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Security: SoulboundSecurity/SBA-Auth

Security

SECURITY.md

Security Policy

Review history

Findings from reviews of this repository, and the changes shipped in response, are recorded in audits/. The implementation carries a pre-publication adversarial review by engineering (2026-10-11), a follow-up hardening against the zero-semantics vulnerability class (2026-10-13), and a security team review, conducted blind to platform context (2026-10-16, report PDF) whose 13 findings were all reproduced on the review's harness and are dispositioned there. External reviews are welcome and will be recorded in the same log.

How we review

  • Two stages: engineering reviews adversarially before publication; the security team reviews after it, blind to platform context, so its findings hold for any adopter of this code. That second stage is the "security team review" wherever this repository uses the term.
  • Every finding is recorded with a severity and the reasoning behind it, including the ones we decline, and including the ones that show our own earlier statements were wrong. Corrections are made in place with a dated note; nothing is quietly edited out of the record.
  • Fixes ship in the open and the entry that motivated them says so.
  • External reviewers are named and credited. Internal reviews are attributed to Soulbound Security, not to individuals.
  • Reproducibility counts: where a reviewer supplies a harness, we re-run it before triage and record the result.

Reporting

Report vulnerabilities to security@soulboundsecurity.io. Accepted disclosures and the changes shipped in response are credited; see the sbf-protocol audits log for the house convention.

Scope

In scope: the verification gauntlet (server/sba-auth.ts), envelope construction (client/sba-client.ts), the enrollment registry (contracts/), and any property SPEC.md claims.

Out of scope by design (SPEC.md section 6): a compromised signer endpoint during an active window. The pattern concentrates all secrecy into the signer key so that the signer is the only thing that must be defended; deployments choose custody accordingly.

Deployment responsibility

This repository publishes a pattern and a reference implementation. Deployments own their enrollment policy, signer custody, allowlist operations, and network posture (USE_CASES.md). Soulbound Security supports commercial deployments under license; unsupported forks are responsible for their own configuration, and modified deployments must not carry the SBA-Auth name (README, Name use).

There aren't any published security advisories