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…every door (#4180) * feat(subscriptions): admission policy seam for a per-agent usage share (A) One edition-agnostic point where a registered policy may stop an agent's turn before it is admitted, on every door. With no policy registered nothing changes. The first intended policy is an agent's share of its subscription's usage, registered through this seam by an optional module. - services/admission_policy.py: register / enforce / notice. A policy refuses with chat_signals.AdmissionRefused (code, plain-words message, frees_at); any other policy error is logged and the turn is admitted. - /chat (admit_chat_request) and /task (dispatch_parallel_task) call it after the skill gate, before the idempotency claim: a refused request claims, uploads, writes and acquires nothing. - execute_task step 1c covers every other door: the row closes SKIPPED with the message (not FAILED: no schedule failure count, no breaker), error_code usage_share, and the refusal on the result. - routers/chat.py maps it to 429 + X-Trinity-Error-Code + Retry-After; a sync /task refused inside execute_task releases its claim and gets the same answer; the Workspace shows the message as category `limit`, not retryable. - ExecutionContext.usage_notice renders the policy's notice as a `- **Usage**:` line via compose_system_prompt's auto-fill. Tests: tests/unit/test_ent1059_admission_policy_seam.py (18). Each seam call, the SKIPPED write, the router mapping, the Workspace branch, the notice fill and the fail-open re-raise were removed one at a time and a named test went red each time. test_2638's pre-dispatch allowlist gains `policy_denied` with its reason. Refs Abilityai/trinity-enterprise#1059 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(subscriptions): usage-share refusal survives the task backlog drain (B) A share that ran out while a sync /task waited in the backlog: the drain closes the row SKIPPED, and a long-poll that reads the terminal back from the row (another worker drained it, or the wait timed out) rebuilt a success-shaped result from a SKIPPED row. It now answers the seam's own refusal. - execute_task's policy gate stores the row error as `[usage_share] text` (the #3114 pull-sink shape), so a reconstruct can tell a share stop from any other SKIPPED; the in-memory result keeps the plain message. - _dispatch_sync_backlog's reconstruct branch rebuilds AdmissionRefused from a SKIPPED row carrying that code; _map_task_failure then releases the claim and the router answers 429 usage_share (no Retry-After: the row has no frees_at, the message says when). Tests: test_ent1059_admission_policy_seam.py +2 (20). The reconstruct removed -> the drain test red; the prefix removed -> the SKIPPED-row test red; each restored from a copy. Refs Abilityai/trinity-enterprise#1059 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(subscriptions): usage share card and breakdown column (C) An agent's share of its subscription's usage, as its owner reads and changes it. Both surfaces render only when the instance is entitled to `usage_share`; an unentitled build calls nothing. - Settings > Guardrails gains a "Usage share" section (UsageShareCard): the rolling 7-day and 5-hour windows as used / budget with a meter, the warning line drawn at warn_pct, Warning / Stopped badges in words, when a stopped window frees, whether a stop ask is pending, the line the agent reads on its next turn, and where each number comes from. The owner changes it inline through the PUT; an empty field is the platform default and all three empty clears the override. Bounds are named client-side before a request; a refused PUT keeps the form open with an InlineError. Applies from the next turn, no restart. - Settings > Subscriptions per-agent breakdown gains "Share used (7d · 5h)": each agent's own percent, warning/danger tone from the share's own threshold; a share the reader cannot see renders a dash, never 0%. - stores/agents.js: getUsageShare / setUsageShare (single API client). stores/subscriptions.js: fetchAgentShares, per-agent isolated. Tests: src/frontend/tests/unit/usageShareCard.spec.js (22, mounted under jsdom). Mutations each turned it red and were restored from a copy: breakdown ungated (1 red), at_budget ignored (2), client validation bypassed (5), Guardrails section ungated (1). Raw-colour ratchet: no existing file grew; the new card carries 0 raw non-gray. Refs Abilityai/trinity-enterprise#1059 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(execution): every door answers an admission-policy refusal; a refused loop iteration is skipped, not failed (Abilityai/trinity-enterprise#1059 fix) Review C2, H1, the test_3274 sweep red and I5 on the pre-admission policy seam. C2: a turn an admission policy stopped inside `execute_task` is a SKIPPED row `[usage_share] <sentence>`, and `_admission_policy_gate` returned it as a result rather than raising — so every `dispatch_and_await_terminal` caller that branched on failed/cancelled only answered success-shaped with an empty reply. On the paid door that attached the execution to the claim, logged verify-ok and SETTLED a charge for a turn that never ran. - `chat_signals.admission_refusal_of(result, agent_name)` is the one rule: the in-memory attribute when the gate ran in this process, else a rebuild from the row's `skipped` + code shape. `result_from_execution_row` attaches it, so a turn refused on another worker (the backlog drain, a long-poll reading the row back) carries the same refusal; the separate rebuild in `_dispatch_sync_backlog` is that call now. - One branch per door, before failed/cancelled: paid releases the claim and neither attaches nor settles (no charge; `payment.reason` is the sentence); MCP inline chat answers 429 with the sentence and `X-Trinity-Error-Code`; a channel sends the sentence and returns before step 12 so no empty assistant turn is persisted; the public link answers 429 (sync) or stores the sentence as the reply (async); `portal_chat` reads status + code as well as the attribute; a room posts the policy's sentence and keeps its resume handle and cursor; A2A maps `skipped` to `rejected` with the message on the inline path as `_ROW_STATE` already did for the row; a refused validation turn is an ERROR verdict. The scheduler (`internal.py`), fan-out and operator-resume doors already record the skipped row with its message and need no branch; voice and the brain orb call `execute_task` directly and close SKIPPED. H1: `loop_service._close_run` counted a policy-refused SKIPPED as a failed run (only a gate-held SKIPPED was exempt), so `failed_runs` rose, `on_failure` applied, and an at-budget loop kept ticking to `max_runs`. It now reads the refusal off the row (`_split_error_code` + the predicate), closes the run `skipped`, counts nothing, and stops the loop with the code as `stop_reason`. Sweep: `usage_notice` joins the platform-controlled list in `test_3274_gate_context` — the line is composed by a policy from platform numbers and never reads requester text. I5: `fetchAgentShares` runs at most six reads in flight. Docs: `requirements/security.md` §20.5d and `architecture/execution.md` state the result-not-worker rule and each door's branch. Red before the fix, with the door code reverted and the predicate kept: all ten door tests in `test_ent1059_refusal_doors.py` (the paid one read `settled`, the Workspace one DID NOT RAISE, A2A read `failed`) and both loop variants beside the ent#751 hold test (`('failed', 'error')`); restored byte-identical. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(completion-report): a refused turn's report shows the policy's sentence, not its [usage_share] code (Abilityai/trinity-enterprise#1059 re-review N1) An admission-policy refusal closes the row SKIPPED with `[usage_share] <sentence>`, and the completion report (Workspace, Slack, Telegram) posted that text as-is. The report now strips a known `[code]` prefix from a non-success terminal before sanitising; an unknown `[...]` and any success text stay as the agent wrote them. `_split_error_code` moves to the cycle-free `execution_envelope` leaf as `split_error_code` so the report uses the same parser; the old names stay importable from `task_execution_service`. Also adds an executing spec for `fetchAgentShares`' six-lane cap (re-review N3): a deferred `getUsageShare` over 15 names, high-water mark 6, every name written, a failed read as `{ error: true }`. Mutation-checked: with the cap at 100 it fails (expected 15 to be 6). Red before the fix: test_the_workspace_report_shows_the_sentence_without_the_code, test_the_channel_report_shows_the_sentence_without_the_code. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Trinity Agent (trinity) <trinity-agent@ability.ai> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…d field, stored in the agent's .env (trinity-enterprise#1066) (#4186) * feat(asks): a credential ask kind the agent raises by name and only the secret field answers (trinity-enterprise#1066) An agent that needs a secret asks for it BY NAME: `type: credential` with `context.credential_name`. The ask sink validates the name through a new policy leaf (`services/credential_ask_policy.py`: the agent reader's variable charset, at most 64 characters, never a name the agent runtime refuses from `.env` or one the platform writes — mirrored from the agent image's `execution_env` and held in parity by test), refuses `options` (`invalid_options`), and refuses the kind unless exactly one person is resolved (`no_person`). The value never travels through an ask: `answer()` takes `via_credential_sink`, and a credential row answered any other way raises `CredentialAnswerRefused` → 422 `credential_answer_via_field` on both doors (operator respond, Workspace answer). Dismiss is unchanged. The Workspace projection carries `credential_name` only; the wake prompt names the variable and says to read it from the environment, never a value. Mutations recorded: removing the `via_credential_sink` check turns TestAnswerRefusal (2) and TestOperatorDoor (1) red; disabling the `no_person` check turns the three no-person cases red; both restored byte-identical. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(workspace): the secret field's sink stores the credential on the agent and answers the ask by name only (trinity-enterprise#1066) A `credential` ask is answered through ONE new Workspace door, `POST /api/enterprise/client-portal/asks/{id}/credential` (a person only — `get_portal_principal` fences agent keys out before the row is read, a system or ops key is 403 `person_required`; the same uniform 404 as the answer route, which here also covers an ask of another kind). The service runs the answer route's door checks (own ask, pending, not expired, not diverged) BEFORE the value is handled, then hands it to the one secret-handling leaf, `services/credential_sink.py`: * the NAME re-checked against the ask policy (a file-channel row validates nothing) and the value checked by shape only (`invalid_value`: empty, below the scrub's floor, over 32 KiB, a line break or NUL); * STAGED into the runtime identity scrub FIRST, fail-closed — 503 `scrub_unavailable` when the store is down, so nothing is delivered that the scrub cannot see; * the agent must be running (409 `agent_not_running`, naming the state); * one sink write per agent at a time through a short Redis lease (409 `env_busy`; a lease the store cannot grant is the same fail-closed 503); * `.env` read through the agent's own `GET /api/credentials/read`, one line set in place through `agent_env_patch.set_keys` (the #2023 quoting the agent's reader reverses; duplicates collapsed; every other byte kept — round-tripped in test against the agent image's `parse_env_file`), refused over 256 KiB (`env_too_large`), written back through `POST /api/credentials/inject` (503 `agent_unreachable` on either leg); * audit `credentials` / `chat_provide` with the name, the ask id and the file — never the value — and the requirements report cache dropped. Only then does the ask sink end the row `provided` with `via_credential_sink`; a compare-and-set lost after the write is 409 `already_resolved` with `credential_written: true` and nothing is rolled back. The value appears in no log line, no audit field, no refusal message, no response body and no wake prompt — asserted in test on every path, and pinned by an AST guard over the module: `value` may be measured, staged, patched into the file or passed on, never formatted, logged, concatenated or raised. Verified from the code, not the plan: the inject path is a whole-file read-modify-write, so the lease is what keeps two sink writes from dropping each other's key across workers. The owner's Credentials-tab inject and the Nevermined bind (ent#966, "no agent-side lock, D8") do not take it and keep their last-writer-wins contract — a documented residual of this change, not closed by it. Mutations recorded, each restored byte-identical: dropping `stage_secret` (4 red), the running check (2), the lease (2), the file cap (1), the line-break/NUL check (3), the kind check in the service (1), the person check on the route (2), `via_credential_sink` (6), and a `logger.info` that formats the value (the AST guard and the leak test, 2). