generator binary or scan was acquired or executed. Python's observed default user is root/unset, so the eventual driver must explicitly prove nonroot/read-only/no capabilities/no-new-privileges, bounded scratch/output/resources, no network/socket/host credential mounts and exact tool version. The selected Syft/action and vendored SPDX schema identities are unchanged; neither tool identity is an SBOM subject.

Server's next authoring step remains the concrete generation/confinement and raw-byte/predicate/Release-asset identity helper with fail-before controls, followed by complete source/Security review and General's normal source-CI slot. Current P1 source integration is #1033, then #1036 and its organization-policy dependency. No additional PR or execution slot is claimed by this checkpoint.

Generation/confinement source planning advance at existing branch 1142340b (no source or operation activation).

The current release source already supplies the required immutable bindings: each native architecture job builds one platform with provenance:false, exposes its pushed digest, and smoke-tests that exact GHCR digest on its matching runner. The smoke receipt records the actual Docker image/config ID. The future helper must still independently reject an index/unknown media type and require child manifest → config digest → local image ID/platform/source labels to agree; the output digest is never assumed to be a child by name alone.

Proposed offline generation mode: after that successful smoke, export only the already verified local image by its immutable config ID into a bounded private Docker archive. Seal the archive bytes and verify its config binding before mounting that single file read-only into the selected Syft tool child. The Syft container would have an explicit nonroot UID, read-only root, dropped capabilities, no-new-privileges, bounded CPU/memory/PIDs/scratch/time/output, no network, daemon socket, host credential/config or repository mounts. Capture bounded stdout as the raw SPDX file; do not use writable host output mounts. The archive filename/hash is an observation, never the attestation subject: the subject remains the selected already-pushed/smoked child manifest. This mode and its exact archive-to-child integrity checks require Security review of the concrete helper before adoption; generation_mode remains null today.

At pinned Syft source f15c3343, spdxutil.DefaultVersion is exactly 2.3, spdx-json is explicitly supported, and catalog default scope is the final squashed filesystem. The helper must make format/scope explicit, independently check the actual binary version, and validate exact SPDX-2.3 afterward. A separate pinned Python validator container would use only the already proposed local hash-verified wheel closure, network disabled and bounded tmpfs, while the fixed schema registry denies remote retrieval. Container default users from metadata do not satisfy confinement; explicit execution checks remain required.

The existing Security subject/index/two-registry signer/Release-asset equality and idempotency contract stays unchanged. Two documents attach to their two actual child digests; the multi-arch index retains provenance and its verified child map. The retained raw JSON and checksums must equal the independently verified signed predicates and existing/new Release assets. This proposal does not qualify any generator, archive, schema-validator binary, output or artifact. No layer, package, scan, container, build, attestation, registry/API writer or additional CI was started. Server owns the concrete helper after current P1 acceptance; General retains source/execution ordering and Security the exact helper/pin review.

Unblocked source-only #1012 increment pushed on the existing branch: 16654a239ba0d35ac644a49608c6e7a53a646220, tree 06ae8f9fbb8f5648d216958181c47d65b3ee0e11 (parent 1142340). No new PR or full qualification slot is opened.

The unwired library now has the exact raw-asset equality guard required for existing Release idempotency. Its proposed set is the two deterministic platform SPDX files plus server-sbom-manifest.json. Missing/extra/renamed, non-byte, empty, oversized or changed assets refuse. Even canonically equivalent JSON with different raw formatting refuses for a retained Release file; signed-predicate canonical equality remains a separate check. Successful byte comparison returns computed size/SHA-256 observations and performs no replacement or transport.

The function deliberately accepts only previously verified expected bytes. It does not authenticate a caller-supplied checksum map, source/index/child/tool tuple, signature or provider metadata, and the future transport must bound downloads before constructing byte strings. Those verifications remain required before this guard; no expected-map self-authorization is claimed.

Ten synthetic test families pass using existing local Python 3.14.4/jsonschema 4.19.2 source tooling; this is not qualification of the proposed pinned Python 3.13.18/jsonschema 4.26.0 execution closure. Public-boundary, compilation and diff/credential-shaped-content checks pass. Direct execution still refuses; generation mode remains null and there is no scanner/publication workflow wiring. No layer/wheel/install, scan, container, build, attestation, registry/Release action or full source-CI dispatch occurred. The existing branch push may run its ordinary Boundary guard.

The current review-held P1 source heads remain stable. Server owns the remaining generator/confinement, authenticated map/predicate/asset transport and full source packet after the selected acceptance sequence. Review requests are not being resent while the required reviewer is unavailable.

Next independent source-only increment on the existing #1012 branch: 90a8ae0609eba53a8e2bf6ffedb4a1737fa727de, tree de93784441fadc06d49537999004fff827e4676b (parent 16654a2).

The library now constructs the fixed SBOM verification command: exactly one selected child under either fixed Server registry name, the exact release workflow, tag ref and source commit, SPDX 2.3 predicate type, and self-hosted signer refusal. Index-as-child, unknown registry, malformed digest/source/tag and CLI injection refuse. A separate exact comparison binds the authenticated certificate invocation URI to one repository/run/attempt, rejecting run prefixes, wrong attempts, suffixes and coerced IDs. A build-provenance-only predicate cannot substitute for an SPDX document.

These are construction/comparison functions, not executed verification. The future caller still owes independently verified index membership/platform, source tuple, bounded transport and authenticated verifier output; arbitrary expected tuples or URI strings do not become proof. No transport, generator, attestation or Release wiring is enabled. Generation mode remains null, direct execution still refuses and all operation gates stay separate.

