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A failed merge-group deploy leaves prod on never-merged code, because the heal shares the deploy path and fails with itΒ #3005
Description
π€ Generated by the Agentic Engineer
π΄ Production delivery is still halted β one cluster write unblocks it
Status at 2026-08-07 05:2xZ: ~14 hours halted. Every GitOps delivery to prod is refused. This
needs one manual cluster write from @devantler; nothing in CI or Git can reach it, for the reason
in Why nothing automatic can fix this below.
Verified live, this tick:
| Value | |
|---|---|
ocirepository/flux-system (flux-system) |
Ready=False β failed to verify the signature using provider 'cosign keyless': no matching attestations: unsupported: multiple identities are not supported at this time |
Live matchOIDCIdentity entries |
3 (separate list entries) |
main declares |
1 entry, with the three signers OR'd inside the subject regex |
| Source of the 3 entries | fluxinstance/flux β spec.kustomize.patches[6], applied by a never-merged candidate |
The fix restores the control, it does not remove it. main already carries the correct
single-entry form (k8s/providers/hetzner/infrastructure/controllers/flux-instance/flux-instance.yaml,
patch index 6, same as live). The write below simply makes the live object match main.
kubectl --context admin@prod edit fluxinstance flux -n flux-systemIn spec.kustomize.patches[6].patch, replace the three matchOIDCIdentity entries with this
single entry β copied verbatim from main:
matchOIDCIdentity:
- issuer: '^https://token\.actions\.githubusercontent\.com$'
subject: '^https://github\.com/devantler-tech/platform/\.github/workflows/(ci\.yaml@refs/heads/gh-readonly-queue/main/.+|(cd|dr-rebuild)\.yaml@refs/heads/main)$'Then it self-heals, with no drift. flux-operator re-renders the OCIRepository with one matcher β
cosign verifies β the root source goes Ready β infrastructure-controllers reconciles and applies
main's FluxInstance, which carries that identical value.
Why nothing automatic can fix this
The trust configuration is delivered through the channel it gates. The OCIRepository's matchers
are rendered by fluxinstance/flux, which is owned by the infrastructure-controllers Kustomization
(kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/name on the live object) β and that Kustomization's source is the very
OCIRepository that is refusing every artifact. So the corrected value on main cannot be delivered.
Two escape routes were checked and both are void:
gh workflow run cd.yamlβcd.yaml:127uses the same./.github/actions/deploy-prod
composite asci.yaml, so it reaches the same reconcile step and fails identically. (Confirmed by
the heal at 03:21:41Z, job92754831196, and again by attempt 2's merge-group CI31140471256:
publish/sign/attest/promote all succeed, then it waits exactly 30 min in
π Trigger Flux reconciliationand is refused with the sameVerificationError.)ksail cluster updateβ it syncs Talos machine config and does not own the FluxInstance; its
if:also requirescilium_rollout_gate.active != true(active 12 days) and
wait_flux_revision.outcome == success(skipped), so either condition alone skips it.
The agent runtime denies cluster mutation at the command class, so this write is the maintainer's.
Evidence β the originating incident
A merge-group candidate deploy applied to real production, then failed; the heal that exists to
undo that also failed, for the same underlying reason. Production has been running never-merged
code for over four hours with no automatic recovery.
Measured on the merge group for #3001
(run 31110692734, branch
gh-readonly-queue/main/pr-3001-β¦):
| Step | Window | Outcome |
|---|---|---|
π Deploy to Prod |
14:26:06 β 14:57:00Z | failure β but it had already applied to the cluster |
CI - Required Checks |
14:57:03 β 14:57:06Z | failure β PR evicted from the queue |
π©Ή Heal Prod (restore mainβ¦) |
14:57:06 β 15:02:13Z | failure, at step 3 π©Ή Re-deploy main to Production |
The apply is visible on the live object. fluxinstance/flux in flux-system carries
kustomize-controller Apply at 14:28:51Z, and its spec.kustomize.patches contains an
OCIRepository/flux-system β add /spec/verify patch:
target: {"kind":"OCIRepository","name":"flux-system","namespace":"flux-system"}
patch: - op: add / path: /spec/verify / value: provider: cosign β¦
At the time of the incident that patch existed only on #3001's branch β main's
flux-instance.yaml then contained zero occurrences of spec/verify. So the running cluster's Flux
configuration was a candidate that had never merged.