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(workspace): a secret pasted as a plain chat message is refused before admission (trinity-enterprise#1066) Both Workspace chat routes (`POST …/agents/{name}/chat` and `/chat/stream`) refuse a message that LOOKS like a credential with 422 `secret_in_message` after the roster and rate-limit gates and before anything else: no reply context, no title decision, no session row, no execution row, and on the streaming route no Idempotency-Key consumed (the ent#403 rule for a refused model). The refusal names the SHAPE that matched and points at the secret field a `credential` ask opens; it never carries the text. The detector, `utils/credential_sanitizer.secret_shape`, runs over `SECRET_VALUE_PATTERNS` — the one list the execution-log redaction already uses — which gains two service-token shapes (`ops_…`, `dop_v1_…`) in BOTH the backend and the agent-image copy, so logs learn them in the same change. Two deliberate differences from redaction: `Bearer` / `Basic` are excluded (in a chat message they are prose about an API, and a false refusal teaches people to route around the guard), and a sensitive `KEY=value` pair counts only with a value of 8+ characters (the identity scrub's own floor) under the #3311 harmless-word blanking (`author=…` is not a credential). Every pattern in the list is either named or excluded, and the test pins that partition complete so a new shape cannot silently escape the guard. Mutations recorded, each restored byte-identical: dropping the guard call on the sync route (11 red), on the stream route (11), the `ops_` shape from the redaction list (the both-copies redaction test), the `ops` entry from the guard's names (3), the `KEY=value` branch (6), the value floor (3 prose cases), and `Bearer` from the excluded set (the partition pin). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(mcp): ask_for_credential — an agent asks the person in the chat for a secret by name (trinity-enterprise#1066) A one-purpose MCP tool over the credential ask kind: `ask_for_credential(name, why, request_id?, expires_at?)` raises `type: credential`, titled "Needs NAME", with `context.credential_name`, addressed to primary and carrying the turn id so it reaches the person of the conversation. The body is built from the declared fields only — a value, an agent name or options passed alongside never travel. Left out, request_id is derived from the name and the turn, so a retry in the same turn replays instead of asking twice. Refusals come back named (no_person, invalid_credential_name). The description (1.6k characters, under the 2,048 cap) says to ask only in a conversation with the person, never to ask for a secret in a plain message, and to read the value from the environment without repeating it. Registered in TOOL_ACCESS_POLICY as self-acting; the documented tool count moves to 176. Red first: the new describe block in operator_queue.test.ts failed on the missing tool (TypeError reading execute/description) before the tool existed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(workspace): a masked secret field in the thread for a credential ask (trinity-enterprise#1066) `PortalCredentialField.vue` is what a `credential` ask renders as in PortalAsks, wherever the card is mounted (thread, Inbox, rail, agent page): the variable's name, a masked input (`type=password`, autocomplete/spellcheck off, password-manager hints off) with Show/Hide, and Send. Send posts once through the new store action `provideCredential` → `POST /asks/{id}/credential` with the value in the body only, and the field is emptied BEFORE the request goes out, so no component state holds the value whatever the server answers; unmounting empties the element too. Nothing touches the drafts or storage, nothing is logged, and each refusal the sink names (agent_not_running, scrub_unavailable, asks_unavailable, already_resolved with or without credential_written, the server's own invalid_value words) is said in an InlineError. Discuss is hidden on the kind: a discussion chat is a composer. The shared kind rule gains `credential` (`queueResponseKind`, label "Needs a credential"), so the Operating Room card, the detail panel and /m show no respond box or acknowledge for it — one line saying it is answered in the person's Workspace. The thread's history row reads "NAME provided" and the card "You provided NAME", never the stored response. The composer, on a 422 `secret_in_message` from either chat route, drops the failed bubble (a Retry would only re-send it), never hands the text back to the composer, clears any draft still holding it, and shows the server's pointer above the composer until the next send. Design system: primitives only (BaseInput, BaseButton, InlineError), the card's own ink, no raw colour — the new file starts at zero. Red first: the three new mount specs failed on the missing component, the `acknowledge` kind, the quoted "provided" answer and the visible respond box, and on the secret staying in the thread. Mutations recorded: removing the `secret` branch of settleDelivery turns 2 composer cases red; removing the field's pre-request clear turns 6 field cases red; both restored. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * test(workspace): build the credential-field fixtures at run time (trinity-enterprise#1066) The two new specs carried token-shaped literals; the backend guard's tests build theirs by concatenation so no token-shaped string sits in the tree. Same here. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(credentials): a credential handed in the chat — requirements, architecture, flow, user docs (trinity-enterprise#1066) - requirements/credentials.md §3.10: the capability — ask by name, masked Workspace field, one `.env` line, "NAME provided", only the field answers, named refusals, what is out of scope. - requirements/security.md §20.11: the one door, the one leaf (scrub first, fail closed; lease; one line; audit by name), the answer refusal, the name policy, the paste guard and the composer keeping no copy, and the stated residuals (channel adapters, non-sink `.env` writers last-writer-wins, live stream). - architecture/backend.md: `credential_sink.py` and `credential_ask_policy.py` in the services catalog; the credential kind on the `ask_service` entry. - architecture/mcp-server.md: `ask_for_credential` on the operator_queue.ts row. - feature-flows/credential-in-chat.md (new) + index rows. - user docs: how a person answers a credential ask and what happens when a secret is pasted into the chat (credential-management.md), the card and the tool in approvals.md. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(credentials): the secret sink never treats an unread .env as empty (trinity-enterprise#1066) The sink rewrites the agent's whole `.env`. The agent's read endpoint omitted the file from `files` in three cases that are not "no file": it held a non-UTF-8 byte (returned in `files_b64`, which the sink never read), the read raised (swallowed into a warning), or the path was not a regular file. The sink mapped all of them to "" and the inject then replaced the file with one line, deleting every other credential with a success response. The agent read endpoint now lists a path in `missing` only when lstat raises FileNotFoundError, and reads from `_HOME` rather than a hard-coded home. The sink treats `.env` as empty only when it is in `missing`; under `files_b64` it is 409 `env_unreadable` (reason `not_utf8`), and absent from all three maps (a read error, or an agent image older than the list) it is 409 `env_unreadable` (reason `unconfirmed`). Nothing is written in either case. Red first: with the sink unfixed, a .env with other keys plus a Latin-1 byte and a .env mode 000 were both overwritten through the agent image's real read/inject router over a tmp home (DID NOT RAISE), and so was an omitted file from an older image. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(credentials): the ops_ shape matches the service-account token, not snake_case (trinity-enterprise#1066) `ops_[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}` matched any identifier of 20+ characters after `ops_` — this platform's own `ops_context_critical_threshold` setting, lease keys, function names. Because the shape sits in SECRET_VALUE_PATTERNS, such an identifier was both refused as a pasted secret in the Workspace chat and redacted from every persisted log, in the backend and the agent image. The token's real form is `ops_` + a base64url JSON document, which always begins `eyJ`. Both copies now use `ops_eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{40,}` (the guard's name map with them; the partition test pins the three together). Red first: three ops_ identifiers were refused by `secret_shape` and redacted by `sanitize_text` in both copies (6 red); they now pass through both, are admitted on both chat routes, and a realistic token is still refused and redacted in both copies. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(asks): a credential ask is addressed to primary only, on every door (trinity-enterprise#1066) The MCP tool sent `to: primary`, but `_validated_ask` never looked at `to` for the kind, so `POST /api/agents/{self}/operator-queue` accepted `type: credential` addressed to `viewer`, `approver` or `role:<id>` as long as one person filled it — handing a viewer a field that writes into the agent's environment. - `_validated_ask` refuses any role but primary for the kind with 422 `invalid_to` (the REST door, which the MCP tool calls). `to: operator` is now refused there too, before addressing. - The file channel never reaches `_validated_ask`: its clamp resolves the addressee from the entry's `addressed_to_email`. For the kind, an addressee who is not the agent's single primary person is dropped, so the item is ingested unaddressed (an operator item no Workspace field opens for). Fails closed on a resolution error, never raises (#1632). Red first: `to` viewer / approver / role:finance were created or refused with the wrong code (6 red), and the file-channel clamp kept a viewer as the addressee (1 red). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(credentials): a refused credential write takes its value back out of the scrub (trinity-enterprise#1066) The sink stages the value into the runtime identity scrub before it checks the agent, takes the lease or touches the file. A refusal after that (agent not running, env busy, lock store down, read unreachable, env unreadable, file too large) left the value staged in Redis for 24 h while the person was told "nothing was stored". - `runtime_secret_scrub.stage_secret` now returns whether THIS call added the value; `unstage_secret` removes one (best-effort, never raises). - The sink runs steps 3-5 in `_deliver` and, on a `CredentialSinkError` that left the agent's file untouched, unstages what it staged. A value staged earlier by something else keeps its protection. - The inject leg is the exception: the agent may have written before failing, so the value stays staged and the message now says it may or may not be stored, instead of implying nothing was. - Every pre-inject refusal message says nothing was stored, and now that is true of the scrub too. Red first: the seven pre-inject refusal arms left the value staged and/or did not say nothing was stored (7 red); the inject arms and the already-staged case are pinned alongside. