[carlospolop]

Blog URL

https://research.jfrog.com/post/shai-hulud-trinitite

Blog Title

Trinitite: Mini Shai-Hulud Hides an Install-Time Worm in binding.gyp

Blog high summary

JFrog analyzes an August 28, 2026 Mini Shai-Hulud supply-chain wave targeting @7nohe/openapi-react-query-codegen, a 150K+ weekly-download package. A workflow published any PR whose comment was exactly npm publish through GitHub Actions OIDC (id-token: write) without maintainer validation. Releases execute through preinstall or Python hidden in binding.gyp, bypassing --ignore-scripts when node-gyp runs.

The XOR/AES loader stages Bun v1.4.0 and launches a worm that steals registry, cloud, Vault, Kubernetes, and CI secrets; dumps Actions secrets, republishes packages, typosquats, exfiltrates to public repositories, and persists via Linux/macOS user services and AI-tool hooks. Isolate hosts, remove the revoke monitor before token rotation, then rebuild lockfiles and rotate credentials; only 0.5.3, 1.6.2, 2.2.0, and 3.0.2 are…

PR changes

• src/pentesting-ci-cd/github-security/abusing-github-actions/gh-actions-npm-supply-chain-abuse.md: Documented obfuscated GYP condition evaluation and corrected the implicit node-gyp hook and --ignore-scripts behavior.

Errors

mdbook build unavailable

[carlospolop]

Decision: keep

The condition-evaluation mechanism adds reusable detail absent from the base page. npm documentation supports the corrected implicit-hook and script-suppression limits. The repair removes a package-specific command while retaining the useful mechanism.

Head: 550de24f0fe37fc2605963431376cb891ff8f404

[carlospolop]

merge