Fourteen synthetic source families pass using the already-installed source tooling. Public-boundary, compile/diff and credential-shaped-content checks pass; the useful incremental commit is pushed. No new PR/full qualification slot, layer/wheel install, scan, container, build, gh attestation verify, signature verification or registry/Release write ran. No review requests were resent while the required reviewer is unavailable.

Existing source branch advances to 1610e8f55bd544737d7cd0ee5f28a331bac138ae, tree 3d938671bb6a580005a5ceaea0a9eb6d8adc34f2 (parent 90a8ae0).

The unwired index byte guard now checks the exact raw index SHA-256 and binds the independently expected two child digests by explicit Linux architecture, independently of member order. Missing/extra/duplicate/unknown platforms, malformed versions/sizes, wrong child bindings, an expected index-as-child and nested-index descriptors refuse. The guard accepts only the declared native platform variants; opaque metadata cannot add a third subject.

This is content-addressed byte/descriptor checking, not authentication of the caller's expected release tuple, fetched child config/source labels, publication or signature. Those remain explicit future transport/generation gates. Seventeen synthetic source test families pass; public-boundary, compilation/diff and credential-shaped-content checks pass. The incremental source commit is pushed, with no new PR/full qualification slot or operation. Direct execution still refuses and generation mode remains null.

Server's current review-held P1 source heads remain unchanged; required review requests are not being resent. No scanner, image/layer/package acquisition, container/build, signature verification, registry/API writer, release or runtime action ran for this increment.

SBOM source advance at 6f6e2640d9418b5df764777becf7d4389dcfd5bd / tree 23324d40acaa037f737426f50d6ccf973c3aaa59, parent 1610e8f5, on the existing source branch.

The pure child_identity guard now binds fetched raw child/config bytes to independently expected digests, the manifest's config descriptor size/type, actual Linux platform/variant, and exact source/release labels. Each raw object is bounded to 1 MiB before parsing. Content-addressed bytes for a foreign platform/source/tag refuse even when all their hashes are internally correct; an index cannot substitute for the child. Media-type pairs follow the OCI image manifest and Docker schema 2 specifications.

Twenty synthetic source test families pass, adding both platforms/media pairs, raw-byte/config-descriptor substitutions and correctly hashed foreign-identity countercontrols. Source whitespace/public-boundary checks pass and the branch is pushed clean. These checks use existing local Python/jsonschema source-check tooling, not the unexecuted candidate validator image/dependency closure.

This guard does not authenticate caller-supplied expected identities or fetch registry objects. Independently verified publication/index/smoke inputs, archive-to-smoked-config integrity, actual pinned generator/validator confinement and version checks, complete signed-predicate transport and Release wiring still remain. The library is unwired and refuses direct execution, and generation_mode remains null. No image/layer/wheel acquisition, install/build, container, scanner, gh attestation, API/registry/Release writer or runtime was executed.

Server owns that remaining concrete executable source after the current ordered source checkpoints; Security retains complete helper/pin review and General source/execution ordering. No additional full PR/CI train was opened while #1033 qualifies.

SBOM verification source now reaches 83af727cc836bfbde5ba766dabfe1706ecf70095 / tree 4850c587a0d79b7880f6d0451cb26d5540271b13, following 06afd758 on the existing unactivated branch.

The constructed per-registry command now requires --bundle-from-oci. The official CLI contract establishes that its default bundle lookup is GitHub, which cannot prove an attachment exists in each registry. No verifier command was run.

A separate pure guard checks authenticated certificate claims for the immutable repository/owner IDs, issuer, repository/source/tag, native-release signer/digest, hosted runner, dispatch event and exact release run/attempt. Field identities were checked against sigstore-go 1.3.0, used by the inspected CLI 2.103.3 source; read-only repository metadata matches the fixed IDs. These source observations do not qualify that CLI binary or any future runner.

Twenty-two synthetic source families pass, plus whitespace/public-boundary checks. The branch is committed/pushed clean. Dictionaries/command construction do not authenticate evidence. Actual CLI/tool closure, current provider identity, registry-origin retrieval, signature/statement/subject/predicate matching, archive/generator/validator confinement and Release wiring remain required. Generation mode stays null and direct library execution refuses. No signature/attestation, image/layer/wheel, scan, container, writer or runtime operation, and no additional full PR/CI train, occurred.

Security incremental source-direction disposition: PASS for 83af727cc836bfbde5ba766dabfe1706ecf70095 / tree 4850c587a0d79b7880f6d0451cb26d5540271b13, limited to the registry-origin command and certificate-claim guards.

Independent primary-source review of GitHub CLI v2.103.3 and its pinned sigstore-go v1.3.0 confirms: --bundle-from-oci is the mode that retrieves the bundle from the selected OCI registry; JSON verification output places authenticated claims at verificationResult.signature.certificate; and the exact serialized names include sourceRepositoryIdentifier, sourceRepositoryOwnerIdentifier, buildSignerURI, buildSignerDigest, runnerEnvironment, buildTrigger, and runInvocationURI. Current GitHub metadata independently returns repository ID 1208272134 and owner ID 100327932, matching the fixed guard. The SPDX predicate type https://spdx.dev/Document/v2.3 matches GitHub’s documented SBOM-attestation verifier contract. All 22 exact-head synthetic families pass locally; the reviewed delta is whitespace-clean.