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(workspace): a credential card names the asking agent and quotes its reason (trinity-enterprise#1066) A credential ask can be raised from any turn — a schedule's ask reaches the owner's Inbox — and the card showed the agent's name only on surfaces that pass `showAgent`, with the agent's `why` drawn as the card's own body. A person could not always tell who was asking, or that the reason was the agent's claim. For the kind, the card now always says "<agent> is asking you for NAME" (the agent's display label, else its name) and quotes the reason in a blockquote under "In <agent>'s words:", or says it gave no reason. The reason is drawn once, attributed, not also as the generic question. No colour of its own (the raw-colour ratchet is unchanged). Red first: the mount spec over the real PortalAsks and store found no asker line and no attributed quote (2 red). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * test(workspace): pin the drafts-clearing loop in dropSecretMessage (trinity-enterprise#1066) The review found no spec reached the loop: the composer watch already clears THIS thread's draft when the send empties the field. The loop is not redundant — it clears the same text left as a draft in ANOTHER conversation (pasted there first, then sent here), which sits in local storage. That case is now seeded and asserted, with an unrelated draft kept. Mutation: with the loop deleted from PortalConversation.vue the new case goes red (1 failed); restored byte-identical. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(credentials): the review fixes in the flow and the backend catalog (trinity-enterprise#1066) Primary-only addressing (REST door and file channel), `env_unreadable` and the agent read endpoint's `missing` list, unstaging on a refusal before the inject, the attributed card, the tightened `ops_` shape, and the owner-reach residual. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Trinity Agent (trinity) <trinity-agent@ability.ai> Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…cdbc) (#4190) Three enterprise commits, all on enterprise main: ent#982 (steward proposes members and task owners), ent#1061 (a task reaches its owner from the project record), ent#1070 (the per-agent usage share policy, the private half of #4180). Co-authored-by: trinity-ability <309458136+trinity-ability@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…ent_now removes an agent at once, audit first (#4183) * feat(subscriptions): admission policy seam for a per-agent usage share (A) One edition-agnostic point where a registered policy may stop an agent's turn before it is admitted, on every door. With no policy registered nothing changes. The first intended policy is an agent's share of its subscription's usage, registered through this seam by an optional module. - services/admission_policy.py: register / enforce / notice. A policy refuses with chat_signals.AdmissionRefused (code, plain-words message, frees_at); any other policy error is logged and the turn is admitted. - /chat (admit_chat_request) and /task (dispatch_parallel_task) call it after the skill gate, before the idempotency claim: a refused request claims, uploads, writes and acquires nothing. - execute_task step 1c covers every other door: the row closes SKIPPED with the message (not FAILED: no schedule failure count, no breaker), error_code usage_share, and the refusal on the result. - routers/chat.py maps it to 429 + X-Trinity-Error-Code + Retry-After; a sync /task refused inside execute_task releases its claim and gets the same answer; the Workspace shows the message as category `limit`, not retryable. - ExecutionContext.usage_notice renders the policy's notice as a `- **Usage**:` line via compose_system_prompt's auto-fill. Tests: tests/unit/test_ent1059_admission_policy_seam.py (18). Each seam call, the SKIPPED write, the router mapping, the Workspace branch, the notice fill and the fail-open re-raise were removed one at a time and a named test went red each time. test_2638's pre-dispatch allowlist gains `policy_denied` with its reason. Refs Abilityai/trinity-enterprise#1059 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(subscriptions): usage-share refusal survives the task backlog drain (B) A share that ran out while a sync /task waited in the backlog: the drain closes the row SKIPPED, and a long-poll that reads the terminal back from the row (another worker drained it, or the wait timed out) rebuilt a success-shaped result from a SKIPPED row. It now answers the seam's own refusal. - execute_task's policy gate stores the row error as `[usage_share] text` (the #3114 pull-sink shape), so a reconstruct can tell a share stop from any other SKIPPED; the in-memory result keeps the plain message. - _dispatch_sync_backlog's reconstruct branch rebuilds AdmissionRefused from a SKIPPED row carrying that code; _map_task_failure then releases the claim and the router answers 429 usage_share (no Retry-After: the row has no frees_at, the message says when). Tests: test_ent1059_admission_policy_seam.py +2 (20). The reconstruct removed -> the drain test red; the prefix removed -> the SKIPPED-row test red; each restored from a copy. Refs Abilityai/trinity-enterprise#1059 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(subscriptions): usage share card and breakdown column (C) An agent's share of its subscription's usage, as its owner reads and changes it. Both surfaces render only when the instance is entitled to `usage_share`; an unentitled build calls nothing. - Settings > Guardrails gains a "Usage share" section (UsageShareCard): the rolling 7-day and 5-hour windows as used / budget with a meter, the warning line drawn at warn_pct, Warning / Stopped badges in words, when a stopped window frees, whether a stop ask is pending, the line the agent reads on its next turn, and where each number comes from. The owner changes it inline through the PUT; an empty field is the platform default and all three empty clears the override. Bounds are named client-side before a request; a refused PUT keeps the form open with an InlineError. Applies from the next turn, no restart. - Settings > Subscriptions per-agent breakdown gains "Share used (7d · 5h)": each agent's own percent, warning/danger tone from the share's own threshold; a share the reader cannot see renders a dash, never 0%. - stores/agents.js: getUsageShare / setUsageShare (single API client). stores/subscriptions.js: fetchAgentShares, per-agent isolated. Tests: src/frontend/tests/unit/usageShareCard.spec.js (22, mounted under jsdom). Mutations each turned it red and were restored from a copy: breakdown ungated (1 red), at_budget ignored (2), client validation bypassed (5), Guardrails section ungated (1). Raw-colour ratchet: no existing file grew; the new card carries 0 raw non-gray. Refs Abilityai/trinity-enterprise#1059 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(execution): every door answers an admission-policy refusal; a refused loop iteration is skipped, not failed (Abilityai/trinity-enterprise#1059 fix) Review C2, H1, the test_3274 sweep red and I5 on the pre-admission policy seam. C2: a turn an admission policy stopped inside `execute_task` is a SKIPPED row `[usage_share] <sentence>`, and `_admission_policy_gate` returned it as a result rather than raising — so every `dispatch_and_await_terminal` caller that branched on failed/cancelled only answered success-shaped with an empty reply. On the paid door that attached the execution to the claim, logged verify-ok and SETTLED a charge for a turn that never ran. - `chat_signals.admission_refusal_of(result, agent_name)` is the one rule: the in-memory attribute when the gate ran in this process, else a rebuild from the row's `skipped` + code shape. `result_from_execution_row` attaches it, so a turn refused on another worker (the backlog drain, a long-poll reading the row back) carries the same refusal; the separate rebuild in `_dispatch_sync_backlog` is that call now. - One branch per door, before failed/cancelled: paid releases the claim and neither attaches nor settles (no charge; `payment.reason` is the sentence); MCP inline chat answers 429 with the sentence and `X-Trinity-Error-Code`; a channel sends the sentence and returns before step 12 so no empty assistant turn is persisted; the public link answers 429 (sync) or stores the sentence as the reply (async); `portal_chat` reads status + code as well as the attribute; a room posts the policy's sentence and keeps its resume handle and cursor; A2A maps `skipped` to `rejected` with the message on the inline path as `_ROW_STATE` already did for the row; a refused validation turn is an ERROR verdict. The scheduler (`internal.py`), fan-out and operator-resume doors already record the skipped row with its message and need no branch; voice and the brain orb call `execute_task` directly and close SKIPPED. H1: `loop_service._close_run` counted a policy-refused SKIPPED as a failed run (only a gate-held SKIPPED was exempt), so `failed_runs` rose, `on_failure` applied, and an at-budget loop kept ticking to `max_runs`. It now reads the refusal off the row (`_split_error_code` + the predicate), closes the run `skipped`, counts nothing, and stops the loop with the code as `stop_reason`. Sweep: `usage_notice` joins the platform-controlled list in `test_3274_gate_context` — the line is composed by a policy from platform numbers and never reads requester text. I5: `fetchAgentShares` runs at most six reads in flight. Docs: `requirements/security.md` §20.5d and `architecture/execution.md` state the result-not-worker rule and each door's branch. Red before the fix, with the door code reverted and the predicate kept: all ten door tests in `test_ent1059_refusal_doors.py` (the paid one read `settled`, the Workspace one DID NOT RAISE, A2A read `failed`) and both loop variants beside the ent#751 hold test (`('failed', 'error')`); restored byte-identical. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(completion-report): a refused turn's report shows the policy's sentence, not its [usage_share] code (Abilityai/trinity-enterprise#1059 re-review N1) An admission-policy refusal closes the row SKIPPED with `[usage_share] <sentence>`, and the completion report (Workspace, Slack, Telegram) posted that text as-is. The report now strips a known `[code]` prefix from a non-success terminal before sanitising; an unknown `[...]` and any success text stay as the agent wrote them. `_split_error_code` moves to the cycle-free `execution_envelope` leaf as `split_error_code` so the report uses the same parser; the old names stay importable from `task_execution_service`. Also adds an executing spec for `fetchAgentShares`' six-lane cap (re-review N3): a deferred `getUsageShare` over 15 names, high-water mark 6, every name written, a failed read as `{ error: true }`. Mutation-checked: with the cap at 100 it fails (expected 15 to be 6). Red before the fix: test_the_workspace_report_shows_the_sentence_without_the_code, test_the_channel_report_shows_the_sentence_without_the_code. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(agents): a dotted tag in github:owner/repo@ref pins the clone The ref after `@` was checked against [A-Za-z0-9_-/] only, so a release tag such as v1.2.0 failed the check and was dropped without a word: the agent was created on main while the caller believed it pinned. The ref is now taken whole when it is a valid branch or tag name (dots allowed, minus the git ref-format shapes '..', a leading-dot component, a trailing '.' or '.lock'), and an unusable ref is a named 400 instead of a silent fall-back to main. The charset stays a shell-safety barrier for startup.sh's eval-built clone. Red first: tests/unit/test_4165_github_ref_tag.py — the five dotted refs returned url_branch=None and the ten unusable refs did not raise. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(agents): purge_agent_now removes an agent at once, audit first (Abilityai/trinity-enterprise#1055) Agent delete is a soft delete (#834): rows, volumes and the MCP key stay for the retention window. Removing an invited member's agent, or rolling back a half-created one, must leave nothing but the audit trail, so the retention sweep's hard purge becomes an immediate, edition-agnostic primitive with no route of its own: - the agent_lifecycle:purge audit row is written while the agent still exists and outlives it; if it cannot be written nothing is destroyed (503) - a person caller must pass assert_admin (an agent key carrying an admin owner's role is refused); actor=None is the platform itself - container, queued and in-flight work, Redis state, the #816 cascade (sharing, permissions both ways, MCP key) and the data volumes under both identities of a renamed agent (#1664) go; a base another agent claims stays; a Docker fault never stops the row purge - system agents (403) and ephemeral agents (409) are refused; no row is a no-op Red first: tests/unit/test_ent1055_purge_agent_now.py (module absent). Each of five mutations turns it red: admin gate removed (2), fail-closed removed (1), soft-delete-before-purge removed (7), base-claim guard removed (1), audit moved after the container removal (2). Docs: requirements/core-agent.md §1.4.1 and §4.2 ref pinning (trinity#4165); architecture/agent-lifecycle.md pointer. Registry: both new test files. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(agents): a tag in github:owner/repo@ref survives the three ref-existence checks (trinity#4165, Abilityai/trinity-enterprise#1055 review C1) The parser accepted a dotted tag and stored it in `source_branch`, but every check that consumed that value before the clone asked for a BRANCH of that name: `provisioning.check_remote_branch_exists` ran `ls-remote --heads refs/heads/<ref>`, `ref_probes._ref_arg` prefixed `refs/heads/`, and the PAT path asked `GET /repos/{repo}/branches/{ref}`. So a tag passed the parser and was refused with "Branch 'v1.2.0' not found" on every path; the public doc claimed it pinned the clone. Now all three accept a branch or a tag, the ref still a value after the URL and never an option: the anonymous check asks for `refs/heads/<ref> refs/tags/<ref>` with no `--heads`; the probes ask for both and take the branch first (as `git clone -b` does), peeling an annotated tag to its commit; the REST path answers a 404 on `/branches/{ref}` with `/git/ref/tags/{ref}` before calling the ref missing. The refusal names both: "Branch or tag '…' not found". Red first: `tests/unit/test_4165_ref_existence_checks.py` drives the real `check_remote_branch_exists`, `probe_anonymous_ref`, `probe_tokened_repo_access` and `_validate_github_access` on all three paths against a fake `ls-remote` that filters like git (so a check that asks for heads only cannot see the tag) — 9 of 15 red before the change, all green after. Three pins on the old branch-only contract moved with it (`test_3725_*`: the argv now carries both refs and a same-named tag answers when no branch does; `test_ent123_tokenless_clone`: the wording). Docs: `requirements/core-agent.md` §4.2 names the three checks and the precedence; the two flow rows that quoted `--heads` / the old wording follow. Registry entry added. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(agents): a ref in github:owner/repo@ref may not begin with '-' (trinity#4165, Abilityai/trinity-enterprise#1055 review I5) `_GITHUB_REF_RE` admitted `-foo`. Safe today — every live site passes the ref as a value (`git clone -b <ref>` takes the next token whatever it starts with; the probes prefix `refs/…`) — but `startup.sh` also runs `git checkout "${SOURCE_BRANCH}"`, where a leading `-` IS parsed as an option, benign only because the clone already checked the ref out. One shell edit away from not. The regex gains `(?!-)`; the 400 names it. Red first: `TestRefRefused[-foo]` — DID NOT RAISE. Upgrade-safe: the parser has one caller (creation); no stored `source_branch` is re-parsed on boot, pull or reset, so existing agents are untouched. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(agents): an annotated tag in @ref resolves to its commit, not the tag object (trinity#4165) `ref_probes` asked `ls-remote` for `refs/heads/<r>` and `refs/tags/<r>` and took a peeled `refs/tags/<r>^{}` line when one was listed. git never listed one: it shows a ref only when a pattern names it, and the peeled line's name ends in `^{}`. So an annotated tag resolved to the TAG OBJECT, and the raw template read was pinned to an id that is not the commit the clone checks out. The probe now also asks for `refs/tags/<r>^{}` by name. The unit fake listed `^{}` lines for a bare tag pattern, which is why the old test passed. It now lists a ref only when a pattern names it, and a new file runs the probes against a real bare repository over file:// (a lightweight tag, an annotated tag, a branch and an annotated tag sharing a name). Red first: test_4165_ref_probes_real_git.py — the annotated-tag and tokened cases returned the tag object id; 4 others passed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(agent-server): a tag-pinned agent's pull cycle is a named skip, not a failure every tick (trinity#4165) `github:owner/repo@<tag>` clones with `git clone -b <tag>` in source mode, which leaves the agent on a detached HEAD: pinned to that release, by design. Pull sync is on for every `github:` agent, and `_run_pull_once` recorded `failed: detached HEAD: nothing to pull onto` on every cycle, a failure streak for an agent doing what it was asked to. A detached HEAD now records `skipped` with the reason named. A detached HEAD left by a rebase stopped part-way (its rebase-merge/rebase-apply directory exists) stays `failed`, so a stuck tree still shows. The push cycle is unchanged: it is off by default for a source-mode agent, and an owner who turns it on for a pinned agent gets an honest failure. Red first: test_4165_pull_cycle_pinned_tag.py::test_every_cycle_is_a_named_skip_not_a_failure — 'failed' == 'skipped'. Real repos, the agent cloned -b v1.0.0 (annotated). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Trinity Agent (trinity) <trinity-agent@ability.ai> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: trinity-ability <309458136+trinity-ability@users.noreply.github.com>
…make the paste guard linear (#4191) * fix(agent-server): the credential read stays inside the agent home (trinity-enterprise#1066) CodeQL flagged the `os.lstat` this branch added to `GET /api/credentials/read` (path depends on a user-provided value). The finding is real at the guard, not at any current caller: - the guard (`lstrip("/").lstrip(".")`, a `".." in` test on the stripped string, `str(resolved).startswith(str(home))`) let a single leading `../` through, and its prefix compare had no separator, so `../home2/.env` READ a file in a sibling directory whose name extends the home's; - the new `lstat` ran before any containment check, so `../<anything>` came back in `missing` — an existence probe one level above the home. Not reachable before this fix through the platform: the route sits behind the agent's per-agent auth middleware (#1159) and every backend caller sends fixed relative paths (`.env`, `.mcp.json`, `.credentials.enc`) or the agent's own `/list` output. Fixed at the root with one helper, `_contained_read_target`: refuse absolute paths and any `..` component, then require both the normalised lexical path and the link-resolved path to sit under the home with a trailing separator. `lstat` runs on the contained lexical path (the absence proof); the read goes through the contained resolved path, so a link is followed only to a target that is itself inside. Red first: tests/unit/test_ent1066_credential_read_containment.py — 5 of 13 red at the previous guard (sibling read, `../` oracle, absolute path, link to a sibling file, linked parent directory), all green with the fix; the fix reverted from a scratch copy turns the same 5 red. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(sanitizer): the paste guard's KEY=value walk is linear by construction (trinity-enterprise#1066) CodeQL flagged the two regex calls in `secret_shape` (py/polynomial-redos, "may run slow on many repetitions of '!'"). Origin: the patterns pre-exist on dev — `_KV_LINE_RE` / `_KV_PAIR_RE` are the redaction's #1661/#3311 walk — but these two alerts are introduced by this branch, which feeds them a Workspace chat message (user-provided text) through the new guard. Measured before the change, CPython was already linear on every shape tried (`!`*n, `=`+`!`*n, `!`*n+`=`, `!=`*n, `k=!`*n, an unclosed quote, sensitive keys with short values): 1M characters took 0.04-1.1 s, scaling ~10x per 10x. The lookbehind pins each key to the start of its run — the engine detail CodeQL's model does not see (#1661 says the same). The route caps a message at 100k characters. The guard no longer rests on that detail. It finds each `=` with `str.find`, walks back to the key start (never past the previous `=`, so no character is visited twice), and checks the value with one fixed-width match — an optional opening quote and eight non-space, non-quote characters. No length cap, so nothing at the end of a long message is dropped. One deliberate widening: the closing quote is no longer required, because a truncated paste is still the secret. The redaction path is unchanged. Red first: tests/unit/test_ent1066_secret_guard_linear.py — red before the change on the no-unbounded-regex pin and the unclosed-quote case (2 of 43); the timing bound (1M < 3 s, 10x input < 30x time) and both-way detection were green before and after. The change reverted from a scratch copy turns the same 2 red. The 1661/2208/2398/3840 sanitizer suites and the paste-guard suite stay green (608 passed). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Trinity Agent (trinity) <trinity-agent@ability.ai> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…7a02) (#4193) Picks up Abilityai/trinity-enterprise#1072 (member_agents module, ent#1055), which composes the purge_agent_now primitive from #4183. Co-authored-by: trinity-ability <309458136+trinity-ability@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* Revert "feat(subscriptions): an agent's share of a subscription, enforced at every door (#4180)" This reverts commit 9eedbbb. * chore(enterprise): bump the gitlink to the ent#1070 revert (trinity-enterprise#1076) Lands with the #4180 revert so dev never carries the usage_share module without the admission_policy seam it imports. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: trinity-ability <309458136+trinity-ability@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…4160) (#4169) Every agent bubble renders PortalMarkdown's sr-only live region, which is position:absolute. The reading pane's scroll box was not positioned, so those regions resolved against the page, escaped the overflow box, and a long room stretched the document: the wheel scrolled the whole Workspace. Make the scroll box `relative`, as the list column's already is. Adds a mount spec pinning the containment structure for a long room, a room with many messages, and a thread. Fixes #4160 Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
… the poller core into PollerCoreMixin (#3785, PR 2 of 4) (#4037) * fix(operator-queue): the #1677 helper delegates to the platform-alert seam create_bounded_alert(_outcome) keep their signatures and outcome contract and become a thin delegate of platform_alerts.observe, which already composes the per-(agent, type) budget inside its one locked create. The registered type names its kind; the key is read back from the item's id and context by derive_legacy_subject and must resolve to that same kind, else ALERT_FAILED_CREATE. The two kinds whose ids carry no subject (gitignore, problem report) are keyed by the request id minus the kind's prefix. observe's "updated" and "snoozed" pass through; "failed" maps to ALERT_FAILED_CREATE; every refused or failed arm logs [#1677 budget]. ALERT_FAILED_COUNT stays importable and is no longer returned. The budget episode reports through observe as kind alert_budget keyed by the budgeted type: one alert_budget:<type> row per agent, re-read by a later refusal outside the cooldown, ended by its 14-day lifetime. The bucketed id and its own operator_queue_new broadcast are gone; observe sends the thin operator_queue_sync trigger. Ratchet: create_bounded_alert_outcome and _maybe_emit_alert_budget_episode leave EMITTERS_NOT_YET_ON_SEAM; alert_budget gets a NO_CLEAR_SITE reason. Census: both leave _ALLOWED_CALLERS (no direct create left in either). #3254 re-pins (asserted outcomes unchanged): - test_1677_operator_alert_budget: write-observation point. The harness stands in for the seam's create with the same budget arithmetic and runs what observe spawns. Id shape in test_deterministic_bucketed_id_with_reserved_prefix, test_cooldown_knob_zero_never_raises (the subject replaces the bucket) and test_under_cap_creates_item_and_notification (the seam's id). The episode raise now stays in its spawned task, so test_episode_helper_raise_swallowed_refusal_stands reads the delegate's WARNING