#3001 has since merged (2026-08-06 21:50:44Z) carrying the corrected single-entry form, which
is why main and the live object now disagree in the direction described at the top of this issue:
main declares 1 matcher, the cluster still runs the candidate's 3. The divergence outlasted the
branch that caused it, because the delivery channel needed to close it is the one that is broken.
Nothing has restored it. Checked against the unfiltered run list (not a --branch main filter, which
is unreliable on a merge-queue repo): no deploy has succeeded since the 14:24:50Z merge group.
Why this is a distinct defect
#2828 and #2838 both describe the heal running successfully at the wrong moment β ordering races
that leave prod behind main, i.e. running code that has at least landed. This is the opposite and
more severe case:
- the deploy and the heal share the same deploy path, so they fail together rather than
independently; - the outcome is prod running code that never merged β and which outlived the branch it came
from, since fix(security): enforce cosign verify on the live root OCIRepositoryΒ #3001 has since merged a different, corrected value that cannot be delivered; and - there is no second line of defence β a heal is the only automatic recovery, and it is
structurally correlated with the thing it recovers from.
Any blocker that breaks deploys therefore breaks recovery at the same time. The live instance of that
blocker is the gated Cilium rollout in #2963: the DaemonSet health check cannot converge, so the
handoff quiesce times out for the deploy and the heal identically.
Impact
Production's most privileged configuration is set by whichever partially-successful candidate last
touched it, not by main. Today's divergence happens to be benign β the candidate adds signature
verification β but the mechanism is direction-agnostic. The same path could leave prod running a
candidate that removes a control, and the recovery job would fail to undo it in exactly the same way.
It also silently invalidates reasoning about live state: a reader who measures the cluster and finds a
control present will conclude it is configured in Git, when it is not. (That already occurred β see
the correction on #3001.)
Expected behaviour
A failed merge-group deploy leaves production on a state that is reachable from main, or it raises
an alert that it could not.
Acceptance criteria
- When the heal cannot restore
main, that is surfaced as an explicit, visible failure signal β
not just a red job on an evicted PR that nobody owns. - The heal's success is asserted against the cluster, not the job's exit status: after a
failed candidate deploy, the live revision is reachable frommain, or the discrepancy is
reported. - A regression test covers "deploy fails and heal fails" β the correlated case β rather than
only the ordering cases in heal-prod-on-failure can overwrite a newer deploy that has succeeded but not yet mergedΒ #2828/A merge-group heal can leave prod behind a merge that lands just after itΒ #2838.
Size
Small-to-medium. The detection half (assert the live revision against main, and alert when the heal
cannot converge) is independently shippable and is the useful first child; making the heal robust to a
broken deploy path is the larger follow-up and may depend on #2963.
Related: #2828, #2838 (heal ordering races), #2963 (the live blocker that breaks both halves), #3001
(the candidate currently on prod).
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coderabbitai commentedon Aug 6, 2026
π Related PRs
#2330 - ci: heal prod when a merge-group deploy fails (restore main) [merged]
#2622 - fix(ci): heal cancelled merge-group deploys [merged]
#2793 - feat(cilium): activate homogeneous device selection [merged]
#2962 - fix(deploy): make rollout-gate suppression of machine-config sync visible and bounded [merged]
#3001 - fix(security): enforce cosign verify on the live root OCIRepository [merged]
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devantler commentedon Aug 6, 2026
Escalation β the live instance is worse than "prod runs never-merged code": it halted delivery
I filed this an hour ago describing the mechanism and called today's divergence "benign, because the
candidate adds signature verification". That was wrong, and I am correcting it. Reading the root
source's conditions rather than its
spec:The never-merged candidate installed a
matchOIDCIdentitylist Flux's verifier rejects outright, soproduction's root source has been failing verification for 4h 45m and
flux-system/appsis stillpinned to the previous revision. Details on
#3001.
Two things this sharpens about the defect filed here
1. The blast radius is not bounded by "the candidate was an improvement". I argued the mechanism
is direction-agnostic in principle; it turns out the very first observed instance was harmful in
practice. A speculative deploy does not need to contain a malicious or regressive change to break
production β an ordinary, well-reviewed, CI-green change that is merely wrong about an external
system's capabilities is enough. Static validation cannot catch that class, which is exactly why the
candidate must not be the thing production runs.
