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chore: add agent skills from github/awesome-copilot - #336
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Adds 7 skills under .github/skills/ (source commit cb64ad1).
Reviewer's GuideInstalls seven agent skills under File-Level Changes
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🔒 Security Analysis ReportSecurity Analysis ReportGenerated: Sat Oct 17 01:08:51 UTC 2026 Bandit Security ScanPip-Audit Results |
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Hey - I've found 3 issues
Prompt for AI Agents
Please address the comments from this code review:
## Individual Comments
### Comment 1
<location path=".github/skills/conventional-commit/SKILL.md" line_range="20-23" />
<code_context>
+2. Run `git diff` or `git diff --cached` to inspect changes.
+3. Stage your changes with `git add <file>`.
+4. Construct your commit message using the following XML structure.
+5. After generating your commit message, Copilot will automatically run the following command in your integrated terminal (no confirmation needed):
+
+```bash
+git commit -m "type(scope): description"
+```
+
</code_context>
<issue_to_address>
**Commit message runs shell commands**
When an attacker-controlled diff influences the generated commit message and the agent executes the suggested command, copilot inserts the generated message into a double-quoted shell command, so shell metacharacters in a message influenced by attacker-controlled changes execute as commands before the commit. This gives those commands the agent's local access.
Pass the message as a separately quoted process argument or through a message file rather than interpolating it into a shell command.
</issue_to_address>
### Comment 2
<location path=".github/skills/github-actions-hardening/references/triggers-and-privilege.md" line_range="13-14" />
<code_context>
+| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
+| `push` | Repo collaborators | read/write | yes | Low — trusted authors |
+| `pull_request` (same-repo branch) | Collaborators | read/write | yes | Low |
+| `pull_request` (from a fork) | **Anyone** | **read-only** | **no** | Low by design — even malicious code can't steal anything |
+| `pull_request_target` | **Anyone with a fork** | **read/write** | **yes** | **High** — runs in base-repo context |
+| `workflow_run` | Fires after another workflow | **read/write** | **yes** | **High** |
+| `issue_comment`, `issues` | **Anyone** | **read/write** | **yes** | **High** |
</code_context>
<issue_to_address>
**Trigger labels ignore effective permissions**
When fork PRs are configured to receive write tokens or secrets, or a privileged-trigger workflow/job explicitly restricts its token permissions, the trust guidance assigns privileges solely by trigger: it says fork `pull_request` runs have no secrets and a read-only token, and treats privileged-trigger code execution as CRITICAL. Repository settings can grant write tokens to fork PRs, while workflow or job `permissions` can restrict a privileged-trigger token, so the audit can both suppress real exposure findings and raise false CRITICALs.
Assess repository fork-PR settings and the effective workflow/job permissions before assigning trust or severity, and state assumptions when those settings cannot be inspected.
Also at `.github/skills/github-actions-hardening/SKILL.md:78`, `.github/skills/github-actions-hardening/SKILL.md:138-139`.
</issue_to_address>
### Comment 3
<location path=".github/skills/README.md" line_range="4" />
<code_context>
+# Agent skills
+
+Installed from [github/awesome-copilot](https://github.com/github/awesome-copilot) at commit `cb64ad12e32737ae764becd6885462e9b4c7cb00`.
+Read by Copilot (cloud agent, code review, CLI, VS Code agent mode) and Claude Code.
+
+| Skill | Purpose |
</code_context>
<issue_to_address>
**Claude Code does not load the skills**
When claude Code uses its default project skill discovery, claude Code looks for project skills under `.claude/skills/`, but the README advertises skills installed only under `.github/skills/`; Claude Code ignores them, so users cannot invoke the advertised skills.
Install or link the skills under `.claude/skills/`, or remove the Claude Code support claim.
</issue_to_address>Sourcery assessment
Needs a human reviewer. 3 findings to address first, and the conventional-commit skill tells the agent to stage changes and commit without confirmation, and the release skill can push a branch and open a PR. Those repository changes and any resulting notifications remain after reverting this PR, though they are normally bounded and repairable.
Blocking findings: .github/skills/conventional-commit/SKILL.md:23, .github/skills/github-actions-hardening/references/triggers-and-privilege.md:14, .github/skills/README.md:4
Claude Code only loads project skills from .claude/skills/, and Copilot reads that path too, so one copy now serves both. .gitignore re-includes .claude/skills/ while keeping the rest of .claude/ ignored. github-release and conventional-commit are removed: they bypass this repo's own release automation, and conventional-commit commits without confirmation. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01CeXGfVNFFTFVtXdALdSQ1g
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01CeXGfVNFFTFVtXdALdSQ1g
🔒 Security Analysis ReportSecurity Analysis ReportGenerated: Sat Oct 17 01:36:38 UTC 2026 Bandit Security ScanPip-Audit Results |
🔒 Security Analysis ReportSecurity Analysis ReportGenerated: Sat Oct 17 01:37:35 UTC 2026 Bandit Security ScanPip-Audit Results |
…ils, drop pytest-coverage - .gitignore: `.claude/*` only matched the repo root, so nested `.claude/` folders (tests/.claude/settings.json, docs/**/.claude/worktrees/...) became trackable. Use `**/.claude/*` and re-include only `/.claude/skills/` (verified with core.ignorecase on and off). - .pre-commit-config.yaml: top-level `exclude: '^\.claude/skills/(?!README\.md$)'` so markdownlint --fix / end-of-file-fixer cannot rewrite (74 fixable) or reject (82 unfixable) the verbatim upstream copy; the repo-owned README stays linted. - CLAUDE.md "Vendored Agent Skills" + AGENTS.md "Agent Skills": repo rules win over the skills; no PR merges/approvals/auto-merge or @dependabot commands (the dependabot skill suggests `gh pr merge --auto`), no installs, report-only audits, the 85% coverage floor and --maxfail CLI override. - Drop pytest-coverage: its 100% target and loop conflict with the 85% floor and the ML-extras skips. - README.md rewritten (it failed markdownlint) and records what is not vendored, including the docs-sync-audit/test-gap-audit helper scripts that `.gitignore`'s `[Ss]cripts` rule had silently left out. - AGENTS.md: correct the stale "pytest.ini … 70% baseline" line. - CHANGELOG: Unreleased → Added entry. Remaining vendored files unchanged (byte-identical to upstream cb64ad1). Full suite: 2833 passed, 16 skipped. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
🔒 Security Analysis ReportSecurity Analysis ReportGenerated: Mon Oct 19 04:26:25 UTC 2026 Bandit Security ScanPip-Audit Results |
Adds agent skills under
.claude/skills/. Claude Code loads them as project skills, and GitHub Copilot (cloud agent, CLI, VS Code agent mode) reads the same path.dependabotdocs-sync-auditgithub-actions-hardeningpytest-coveragetest-gap-auditAlso in this PR:
.gitignorere-includes.claude/skills/and keeps the rest of.claude/ignored.LICENSEships alongside the skills.Source: github/awesome-copilot, vendored verbatim at the commit recorded in
.claude/skills/README.md.github-releaseandconventional-commitwere deliberately left out because they conflict with this repo's release and commit workflow. No skill pre-approvesshell/bash.The open review threads are about the upstream skill content itself and are waiting on the owner's call.
https://claude.ai/code/session_01CeXGfVNFFTFVtXdALdSQ1g
Generated by Claude Code
Summary by Sourcery
Add and document vendored agent skills that support dependency management, documentation audits, workflow security reviews, and test coverage audits.
New Features:
Enhancements:
Documentation:
Chores: