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Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0119FgmJ3gjmkHK57Fdv9p4K
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Discovery opened a candidate twice: once for the security gate and again by pathname to read its token, so a writer holding a retained handle could pass the ACL check and then swap the bytes. Hold one exclusive handle (UV_FS_O_EXLOCK, share mode 0 on win32) across the gate and the read so both refer to the same file object; a candidate that cannot be held is unverified. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PouvNPAFGjBvios1SoimzP
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A descriptor's CURRENT owner and DACL prove nothing about its history: a file that was once attacker-readable can be repaired (WRITE_DAC) into a snapshot byte-identical to a creator-born one, with its already-leaked token intact, so the security gate alone cannot establish trusted origin. Give every anchor ONE reserved secret file — a name no runtime ever mints and no candidate ever carries — created through the existing provenanced creator (CREATE_NEW, born protected) and never rotated, replaced, swept, or deleted. Each descriptor carries proof = HMAC-SHA256(secret, runtime id || token). Discovery reads the secret FIRST, through the same gate and held-handle path as a candidate, and trusts a candidate only when its proof verifies; an absent, unverified, or malformed secret fails closed before any candidate's token is read. A legacy descriptor has no proof and cannot acquire one. Stale cleanup is not narrowed: the sweep still parses unbound descriptors, so a dead legacy file whose pipe is ABSENT remains removable. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011emfPPGduRoynL9zWtxcMP
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PR #103 retirement adjudication complete after D062 landed on |
1 participant
Parent: #84
Finding:
Problem:
Descriptor discovery could read and trust a pre-existing candidate descriptor's
token and pipe without first verifying the descriptor's current security
metadata.
A legacy attacker-readable descriptor could therefore leak its token. An
attacker possessing that token could serve the corresponding named pipe and
return a correctly authenticated APPLIED response, allowing the official CLI to
exit 0 without a genuine AgentBridge runtime applying the Autoflow action.
Protected invariant:
CLI EXIT 0 => APPLIED by a genuine runtime identified through a CURRENTLY
verified descriptor.
Repair:
principals, unreadable descriptor identity, and symlink/reparse identity
Attack validation:
Before repair:
attacker-readable legacy descriptor + leaked token + attacker-controlled pipe
=> authenticated APPLIED
=> CLI exit 0
After repair:
same descriptor rejected before read/token/probe
=> attacker pipe not contacted
=> NO_VERIFIED_CANDIDATES
=> CLI exit 1
Validated commit:
300e437
Parent SHA:
b33a698
Patch fingerprint:
SHA256:
221387D08E2EE0C2951C65A11680041BA559CAF40DB4338F0C7F7E86B8152110
Patch bytes:
32701
Validation:
Fresh independent validator verdict:
VALIDATED_UNCOMMITTED_PR84_F2_DESCRIPTOR_ACL_REPAIR
Scope:
This PR repairs F2 only.
It does NOT repair the separate CURRENT F1 ancestor-depth finding in
enumeratePathComponents(), and F1 remains unresolved.
Authority:
No new Git/GitHub/provider/repository mutation authority.
No additional control command.
No generic WorkflowEvent submission.
No generic apply(event).
No CLOSE_REQUESTED production source.
No shell execution.
This PR is intentionally Draft and is a validation child stacked directly under
PR #84.