marker; test_ws_broadcast_failure_swallowed checks the thin operator_queue_sync payload. - test_3130_flood_guard, test_1632_operator_queue_caps: write-observation point. The flood alert still rides the delegate, so its writes, the typed budget read and the I1 fault injection move to the seam's create. - test_3243_atomic_asks::test_a_cap_hold_never_fires_the_flood_alert: write-observation point. Watched at observe, since the oqs.db assertion alone would now pass whether or not the alert fired. Known until the problem report moves in its own commit: nine test_3521_problem_report_comment cases are red here. The delegate files an event-kind row under the seam's id, which the old _attach_comment (keyed on the pre-seam request id) cannot find. New: tests/unit/test_3254_budgeted_alerts.py (registry parity, reach-back imports, the delegate's outcome table over all five budgeted types, the episode's seam properties, R1 for alert_budget). Part of #3254 * fix(operator-queue): the flood alarm reports through the seam and ends with its episode OperatorQueueSyncService._maybe_emit_flood_alert reports through platform_alerts.observe as kind queue_flood keyed by the reason: one pending row per (agent, reason), rewritten in place, budgeted by the seam. #3130's outcome rule is kept on observe's strings: a failed write releases the episode and is retried after the cooldown (I1); created, updated, snoozed and refused consume it. While an episode lasts it is re-read at most every 6 hours, so the kind's 14-day lifetime ends only a row nobody re-read, never a condition that still holds. The refresh time per (agent, reason) is a dict the method creates on the instance for itself; __init__ is unchanged. The flood's own operator_queue_new broadcast (which carried the title) is gone; observe sends the thin operator_queue_sync trigger. The two _sync_agent statements where an episode ends (_flood_episodes.discard for oversize_file and ingestion_cap) become calls to the new _end_flood_episode, which ends the episode and, only when one was running, ends its alert as the platform through platform_alerts.clear. A cycle with no episode costs no read. Ratchet: _maybe_emit_flood_alert leaves EMITTERS_NOT_YET_ON_SEAM; queue_flood's clear site is _end_flood_episode. No re-pin in this commit: the #3130 and #1632 harnesses were moved to the seam's create in the previous commit and keep their results. Tests: the flood through the real _sync_agent poll for 30 simulated days with the real expiry sweep (one row, re-read every 6 hours, ended as the platform when nothing is held), no read without an episode, two reasons two subjects, I1 on the real seam, a person's ending standing through the re-read and the clear, the thin trigger, R1 for queue_flood. Part of #3254 * fix(execution): the effect guard and missing-skill alarms report through the seam _on_unguarded_effect reports a refused effect through platform_alerts.observe as kind effect_unguarded keyed "<effect_type>:<reason>": one row per agent, effect and reason, rewritten by each further refusal, ended by its lifetime (nothing observes an agent starting to send ids). The send is refused whatever the alarm's outcome. _alert_skill_not_found reports through observe as kind skill_not_found keyed by the truncated command: one row per agent and command, re-read by each scheduled run. The paired notification is sent only on "created": a repeat of a pending command is an "updated" reading and already had one; refused, failed and snoozed wrote no new row. The pre-create dedup read stays and now matches only a pending pre-#3246 row (no subject), which keeps standing for its command until the upgrade sweep stamps it; a seam row is re-read through observe, where a repeat is never refused at the cap. task_execution_service.py: only _alert_skill_not_found changes. Its module-level utc_now_iso import is now unused and is left in place. Ratchet: _on_unguarded_effect and _alert_skill_not_found leave EMITTERS_NOT_YET_ON_SEAM; skill_not_found gets a NO_CLEAR_SITE reason (only the dispatch path could see a command resolve, and there the detector cannot tell "resolved" from "not a slash command"). #3254 re-pins (asserted outcomes unchanged): - test_1677_operator_alert_emitters:: test_skill_not_found_emitter_is_routed_not_allowlisted: the module must call platform_alerts.observe naming "skill_not_found" (AST), the seam that composes the budget, instead of mentioning create_bounded_alert. - test_2392_effect_guard_fail_closed: write-observation point and id shape. The alarm is recorded at platform_alerts.observe instead of a sys.modules stub of operator_queue_service, which lacks the names the seam reaches back for. The id prefix is asserted on the kind; the at-budget case returns the seam's refused_at_budget. - test_ent879_aauth_resource_route (the refused-call case): the dead create_bounded_alert patch moves to platform_alerts.observe. Tests: the effect refusal's seam properties and lifetime; the missing skill's one row per command, no notification on a repeat, a pre-seam row still standing, no notification at the cap; R1 for both kinds; the other shape, the clock 30 days ahead: a full skill_not_found budget frees itself through the real expiry sweep and a new command files. Part of #3254 * fix(git-sync): the gitignore sweep's alert is one row per change set _emit_gitignore_untracked_alert reports through platform_alerts.observe as kind gitignore_untracked, which stops being an event kind (platform_alerts.py: event=True dropped). It is a must-act kind: no lifetime, never ended by the platform. It is keyed by the change itself: a 32-hex digest of the canonical, direction-tagged set of paths the Push untracked and newly un-ignored (sorted removed paths, the exact removed count, sorted un-ignored paths). A repeat of the same set collapses onto one row; a different set, a different total behind a capped list, or the same path in the other direction is a different row. Keying per agent would let a later Push overwrite an earlier Push's path list on a pending must-act alert, which #2529 calls the surface that outlives the session. The legacy prefix keeps its _no_subject parser, so pre-existing rows stay pending until a person acts. Ratchet: _emit_gitignore_untracked_alert leaves EMITTERS_NOT_YET_ON_SEAM. #3254 re-pins (asserted outcomes unchanged): - test_2529_gitignore_precedence: write-observation point and id shape. The alert is watched at platform_alerts.observe (the two create.await_count == 0 checks would otherwise have gone vacuous); the per-agent id prefix is asserted on the kind, with the 32-hex key. - test_3246_platform_alerts_leaf::test_event_kind_has_no_subject: gitignore_untracked is a condition now, so it is asserted keyed and the problem report stays the event example. Tests: a repeated set is one row that never expires; distinct sets and a capped list with another total stay distinct; the direction tag holds; a person's ending stands; the 30-day case now also shows the gitignore row still pending. Part of #3254 * fix(workspace): the problem report is one seam row per person, target and day raise_problem_report reports through platform_alerts.observe as kind workspace_problem_report, which stops being an event kind (event=True dropped). It is keyed by the 32-hex digest _problem_report_id already computes: one row per person per target per UTC day, the "never duplicates" rule its docstring states. A person must act on it, so it never expires and the platform never ends it. The workspace-problem- id prefix is kept, so ent#866's owner-only rule and the machine-key "about a person" exclusion still hold. It returns True when the row was created or updated, False when snoozed, refused or failed. #3521's words-only rule moves under the seam's lock. observe gains keep_text (passed through database.create_platform_operator_queue_item to create_platform_item and _touch): with keep_text and a pending row, the reading only counts (last_seen_at, seen_count, expires_at) and the title, question, priority and context stand. The bare click passes keep_text, a reading with words does not. The click and the comment are two background requests that meet on one row inside the per-agent lock, so either order ends with the words. With no pending row the reading files as usual. update_pending_problem_report (database.py, db/operator_queue.py) and the nested _attach_comment are removed: one write path. Ratchet: raise_problem_report leaves EMITTERS_NOT_YET_ON_SEAM, which fixes the nine test_3521 cases the delegate commit left red. #3254 re-pins (asserted outcomes unchanged): - test_3521_problem_report_comment: the acknowledgement fixture goes through ask_service.answer (fixture shape; a raw status UPDATE carries no person ending for the snooze to read); the accessor test asserts the same type guard at the seam (a foreign row under the report's old id is never written); the lost-race test injects the bare click's whole reading, in its own thread, before the comment's locked create. - test_ent499_problem_report: write-observation point. The fake moves from create_bounded_alert to platform_alerts.observe; the routing AST test asserts the call to observe. - test_ent715_queue_person_fields: update_pending_problem_report leaves _NON_ROW_ACCESSORS (the accessor census forbids a stale entry). - test_3246_platform_alerts_leaf::test_event_kind_has_no_subject: no built-in kind is an event any more, so the property is pinned on a kind registered for the test, and both former events are asserted keyed. test_ent866_problem_report_owner_only is unchanged. Tests: keep_text at the sink, both interleavings keeping the words, one must-act row per person, target and day, the owner-only prefix, the delegate and the emitter landing on one subject, a person's ending not rewritten or reopened; the 30-day case now also shows the report still pending; the five-type admission test asserts every kind keyed. Part of #3254 * fix(operator-queue): decide a platform alert's snooze under the create's lock observe checks the snooze before the create's lock. Two moments let a person's ending slip past that check: an acknowledgement after observe read the pending row but before the locked create (the locked find then misses), and one between the locked find and _touch's compare-and-set (the lock covers creates, not respond_to_item, so the CAS loses). Either way the create fell through to an insert, and the alert a person had just ended was back at once. Before this batch most of the moved writers had a deterministic id that could not re-file after an ending, so the moves would otherwise ship that regression. create_platform_item gains snooze_since and a snoozed predicate. On the insert path, after a missed find or a lost CAS and inside the same locked transaction, it reads the newest person-ended row for the subject through the transaction's own connection (the public lookup opens another one) and returns {"outcome": "snoozed"} without inserting when the predicate says so. observe passes the standard 7-day window, computed on its own rather than from the pre-lock check's conditionally assigned cutoff, and lambda ended: _snoozed_by(kind, ended, priority, context). The pre-lock check stays as the fast path. A caller that passes neither keeps the old behaviour. The statement behind the public find_person_ended_by_subject becomes _find_person_ended_by_subject(conn, ...), shared by both reads. Tests: a person's acknowledgement through ask_service.answer, landed (a) between observe's read and the locked create and (b) between the locked find and the CAS, yields "snoozed" and no new row, for the problem report, an inbox collision as registered on dev, and the flood alarm's 6-hourly re-read. All six cases were red before this commit (a fresh row was created) and pass with it. On SQLite, BEGIN IMMEDIATE holds every other writer, so moment (b) lands the ending first and hands both finds the row as it stood just before it; two real workers are not exercised. Review fixes carried here (the earlier commits are left as they are): - OperatorQueueSyncService._maybe_emit_flood_alert: the cooldown is stamped before every reading, the 6-hourly re-read included. A failed re-read released the episode with the cooldown stamp still 6 hours old, so it was retried on the next 5-second cycle. New test: a failed re-read is retried no sooner than the cooldown (red before the fix). - test_3521_problem_report_comment (the lost-race re-pin): asserts the bare click's