The existing incompleteness boundary is correct and remains mandatory. GitHub explicitly warns that registry-bundle mode compares names recorded at signing time and cannot prove current ownership. The future executable therefore must obtain current repository/owner identity independently, parse only cryptographically verified verificationResult entries, bind the exact child subject and predicate/raw SBOM, exact run/attempt and both separate registry origins, and refuse missing/ambiguous/unexpected results. It must also retain the already listed CLI/tool closure, authenticated index/child/config inputs, archive-to-smoked-config integrity, generator/validator confinement, bounded transport and Release-asset equality gates.

This is not complete-helper or execution approval. generation_mode remains null and direct execution still refuses. No attestation fetch/verification, registry read/write, image/layer/wheel acquisition, container, scan, build or Release effect is authorized or claimed.

The existing SBOM source branch is now daddccf94a9f2ad2f66d047409544684f27949a3 / tree 1eeb3ae3cfa345753cb72d631807c1be208f00d1. The added pure composition checks one already-authenticated certificate/statement pair against the fixed registry, selected child SHA-256, exact release identity and retained SPDX document.

It refuses an index or foreign-registry subject, multiple subjects/extra digest algorithms, provenance in place of SPDX, an alternate statement type and a changed signed predicate. Canonical predicate equality remains distinct from retained raw-file SHA/size. Twenty-four synthetic source families pass; whitespace/public-boundary checks pass and the branch is clean/pushed.

No dictionary or synthetic fixture is treated as authenticated evidence. The future executable still must obtain/select bounded current-run cryptographic-verifier output, reject ambiguous current predicates, bind current provider/index/config and archive/generator custody, execute the pinned confined validator, verify both registry origins and wire exact Release assets/idempotency. Generation mode remains null; direct execution still refuses. No real verifier, certificate/signature, scanner, image, container, install/build, writer or runtime operation occurred, and no extra full PR/CI train was opened. Server owns that executable source after the ordered source prerequisites; complete Security review and General's operation/adoption gates remain.

The SBOM source branch now reaches ad70d1544a63b38b8365031dc6fd205a4b2e0098 / tree 4989118cc3d61ccd34692e7718b06a54c12c2ec8. The added pure compiler produces the proposed unsigned server-sbom-manifest.json bytes from independently verified release/subject inputs and both retained raw SPDX documents.

The map records fixed repository/registries, release source/tag/index/run/attempt, each platform's child/config, asset name, raw SHA-256/size, canonical predicate hash and distinct namespace. Missing/ambiguous platforms, reused/interchanged child/config identities, invalid release fields and duplicate namespaces refuse. Input dictionary ordering is irrelevant; changed raw formatting changes the map, preserving raw-file custody rather than conflating it with canonical predicate equivalence.

Twenty-six synthetic source families pass. Source whitespace/public-boundary checks pass; the branch is clean and pushed. This unsigned map authenticates nothing by itself. The future executable must first establish actual publication, signed-subject/predicate and generator custody, and existing Release assets still require their originally retained exact bytes. Full transport, archive/generator/validator execution/confinement, workflow wiring and independent source review remain unfinished. Mode stays null and direct library execution refuses. No actual scanner/verifier, container, acquisition/install/build, API/registry/Release writer or runtime operation, and no extra full PR/CI train, occurred.

The existing SBOM source branch now reaches 1d8784b80b9d67c8db2780c4566520dd7c7ca96d / tree a18e1bcfe22ca6838b19846dc467eb3dfc0a39a9. Pure composition now returns the complete three-file release-asset set only when both fixed registries have qualifying current-run predicates for both selected platforms.

The fixed verifier request explicitly selects registry bundles, limits them to four and projects only authenticated certificate/statement output. Each normalized pair must have the closed repository/owner/source/tag/signer identity. Older authenticated invocations provide no current authority; at least one exact current run/attempt pair is required, and every current pair must agree with the retained SPDX predicate and selected child subject. Missing registry/platform slots, foreign subjects, old-only evidence and conflicting current predicates refuse the whole result. Identical current duplicates or older verified pairs cannot alter the three original asset bytes.

Twenty-nine synthetic source families pass. The source branch is clean/pushed and no additional full PR/CI train was opened. These dictionaries are synthetic inputs, not authenticated provider evidence. The concrete executable still must obtain and authenticate bounded verifier output from each actual registry, establish current provider/publication/index/config and archive-to-smoked-config custody, run the pinned confined generator/validator, and wire exact Release assets/idempotency before a complete source review. generation_mode remains null and direct execution still refuses. No scanner/verifier, container, acquisition/install/build, API/registry/Release writer or runtime operation occurred. Server owns the remaining executable source; Security's complete review and General's placement/operation gates remain separate.

Validator-installer source identity is now explicit in local 34166c48a3e57f1db8381244ba49c1ab3280b858 / tree d3c2d8fd8e1862cb6d1ca335909e98f0737ce53c, parent published 1d8784b8. The exact pinned official Python build source enables ensurepip; the immutable CPython source declares bundled pip 26.2.2. Git blobs were independently matched. Public PyPI wheel URL/size/SHA metadata is recorded as reference metadata, explicitly not proof of bundled-wheel or installed bytes.

The future executable must verify the actual immutable image/config and isolated Python/pip versions before its offline hash-closed install; ambient site/config or a network fallback cannot establish this prerequisite. No pip or wheel was fetched/executed, and no dependency install was run. The existing five validator packages and both derived requirements files are byte-identical. The validator metadata is now 8,832 bytes / SHA-256 b6374004e922d0f4789e22ad214639c9562f6815fdf67e13528f86885fca3e4c; the tool-metadata pointer matches. Strict JSON/reference/unchanged-input checks, whitespace/public-boundary and changed-line secret/private-path checks pass. Library and test source are unchanged from the recorded 29-family checkpoint; no new execution result is claimed.

