fix: safely encode storage-derived values in data views

[anupamme]

Summary

This hardens the debug/data-management views (js/danoni_main.js's formatObject()/formatValue()) against HTML injection from localStorage-derived data, without breaking the plain-text clipboard export path.

Original report: formatObject() processes data from localStorage (custom key configurations) and renders it into the DOM via innerHTML (viewKeyStorage() → createDivCss2Label() / direct .innerHTML assignments in title.js). This is defensive hardening of debug/data-management functionality (debug=true precondition for the precondition view) rather than a demonstrated remotely-exploitable XSS — I have not demonstrated an exploit against your deployment, so please judge it against your own threat model.

What changed, and why (revised from the original commit):

The first commit escaped every string inside formatValue() unconditionally, including the colorFmt=false path, which is intentionally used to produce plain, unescaped text for copyTextToClipboard() (see title.js's "copy storage" buttons). That broke the clipboard output, as flagged in review.

The second commit:

• Reverts the unconditional escape in formatValue(), restoring the original colorFmt=true → escaped HTML / colorFmt=false → raw text for clipboard contract.
• Escapes formatSetArray()'s raw array-pair interpolation (${_obj[j]}: ${_obj[j + 1]}), which spliced values directly into the HTML string, bypassing formatValue()/escapeHtml() entirely. This function only ever runs on the HTML-rendering path, so the escape is unconditional there.
• Escapes object keys rendered in formatCollection(), but only when colorFmt is true, so clipboard output stays unescaped.

What changed

• js/danoni_main.js

Verification

No test framework exists in this repository, so I verified manually: extracted the real formatObject()/formatValue()/escapeHtml() source and ran it against <script>alert(1)</script>, <img src=x onerror=alert(1)>, "foo & bar", and foo < bar as plain values, object keys, and set-array entries. With colorFmt: true all of these are now HTML-entity-escaped (including the previously-missed formatSetArray/object-key paths); with colorFmt: false output is byte-identical to the pre-fix behavior (raw text, safe for clipboard use).

Reference: CWE-79

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ℹ️ Recent review info

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📥 Commits

Reviewing files that changed from the base of the PR and between 3cfcf09 and 406ef4f.

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• js/danoni_main.js

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📝 Summary

Summary by CodeRabbit

• Bug Fixes
  • Text values are now safely displayed when color formatting is off, and newline and color-code formatting preserve escaped text.

Walkthrough

formatValue now HTML-escapes string values whether or not colorFmt is enabled. When color formatting is enabled, newline conversion runs after escaping.

Changes

Value formatting

Layer / File(s)	Summary
String escaping and formatting js/danoni_main.js	formatValue escapes strings before optional color formatting. Newline conversion in the color-formatting path runs after escaping.

Priority: ➖ Normal

Estimated code review effort: 2 (Simple) | ~5 minutes

Change: Bug fix

Suggested reviewers: cwtickle

Merge Risk: ⚪ Minimal · up to 406ef

The formatting change preserves plain-text copying for array values. No actionable merge-blocking issue was established.

Security Architecture Review

Security architecture risk: 🔵 Low · up to 406ef

The change strengthens encoding before saved data is displayed as HTML and preserves text-only clipboard output. No introduced security weakness was established. How an external attacker could populate the saved data, and the deployment’s isolation boundaries, remain unverified.

Retained concerns
No architecture-level concerns identified.

Security review details

Security Blast Radius

• inferred — The traced exposure concerns saved data in the current browser origin, its storage-management HTML view, and explicit clipboard export. The evidence does not establish a remote storage-write path or the deployment’s broader tenant and asset exposure.

Trust Boundaries and Controls

• observed — The selected-key HTML consumer uses the default colorFmt:true mode. The newly encoded set-array path runs only in that mode. Clipboard callbacks explicitly disable color formatting and use navigator.clipboard.writeText or a textarea textContent fallback, so unchanged literal keys are not interpreted as HTML by those consumers.

🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 5

✅ Passed checks (5 passed)

Check name	Status	Explanation
Docstring Coverage	✅ Passed	No functions found in the changed files to evaluate docstring coverage. Skipping docstring coverage check. Docstring coverage is scoped to functions touched by this diff. Analyzed 0 functions across 1…
Linked Issues check	✅ Passed	Check skipped because no linked issues were found for this pull request.
Out of Scope Changes check	✅ Passed	Check skipped because no linked issues were found for this pull request.
Title check	✅ Passed	The title clearly describes the main change: safely encoding storage-derived values in data views.
Description check	✅ Passed	The description explains the HTML-injection hardening, the affected formatting paths, and how the change preserves plain-text clipboard output.

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Actionable comments posted: 1

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Inline comments:
Review comments at @js/danoni_main.js:
- Line 603: Move string escaping in formatValue into the colorFmt string branch
so HTML display remains escaped while formatObject calls with colorFmt false
preserve raw strings in clipboard output.

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ℹ️ Review info

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• Configuration used: Repository UI
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• Run ID: 003850b5-2ba9-41c7-ab48-820b398c8c74

📥 Commits

Reviewing files that changed from the base of the PR and between d2a5d0a and 3cfcf09.

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• js/danoni_main.js

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[cwtickle]

As Coderabbit pointed out, colorfmt=false is intended solely for the clipboard, so escaping characters causes issues.

I believe the issue here lies in the part of the Precondition or Data Management screens that visualizes the object structure. However, the default object structure does not contain any keys that could lead to an XSS vulnerability; such keys do not exist unless created in combination with a custom script. Furthermore, the Precondition screen itself is hidden when the server is live and will not be displayed unless a GET query (debug=true) is intentionally added.

The Data Management screen displays LocalStorage keys, which are limited to only those that are necessary; vulnerabilities will not occur unless such strings are intentionally inserted via a custom script.
In any case, I believe the impact is limited.

Escaping formatSetArray is harmless and consistent with defensive coding practices, so it is a viable option to implement.

[anupamme]

Thanks for the detailed explanation @cwtickle — agreed on all points, and I've pushed a second commit that addresses this directly:

• Reverted the unconditional escapeHtml() in formatValue(). You and CodeRabbit were right that colorFmt=false is intentionally used for plain-text clipboard output (copyTextToClipboard()), so escaping there was corrupting that output. Restored the original colorFmt=true → escaped HTML / colorFmt=false → raw text contract.
• Escaped formatSetArray()'s raw pair interpolation (${_obj[j]}: ${_obj[j + 1]}) unconditionally, as you suggested — it's harmless there since that function only ever runs on the HTML-rendering path.
• Also escaped object keys in formatCollection(), but only when colorFmt is true, so the Data Management "copy to clipboard" output stays unescaped/raw.

I also agree the practical impact is limited given the debug=true precondition for the Precondition screen and that exploitable keys/values generally require a custom script to introduce. I've updated the PR title/description to frame this as defensive hardening rather than a demonstrated remote exploit, and kept the "I have not demonstrated an exploit against your deployment" caveat.

Verified manually (no test framework exists in this repo) by extracting the real formatObject()/formatValue()/escapeHtml() source and running it against <script>alert(1)</script>, <img src=x onerror=alert(1)>, "foo & bar", and foo < bar as plain values, object keys, and set-array entries — confirmed colorFmt: true now escapes all of these consistently (including the previously-missed formatSetArray/key paths), and colorFmt: false output is unchanged from before.