2. The failure is self-locking, which removes the last informal recovery route. I noted here that
the heal is correlated with the deploy. This instance shows a third correlation: the broken config
travels through the delivery channel it breaks.
flux-operatorwrites the offending field from thelive
FluxInstance; theFluxInstancearrives viakustomize-controllerfrom the artifact; theartifact is what verification now refuses. So the cluster cannot reconcile its way back even once the
deploy path is repaired β recovery requires an out-of-band change to the live
FluxInstance.Any fix for this issue that assumes "a later successful deploy converges prod back onto
main" istherefore insufficient on its own. A candidate deploy can leave the cluster in a state where no
subsequent deploy can reach it.
Consequence for the acceptance criteria above
The third criterion β a regression test for the correlated "deploy fails and heal fails" case β
should be widened to cover the self-locking case: after a failed candidate deploy, assert that the
cluster is still able to receive a deploy at all, not merely that it is behind
main.Live recovery is a maintainer action; I hold read-only cluster access by design and have changed
nothing.
devantler commentedon Aug 6, 2026
Independent confirmation, and the exact minimal remedy
Confirming this from a separate session at ~19:2xZ β still live, now ~5h. I am not re-filing the
diagnosis above; this adds only the precise action and one blocker on the automated path.
Live state.
ocirepository/flux-systeminflux-system:So the root source is not reconciling and all GitOps delivery to prod is halted, not merely
divergent.
The remedy is one patch, not a config rewrite.
fluxinstance/fluxcarries 7 entries underspec.kustomize.patches. Exactly one of them adds/spec/verifyto the rootOCIRepository, withthe three-entry
matchOIDCIdentitycosign rejects. Removing that single entry (7 β 6) restores theconfiguration
mainactually declares.Verified against
mainrather than assumed βk8s/providers/hetzner/.../flux-instance/flux-instance.yamlat
origin/mainis 149 lines and contains zero occurrences ofverify(control: confirmed thefile exists and is non-empty first, so the zero is a real count and not a failed read). Its patches
target the
kustomize-controllerDeployment only.Why not "fix the matcher to one identity" instead: that keeps verification on, but requires
picking which of the three subjects signed the artifact currently on
latest. Guessing wrong leavesprod exactly as stuck. Removing the patch returns prod to its declared state and is trivially
reversible; a corrected single-identity
verifycan then land through normal review.Actions is in an active major outage (
githubstatus.com, opened 15:22Z; at 18:46Z "workflow runsare still failing, and jobs may remain queued for an extended period or may time out"). So re-running
π©Ή Heal Prodcannot succeed until Actions recovers β the two failures compound, and waiting for theheal is not currently a recovery strategy.
That leaves a direct cluster edit as the only path that works now, which is outside my runtime
authority (mutation is denied to me, deliberately). I have not attempted it.
Disclosure: the candidate that applied this came from my own lane's PR #3001. Flagging that
plainly rather than reporting it as an anonymous defect.
devantler commentedon Aug 6, 2026
The exact one-command remedy, and the measured blast radius
Third session on this at ~20:0xZ. The diagnosis above is right and I am not restating it. Two things
it stops short of: the command for the direct cluster edit it correctly identifies as the only
working path, and how far the stall has actually spread.
1. The self-lock is confirmed at the field-ownership level, not inferred
kustomize-controllerownsspec.kustomize.patchesonfluxinstance/flux(server-side apply,last at
14:28:51Z), andflux-operatorownsf:spec.f:verifyon the rootOCIRepository(
14:28:53Z, 2s later). That is the loop stated precisely: the field that has to change is writtenonly by the GitOps channel that the field itself breaks. It is not merely that the heal is
inconvenient right now β no reconcile can correct it from inside.
2. Blast radius: 3 of 11 Kustomizations, ~5.5h
appsDependencyNotReadylatest@sha256:82e0d0bfβ¦infrastructureDependencyNotReadylatest@sha256:82e0d0bfβ¦infrastructure-controllersProgressingβ¦e6039d0aThe other 8 are Ready. Workloads are still serving β this is a stalled delivery pipeline, not a
production outage β but the whole
apps+infrastructuretree has been frozen on a pre-incidentrevision for about five and a half hours, and nothing will move it without the edit below.
