Signed APT package repository for Montimage MMT tools, served at https://montimage.github.io/packages.
.debpackages for MMT tools, built from Montimage/mmt-dpi.- An APT repository index (
Packages,Packages.gz,Release,Release.gpg,InRelease) signed by subkey A (the primary key never leaves the maintainer's signing machine). - The last 2 mmt-dpi releases are retained at any given time.
sudo apt-get update
sudo apt-get install -y curl gnupg
sudo install -d -m 0755 /etc/apt/keyrings
keyring=$(mktemp)
curl -fsSL -o "$keyring" https://montimage.github.io/packages/montimage-archive-keyring.gpg
gpg --show-keys "$keyring"Check that it prints this primary key fingerprint (also published in docs/signing-key.md#fingerprint):
2163 0C36 2624 FB20 5C3D 0B18 4F95 AECC FEF4 8443
Then install:
sudo install -m 0644 "$keyring" /etc/apt/keyrings/montimage-archive-keyring.gpg
rm -f "$keyring"Use a deb822-format .sources file — never apt-key:
# /etc/apt/sources.list.d/montimage-packages.sources
Types: deb
URIs: https://montimage.github.io/packages
Suites: <your codename>
Components: main
Signed-By: /etc/apt/keyrings/montimage-archive-keyring.gpg
Replace <your codename> with the value from /etc/os-release VERSION_CODENAME
(jammy, noble, resolute, bookworm or trixie).
sudo apt-get update && sudo apt-get install mmt-dpiNote: after any key change (a new expiry, a new subkey, a revocation), download the keyring again. apt does not update it by itself.
- One ed25519 primary key (certify-only, 5-year expiry), never in CI, held by the maintainer.
- Two signing-only subkeys (2-year expiry):
- Subkey A — signs the APT repository; lives only in this repo's CI
(
apt-signingenvironment). - Subkey B — signs the mmt-dpi source tarball; lives only in Montimage/mmt-dpi.
- Subkey A — signs the APT repository; lives only in this repo's CI
(
See docs/signing-key.md for rotation and revocation.
.github/workflows/apt-repo.yml rebuilds the
whole repository on every run; nothing is kept between runs and no package is
committed. It runs on a repository_dispatch of type mmt-dpi-release (sent by
the mmt-dpi release job), on workflow_dispatch, on pushes to main that touch
scripts/, site/ or the workflow, and, as a dry run only, on every pull
request (the build runs when the pull request touches those paths).
-
Fetch and verify (
scripts/fetch-releases.sh). It takes the last 2 published, non-draft, non-prerelease Releases of Montimage/mmt-dpi, and from each onlymmt-dpi_<distro>-<ver>_<arch>.debandmmt-dpi-security_<distro>-<ver>_<arch>.deb. The run stops, before anything is signed, unlessSHA256SUMSand every.debhave a build-provenance attestation from mmt-dpi'srelease-packages.ymlat that tag (gh attestation verify), and every.debmatchesSHA256SUMS.Package,VersionandArchitectureare read withdpkg-deb, not from the file name. -
Build (
scripts/build-repo.sh), withapt-ftparchive. Every distribution's package has the same Debian version, so each suite has its own pool:Release asset Suite ubuntu-22.04jammyubuntu-24.04nobleubuntu-26.04resolutedebian-12bookwormdebian-13trixiepool/<suite>/main/m/mmt-dpi/<package>_<version>_<arch>.deb dists/<suite>/main/binary-{amd64,arm64}/Packages{,.gz} dists/<suite>/{Release,InRelease,Release.gpg}Releasehas Origin and LabelMontimage, Suite and Codename the suite, Architecturesamd64 arm64, Componentsmain, and noValid-Until. ItsDateand every file time are the publication time of the newest release, so the same releases always give the same unsigned tree. Because of this, a published mmt-dpi release must never be deleted or demoted:Datewould move backwards, and apt silently keeps its older indexes, so existing clients get a 404 for the removed version. Publish a newer release instead (see AGENTS.md). The files insite/(index.html, the public keyring) are copied to the root. -
Test, in every run. The tree is signed with a throwaway key made in the job and checked with
gpgv(scripts/test-signing.sh), thenmmt-dpiis installed from it inubuntu:24.04anddebian:13containers, unsigned and with the throwaway key (scripts/smoke-install.sh). The unsigned tree is uploaded as theapt-repo-unsignedworkflow artifact. -
Sign (
scripts/sign-repo.sh), onmainonly, in theapt-signingenvironment. The secret subkey is read from stdin into a throwawayGNUPGHOMEunder$RUNNER_TEMP, after the committed public keyring (so a renewed expiry is honoured), and removed on exit. It writesInReleaseandRelease.gpgwith--local-user "$APT_SIGNING_FINGERPRINT". -
Verify and deploy. Every signature is checked with
gpgvagainstsite/montimage-archive-keyring.gpgalone, with every index and pool hash (scripts/verify-repo.sh), and the tree is deployed to Pages.mmt-dpiis then installed from the live URL inubuntu:24.04anddebian:13containers, once the site serves theInReleaseandPackagesjust signed (Pages caches for up to 10 minutes; the smoke waits at most 15), and it must be the newest version.
Dry run. While the apt-signing secrets and the committed keyring are
missing, steps 1–3 run and steps 4–5 do not: nothing is deployed, and the
published site stays as it is. A partial setup (for example the secret without
the committed keyring) fails the run instead of falling back to a dry run.
This workflow is the only one that deploys Pages: a deploy replaces the whole site, so a second deployer would erase the repository.
Pull requests run shellcheck on every tracked *.sh file
and actionlint on every workflow file (which also
runs shellcheck on the run: blocks), and the APT repository dry run when they touch
scripts/, site/ or its workflow.
The apt-repo-gate job reports on every pull request (it passes when the dry run
passed, or was skipped because none of those paths changed), so it is the check
to require, together with lint.
See AGENTS.md for repository conventions.
All packages are distributed under their respective upstream licenses.