ci: Add actionlint and zizmor workflow linting - #21
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Reviewer's GuideAdds pinned actionlint and zizmor checks for workflow changes and scheduled maintenance, configures zizmor’s trust and pinning policies, and hardens existing workflows with least-privilege permissions, safer checkout and shell handling, SHA-pinned actions, and scoped workflow_run behavior. Dependabot updates now use ecosystem-specific cooldown periods. Flow diagram for least-privilege workflow permissionsflowchart LR
Workflow[Workflow permissions: none] --> Build[Build job<br/>contents: read]
Workflow --> Submit[Dependency submission job<br/>contents: write]
Workflow --> Site[Site build job<br/>contents: read]
Workflow --> Deploy[Pages deploy job<br/>pages: write<br/>id-token: write]
File-Level Changes
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Included review availability: Your plan provides up to 1 included review per hour; 0 remain after this review. 📝 WalkthroughWalkthroughThe pull request hardens GitHub Actions workflows, adds Dependabot cooldowns, defines zizmor policy, and introduces automated actionlint and zizmor checks. ChangesActions security and linting
Priority: ⬇️ Low Estimated code review effort: 3 (Moderate) | ~20 minutes Sequence Diagram(s)sequenceDiagram
participant GitHubEvents
participant lint-workflows.yml
participant actionlint
participant zizmor
GitHubEvents->>lint-workflows.yml: trigger workflow lint run
lint-workflows.yml->>actionlint: validate workflow syntax
lint-workflows.yml->>zizmor: inspect .github/
Merge Risk: ⚪ Minimal · up to No current merge-blocking risk was identified in these workflow hardening and linting changes. 🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 5✅ Passed checks (5 passed)
✨ Finishing Touches🧪 Generate unit tests (beta)
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Hey - I've reviewed your changes and they look great!
Sourcery assessment
Needs a human reviewer. If the workflow-run checkout change selects the wrong revision, the deployment jobs could publish an unintended snapshot to Maven Central or deploy incorrect site content; the Maven publication cannot be fully undone by reverting this PR. The permission and trigger changes also alter CI trust boundaries, so a mistaken assumption about workflow_run safety could expose privileged automation.
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Reviewed commit: 8b35820d7d
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| - uses: actions/checkout@v7 | ||
| with: | ||
| ref: ${{ github.event.workflow_run.head_sha }} | ||
| persist-credentials: false |
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When a new commit lands on main after a successful Build any branch run but before this job reaches checkout, this defaults to the newer default-branch tip rather than the triggering run's SHA. The deploy command skips tests, so that newer commit can be published to Maven Central even if its own build subsequently fails; retain a checkout ref based on github.event.workflow_run.head_sha so the deployed snapshot is the commit that passed.
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Actionable comments posted: 1
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Inline comments:
In @.github/workflows/lint-workflows.yml:
- Around line 52-53: Update the zizmor workflow using the visible collection
configuration so parse failures in collected files, including
.github/dependabot.yml, fail the job; invoke zizmor with --strict-collection or
add equivalent Dependabot validation, without relying on the unsupported
strict-collection action input.
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📒 Files selected for processing (6)
.github/dependabot.yml.github/workflows/build-any-branch.yml.github/workflows/deploy-snapshot.yml.github/workflows/lint-workflows.yml.github/workflows/publish-docs.yml.github/zizmor.yml
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Reduce the token exposure and shell-injection surface of the workflows
without changing what they do:
* Set workflow-level `permissions: {}` on Build any branch and move
`pages: write` / `id-token: write` off the docs workflow and onto its
Pages deploy job; give each job only the scopes it uses.
* Set `persist-credentials: false` on the checkouts that never reuse the
token for a `git` operation.
* Drop the `workflow_run` checkouts' `ref:` so Deploy Snapshot and the
docs publish build the default branch rather than the triggering
commit, which on a `workflow_run` can be a fork's.
* Quote `$GITHUB_OUTPUT` and the `$(date ...)` command substitution, and
pass the resolved version through `env:` into the run step.
* Pin `advanced-security/maven-dependency-submission-action` to a commit
SHA; the floating `v5` tag has no matching release tag to name, so this
moves to `v6.0.1`.
* Record why the `workflow_run` triggers are not exploitable: the branch
filter excludes fork PRs, the job checks out the default branch, and it
reuses no artifact from the triggering run.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01YA7TRsrNp1TPrHn1KD6vnJ
Give a bad or compromised release time to be yanked before Dependabot opens a PR for it: seven days for Maven dependencies, and a shorter three days for GitHub Actions so security-relevant pin bumps still land quickly. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01YA7TRsrNp1TPrHn1KD6vnJ
Add a "Lint workflows" workflow that runs actionlint (workflow schema plus shellcheck on `run:` scripts) and zizmor (workflow security) on every change under `.github/` and weekly on a schedule. Both tool versions are pinned. `.github/zizmor.yml` accepts tag pins for actions from GitHub's own orgs (`actions/*`, `github/*`, `dependabot/*`) and requires a commit SHA for anything else, and keeps the workspace-relative `./...` action syntax rather than the very recent `$/...` form. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01YA7TRsrNp1TPrHn1KD6vnJ
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Adds actionlint + zizmor linting for the GitHub Actions workflows, plus the
hardening to pass them clean. Same setup as
dbunit/dbunit-extension. Bothlinters pass clean locally.
ci: Add actionlint and zizmor workflow lintingactionlint(schema + shellcheck) andzizmor(workflow security), tool versions pinned, on.github/**PRs and aweekly schedule.
.github/zizmor.yml— tags allowed foractions/*/github/*/dependabot/*, commit SHA required for anything else; the new$/…self-repository
uses:syntax deferred.ci(dependabot): Add a cooldown before opening update PRsci: Harden the GitHub Actions workflowspermissions:blocks andpersist-credentials: false.workflow_runcheckouts dropref: …head_sha— Deploy Snapshot and thedocs publish now build the default branch, not the (possibly fork) triggering
commit.
dangerous-triggerssuppressed with a justification comment.$GITHUB_OUTPUTand$(date …); step outputs routed throughenv:.advanced-security/maven-dependency-submission-actionpinned to a commit SHA(the floating
v5tag has no matching release tag, so this moves tov6.0.1).🤖 Generated with Claude Code
https://claude.ai/code/session_01YA7TRsrNp1TPrHn1KD6vnJ
Summary by Sourcery
Add workflow linting and security hardening while introducing safer Dependabot update timing.
New Features:
Bug Fixes:
Enhancements:
CI:
Summary by CodeRabbit
New Features
Security
Reliability