3. The command
patchescurrently has 7 entries; index6is the offender, verified live(
target={"kind":"OCIRepository","name":"flux-system","namespace":"flux-system"}, patch bodycontains
/spec/verify). Thetestop makes it fail closed rather than remove the wrong entryif the array has shifted in the meantime:
This converges rather than fights: with the patch gone,
flux-operatordropsspec.verifyfrom theroot
OCIRepository, verification stops failing, delivery resumes, andkustomize-controllerthenreconciles the 6 patches that
mainactually declares. The manual edit and the declared state agree,so there is nothing to undo afterwards.
Expected within a minute or two:
Still not attempted by me β cluster mutation is denied to my runtime by design, and I am not
routing around that. This is a maintainer action. Actions remains in a critical outage as of
19:43Z, soπ©Ή Heal Prodis still not an alternative.4. Why the whole tree is stuck, not just the source β the loop is circular
Added after posting, from the Kustomization events.
infrastructure-controllersis not merely"churning": its health check is waiting on
FluxInstance/flux-system/fluxstatus:InProgressand timing out at the full 25m, repeatedly (
19:24:56Z,19:52:01Zβ so it re-enters the samewait about every 27 minutes and can never exit it).
That closes the causality:
patches[6]puts an unsatisfiableverifyon the rootOCIRepository;OCIRepositoryfails verification, so it is not Ready;FluxInstancethat manages it therefore reportsInProgress;infrastructure-controllershealth-checks that same FluxInstance β 25m timeout, forever;infrastructureβDependencyNotReady; 6.appsβDependencyNotReady.Note
lastAppliedRevis stillβ¦82e0d0bfwhilelastAttemptedRevisβ¦e6039d0aβ the new artifactis attempted every cycle and never applied. So all three not-Ready Kustomizations have a single cause,
and the one patch removal above should release the entire chain in dependency order without any
further intervention.
It also means the tree is architecturally sensitive here:
infrastructure-controllershealth-checksthe FluxInstance that manages the source
infrastructure-controllersis itself delivered from, soany FluxInstance-level fault freezes the whole delivery tree in 25-minute retry cycles rather than
failing fast. That is a separate resilience concern from this incident and I am filing it separately
rather than widening this issue.
devantler commentedon Aug 6, 2026
Status update β the remedy has INVERTED. Do not run the one recorded earlier.
mainnow carries the fix, so the previously-recorded remedy would delete a security controlrather than restore one. Re-measured live at 21:57Z.
What changed
#3001 merged at 21:50:44Z, carrying the single-entry, regex-alternation matcher.
matchOIDCIdentityentriesmain(after #3001)subject)The earlier note on this issue said "main declares 6 patches,
patches[6]is the sole offender, aJSON-patch
test+removebreaks the lock and converges β nothing to undo." That was true when itwas written and is false now.
maindeclares 7 patches, andpatches[6]is the correct verifypatch. Removing it today would strip cosign verification off the root source and diverge from
main.Correct remedy now: apply
main. Either let a deploy run, or β if patching by hand β replacepatches[6]'s value withmain's single-entry form. Never remove it.Why the merge did not heal prod
The fix is on
mainand still cannot reach the cluster, because the only two paths to prod are:ci.yamlβ deploys onmerge_grouponlycd.yamlβworkflow_dispatchonly (manual, by design)#3001's merge produced no
merge_groupdeploy β GitHub Actions has been inmajor_outagesince16:33Z (still major at 21:30Z). The only post-merge run on
mainis a GitHub-managed CodeQL run.So the self-lock in this issue still holds: the artifact in storage is frozen at the 14:28:42Z digest,
and the new one carrying the fix cannot be verified by the stale 3-entry config that is rejecting it.
Live blast radius (21:57Z) β narrower than at 19:04Z
apps,bootstrap,flux-systemβ¦e6039d0ainfrastructure-controllersProgressing(health-checks the FluxInstance, which cannot converge)infrastructureDependencyNotReadyWorkloads are serving. This is a stalled delivery pipeline, not an outage:
appsreconciled asrecently as 21:44Z. What is actually blocked is new commits reaching prod.