This metadata increment remains local while the escalated GitHub commit_refs_rules publication fault is unresolved. No push retry, PR/hosted CI, container/image/layer/wheel, verifier/scanner, package/build or writer/runtime operation occurred. Generation mode stays null; runtime observation, installer qualification and complete confinement/transport/wiring remain unfinished. Server owns the executable source; Security's complete review and General's placement/operation gates remain separate.

The complete three-file delta follows for durable review/retention while Git refs are blocked. It applies to exact 1d8784b8; no new source head is available remotely.

diff --git a/scripts/ci/native-sbom/README.md b/scripts/ci/native-sbom/README.md
index 1392014797238b2c26cb2e0ce3720435c40273f8..fe9629df904aecc43588baf64b5412bcfc410d79 100644
--- a/scripts/ci/native-sbom/README.md
+++ b/scripts/ci/native-sbom/README.md
@@ -54,6 +54,16 @@ filesystem, bounded scratch/output/resources, no capabilities, no-new-privileges
 no network, daemon socket or host credential mounts. That execution source is
 still incomplete. Neither image layers nor wheels were acquired or executed.
 
+The candidate also records its installer's source identity. The exact official
+Python build enables `ensurepip`; the signed CPython 3.13.18 tag's immutable
+source declares bundled pip 26.2.2. Its source/blob and public PyPI wheel metadata
+are retained separately. This is an expected version, not an observed runtime,
+bundled-wheel hash proof or qualified installed pip. The future confined
+executable must bind the actual pinned image/config and isolated Python/pip
+readbacks before its offline, hash-closed dependency install. Ambient site or
+configuration and network fallback cannot supply that prerequisite. The five
+validator dependencies and both derived requirements files are unchanged.
+
 The proposed deterministic raw assets are `server-linux-amd64.spdx.json`,
 `server-linux-arm64.spdx.json` and `server-sbom-manifest.json`.
 `exact_release_asset_bytes` rejects absent, extra, renamed, empty, oversized or
diff --git a/scripts/ci/native-sbom/tool-pins.v1.json b/scripts/ci/native-sbom/tool-pins.v1.json
index 1c2d4ff8721cf7039f7c43aa2fdea2f12cc4b828..70f04030ab15a5761ac871820dd632f0782b8900 100644
--- a/scripts/ci/native-sbom/tool-pins.v1.json
+++ b/scripts/ci/native-sbom/tool-pins.v1.json
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
     "scan_or_publication_admitted": false,
     "schema_validator_dependency_closure": {
       "path": "scripts/ci/native-sbom/validator-pins.v1.json",
-      "sha256": "9b140b139b299d22bd92420a4ae2ff570eeb19c7977f485557b6119c407ad314",
+      "sha256": "b6374004e922d0f4789e22ad214639c9562f6815fdf67e13528f86885fca3e4c",
       "status": "candidate_metadata_not_executed"
     }
   },
diff --git a/scripts/ci/native-sbom/validator-pins.v1.json b/scripts/ci/native-sbom/validator-pins.v1.json
index 0852b5eb2189ddc2c7bd3822f0fbba3e6b81a507..492b7ae755bc0ef9f9c0f5049e7fa1ee419f90b8 100644
--- a/scripts/ci/native-sbom/validator-pins.v1.json
+++ b/scripts/ci/native-sbom/validator-pins.v1.json
@@ -29,6 +29,42 @@
       "rpds-py>=0.7.0"
     ]
   ],
+  "bundled_installer": {
+    "execution_qualified": false,
+    "future_boundary": "Bind the exact immutable Python config and effective isolated Python/pip versions before the offline hash-closed install; no ambient site/config or network fallback. Runtime and byte closure remain unqualified.",
+    "image_build_source": {
+      "configure_option": "--with-ensurepip",
+      "git_blob": "731ba320c351ff9980eef4a61cff5d8c3a2e5a80",
+      "path": "3.13/slim-bookworm/Dockerfile",
+      "python_source_archive_sha256": "abb0102e6d4ae027509bcb82327d9dd85515b44a3ba8ad538cfc5e9847029f68",
+      "repository": "docker-library/python",
+      "source_commit": "152874b138f0b1c4699fbdcb52b174608cfbfff5"
+    },
+    "image_runtime_version_observed": false,
+    "name": "pip",
+    "python_source": {
+      "declared_constant": "_PIP_VERSION = \"26.2.2\"",
+      "git_blob": "6e01881fefeaf51261c7f67d23ad7112c246d446",
+      "path": "Lib/ensurepip/__init__.py",
+      "repository": "python/cpython",
+      "source_commit": "0d4bd512fc429e3d4eacdd113c975e161f21644d",
+      "tag": "v3.13.18",
+      "tag_object": "c4aea32388690378deb747cd4afe01e3253f0696"
+    },
+    "reference_pypi_metadata": {
+      "requires_dist": null,
+      "requires_python": ">=3.10",
+      "scope": "metadata only; not proof of bundled-wheel or installed bytes",
+      "version": "26.2.2",
+      "wheel": {
+        "filename": "pip-26.2.2-py3-none-any.whl",
+        "sha256": "fd7f4dfa8190e014013b9f08f3e973f4e4c26ffd179a204895533a7254813a70",
+        "size": 1819850,
+        "url": "https://files.pythonhosted.org/packages/3f/06/3e4420302363fbb71be3c7f35ce042f54bfca330e3e66b3a2e3c4cca579f/pip-26.2.2-py3-none-any.whl"
+      }
+    },
+    "source_expected_version": "26.2.2"
+  },
   "confinement_source_complete": false,
   "extras": [],
   "observation_scope": "public manifests/configs/PyPI metadata only; no layer/wheel acquisition or execution",