own request returned True and left a pending, comment-free row before the comment's locked create ran, so the test cannot pass without the interleaving it claims. - gitignore_sweep: states that past the probe's 2,000-line cap the key is the capped list plus the exact total (a full-set digest needs the in-container probe, outside this change). - test_1677_operator_alert_emitters: the census's guidance for an agent-influenceable emitter now points at platform_alerts.observe, not the delegate the #3246 ratchet counts as off the seam. - test_3254_budgeted_alerts: the frozen clock also covers db.operator_queue's ent#815 commit-lag check, which logged spurious errors against the real clock. Part of #3254 * fix(operator-queue): a failed flood re-read keeps the episode, so its end still clears the alert Fresh review of the #3254 budgeted slice (two findings): - A failed 6-hourly re-read of a persisting flood released the episode. If the condition then cleared before the retry, `_end_flood_episode` found no episode and the pending alert waited out its 14-day lifetime, although the code had seen the condition clear (AC 2). A failed re-read now keeps the episode, whose alert an earlier reading filed, and the re-read is retried once the cooldown has passed. A failed first reading still releases the episode (#3130 I1). New test: test_a_failed_reread_keeps_the_episode_so_its_end_still_clears_the_alert (red with the old release branch put back). - AC 8 for two kinds had no "a person's ending is never overwritten" test: `skill_not_found` (the next run is snoozed and sends no notification) and `alert_budget` (a later refusal re-reads the episode and the acknowledgement stands). Both added. * test(operator-queue): the budgeted-alert suite freezes the clock its running methods read In the full serial unit tier, test_1595_sync_health_signals evicts `database` and every `db.*` module from sys.modules and restores only some of them. Afterwards `database.db` and `ask_service.db` run on an older `db.operator_queue` module than the one this suite's clock fixture imports and patches, so the seam's create, the expiry sweep and the answer's compare-and-set read the real clock: rows filed at the frozen T0 read as long expired (five cases red, `AskConflict: expired`, a second flood row). The fixture now also freezes `utc_now_iso` and `datetime` in the globals of the live operations class (R6: patch what the running method reads). Red before: test_1595 followed by this file, 7 failed; green after: 66 passed; the file alone: 55 passed. * refactor(operator-queue): operator_queue_service becomes a package, content unchanged (#3785) The 2,840-line module moves to services/operator_queue_service/__init__.py byte for byte (100% similarity), the first step of the Invariant #1 split. Every `from services.operator_queue_service import X` and `from services import operator_queue_service` resolves as before. Six path-keyed guards name the file by its path, so their key moves with it (the PR #2487 precedent): _NOT_EMITTERS (test_3246), _ALLOWED_CALLERS (test_1677), _ALLOWED (test_1920), _OQS (test_ent715), FLEET_LEVEL_ALLOWLIST (test_ent467), and the source read in test_ent499. Only the key changes; the rule, the reason text and every assertion are untouched. Part of #3785 * test(operator-queue): pin the package's one-binding rules before the split (#3785) tests/unit/test_3785_operator_queue_package.py pins what S2–S6 must keep while they move code out of __init__, each property derived from the tree so no later slice edits it: modules under 800 lines (__init__ exempt, with a staleness check); the import surface src/backend and tests/ read still resolves; no from-import between package modules; one top-level binding per name; import-time reads defined first and the _MARKER_UNCHANGED default the owner's object; a patch of a re-exported name lands where its readers read; one logger identity; owner-exact qualified reads; no submodule named like a package attribute; one rate_limiter; no method on two classes of the composed service; external imports before the first submodule import, and a failed first import, injected at that line, leaves no stale submodule. The AST scans live in _oqs_package_scan.py (pure stdlib, never imports src). The other shape, a fresh install: each consumer imported first in its own interpreter on an empty database raises a bounded alert (created; only main binds a WebSocket manager, and then exactly one thin operator_queue_sync trigger goes out). Outcomes equal on the base. Part of #3785 * refactor(operator-queue): bind the service's collaborators once, in deps.py (#3785) db, _queue_db, principal_reach, get_breaker_redis, ask_service, AgentClient and the audit sink _audit_sync move to services/operator_queue_service/deps.py, bound once and read as deps.X everywhere in the package. They are no longer attributes of the package, so a stale monkeypatch.setattr(oqs, "db", ...) raises AttributeError instead of patching a copy nothing reads (Invariant #1(a), the PR #2487 rule). rate_limiter stays on the package: ask_service reads oqs.rate_limiter.check. Tests that patched a collaborator on the package now patch oqs.deps.X; no assertion, expected value, fixture or control flow changes. The package guard gains G4 (deps binds exactly the collaborators, no other module imports one from its source under any alias or holds one by identity, the package has none) and refuses any reach of a package function's __globals__. Part of #3785 * refactor(operator-queue): the queue listing engine moves to listing.py (#3785) QueueListError, narrow_to_agent_key, the cursor and walk-snapshot helpers and list_for_principal (trinity-enterprise#815) move whole from __init__ to services/operator_queue_service/listing.py. The two package-owned prefix tuples are read as _oq.X, collaborators as deps.X. The package re-exports exactly the six names read from outside (the router's list_for_principal and QueueListError; narrow_to_agent_key, encode_cursor, decode_cursor and CURSOR_MAX_BYTES, which tests call or compare). test_ent715's row-reader census re-keys list_for_principal to listing.py; no assertion changes. Part of #3785 * refactor(operator-queue): the poller core moves into PollerCoreMixin (#3785) The instance state, start/stop, the Redis leader lease, _poll_loop, _poll_cycle and _broadcast_sync move into PollerCoreMixin in services/operator_queue_service/poller.py. OperatorQueueSyncService is now composed in __init__ from the mixin and keeps its singleton there (the db/schedules shape). Package-owned names (DEFAULT_POLL_INTERVAL, _LEADER_KEY, _RESERVED_ID_PREFIXES, _websocket_manager) are read as _oq.X; the default poll_interval still binds 5 at import. Three path-keyed censuses re-key their poller entries to poller.py (test_1920's lease, test_ent467's operator_queue_sync trigger, test_ent715's _poll_cycle); no assertion changes. Part of #3785 * fix(operator-queue): a new flood, budget or untracking episode files after an acknowledgement (#3254) A person's ending of a `queue_flood`, `alert_budget` or `gitignore_untracked` row snoozed every later reading of the subject for 7 days, because none of the three kinds had a material key, so `_snoozed_by` was vacuously true. A runaway agent's second flood, a second budget-full episode and a second untracking Push of the same paths were all silent (review C1; dolho on operator_queue_service.py:2800 and gitignore_sweep.py:335). Each reading now carries an episode marker that the kind lists in its `material_keys`: - queue_flood: `episode_started_at`, stamped when the in-memory episode starts. Re-reads of one episode share it; an episode that starts after the condition cleared does not. - alert_budget: `filled_by`, a digest of the ids of the pending rows filling the budget. Re-reads of the same full budget share it; once a slot frees and a new row fills it, it differs. - gitignore_untracked: `push_id`, one per call. The emitter runs once per Push, so every untracking Push after an acknowledgement files; repeats still collapse onto a pending row. So the snooze silences re-reads of the acknowledged episode for the snooze window and a new episode files at once, which makes the `_maybe_emit_flood_alert` docstring's #3130 edge-trigger claim true again. The budget episode's read of the filling rows is classified in the ent#780 row-reader census as internal. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HWna79vVmnezQdhpaGRKbw * fix(operator-queue): a flood re-read no longer stamps the per-agent cooldown; the oversize end is pinned (#3254) Review follow-ups on the flood alarm: - dolho on operator_queue_service.py:2778 (webmixgamer agreed): the 6-hourly re-read of one reason's episode stamped the per-agent `_flood_alert_cooldown`, so the other reason's first alert could wait up to one cooldown. The cooldown spaces episodes and a re-read is not one, so it is now stamped only before an episode's first reading. A failed re-read's retry spacing already comes from its refresh time. - webmixgamer I3: the 6-hour re-read spacing is one constant, `OPERATOR_QUEUE_FLOOD_REREAD_SECONDS`, read by the gate and by the failed re-read's retry arithmetic, so the two cannot drift. - webmixgamer I1: a `_sync_loop` case serves an oversized file and then a sane one and asserts the row ends as the platform. It goes red when `_sync_agent`'s `_end_flood_episode(agent_name, "oversize_file")` is replaced by a bare episode discard. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HWna79vVmnezQdhpaGRKbw * docs(operator-queue): state the fail-open double-leader bound on the flood episode marker (#3254) The episode marker is worker-local. With Redis down the leader lease fails open, so each worker stamps its own episode_started_at and another worker's re-read can file past a person's ending, at most one extra row per extra worker per re-read window. Docstring only; no behaviour change (review L1). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HWna79vVmnezQdhpaGRKbw * lint(operator-queue): __init__ drops its file-level F401 waiver (#3785) Review I1 (dolho): the file-level `# ruff: noqa: F401` switched off unused-import detection for all of `__init__`, so a dead import left behind by a later slice or feature would go unflagged. At this PR's head `__init__` still reads every name in its import block, so the waiver hid nothing: `ruff check --select F401` gives 0 findings with it removed. It is dropped, and the block's comment now says that a name `__init__` stops reading keeps its line with a per-line waiver naming why (G13, or read as `oqs.X` from outside). PR2, PR3 and PR4 add those per-line waivers where their moves leave a name unread. `deps.py` keeps its file-level waiver: it is a binding module whose imports are its bindings, so there is no import there F401 could rightly flag. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HWna79vVmnezQdhpaGRKbw * lint(operator-queue): per-line F401 waivers for what __init__ stops reading (#3785) Review I1 on #4036: PR1 dropped `__init__`'s file-level F401 waiver. This slice's moves leave four of its imports unread in `__init__`; each now carries its own `noqa: F401` with the reason, so F401 keeps checking every other line: - `asyncio`, `base64`, `uuid`: kept for G13, because `listing` and `poller` import them at module level. - `from . import listing`: loads the submodule at its G6 point; the names callers read come from the re-export block. `ruff check --select F services/operator_queue_service/` is clean. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HWna79vVmnezQdhpaGRKbw --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
#2720) (#4185) The last bare axios call in the composable, voice stop, built its own auth header. It now uses the shared client, so it follows the interceptor's token and 401 handling (Invariant #7). The WebSocket URL still takes the store token, which is a different path. Closes #2720 Co-authored-by: trinity-ability <309458136+trinity-ability@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
) The memory_on fixtures in test_ent1022_retrieval_memory and test_ent1027_model_gateway stubbed is_loaded and availability but not last_error, so an embedder error left by an earlier test on the same worker made status() report memory unavailable. The 1028 fixture got the same stub in #4145. Fixes #4137