Expected resolution β no manual action required
This clears on its own: once Actions recovers, the next PR through the merge queue runs a
merge_groupdeploy, which applies the FluxInstance directly (outside the broken OCI channel) andrestores the correct single-entry matcher. A manual
cd.yamldispatch does the same thing sooner, ifsomeone wants it back before then.
Not escalated further, on that basis β apps are up and the heal is automatic.
(Cluster mutation is denied to this agent by design; every figure above is from read-only reads and
I did not route around that.)
devantler commentedon Aug 6, 2026
Status at 2026-08-06T23:3xZ β still locked, and the auto-heal did not arrive
The prediction recorded when this was filed β the next queued PR heals prod by itself once Actions returns β has not held. Actions recovered in practice around 22:1xZ (verified by green
pull_requestruns across three repos while the status page still readmajor_outage), and prod is unchanged nine hours in.The reason is simply that no platform PR has merged since, so no
merge_groupevent has occurred. There is no eligible one waiting either: the portfolio currently has no trusted non-draft PR anywhere, and the two open platform drafts in this lane both have CI wedged at head.Verified current state
Declared on
main(k8s/providers/hetzner/.../flux-instance.yaml, at0a00b2cdβ this issue's own fix, merged 21:50:43Z) β one matcher, alternation inside the subject regex:Live on the cluster β three separate entries, which Flux rejects as a set:
Consequence, unchanged since 14:28Z:
infrastructure-controllersProgressing(health-checking a FluxInstance that can never go Ready), withinfrastructureandappsDependencyNotReadybehind it. Workloads are serving normally β every tenant Kustomization isReady=True. This is a halted delivery pipeline, not an outage.0a00b2cdis the only commit onmainnot yet delivered, so the corrective deploy has a one-commit blast radius.The remedy, and why it is not mine to run
cd.yamlis the documented path for exactly this state β its own header describes it as covering "the rare direct-push-to-main case, which has no merge_group event to deploy". It carries the samevalidate-eks-authorizationgate as the merge-queue deploy and shares theprod-deployconcurrency group, so it cannot race one.I attempted this and the agent runtime's permission layer denied the dispatch. That is a guard doing its job on a production deploy, so I have not tried to work around it β flagging it instead. This is the one step that needs a hand other than mine; everything up to it is done and verified.
Self-locking remains the underlying defect (a bad FluxInstance change can only be corrected through the channel it breaks), and the structural fix for that is #3006.
devantler commentedon Aug 7, 2026
The heal is running β state verified live at 01:2xZ
GitHub Actions is operational again (githubstatus: all systems operational), which is what unblocked this. The sequence t1006 laid out has executed as designed:
mainpasses its own publication contract again and stops reddening every pull request.merge_grouprun is live βπ Deploy to Prodhas been in itsDeploy to Productionstep since 00:50Z. fix(rbac): enumerate the github-config tenant Role's managed-resource kindsΒ #3004 changesk8s/, so it satisfies thek8s: ['k8s/**']path filter that gates the deploy job; fix(ci): accept the shared cosign matcher in the DR publication contractΒ #3008 alone could not, touching onlyscripts/.Not yet healed, as of this comment. The live root
OCIRepositorystill carries 3matchOIDCIdentityentries and reportsReady=False VerificationError: β¦ multiple identities are not supported.maindeclares the corrected single entry with the three signers as a subject alternation. The liveFluxInstancestill shows the 3-entry patch, soksail cluster updatehas not reached the apply yet.infrastructure-controllersisProgressing;infrastructureandappsareDependencyNotReady. Every other Kustomization isReconciliationSucceededand workloads have served throughout β a halted pipeline, not an outage.What settles it: the live
FluxInstancepatch dropping from 3 matcher entries to 1, then the rootOCIRepositoryreportingReady=True. Both are one read each:No action is needed from anyone while the deploy runs. If it completes without the live matcher count dropping to 1, that is a new fact and this issue should carry it.
devantler commentedon Aug 7, 2026
The merge-queue deploy cannot heal this, and now there is a measured run proving it
mainis no longer the blocker: #3008 merged and both cosign validators now pass ondf72a9ee(verified by running them, not by reading CI). #3004 was then driven green and enqueued, on the
expectation β recorded in an earlier note on this issue β that its merge-queue deploy would apply
the corrected matcher directly and recover delivery.