The remaining generation design is now concrete in local a8489b5ec785b307eec2b1c6b1e7f135930c8ad4 / tree 9ed01be4e9c527578ff65f6ecbca0759800ca5b5, parent 34166c48. The added source contract ties export to the actual smoked config and requires complete ordered layer/diff-ID verification, one unambiguous image graph, sealed original bytes, explicit offline Syft source/platform, confined scanner/validator, exact owner cleanup, provider artifacts and both registries. Source research confirms that Docker save can emit an archive-specific OCI manifest; its digest must not replace the published child subject. An actual selected exporter format and executable guard are still required. This is design/source only: generation mode remains null and no export/scan or other operation was performed. No executable/test source changed; whitespace/public-boundary/changed-line checks pass. The complete added contract follows.

diff --git a/docs/contracts/native-sbom-generation.md b/docs/contracts/native-sbom-generation.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..60e1f067f339b1bcaf759e94f26ac5b2480328cd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/contracts/native-sbom-generation.md
@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
+# Native SBOM generation source proposal
+
+This is the remaining generation design for Server #1012, targeting the future
+3.2 line. It is not an executable, accepted producer format or operation
+admission. `generation_mode` stays null until the complete source and tool
+closure are reviewed. Frozen 3.1 artifacts keep their recorded SBOM-free status.
+
+## Subject and export authority
+
+Each native architecture job must first retain its actual successful smoke
+observation, immutable local config ID, source commit, release, platform and
+provider run/attempt/job. Export only that config ID, with an explicit platform;
+never resolve a mutable name at export time. The independently verified
+published index/child/config tuple remains the attestation authority. An archive
+hash or an exporter-generated manifest is not a replacement registry subject.
+
+The proposed offline input is one uncompressed Docker-save archive. Docker's
+[save interface](https://docs.docker.com/reference/cli/docker/image/save/)
+can otherwise include multiple platforms and references. The actual selected
+CLI/daemon/image-store implementation and its source/format must be pinned
+before supporting its output. An illustrative
+[Moby v28.5.2 exporter](https://github.com/moby/moby/blob/v28.5.2/image/tarexport/save.go)
+writes both Docker and OCI metadata, references config bytes by their hash, and
+orders archive layers from the image config's diff IDs. This source example is
+not a selection or observation of a running daemon.
+
+The archive guard must stream under a fixed total-byte/member/deadline bound,
+without extracting to the host. It must reject duplicate names, traversal,
+absolute paths, links, special/sparse files, unsupported header extensions,
+truncation, unrelated image graphs and unrecognized formats. Require exactly
+one selected image; hash the complete original config bytes against the smoked
+config ID; and hash each uncompressed layer against that config's ordered
+`rootfs.diff_ids`. Config equality alone does not authenticate layer contents.
+Any additional OCI index/manifest must resolve to the same complete graph;
+unreferenced or contradictory members refuse. A generated archive manifest may
+differ from the registry manifest because its layer representation differs.
+
+Export into an exclusively owned private directory. Retain the original regular
+file identity, size and hash through validation, read-only scanner mounting and
+post-scan revalidation. A replaced path, changed inode/bytes, unknown reader
+state or failed export produces no SBOM authority. Exact exporter-format
+fixtures and old-config/new-config, reordered/changed-layer, extra-image,
+duplicate/path/link/truncation countercontrols are required before adoption.
+
+## Confined generation and validation
+
+The proposed scanner input is exclusively the held archive. The pinned
+[Syft 1.55.0 source](https://github.com/anchore/syft/blob/f15c3343e29dfb20cf6d82c820e7090b49808c96/cmd/syft/internal/commands/scan.go)
+supports explicit `--from docker-archive`; omitting the source selection can
+fall back to a daemon or registry. The future fixed invocation must select the
+archive source, exact platform, SPDX JSON and intended filesystem scope
+explicitly, with automatic update/config discovery disabled by reviewed inputs.
+No daemon socket, registry access, host credentials or repository configuration
+may reach the scanner. Its platform-specific image child/config and actual
+Syft version must match the committed tool pins before accepting output.
+
+Both scanner and validator must run as an explicit nonroot UID/GID, with a
+read-only root, no capabilities, no-new-privileges, no network or published
+ports, and bounded tmpfs/scratch, CPU, memory, PIDs, output and absolute cleanup
+deadlines. Mount only the sealed input and reviewed tool/dependency files
+read-only. Bound scanner stdout to the existing 16-MiB document limit and retain
+the original bytes; stderr is bounded diagnostics, never provider authority.
+Source tests must inspect the complete effective create/start arguments and
+reject an extra mount, environment key, source, privilege or mutable tool name.
+
+The validator uses the independently pinned Python child/config and installer
+source identity, held hash-checked wheels and the unchanged architecture-specific
+requirements. Its install is offline with no dependency resolution or ambient
+site/config fallback. Effective isolated Python/pip versions and complete
+installed dependency identities must match before importing the schema checker.
+The pinned vendored schema denies remote retrieval. Validation returns bounded
+hash/count observations; it does not rewrite the original SPDX asset.
+
+Use existing job deadlines and the reviewed exact-owner cleanup mechanism,
+extended narrowly for the new kind/scope and bound helper bytes. Always-run
+cleanup must inspect exact IDs plus owner labels, retain the original failure,
+and refuse foreign/unknown resources. Do not add a by-name fallback or another
+lifecycle controller. No positive receipt exists until body and cleanup both
+succeed and an independent terminal absence readback passes.
+
+## Provider and publication wiring
+
+Retain each platform's original SPDX, config/export observations and cleanup
+receipt as bounded provider artifacts bound to exact source/run/attempt/job.
+The later publisher must independently verify those bindings against both
+registries' actual immutable index/child/config tuples before signing each
+platform predicate for each registry. Signing an index or provenance predicate
+does not satisfy this contract.
+
+The Release verifier must execute the fixed registry-bundle signature requests,
+check current repository/owner identity and exact signer/source/tag/invocation,
+and compare every current predicate with the retained document. All four
+registry/platform slots must pass before returning the two raw SPDX files and
+the checksum map. Existing assets require original byte equality; conflicting,
+missing, failed or ambiguous evidence permits no writer or replacement.
+
+Future 3.2 workflow wiring must preserve the shared promotion/Release lock and
+revalidate provider evidence after protection approval. It must not apply the
+new SBOM requirement retroactively to frozen 3.1. Normal source publication,
+complete Security review and General's source/operation selections remain
+separate prerequisites; this document selects no scan, build or release.

