[18.0][ADD] vault_portal: portal access to shared vaults - #983
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@jans23 it would supercool if you review this 99% AI coded module... we deployed it in test and it looks like ok... |
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My colleague would be better positioned for reviewing. @KDRdev could you review it please? |
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still WIP |
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ready for review |
fkantelberg
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fkantelberg
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I left only some comments. The same applies for most of the JS. Please use the framework and controllers instead of doing everything with plain JS when it's not needed. Also a lot of the important functions like encryption/decryption etc. is duplicated and can lead to problems in the future. I haven't tested it yet and from glancing over it the key management might be a problem or atleast not fully supported (invalidation, new password etc.)
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Thanks for reviewing this 99% AI dev... I was unable to review js/controller because of my very bad level in it... |
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tests fail because of cross_connect_server/tests/test_cross_connect_server.py |
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fkantelberg
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Tell me if it's working again and you need a proper review + tests. It goes into a better direction now.
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Extends vault (OCA/server-auth) to let portal contacts view and, where explicitly granted per contact, edit or add password field values from their own portal account. Access stays strictly per individual, end-to-end encrypted exactly like internal users: each contact holds their own key pair, and the vault's master key is re-wrapped for them individually. Two clients never share any key material. Read-only by default at every layer (model access, ir.rule and vault.abstract.check_access(), unchanged from "vault"): the vault itself and entry names always stay read-only from the portal; only the value of a vault.field can be written, gated by vault.right.perm_write/perm_create per contact. An optional MFA policy (Settings > Vault) can require two-factor authentication before a portal contact is granted write access, or any access at all; disabling 2FA afterwards applies the same policy in reverse. Assisted-by: Claude Sonnet 5
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Extends vault (OCA/server-auth) to let portal contacts view and, where explicitly granted per contact, edit or add password field values from their own portal account.
Access stays strictly per individual, end-to-end encrypted exactly like internal users: each contact holds their own key pair, and the vault's master key is re-wrapped for them individually. Two clients never share any key material.
Read-only by default at every layer (model access, ir.rule and vault.abstract.check_access(), unchanged from "vault"): the vault itself and entry names always stay read-only from the portal; only the value of a vault.field can be written, gated by
vault.right.perm_write/perm_create per contact.
An optional MFA policy (Settings > Vault) can require two-factor authentication before a portal contact is granted write access, or any access at all; disabling 2FA afterwards applies the same policy in reverse.
Assisted-by: Claude Sonnet 5