Simplify and Innovate for Everyone.
Identify gaps and fill them, make improvements where possible, but above all, empower developers to offer more to users.
Use GitHub private vulnerability reporting or email guillou.gabriel@gmail.com. Do not open a public issue for an undisclosed vulnerability.
Include the affected commit or image digest, architecture, installation path, impact, reproduction steps, and relevant logs with secrets removed.
The project is under active development. Security fixes target the current default branch and the newest artifacts produced from it. There is no versioned long-term-support branch; older images and installer media should be treated as unsupported.
The kernel and the third-party patches move by automatic election, without a human reviewing each diff. The doctrine is reactivity over review: the version is NEVER pinned by hand — each build the upstream-track election resolves the newest candidate whose full patch set applies, and the automatic security gates judge it:
- Care delay (
CARE_DELAY, default 24 h,0= hotfix): a freshly published candidate is held until its age clears the delay, so a same-day regression upstream does not ship the hour it lands. The hold reason is written to the election log. - Flux gate: OSV.dev and the GHSA advisory stream of each source repository are consulted at resolution. An open advisory on the source or the elected commit holds the build (the last-good deb stays published) and opens a deduplicated issue. An unreachable advisory source degrades to a loud logged pass — the gates never black out the build on their own outage.
- Bypass: an actively exploited kernel CVE listed in CISA KEV (or a CRITICAL linux-cve-announce announce) lifts the care delay so the fix ships immediately; the election log cites the CVE ids and the feed.
- Traceability: every adopted election is logged (
selection.log) and published assbom.json+CHANGELOG.mdat the repository Pages root: each kernel, module and patch carries its URL, sha256, election date and gate verdicts.
The honest consequence of the trust model:
- 'security' means the RECENT MAINLINE kernel with the shipped patch profile — not a distribution-patched LTS. CVEs are handled by the mainline release train, not by cherry-picks.
- The patches are third-party sources (lore mboxes, mirrors) verified by sha256 pin, dry-run and test builds — never by human review of every diff. The gates above catch known-bad content; unknown content ships with mainline trust.
- Support is a best-effort COMMUNITY effort: nothing here is a guaranteed SLA, and a held build keeps the last-good deb until the gate clears.
- The image trusts the project APT key only after checking its pinned digest.
- Published images are signed with a cosign key owned by the repository (repository secrets); the images ship its public key and a policy so hosts only accept signed updates. The private key must never appear in artifacts or logs.
- Secure Boot signing keys are repository secrets and must never appear in artifacts or logs.
- Installer jobs and bootc installation perform privileged disk operations.
- The current installer does not embed a shared root password; the bootc-installer system step provisions the initial user, root password, sudo and SSH policy at install time (the tty1 first-boot wizard is removed).
- Runtime tests reduce integration risk but do not certify arbitrary hardware.
Reports involving the package cache, signature verification, installer target selection, credential masking, boot chain, or writable-state boundaries are in scope.