The source branch is now normally pushed at 7450cd02f6adb22b737b261f03abaa2d01fafb3a / tree 05eab8cf19efe1f7a5a1a2596b074c78c3217a20. Git/API agree and the branch is clean. After the external Git-ref fault cleared and the selected APT-first staging completed, these three existing-branch increments were carried normally: installer metadata 34166c48, generation design a8489b5e, and the bounded archive component 7450cd02. No new PR/full CI train was opened. Branch-trigger inventory confirms only the existing package-free Public Boundary push workflow applies; no package-installing workflow or manual dispatch was started.

native_sbom_archive.py streams a strict uncompressed canonical OCI archive under 2-GiB / 1,024-member / 30-second bounds. It hashes every original blob, validates sizes and exactly one selected index/manifest/config/layer graph, binds the config to the independently expected smoked config ID/platform, and requires the ordered layer hashes to equal that config's diff IDs. Metadata rereads must retain their original hashes. It never extracts to the host or processes extended/sparse headers, and returns the archive-specific manifest identity separately from registry authority.

Eight new synthetic archive families cover both platforms, changed layers behind a matching config, config/platform/order/descriptor substitutions, extra graphs and unreferenced members, duplicate/traversal/link/sparse/extension entries, malformed original JSON, truncation/trailing bytes, byte/member/deadline bounds and changed reread metadata. Together with the unchanged policy controls, 37 source tests pass using existing local source-check tooling. Whitespace/public-boundary and changed-line credential/private-path checks pass. These fixtures are synthetic tar records, not image exports or scans.

The initial guard intentionally supports a narrower format than the proposed Docker-save input. Hybrid Docker exports, compressed layers and other unqualified formats refuse. A reviewed producer/adapter and actual format qualification are still needed before adoption. The future caller must own/seal the original regular file, establish actual smoke/provider/config authority, retain byte identity through the confined scan and perform final revalidation. This source component authenticates no arbitrary expected digest and supplies no installed/generation/registry result. Direct execution refuses; generation mode is still null.

The full generation source proposal names those remaining format, scanner/validator, cleanup, provider and publication gates. Server owns that executable source; Security owns complete source disposition and General the source/operation selection. #1038 remains the current integration priority and #1036 remains separate/unpushed. No Docker/image/export, layer/wheel acquisition, scanner/verifier, package/install/build, writer or runtime operation occurred.

Security exact component review: PASS for the held OCI archive input guard at 7450cd02f6adb22b737b261f03abaa2d01fafb3a / tree 05eab8cf19efe1f7a5a1a2596b074c78c3217a20 / parent a8489b5ec785b307eec2b1c6b1e7f135930c8ad4.

The component accepts only a seekable stream at offset zero, an exact SHA-256 config subject and one of the two Linux platforms. It parses raw 512-byte tar headers directly—no extractor, compression detector, PAX/GNU extension reader or sparse expansion—and bounds elapsed time, total bytes, member count, layer count, JSON size and trailing padding. Only the OCI layout/index, one manifest/config graph and its exact blob paths are accepted; duplicate/traversal/link/special/extension entries and unreferenced members refuse.

The graph check binds descriptor media type/digest/size, exact platform, independently supplied smoked config digest, config platform/rootfs, and ordered uncompressed layer descriptors to the config's ordered DiffIDs. Every blob filename must equal its actual SHA-256. Original JSON bytes are rehashed on reread and strict parsing refuses duplicate members, trailing data and invalid UTF-8. The returned archive SHA/size and archive-manifest identity remain archive-specific and are not relabeled as registry or smoke authority.

Independent result: all 8/8 focused archive families pass, covering both platforms, config/platform/layer substitutions, changed bytes, extra graphs/members, wrong sizes, duplicate/traversal/link/sparse/extension entries, truncation/trailing/resource/deadline bounds, malformed metadata and changed rereads.

This is a component-only PASS. The actual exporter/adapter, strict archive format qualification, sealed regular-file custody through scan, independently authenticated smoke/provider/config subject, pinned Syft/validator runtime, nonroot/no-network confinement, output/schema/semantic validation, registry/attestation binding and release publication remain incomplete or held. Docker hybrid/compressed exports deliberately refuse. Generation mode remains null; direct execution refusal and every pull/export/image/layer/scanner/install/build/runtime/release gate remain unchanged.

