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Security: dereksantos/cortex

SECURITY.md

Security Policy

Supported Versions

Cortex is in public alpha. Only the main branch receives security fixes.

Reporting a Vulnerability

Please do not open a public GitHub issue for security vulnerabilities.

Instead, report privately via GitHub's Private Vulnerability Reporting (the "Report a vulnerability" button on the Security tab). Reports go directly to the maintainer.

Please include:

  • A description of the issue and its impact
  • Steps to reproduce
  • Affected versions or commits
  • Any suggested mitigations

You can expect an initial response within 7 days. We'll work with you on a fix and a coordinated disclosure timeline.

cortex serve's auth posture

cortex serve binds loopback-only (127.0.0.1/localhost/[::1]) and, as of 2026-07-19, gates every /api/... request with a strict Host/Origin allowlist (hostOriginMiddleware, cmd/cortex/serve.go) instead of a bearer token. This is by design, not an oversight: on a loopback-only bind there is no network attacker to keep out with a secret — the actual threats are DNS rebinding (a malicious page gets a victim's browser to resolve some other hostname to 127.0.0.1) and cross-site request forgery (a malicious page's browser issues a same-machine request on the victim's behalf). Both are Host/Origin problems, not authentication problems, and a bearer token carried in a URL query string is itself a leak surface (browser history, referrer headers, shell scrollback) that the allowlist avoids entirely. A bypass of the allowlist — a request whose Host or Origin should have been rejected but was accepted — is in scope for this policy, at the same tier as a shell-risk gate bypass below. If cortex serve ever binds to a non-loopback address, that build will need a real auth mechanism again; loopback-only is the precondition this posture depends on.

Scope

In scope:

  • The cortex CLI and its agentic turn loop
  • cortex serve's Host/Origin allowlist (see above) — a request that should be rejected by Host or Origin but is accepted anyway
  • The shell-risk gate (internal/shellrisk) — i.e. a command that should be classified Risky/Blocked but runs as Safe, or any bypass of the approval prompt
  • Workspace confinement for remove_path and bash — escapes outside the configured delete_root / workspace, or deletion of .git / .cortex
  • Secret handling — API keys are referenced by key_env / key_service and must never be written to ~/.cortex/config.json, the journal, or session transcripts
  • The journal's local-only invariant (journal.AssertLocalOnly) — any path that sends .cortex/ contents off the machine by default
  • Anything that handles user data in ~/.cortex/ or a project's .cortex/

Out of scope:

  • Third-party LLM providers and model backends (report to Anthropic, Ollama, OpenRouter, etc.)
  • Prompt-injection causing the agent to run a command you would have approved anyway — the risk gate mitigates but cannot eliminate this; review what the agent proposes
  • Issues that require local code execution as the same user already running cortex

There aren't any published security advisories