Report a vulnerability privately, not in a public issue or pull request: open a private report. Only the maintainer sees it. Include the ChromeForTestingAutomatedDownload version, the .NET version and operating system, the method involved, and the smallest code or JSON that shows it, with credentials and private data removed.
A confirmed vulnerability is fixed in a release on nuget.org, and the advisory is published with it, crediting you unless you ask otherwise.
Only the latest release on nuget.org receives security fixes. Older releases are not maintained separately; update when a fix ships.
ChromeForTestingAutomatedDownload is a library. It opens no port. What it reaches, reads, writes and runs:
- Network. The model classes and
GoogleChromeLabsEndpointQueriesread the eight Chrome for Testing JSON files underhttps://googlechromelabs.github.io/chrome-for-testing/.AutomatedDownload.DownloadChromeDriverAsyncalso downloads the chromedriver ZIP file from the URL that JSON gives (today onstorage.googleapis.com). - Files written. Only
DownloadChromeDriverAsyncwrites: the ZIP file, to a temporary file of its own that is deleted when it is closed, and the chromedriver entry extracted from it, into the caller's folder or, by default, the application's base directory, replacing an existing chromedriver. An entry whose path is absolute, names a drive or climbs with..is refused; otherwise only its file name,chromedriverorchromedriver.exe, is used. - Files read and processes started.
LocalVersionCheckingreads the file version ofchrome.exeunder Program Files, Program Files (x86) or the user's AppData\Local on Windows and runs nothing there. On Linux it runsgoogle-chrome --product-version, withgoogle-chrometaken from the first absolute folder onPATH, never the application's folder or the current directory; on macOS it runs/Applications/Google Chrome.app/Contents/MacOS/Google Chrome --version. Either command is stopped after 30 seconds.DownloadChromeDriverAsynccalls it unless given a milestone. Nothing the library downloads is run by the library.
The library trusts the Chrome for Testing JSON as it is served over HTTPS. It requires the download URL to be absolute HTTPS but does not restrict its host, and Chrome for Testing publishes no checksums to verify a download against. These count as vulnerabilities:
- a JSON response or download that makes the library write outside the download folder or its own temporary ZIP file, or write anything in the folder other than the chromedriver extracted from the ZIP file;
- anything that makes the library run a program other than the Chrome version commands above, or run what it downloaded;
- a request the library makes to anything other than the endpoints above and the download URL the JSON gives.
A wrong URL, a missing version or an exception is not a vulnerability on its own; report it as an issue.
Pass a folder of your own to DownloadChromeDriverAsync rather than relying
on the default, the application's base directory, so a chromedriver your
application ships is not replaced by surprise.
The google-chrome that runs is the first one on PATH. Keep folders that
other users can write to off the PATH of a process that calls
GetChromeVersion or DownloadChromeDriverAsync without a milestone, or
pass the milestone yourself.
Three workflows check every pull request and every push to main, and
their gates decide whether a change can merge: CI passed,
Security passed and Malware scan passed. A gate passes only when
every job before it did, and any unexpected finding fails it, whatever its
severity. Security also runs weekly, so new queries, rules and advisories
reach code that has not changed, and Malware scan runs daily, so new
signatures and rules reach files that have not changed.
- Code: CodeQL with GitHub's security-extended queries, for C#
(extracted from a Release build of net8.0, net9.0 and net10.0) and GitHub
Actions, and Semgrep with the default, C#, security-audit, secrets and
GitHub Actions rule sets. Semgrep scans the library, the workflows that
build and publish it, and the scripts in
scripts/securitythat judge the scans. Anosemgrepcomment cannot hide a finding. Results go to the repository's code scanning. - Workflows: zizmor audits the GitHub Actions workflows; a finding fails Security.
- Dependencies:
dotnet list package --vulnerable --include-transitivechecks the packagespackages.lock.jsonresolves, after the same locked restore CI builds with, and any known vulnerability fails Security. The library has no NuGet dependencies today beyond the .NET runtime. - Malware: ClamAV, with signatures freshclam fetches and verifies on every run, and YARA-X, with the YARA Forge rules pinned to a release and its SHA-256, scan every file the commit holds and the .nupkg built from it with the locked restore, both as the archive and unpacked. On a release they scan the very .nupkg that is published. YARA-X runs YARA Forge's full rule set. A scan error fails the report as a match does. No workflow downloads Chrome or chromedriver, so neither is scanned.