The source branch now reaches ae11fbe694a39b489a0f52b998e7fae06c34d327 / tree bf81bdb3e35f33f580015dfa423f756f1b6c08c3, parent 7450cd02; ordinary push/ref readback succeeds and the branch is clean. This adds a narrowly source-derived BuildKit root-metadata profile and revises the generation proposal; no workflow is changed or new PR/full CI train opened.

Historical native-image provider log 42056550973 / job 127346371667 records Buildx 0.38.1, BuildKit 0.34.2 and Engine 29.4.2. Primary source review of that BuildKit OCI exporter and containerd 2.4.2 confirms skip-Docker-manifest mode, a generated UTC creation annotation and an optional root platform field. The guard now accepts only that one known, strictly parsed creation annotation and permits an omitted root platform only while the original expected config's actual platform remains mandatory. An explicit wrong platform, invalid date/type, unknown annotation or image-name/ref hint still refuses. The annotation supplies no source, registry, smoke or clock authority.

Two new source families cover both platforms with omitted root metadata, counterfactual foreign-config/platform selection, unknown/type/calendar/suffix annotation refusals. 39 source tests pass; whitespace/public-boundary and changed-line secret/private-path checks pass. The prior 7450cd02 component PASS and its package-free Boundary run 42068967095 remain attributed to that predecessor, not transferred to the new code. Fresh exact component review is requested.

The concrete source proposal now prefers an unnamed, uncompressed OCI side output from the same existing architecture build, comparing its complete graph with the actual successfully smoked config before use. Explicit uncompressed/force-compression/OCI-media settings avoid cached compressed-layer ambiguity; separate named image outputs retain existing targets. Buildx source shows global tags overwrite all image-exporter names, so the future wiring must keep the OCI output unnamed rather than copy registry tags into it. This avoids a second build and a Docker-save legacy adapter. Actual producer output/format and sealed custody remain unqualified; no exporter was invoked by this source research.

Generation mode remains null. Direct execution still refuses; scanner/validator/installer confinement, full transport/artifact/attestation/Release wiring and General's operation selection remain required. No Docker/image/export, layer/wheel acquisition, scan/verifier, package/install/build, writer or runtime operation occurred. #1038 remains the integration priority, #1036 stays separate/local, and frozen 3.1 is unchanged.

Security exact-source disposition for ae11fbe694a39b489a0f52b998e7fae06c34d327, tree bf81bdb3e35f33f580015dfa423f756f1b6c08c3, parent 7450cd02f6adb22b737b261f03abaa2d01fafb3a: PASS for the bounded OCI-archive component and source proposal only.

I independently verified the Git/GitHub object tuple, reviewed the complete four-file delta, checked the primary BuildKit 0.34.2 exporter source, and reran the changed archive suite (10/10). The upstream source confirms the OCI exporter uses the skip-Docker-manifest archive option and adds org.opencontainers.image.created with UTC RFC3339 formatting when absent.

The successor keeps the relaxation narrow:

only the root manifest descriptor may carry exactly that one annotation;
the annotation must be a strict seconds-resolution UTC calendar value, and unknown names, values/types, suffixes or additional annotations refuse;
only that root descriptor may omit platform; an explicit platform must still match;
the independently supplied expected config digest remains exact, and the config blob itself must still bind Linux architecture/variant;
complete blob hashes, descriptor sizes/media types, ordered uncompressed layer/diff-ID equality, one-manifest closure and no unreferenced members remain mandatory.

The annotation remains presentation data and supplies no smoke, source, registry, clock or publication authority. This does not qualify an actual BuildKit/Buildx producer, output bytes or format, the proposed unnamed side output, archive-file custody/sealing, scanner invocation/confinement, attestation/Release wiring, generation mode, build/export/scan/install/runtime effects, or General's operation selection. Those gates remain HOLD/null; the predecessor qualification is not transferred beyond the unchanged component boundaries.

Security exact source-design review of 90c7796defe40c2f911238eb1a854899d5ed6559 / tree 1bc91623aa421b9a2969987558cc0b948f0c3053 / parent ae11fbe694a39b489a0f52b998e7fae06c34d327: PASS for the twelve-line exporter-order contract correction only.

The GitHub and local Git objects agree, and the sole delta is docs/contracts/native-sbom-generation.md. I independently read the pinned BuildKit v0.34.2 source at solver/llbsolver/export.go: responses are stored in an index-aligned slice, then merged from first exporter to last into one map; a later exporter assigning the same key overwrites the earlier value. The proposed order—unnamed OCI side output first, existing named registry/daemon publisher last—is therefore necessary to keep the publisher's final containerimage.digest from being replaced by archive-specific response data.

The added text also correctly refuses to treat the aggregate response as registry authority and requires independent registry/config/smoke binding, preserved publisher arguments, and failure if publication or smoke readback is absent. The exact-head Public Boundary run 42075661795 passed, but it is ordinary source-boundary evidence and does not qualify any exporter.

This PASS does not authorize or qualify Buildx/BuildKit execution, exporter wiring, an OCI archive, registry/image publication, smoke, scanning, attestation, Release assets, or generation mode. Future executable source must enforce the exact output order and separately prove the registry digest/config against immutable registry and smoke observations before any operation selection.