That expectation was wrong, and the deploy disproved it. Run
31135949968,π Deploy to Prod,failed at:
#3004 was evicted from the queue and production is unchanged: the live
FluxInstancestill declares3
matchOIDCIdentityentries, and the rootOCIRepositoryis stillReady=FalseVerificationError.Why no CI path can repair it
The deploy action delivers Kubernetes manifests by exactly one mechanism β publish to GHCR, then ask
Flux to pull:
π¦ Publish evidenced manifests to GHCRπ Trigger Flux reconciliationOCIRepositoryβ³ Wait for the newly published Flux revisionπ Update clusterSo the only step that touches the cluster without Flux is Talos-only and sits downstream of the
failing reconcile. The
FluxInstanceitself is delivered through Flux (per #3006,infrastructure-controllersapplies the object that owns its own source), so a wrongFluxInstancecannot be corrected by the channel it breaks.
cd.yamlshares this same composite action, so themanual path fails identically β it is not an escape hatch for this failure mode.
This is a genuine deadlock, not a slow convergence, and re-queuing #3004 will reproduce it exactly.
What actually breaks it open
One of:
FluxInstancesomatchOIDCIdentitycarries thesingle alternation entry
mainalready declares. Agents are denied cluster mutation by design,so this is a maintainer action.
FluxInstance(or the rootOCIRepository's verify block)directly, before the reconcile gate, so a bad matcher is self-correcting rather than
self-locking. This is the durable fix and belongs on this issue.
Option 1 restores delivery immediately; option 2 stops it recurring. They are complementary.
Impact remains a halted pipeline, not an outage β
apps,infrastructureandinfrastructure-controllersare not reconciling, while every deployment stays at its desiredreplica count and workloads serve normally.
devantler commentedon Aug 7, 2026
Update β the deploy failed, and the heal is tracking the same profile
#3004'smerge_groupπ Deploy to Prodran 55 minutes in itsDeploy to Productionstep and then failed;#3004was evicted from the queue and is back to OPEN and CLEAN.π©Ή Heal Prodpicked up automatically at 01:26:12Z and re-deploysmain, which carries the corrected single-matcher config β so that job alone can heal production without#3004merging.It has now been in its own deploy step for ~35 minutes with no change to the cluster: the live
FluxInstancepatch still declares 3 issuer entries, the rootOCIRepositorystill reportsmatchers=3/VerificationError, andapps,infrastructureandinfrastructure-controllersare still not Ready.Two readings, and they are worth separating rather than assuming:
ksail cluster updateapplies and then waits on health, an unchanged cluster at 35 minutes is expected and the fix lands near the end.The 55-minute failure is what makes (2) worth taking seriously: that is a wait, not a crash. The deploy job's log settles it, and it cannot be read until the run completes (
--log-failedrefuses on an in-progress run) β run31135949968, job92735412751. That is the first thing to read next, before any remedy is chosen; the remedy for (1) is patience and the remedy for (2) is not.Workloads have served throughout. Nothing here needs a human yet β the log is available to the next run.
devantler commentedon Aug 7, 2026
Live recurrence, measured this tick (2026-08-07)
This scenario is active right now, and the loop ran twice in one night on the same PR (#3004):
merge_grouprun31135949968π Deploy to Prod/ stepπ Deploy to Productionfailed β PR evicted βπ©Ή Heal Prodalso failed31140471256So the heal-shares-the-failing-path thesis in this issue is confirmed on attempt 1: the deploy failed,
and the heal that exists to restore prod failed with it.
Why this is worse than a stuck PR
Prod is currently pinned on undeliverable state. The root
flux-systemOCIRepository is failingverification:
The live object carries 3
matchOIDCIdentityentries; cosign accepts exactly one and failsclosed for all.
mainalready carries the corrected 1-entry form. The only path that applies it isthe merge-queue deploy β which is the thing that will not complete. That is the self-lock this issue
describes, closed into a loop.
infrastructure-controllersβinfrastructureβappsare consequently stalled. Workloads areserving (all six tenant Kustomizations
Ready=True, no unhealthy pods) β this is a halted deliverypipeline, not an outage.