* docs(readme): link the Trinity 1.0 complete course Add the 39-chapter complete course video as the first entry under "Watch more" so new visitors find the end-to-end walkthrough first. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(readme): update Complete Course link to new YouTube id and chapter count Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(readme): update Complete Course YouTube link to re-published video Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Trinity Agent (trinity) <trinity-agent@ability.ai> Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…#1054) (#4195) OSS half of trinity-enterprise#1054: the terms-gate seam (services/terms_gate.py, consulted in resolve_platform_user_unfloored; @terms_route exemptions), EmailService.send_html on one HTML shell, the /terms SPA view + interceptor, and the entitlement-gated InvitesPanel. Refs Abilityai/trinity-enterprise#1054 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…and you hear its own reply (trinity-enterprise#1046) (#4194) * feat(workspace): a Direct call, where every spoken turn goes to the agent and you hear its own reply (trinity-enterprise#1046) A second call mode beside Live, chosen from the Call control's menu (remembered per browser; Live stays the default). No model sits in the conversation: the browser endpoints an utterance, the backend transcribes it, and the browser sends the text through the same POST .../chat/stream a typed message uses, carrying the call's vd_ id. The bridge then speaks the agent's reply sentence by sentence. - Harness-agnostic: every reply is spoken from the persisted row; a runtime whose stream carries messages (Claude Code, Codex) only starts sooner, and the unspoken tail is reconciled so nothing repeats. Gemini CLI agents work, with a line saying replies take about 10 s. - Agent approvals by voice: an ask the turn raises is read aloud, and a whole-utterance yes/no after the prompt has played is posted by the browser on the person's own answer route. The socket never answers an ask and never starts a turn. - Gates: socket owner only (no admin attach); a turn may carry only the caller's own live Direct call on this agent and thread (uniform 404); a spoken run must be the caller's own execution, including one reached through an approval; one call per thread, claimed atomically when the socket opens; a vd_ id never bypasses the Live call guard; 30 utterances/min per person. - Speech providers behind services/speech (Gemini REST STT/TTS, ElevenLabs), chosen in Settings (GET/PUT /api/settings/direct-voice, admin, audit-logged). - The #2694 delta cursor treats a Direct reply as the agent's own session answering. Measured end to end with real speech: first spoken word 3.4-4.4 s after send on Claude Code, 10.7-12.0 s on Gemini CLI; STT 1.1-1.9 s. The speech providers and the bridge were written before their tests. Every gate was then mutation-checked: 16 backend gates go red when removed, run with bytecode caching off. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(workspace): two call buttons, and the Live orb in the Direct call's strip (trinity-enterprise#1046) Operator review of the first build: - The Call control's mode menu is gone. The composer has two buttons, one per call: the Live call (waveform) and the Direct call (handset). Each carries its own reason when it is off; while one call is on, its button ends it and the other says "Another call is on". Nothing is remembered per browser any more (`CALL_MODE_KEY`, `loadCallMode`, `saveCallMode` and `CallModeMenu.vue` are removed; `callButtons` is the pure rule). - The Direct strip's flat pulsing disc is replaced by the Live call's orb in a 48px disc. The overlay's smoke and core move into `chat/voiceOrbField.js` (one renderer, an instance per orb, no module state) and `VoiceOverlay.vue` draws through it unchanged. `chat/VoiceOrb.vue` draws the same field clipped to a circle on the orb's black ground, so it reads in both themes: 80 particles, a DPR-capped bitmap, the first frame drawn on mount, one still frame under reduced motion, and the core tinted with the state — green listening, amber working, blue speaking — because at this size the smoke is a rim and cannot carry it. `directOrbState` maps the Direct statuses onto the orb's vocabulary. - While the person talks, the orb moves with their voice: the composable feeds the mic RMS into `amplitude` whenever nothing is playing (`rmsOf` is exported from the endpointer). PortalConversation's raw_gray count stays at its baseline: the two buttons share one class recipe (#2662 arms) instead of repeating it. Tests: `portalDirectCall.spec.js` covers the button rule, the status→orb map and the mounted orb (draws, animates, stops on unmount, still under reduced motion); `portalDirectCall.mount.spec.js` drives both buttons in the real conversation. Verified in the browser on the local stack, light and dark, Live and Direct. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(workspace): the Direct call's strip shows four call bars, not a canvas orb (trinity-enterprise#1046) The strip's mark is now `portal/CallBars.vue`: four rounded bars in a disc tinted with the status tokens, sitting on the theme's own surface. Green bars follow the person's mic while it listens, amber bars run a slow wave while the turn is worked on, blue bars follow the agent's voice while it speaks, and muted is four flat gray dots. Four elements and no canvas; under prefers-reduced-motion it holds one still frame per state. The canvas orb and the field extracted to share with it are gone, so the Live call's VoiceOverlay.vue is back to dev's version and this PR no longer touches it. Tests mount the bars. Each of three mutations turns a test red: ignoring the sound, ignoring mute, and starting the loop under reduced motion. `portalUndefinedCalls` now lists `cancelAnimationFrame` as a browser global, next to `requestAnimationFrame`. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(workspace): a Direct call answers a reply it cannot read aloud, and its strip is one quiet row (trinity-enterprise#1046) A reply that is only code, a table or links had no speakable sentence, so the call said nothing and looked dead. test-echo's fenced echo hit this on every turn. A successful reply with nothing to read aloud now gets "The reply is in the chat." (LINE_REPLY_IN_CHAT); a reply with any spoken sentence does not. The strip is now one fixed-height row, so the thread below it no longer moves when the state changes: 32px bars, one short word (Listening, Got it, Thinking, Speaking, Yes or no?), one detail line (a notice, what was heard, the tool at work, or the slow-runtime wait), a mic icon that shows a slash when muted, and a red hang-up handset. The "Direct call · runtime · speech by …" line and the first-word timing are gone; Esc moves to the hang-up's tooltip. Tests written red first: two backend (the in-chat line, and no line when something was spoken) and four frontend (the detail order, short words, and the mounted row with icon buttons and a danger-token hang-up). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(workspace): a Direct call reads a reply that is only a code block, instead of pointing at the chat (trinity-enterprise#1046) test-echo answers with nothing but a fenced block. The previous fix spoke "The reply is in the chat." for it, which is no answer. When a reply has no prose outside its code blocks, the text inside the blocks is the reply and is now read (fence markers and the language tag dropped). Code beside prose stays unsaid. The in-chat line remains only for a reply with nothing to read at all, such as a table alone. The rule lives in spoken_text.speakable, so the streamed speech and the reconciled tail agree and nothing is said twice. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * Revert "fix(workspace): a Direct call reads a reply that is only a code block, instead of pointing at the chat (trinity-enterprise#1046)" This reverts commit c214c9e. Operator ruling: a reply that is only a code block is correctly answered with "The reply is in the chat." Code is not read aloud, whether or not prose sits beside it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(voice): a Direct call speaks an execution once (trinity-enterprise#1046) Each speak frame built a fresh SpokenBudget, and only utterances were rate-limited, so re-sending speak for the same run bought its synthesis again, up to the call's 30 minutes and across calls. The bridge now claims an execution before speaking it: Redis SET NX across calls and workers, plus a per-socket set that holds when Redis cannot answer. Also pins the store<->backend contract of a Direct call (mode on start, voice_call_id on a spoken turn, the roster's direct_voice), each of which could be deleted with every test green. merge-train 2026-11-02, mechanical per operator ruling at Gate 1. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * test(voice): stub the Live capability in the one-call-per-thread test (trinity-enterprise#1046) The live case reached realtime_voice_capability before the cross-kind 409 and got a 503 on a host with no realtime provider key (CI). merge-train. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: trinity-ability <309458136+trinity-ability@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…(trinity-enterprise#1054) (#4200) src/backend/enterprise 47cb75a → 452ea04 (Abilityai/trinity-enterprise#1074). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
# Conflicts: # tests/registry.json
…y-dial Re-chains the Alembic revision as 0113_seat_ask_class_state on dev's 0112_loop_runs_stale_duplicates (it forked at 0107, leaving two heads). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…e one verb (Abilityai/trinity-enterprise#871) (#4174) An agent key a grant admits now writes one `capability_used` audit row: the agent as actor, its key id, the capability, the target, the method and the endpoint. It is written inside `enforce_agent_capability`, after the owner bound, so it means the grant cleared the call, not that the change landed, and a refused call writes only `capability_refused` (a holder aiming outside its owner's agents included, code `capability_target_not_owned`, same 404). People, `user` and `system` keys write none. One row per capability and target per request; manifest deploys and an honoured skill-set probe record their own use. `skills.manage` grant changes log `capability_grant` / `capability_revoke` through every door; earlier rows keep `skill_manager_*`. Security fixes found by `/cso --diff` and review (docs/security-reports/cso-diff-2026-11-02-871-capability-used.md): - `owner_owns_agent` now refuses the system agent. Owned by the admin, it was reachable by any holder an admin owns, and what lands there runs under a key that bypasses every permission check. - The file routes apply the owner bound, so an edge to another user's agent no longer lets a holder write its instructions or skills (now 404). - The skill-gate map read uses the same bound. - The create row names the slug the agent would get, not the raw body. Also: `request_id` on the agent `delete` row; `test_ent1030_gates.py` no longer reaches the host's Docker. Out of scope: issue item 3 (outcome rows for schedule writes and the timeout PUT); `trinity_prompt` via create-mode deploy stays #4025. Fixes Abilityai/trinity-enterprise#871 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
# Conflicts: # tests/registry.json
…unt get_autonomy in the MCP docs (ent#641) Fallout from merging dev: - test_ent719_self_gate_identity drives every assert_own_agent route with a well-formed request. The new GET /seat-autonomy needs an execution_id query parameter, like its seat-decision siblings. - tool-count-docs (ent#991 T5) reads the registered total from the user docs. dev's search_memory plus this PR's get_autonomy make 177 tools (172 operator), and decisions.ts now has 3 tools. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…owner's turn (ent#926) test_ent1003_gemini_wall_clock and test_ent986_gemini_usage_statistics came in with the dev merge and drive the Gemini runtime with an execution id. This branch's tier check asks the platform whose turn it is, and with no platform to ask it fails closed (503). These tests are about the CLI, not the turn, so they take the same owner-turn stub the branch's other Gemini tests use (turn_scope.fetch_turn). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
feat(workspace): the autonomy dial — what a companion may do unprompted (ent#641)
feat(access): hold an agent's turn to what its person may do, and declare every agent route's tier (ent#926)