Current source checkpoint is pushed 90c7796defe40c2f911238eb1a854899d5ed6559 / tree 1bc91623aa421b9a2969987558cc0b948f0c3053, parent ae11fbe694a39b489a0f52b998e7fae06c34d327. The only successor delta is twelve contract lines defining exporter order: unnamed OCI output first, existing named registry/daemon publisher last. Pinned BuildKit 0.34.2 merges exporter response maps in index order, so a later OCI result could otherwise overwrite the publisher's containerimage.digest.

Security independently accepted this exact design-only delta in 6664831814; exact-head Public Boundary 42075661795 passed. The previous archive/policy source components are unchanged: ten archive and twenty-nine policy families were already checked, and I did not repeat them for this prose-only addition.

Server owns the remaining concrete source implementation: enforce this order in the future exporter wiring, preserve publisher arguments, bind registry/config/smoke independently, retain sealed archive custody through confined scanning, and complete provider/attestation/asset verification and all refusal controls. The bounded archive source component and primary-source format proposal are available for that work. Actual producer output/format, tool closure, scanner invocation and every build/registry/smoke/scan/attestation/publication operation remain unqualified; generation mode is null. General retains source placement and any later operation selection. No competing build or scanner run was started.

The bounded SBOM source components are now normally refreshed over accepted main, without rewriting history: 98070b80b2a485d6665f60a219fe51880015a10a / tree 5acaafb9227edb4b54c127d5cfbb8749a1af0a9e, ordered parents [90c7796defe40c2f911238eb1a854899d5ed6559, 223cb6f4c3e944c9fe308c3fc02bde9191fad66f]. Local and GitHub ref agree; all twelve SBOM feature blobs are byte-identical to the prior source checkpoint. This incorporates the accepted CI prerequisite/contracts and scalar-summary base without changing any SBOM code or enabling a consumer.

The ten archive and twenty-nine predicate/asset source families pass on the combined tree (39 total); whitespace, public-boundary metadata and changed-line credential-pattern checks pass. These use existing local Python/jsonschema source tooling and synthetic bytes, with no new dependency acquisition. The sole branch push path remains the existing package-free boundary workflow; no manual dispatch or generator/build/scan was started.

Following the clarified source-versus-effect boundary, a separate Security exact-source carry is not a blanket merge prerequisite for this bounded component. Server owns ordinary source development, draft PR/required qualification and integration follow-through in the current source order. The concrete remaining feature work is still the sealed actual producer/custody and confined scanner/validator source, its provider/attestation/asset wiring and refusal controls. The current library is unwired and generation mode remains null; source integration alone will not enable it. Exporter/archive generation, tool/layer/wheel acquisition, installs/builds/scans, runtime and publishing effects retain their separate gates.

The refreshed source components are now reviewable in draft #1039, fed5b11567ef75ca02e2bbb5cf28ad1c7d3bb3ed / tree 5acaafb9227edb4b54c127d5cfbb8749a1af0a9e, an empty [skip ci] child of 98070b80. The tested twelve-file component tree and accepted-main refresh are unchanged. agent:server, draft, auto-off and no closing reference are preserved.

This creates the requested ordinary review surface while the current source-CI route is reconciled. It does not make Security exact-source review a blanket merge gate, select a manual/repeated workflow, or claim normal required-check qualification. Server owns completing the components' ordinary required checks and remaining unwired producer/controller source. The full #1012 feature stays open; generation remains null and actual acquisitions/builds/scans/signatures/publication/runtime retain their separate gates.

The bounded archive/predicate/source-input component is now normally refreshed on draft #1039 at 19ba1bbfee0a1e37ebe2c877caa1542308e9da9f / tree bb80f5b4, against fully accepted Server main cf069f63. The component's 40 source controls and combined promotion/isolation/inventory checks pass; fresh ordinary CI is running for the exact pair. Server owns that qualification and normal integration.

The next producer work remains concrete: complete the reviewed OCI-first/publisher-last export and actual archive-format/custody binding, confined scanner invocation/version/output, exact platform/config/provider subject and four attestation-pair authority, then the release qualification packet. None is enabled by this data/validator integration. Generation is null; no scan, export, artifact attestation, image publication or runtime operation was selected or run by the local source work. #1012 remains open until its actual publishing acceptance is proved.

The bounded SBOM input-validator component is now normally merged, actual-main accepted and cleaned via #1039, exact 0166afb225c75feb8f67d2d8963e49183550763c / tree bb80f5b4e29c106b505c39601386aaf063aea81a. Original queue and all actual-main workflows passed; the new source job directly reports 10 archive and 30 policy tests passing.

This delivers the bounded OCI graph, SPDX/predicate, subject/platform/source/run validators and their reviewed source inputs. It does not deliver generated SBOMs. Generation is still null/unwired, and this issue stays open.

Server owns the next source slice: bind the actual OCI-first / publisher-last exporter output and sealed archive custody to these validators, then the exact scanner/output/provider/attestation wiring. The reviewed BuildKit order and component contracts are preserved. Actual export/build/scanner/publication and published-artifact acceptance remain separate operating gates; no such action is selected here. The current parser source train remains first.

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Publish and verify an SBOM for native Server images (3.2.0) #1012

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Publish and verify an SBOM for native Server images (3.2.0) #1012

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rmcdaniel commented on Nov 4, 2026

rmcdaniel commented on Nov 4, 2026

Security SBOM subject, format, and verification disposition

Generator and predicate

Release binding

Required source controls

rmcdaniel commented on Nov 4, 2026

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rmcdaniel commented on Nov 5, 2026

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