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TrustSource Community Edition

Open-source compliance management: component and license compliance, vulnerability tracking, SBOMs and release approvals.

Quickstart (Docker)

The reference setup in docker-compose.yml runs the app, MongoDB, the license check service and a local mail catcher. You only need Docker with Compose v2.

1 Clone the repository and change into it.

2 Create your settings file from the template:

cp .env.example .env

3 Fill in the five required settings in .env:

Setting What to put there
INITIAL_ADMIN_EMAIL Email of the first administrator.
INITIAL_ADMIN_PASSWORD Their password, at least 8 characters.
TS_ENCRYPTION_KEY Random secret that encrypts stored credentials and signs releases. Keep it: changing it later makes stored credentials unreadable unless you follow Rotating the encryption key.
MONGO_ROOT_PASSWORD Password for the bundled MongoDB's root user.
MONGO_APP_PASSWORD Password for the MongoDB user the app connects with (read/write on its own database only).

Generate the secrets with:

openssl rand -hex 32

Use hex or other URL-safe values for the MongoDB passwords; they are placed in a connection string unescaped. Both MongoDB users are created when the database volume is first created, so changing these settings later has no effect on an existing volume.

INITIAL_COMPANY_NAME is optional (default My company).

4 Build and start:

docker compose up -d --build

The first build takes several minutes. Follow the start-up with docker compose logs -f ts_core; on the first start the app is ready once it logs => Initial admin created.

5 On the same machine, open http://localhost:3000 and sign in with INITIAL_ADMIN_EMAIL and INITIAL_ADMIN_PASSWORD. The administrator and the company are created on the first start only, while the database has no users; changing these settings later has no effect.

Mails the app sends (invitations, password resets) are caught by Mailpit at http://localhost:8025.

Optional settings

Setting Default Purpose
ROOT_URL http://localhost:3000/ Public URL of the app: the address users open. Links in mails use it, and live updates are refused from any other origin.
TS_BIND_ADDRESS 127.0.0.1 Address port 3000 is published on. Keep it local behind a reverse proxy; 0.0.0.0 publishes it on every interface.
TS_ALLOWED_DDP_ORIGINS unset Further origins (comma-separated) users may open the app from.
HTTP_FORWARDED_COUNT 0 Number of reverse proxies in front of the app; the client IP is then read from X-Forwarded-For. Never set it higher than the real number: a client could then forge its address.
TS_ALLOWED_PRIVATE_HOSTS unset Internal hosts that integration URLs (Jira, TFS, webhooks, logos) may reach, for every company on the installation; other private, loopback and link-local addresses are refused. Comma-separated host names (jira.corp.local), domain suffixes (.corp.local), IP addresses and CIDR ranges (10.20.0.0/16). A listed name is trusted for any internal address it resolves to, so list only hosts you control. Cloud metadata addresses stay blocked.
TS_UPLOAD_MAX_MB 50 Largest file one REST file upload (scan, SARIF, import) may send, in MB. A larger file is refused with HTTP 413.
TS_ANALYSIS_CONCURRENCY 2 How many module analyses run at the same time.
TS_VULN_ALERT_SWEEP, TS_VULN_ALERT_INTERVAL_MIN, TS_VULN_ALERT_PROJECT_BATCH, TS_VULN_ALERT_RELEASE_BATCH true, 60, 25, 10 Vulnerability alerts: a background sweep re-checks the approved releases of projects that have a webhook with a vulnerability trigger and notifies it of new findings. TS_VULN_ALERT_SWEEP=false turns it off. The interval is in minutes; the batch sizes bound how many projects, and releases per project, one pass checks. Releases are taken in turn, so all are covered over several passes.
MONGO_ROOT_USERNAME, MONGO_APP_USERNAME admin, trustsource MongoDB user names.
REGISTRATION_ENABLED false Allow self sign-up on the login page.
TS_OSV_ENABLED true Look up vulnerabilities in OSV during analysis.
TS_EPSS_ENABLED true Fetch EPSS exploit scores.
MAIL_URL, MAIL_SENDER Mailpit Send real mail through your SMTP server.
TS_OPERATOR_NAME, TS_SUPPORT_EMAIL, TS_IMPRINT_URL unset Who runs the installation, a support address and an imprint page, shown in the footer of outgoing mails.
TS_CSAF_PROVIDER_URL, TS_CSAF_PROVIDER_PASSPHRASE, TS_CSAF_PROVIDER_PASSWORD unset CSAF provider for publishing advisories. All three are needed.
TS_UPDATE_CHECK, TS_UPDATE_CHECK_URL true, TrustSource update check Look for a newer version on startup. Each check sends this installation's random id to the TrustSource update check at ce.trustsource.io (or to TS_UPDATE_CHECK_URL). Set TS_UPDATE_CHECK=false to turn it off.
DEBUG_MODE_ENABLED false Verbose debug logging of outbound integration calls, webhooks, workers and security guards. Only the literal true turns it on. Credentials are redacted, but the log then holds request and response data and user ids: keep it off in production.
TS_RESET_2FA unset Recovery when the only Account admin lost their authenticator: the admin's login e-mail. On every start while it is set, that user's two-factor authentication is turned off, so remove it once they have signed in with the password. Their existing sessions stay signed in. Other users' 2FA is reset by an Account admin in User management.
TS_ENCRYPTION_KEY_LEGACY unset Password of the old, pre-v2: encryption scheme, for credentials written by an older installation. See Rotating the encryption key.