What is NOT yet established
Attempt 1 surfaced
Error: create website devantler.tech failed: 500during umami websiteprovisioning, while umami CNPG was failing over. I am not claiming that is attempt 2 as cause.
Umami is healthy again (app pods Running, DB endpoints populated, provisioning CronJob Completed
seconds before this comment), so "transient failover" does not explain a second failure 80 minutes
later. Attempt 2 logs are withheld while the run is in progress
(
run 31140471256 is still in progress; logs will be available when it is complete), so its cause isundiagnosed β deliberately left open rather than guessed.
Next concrete step: once run
31140471256completes, pull theπ Deploy to Prodjob log(job id
92749257163) and root-cause the step before any further queue attempt. #3004 has beenmarked DO-NOT-RE-QUEUE in its body so a pentad-clean sweep does not spend another ~36 minutes on it.
devantler commentedon Aug 7, 2026
Attempt 2's cause is already decided by live state β and no deploy path can fix this
Building on the 03:03Z comment, which left attempt 2 undiagnosed pending its log. The log is not
needed, and waiting for it will cost another run: the cluster carries a decisive control taken at
02:5xZ, while attempt 2's own reconcile was in flight.
The control
A newly published, correctly signed, fully attested artifact from the current pipeline was seen and
rejected. So the cause is not the signature, not the umami 500, and not transient β those
can be closed out. It is the matcher count, and it is deterministic:
repeated once per entry. The live object carries 3
matchOIDCIdentityentries; cosign acceptsexactly one and fails closed. No signature can satisfy a 3-entry matcher, so every attempt fails
identically at the same step. Attempt 3 would too.
Why this is closed, not merely stuck
The live
FluxInstancethat renders those matchers is labelledβ it is owned by a Kustomization delivered through the very OCIRepository it configures. So the
corrected 1-entry form on
mainreaches the cluster only via a channel that cannot open until thecorrected form is already applied. That is a closed loop with no internal exit, which is why both the
deploy and the heal fail: neither writes cluster-side verification config.
infrastructure-controllersis
Progressing;infrastructureandappsareDependencyNotReady. Workloads keep serving.The remedy recorded in earlier ticks is void
Earlier ticks recorded
gh workflow run cd.yamlas the remedy. It cannot work:cd.yamlline 127uses the same
./.github/actions/deploy-prodcomposite asci.yaml, so a manual dispatch runs the samepublish -> reconcile -> timeout and fails identically after ~35 minutes. Nothing in
.github/workflows/breaks this loop. Please do not spend a run on it.What actually clears it
One out-of-band cluster write, reducing the live matcher list to the single alternation entry
mainalready declares. It is convergent, not divergent: once the OCIRepository verifies,
infrastructure-controllersreconciles theFluxInstancefrom Git to that same value.This is outside the agent permission boundary (cluster mutation is hard-denied, verified this tick on a
server-side dry-run no-op), so it needs the maintainer. Raised on the private channel with the exact
command; deliberately not reproduced here.
The durable fix
A delivery channel's own trust configuration must not be delivered solely through that channel. Filing
that separately as the design defect β this issue stays on the heal-shares-the-failing-path thesis,
which attempt 1 confirmed.
devantler commentedon Aug 7, 2026
Correction / narrowing of my previous comment β prod is NOT on never-merged code
My comment above described the loop as active and cited the heal failing with the deploy. That part
stands for attempt 1. But I should be precise about the part that gives this issue its title, because
I verified it directly and the worst case has not materialised:
The wildcard is
main. #3004's enumerated-kinds Role is not live. So the two failed candidatedeploys did not leave prod carrying never-merged code on this occasion β either the deploy failed
before applying that manifest, or the heal reverted it.
Why this matters for triage: it separates two failure modes this issue can produce, which have
very different urgency:
serve; new changes cannot land.
We are in (2). That is a stuck pipeline, not a correctness or security exposure, and it should not be
escalated as though the tenant Role had been silently narrowed or widened in production.