- OpenSSF Scorecard rates the repository's security practices on every
change to
mainand weekly, and the README badge shows the result. Its Code-Review and Contributors checks assume more than one maintainer, such as a second person approving every change, so a single-maintainer project cannot score full marks on them. Its Fuzzing check finds no C# fuzzer short of OSS-Fuzz or ClusterFuzzLite, so this repository has no fuzz workflow; the JSON it parses goes to System.Text.Json.
A finding is fixed, or accepted with a written reason in
.github/security/accepted.toml
for CodeQL and Semgrep, or
.github/security/malware-accepted.toml
for ClamAV and YARA-X. A finding entry matches on the tool, the rule and
the file, and in accepted.toml also the text of the flagged line, so an
edited line needs another review; a notice entry, for a warning a tool
raises about its own scan, matches on the tool, the warning and text the
message contains. An entry that no longer matches fails the report. zizmor
keeps its exceptions in .github/zizmor.yml or inline beside the line they
excuse, each with its reason.
The current entries: there are none in accepted.toml or
malware-accepted.toml. zizmor's self-repository and superfluous-actions
rules are turned off in .github/zizmor.yml, each with its reason and when
it comes back.
Everything the workflows run is pinned: actions to full commit SHAs,
runners to named OS releases, scanner images to digests, Python tools to
hash-locked lock files, the library's NuGet packages to
packages.lock.json, restored in locked mode, the YARA Forge rules to a
release and its SHA-256, and the YARA-X engine to a release and its
SHA-256. global.json sets the .NET SDK's floor at 10.0.400 and lets it
roll forward to a newer feature band, so CI builds with the newest .NET 10
SDK. ClamAV's signatures change too often to pin, so freshclam fetches and
verifies them on every run.
Dependabot proposes updates to the GitHub Actions, the hash-locked files in
.github/requirements, the NuGet packages and the .NET SDK in
global.json once a version is a week old, and at once for a security
advisory. The Update YARA rules workflow proposes new YARA pins in
.github/security/yara.json each week, and the Update images workflow new
ClamAV and Semgrep images once they are a week old, a version rebuilt in
place included (GitHub refuses Dependabot's updates of those images). A
minor or patch update, and the YARA and image pull requests, merge
themselves once CI, Security and Malware scan pass; a third-party major
version waits for review.
A pushed vX.Y.Z tag builds the .nupkg with the locked restore, checks
that the tag matches the package version (PackageVersion in the csproj),
and runs Security and Malware scan on the tagged commit and that package.
Nothing is published unless all of them pass. The package goes to
nuget.org through trusted publishing, so no long-lived API key exists to
leak. The GitHub release, titled with the tag, carries the .nupkg,
ChromeForTestingAutomatedDownload-<version>-security-report.md and
ChromeForTestingAutomatedDownload-<version>-malware-report.md beside the
scan results they were made from, and the provenance bundle, with the
version's section of CHANGELOG.md as its notes. Started by hand, the
Publish workflow is always a dry run and publishes nothing.
Releases after 1.1.3 carry a GitHub build provenance attestation for the .nupkg CI built. Check the copy attached to the GitHub release:
gh attestation verify ChromeForTestingAutomatedDownload.<version>.nupkg --owner WilliamSmithEdward
The output names the commit and workflow run that built the file. The
signed bundle is also attached to the release as
ChromeForTestingAutomatedDownload-<version>.sigstore.json, so the check
works without asking GitHub for it: add
--bundle ChromeForTestingAutomatedDownload-<version>.sigstore.json.
nuget.org adds its own repository signature to every package it serves,
which changes the file, so the copy from nuget.org does not match the
attestation. Check that copy's signature with dotnet nuget verify.
mainaccepts changes only through a pull request that passes CI passed, Security passed and Malware scan passed. The ruleset has no bypass, for the owner either, and refuses force-pushes and deleting the branch.- A
v*release tag cannot be moved or deleted once pushed, except by a repository admin. - A workflow that uses an action not pinned to a full commit SHA fails to run. Workflow tokens are read-only unless a job is granted more for itself.
- Secret scanning with push protection, Dependabot alerts and security updates, and private vulnerability reporting are on.