Serving users over HTTPS

The app speaks plain HTTP on port 3000 and is published on 127.0.0.1 only. To serve users, put a reverse proxy that terminates TLS in front of it (nginx, Caddy, Traefik, a load balancer) and:

  • set ROOT_URL to the HTTPS address users open, for example https://ts.example.org/;
  • forward WebSocket upgrades (the app keeps a live connection on /websocket and /sockjs);
  • send X-Forwarded-Proto. With an https ROOT_URL, a request the proxy received over plain HTTP is redirected to HTTPS;
  • send X-Forwarded-For and set HTTP_FORWARDED_COUNT to the number of proxies in front of the app, typically 1. Otherwise every user appears to come from the proxy's address and they share the per-IP sign-in rate limits and login history entries. Never set it higher than the real number of proxies: a client could then forge its address.

Without TLS, sign-in, session tokens and API keys travel unencrypted.

Day-to-day

docker compose stop                    # stop, keep data
docker compose up -d --build           # update after a git pull
docker compose down -v                 # remove everything, including all data

Data lives in two named volumes: mongo-data (database) and ts-files (uploaded files).

Updating from 1.0.1 to 1.0.2 needs no manual step: LeanIX tokens saved in plaintext by earlier versions are encrypted on the first start. The Updates page shows the release notes of each version.

Back up the database and the uploaded files. The backup contains personal data, password hashes and encrypted credentials: tools/backup.sh writes it readable by you only and outside the checkout (default ~/ts-backups/<date-time>), and refuses a directory inside it.

tools/backup.sh [directory]

Restore from such a directory:

docker compose exec -T mongo sh -c 'mongorestore -u "$MONGO_INITDB_ROOT_USERNAME" -p "$MONGO_INITDB_ROOT_PASSWORD" --authenticationDatabase admin --archive' < <directory>/backup.archive
docker compose exec -T ts_core tar xzf - -C /app.storage/files < <directory>/ts-files.tar.gz

Rotating the encryption key

1 In .env, move the current TS_ENCRYPTION_KEY value to TS_ENCRYPTION_KEY_PREVIOUS and set a new TS_ENCRYPTION_KEY.

2 Start (docker compose up -d) once with TS_REENCRYPT_SECRETS=dry to log what would change, then once with TS_REENCRYPT_SECRETS=true to rewrite the stored credentials (integration tokens, API keys, release and CSAF feed keys, webhook URLs, headers and signing secrets) with the new key.

3 Remove TS_REENCRYPT_SECRETS. Keep TS_ENCRYPTION_KEY_PREVIOUS while release signatures and published CSAF product ids made with the old key must still verify.

A database taken over from an older installation may hold integration credentials (Jira, TFS, GitHub, SCANOSS) in the old, pre-v2: encryption scheme. Set that scheme's password as TS_ENCRYPTION_KEY_LEGACY to keep them readable, and run steps 2 and 3 to rewrite them with TS_ENCRYPTION_KEY. Once a TS_REENCRYPT_SECRETS=dry run logs nothing left to migrate and no failures, remove TS_ENCRYPTION_KEY_LEGACY. An installation that always ran with TS_ENCRYPTION_KEY set does not need it.

Development instructions

Install required components

1 Meteor 3.5 https://docs.meteor.com/about/install.html

2 Node.js (v24) https://nodejs.org/en/download/ (NVM recommended https://github.com/nvm-sh/nvm)

3 Install node dependencies

yarn install

4 Create .env in the root of the project from .env.example (see the Quickstart for the required settings; imports/server/config.js lists every setting)

5 Run development server

meteor

Meteor starts its own MongoDB on port 3001.

Backup Mongo (development)

  1. Start app
  2. Wait for: => Started MongoDB.
  3. mongodump --host localhost --port 3001 --out dump

Restore Mongo (development)

  1. Start app
  2. Wait for: => Started MongoDB.
  3. mongorestore --host localhost --port 3001 dump/

Build instructions

build package

npm run meteor-build

which is a shortcut for

meteor build --server-only --architecture os.linux.x86_64 --directory ../build

Versions

The major number counts years (2026 = 1, 2027 = 2, 2028 = 3). The minor number counts sprints within the year, starting at 0. The patch number counts fixes between sprints. A new major does not by itself mean breaking changes: they are called out in the release notes, which the Updates page shows. See the roadmap for what is planned.

Support

Support is best effort and runs through GitHub issues: see SUPPORT.md. Planned features are in ROADMAP.md.

Contributing

Issues and pull requests are welcome. See CONTRIBUTING.md for the checks to run before you open a pull request. By contributing you agree that your contribution is licensed under the AGPL-3.0.

Security

Please do not report security issues in public issues. See SECURITY.md.

License

TrustSource Community Edition is licensed under the GNU Affero General Public License v3.0 (AGPL-3.0-only). Third-party notices and trademark terms are in NOTICE.

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