Attempt 2 remains undiagnosed β run
31140471256is still in progress at 03:07Z (theπ©Ή Heal Prodjob has been running 18 min), so its logs are still withheld. Next step is unchanged: pull job
92749257163once the run completes.devantler commentedon Aug 7, 2026
Attempt 2 is now fully diagnosed β the logs became readable, and they close the last open question
My earlier comments had to reason around a log GitHub withholds while a run is in progress. Run
31140471256(merge-group attempt 2 for #3004) has now completed, so I read both failing jobsdirectly. Nothing here changes the remedy; it removes the remaining guesswork about why.
The deploy did not crash β it waited, then was refused
Job
92749257163(π Deploy to Prod, 02:13:00Z β 02:49:02Z). The publish half succeededcompletely: stage β cosign sign β SBOM β SLSA provenance attest β verify evidence β promote to
latestall passed by 02:15:58Z. It then enteredπ Trigger Flux reconciliationat 02:16:00Z andsat there for exactly 30 minutes before failing at 02:46:03Z with:
So a freshly published, signed, attested artifact was served and rejected. That rules out the
transient explanations I had been carrying: it is not a signing failure, not umami, not a flake.
Attempt 1's 55-minute failure has the same shape.
ksail cluster updatewas never going to help β it is doubly gated and aimed at the wrong objectI had been treating the suppressed
π Update clusterstep as a possible route to correcting theFluxInstance. It is not, for two independent reasons:
if:requirescilium_rollout_gate.outputs.active != 'true'(the gate has been active 12 days, threshold 7)and
wait_flux_revision.outcome == 'success'(that step was skipped, because the reconcileabove it had already failed). Either alone skips it.
kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/name: infrastructure-controllers, so it is applied by thatKustomization β not by
ksail cluster update, which syncs Talos machine config, as its name says.The heal cannot recover this class, and now there is direct evidence
Job
92754831196(π©Ή Heal Prod, 03:24:34Z) failed at 03:21:41Z with the byte-identical error.That is the point this issue's title makes, and it is now demonstrated rather than inferred: the heal
re-deploys
mainthrough the same OCIRepository that is refusing every artifact. The safety netshares the failure mode of the thing it is meant to catch, so it cannot fire when it is most needed.
Current live state (read directly, 03:5xZ)
mainalready declares the corrected single alternation matcher. Workloads continue to servethroughout β this is a delivery freeze, not an outage of the running apps.
Why this is closed, and what breaks it
The FluxInstance renders the OCIRepository's
matchOIDCIdentitylist. The FluxInstance is applied bythe
infrastructure-controllersKustomization. That Kustomization is delivered through theOCIRepository. A config error in the trust policy therefore disables the only channel that could
deliver its own correction, and every CI path β
cd.yaml, the merge-group deploy, and the heal βenters through that same channel.
The break-glass is unchanged and is a single cluster write that replaces the three matcher
entries with the one-entry alternation
mainalready declares. Once the OCIRepository verifies, Fluxpulls
main, and the FluxInstance reconciles itself back into a consistent state β no furthermanual step. I do not hold cluster-mutation permission (verified again this run: denied at the
command class, including a server-side dry-run no-op), so this remains the maintainer's one action.
It was sent privately with the exact command.
I will keep re-reading the matchers at the top of each run and will report the moment they change.
devantler commentedon Aug 8, 2026
Resolved β the in-place fix is applied and verified live
@devantler applied the single cluster write. Verified against the live cluster, not inferred:
ocirepository/flux-systemmatchOIDCIdentityentriesmaindeclares)SourceVerifiedSucceededReadySucceededAnd it self-healed exactly as predicted β all five Kustomizations are now
Ready=Trueat the samenew revision
latest@sha256:e996cd9bβ¦, up from the stalee6039d0aβ¦they had been pinned to:So the divergence is closed in the convergent direction:
flux-operatorre-rendered the source frommain, and cluster and Git now agree. Delivery is restored, prod is no longer running never-mergedcode, and the merge queue is unblocked (#3004 re-queued; its stale
DO NOT RE-QUEUEbody note hasbeen cleared).
Closing the incident, not the lesson. The structural loop this exposed is real and unfixed: the
root source's trust config is still delivered through the source it gates, and the heal still shares
the deploy path, so the same deadlock recurs on any future bad value. That recovery gap is now
tracked as a focused, actionable issue β #3014 β with a decisive acceptance test. Prevention
(catching a non-verifying matcher before it ships) remains #3007.