Re-chains the Alembic revision as 0114_room_participant_visible_from on dev's 0113_seat_ask_class_state (#2984), and orders the SQLite migration after it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
feat(rooms): people in a room — a read floor, leaving, and who is speaking (Abilityai/trinity-enterprise#701)
…ts (Abilityai/trinity-enterprise#660) (#4178) - Assign skills dialog: text, source and category filters narrow the rows and both bulk buttons, never the draft. Each row and a footer count say what Save would do: "to add", "to remove", or "kept by set" for a skill an assigned set still holds. The list keeps one height while the filter narrows, in a panel capped to the window. - Library and the agent's Skills tab: the lists scroll in a BoundedRegion that fills the window, so the page no longer grows with the library. The Library gets the same filters and a stated total. On the tab, Own and Shared share one box, a total sits in the header, and Shared's heading docks to the box from 640 px up. - BoundedRegion is now `relative`: unpositioned, the cards' sr-only labels escaped the box and Chrome counted them in the page height. - Backend: `category` on SkillInfo, from the skill's frontmatter. No migration, no new route, no base-image or MCP change. - e2e/skills-bounded-lists.spec.js (Chromium, @smoke, hermetic) pins the geometry that jsdom and Firefox cannot see. ent#660 was re-scoped because its text predates ent#754. Edition: OSS-core, ungated (confirmed on ent#660). Fixes Abilityai/trinity-enterprise#660 Fixes #3448 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…sus (#4206) #2984 added GET /api/agents/{agent_name}/seat-autonomy and #3778 added the census that requires every agent-naming route to declare a tier. They merged one after the other without seeing each other, so dev fails test_ent926_agent_route_census::test_every_agent_route_is_declared. Declared accessor, with a reason, matching its sibling decision routes' gates (assert_own_agent, then assert_agent_access). Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Motivation: with FRONTEND_URL empty (the .env.example default), the Slack OAuth callback redirect fell straight to http://localhost, so after Install to Workspace the admin landed on a dead page even though the install succeeded. The redirect URI for the same flow is already built from the Public URL setting. Approach: get_oauth_callback_redirect now uses FRONTEND_URL if set (unchanged precedence), else the Public URL setting, and only then the localhost fallback with the existing error log. This covers the platform and per-agent success and error redirects, since they share the function. Validation: ran tests/unit/test_slack_*.py plus the new tests/unit/test_3563_slack_oauth_redirect_base.py: 227 passed. With the fix reverted, test_empty_frontend_url_uses_public_url fails; the other two new tests pass either way. Not run: a live Slack install, and the full unit suite, which does not collect in my local venv because of missing dependencies. Report: #3563 Assisted-by: claude-sonnet-5-5 (via Claude Code) Signed-off-by: Pujitha Paladugu <10557236+pujitha24@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Pujitha Paladugu <10557236+pujitha24@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: trinity-ability <309458136+trinity-ability@users.noreply.github.com>
…r wins the status race (#4475) (#4550) * fix(audit): record a terminate that ended the turn when another writer wins the status race (#4475) The execution_terminate audit row fired only when the terminate request won the CANCELLED compare-and-swap. The agent's terminate route waits for the process to exit before it answers, so the synchronous /task or /chat caller that started the turn usually writes the terminal status first, and the terminate wrote no audit row although its kill ended the work. The parked arm had the same race with the parked dispatcher. The container arm now records the row when the agent answers `terminated`, and the parked arm when it finds the turn parked. A Redis first-claim (terminate_audit:{agent}:{execution_id}, SET NX, 24h) on an id the agent or the call limiter verified keeps a repeat or concurrent terminate to one row. It fails open when Redis is unreachable and releases the claim if the audit write raises. The CAS still decides the status row and the activity close. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(audit): release the terminate audit claim when the audit write fails (#4475) - The route hook returns platform_audit_service.log's event id; a None result releases the terminate_audit claim, so the next terminate records the turn. log swallows insert errors, so the raise branch alone never fired for the real hook. - Allowlist the terminate_audit dedupe claim in the #1920 single-flight guard (once-guard, 24 h TTL, deleted only on a failed audit write). - Tests: the Redis claim raising still writes the row; a failed audit insert through the real route releases the claim and a repeat writes one row. - Refresh the #3180 test docstrings, the feature-flow Audit Row text and Revision History, the CSO report A10 row; register the #4475 test file. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…4536) (#4545) * fix(wake): park an ending that collides with a running wake's window (#4536) A delegate->wake loop with a callee faster than 15 s stalled after a few rounds: the callee's ending landed in the window its own wake had claimed and was dropped as "already woken in this window". - A wake releases its 15 s window when it ends, so an ending after a finished wake wakes at once. - An ending that hits a window whose wake still runs collapses into it only if the run ended at or before the wake's claim (the sweep storm bound is kept). Otherwise it is parked in Redis (trinity:wake_missed:{caller}, 24 h, audited `parked`) and delivered once when the wake ends, on the follow-on key caller_wake:{caller}:after:{wake_id}, drained from the wake row's own terminal and from the holder after it releases. - Redis trouble on the park is audited `skipped_window`, never raised. Tests: tests/unit/test_4536_wake_window.py against the real idempotency claim and fakeredis. Red with the fix absent (5 of 6, the sweep guard green on HEAD). Mutations each turn a test red: no terminal drain (in-flight + follow-on tests), no holder drain (parked-after-terminal), no coverage rule (sweep), no re-check after park (holder-releases race). Fixes #4536 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(learnings): a time-bucket dedup key collapses events the holder caused (#4536) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(wake): keep a parked ending across a backend stop and keep the sweep bound (#4536) - A holder cancelled by a backend stop no longer drains the parked ending; the wake row's terminal delivers it after the restart. - The follow-on key is released when the follow-on ends, so a second ending parked on the same wake is delivered. - The latest claim of a wake whose turn ran is kept in Redis (trinity:wake_claimed:{caller}); an ending from before it collapses, so a sweep still fanning out after its wake returned is one wake. - Tests for the cancelled holder, the second drain, the late sweep, the _expect_caller guard, the real follow-on spawn, and a holder that raises or returns failed. _complete_idempotency had no caller left and is removed. - Docs: budget sentences back on the #4357 bullet; bound, restart and one-marker audit behaviour stated in the requirements and feature flow. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(wake): drop the latest-claim collapse; a closed holder leaves the marker (#4536) - Remove trinity:wake_claimed:{caller}, _note_claim, _last_claim and the pre-claim collapse. An ending collapses only into the wake still running in its window. Bound: one running wake plus one pending per caller. - The holder drains on Exception; GeneratorExit and CancelledError leave the marker for the wake row's terminal. - Tests: a back-dated recovered run, a parked ending drained by a later window's wake (failed and completed), a FAILED wake in an earlier window, a holder closed mid-wake, a holder raising past the dispatch. Removed the test that pinned the dropped rule. - Docs, module docstring and registry entry describe the current behaviour. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(channels): B18 fixes — Telegram setup UX (Abilityai/trinity-enterprise#1189) Fixes found while testing B18. - Channel config dialog closes when the KeepAlive-cached agent page is deactivated, so a link inside it (e.g. to Settings) no longer leaves the teleported dialog and its body scroll lock on the next page. - Telegram webhook warning explains why a public HTTPS address is needed and links to Settings > General. - Verify checks the webhook, not only getMe: it registers a missing webhook when a Public URL is set, reports "operational" only when registered, and returns Telegram's rejection reason, shown in the warning. The result sits inline next to the button and the binding refreshes in place. - Client roster: fixed widths on the Access and Actions columns so an in-flight button or state change does not re-balance the table. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(channels): Telegram Verify reads Telegram's webhook record (Abilityai/trinity-enterprise#1189) - Verify reads the Public URL through get_public_chat_url_setting(), so a row with a trailing host dot is registered without it (#3881). - Verify calls getWebhookInfo. It re-registers when Telegram holds no webhook or one for another URL, and reports not operational when a delivery error is outstanding with updates pending. - GET binding returns webhook_url only under the current Public URL and adds public_url_set; the PUT response carries public_url_set too. - setWebhook, getWebhookInfo and deleteWebhook errors are logged through masked_traceback; the bot token stays out of logs and reason strings. - Panel: the warning follows the Verify result, non-admins are told to ask an admin, the set-the-URL advice shows only when no Public URL is set, and the Verify result is cleared on connect and disconnect. - Tests exercise set_webhook and get_webhook_info reason strings and the token-free log; feature flow updated. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…nues (Abilityai/trinity-enterprise#1225) (#4546) * fix(access): a platform continuation turn stands as the turn it continues (Abilityai/trinity-enterprise#1225) Four turns the platform dispatches continue another turn's work and carry nobody on the row: caller_wake, operator_response, operator_ending and skill_gate. turn_actor rated each a visitor's turn, so the agent's key read no executions while it ran, a continuation of a shared person's turn got the shell, and a continuation of a delegated turn lost owner tier. Each continuation row now names the turn it continues (schedule_executions.continues_execution_id, nullable, SQLite migration + Alembic 0124). turn_actor and turn_person rate a continuation trigger as that turn. The link is written only through turn_tier_service.continuation_origin, which accepts an id only while it is RUNNING on the same agent and stores the root of a chain: - /chat, /task and fan-out callee rows record the caller key's acting turn; the wake copies it (ent#1216's _standing_person stays the fallback for a callee row with no link); - a native ask raise records its turn under a platform-only context key (stripped from agent-authored context); the answer and ending wakes copy it; agent-written context.execution_id is never used; - a gate request records the requesting agent's turn; the notice copies it; DISPATCH_FIELDS freezes the link for an approved replay. A link that cannot be followed (pruned, another agent's, unreadable, or one ending over asks raised by different turns) rates (share, person, None): no shell, no reads. Rows with no link are rated as before. Tests: tests/unit/test_ent1225_continuation_tier.py (50, real DB, real admission/wake/resume/raise paths). Mutations: disabling the rule turns 24-29 red, dropping the running check 3, removing each producer hand-off at least 1. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(access): a Workspace-reported resume keeps the Workspace rule; auto-memory and /task gated freeze follow the link (Abilityai/trinity-enterprise#1225) Review of #4546: - an answer resume whose result goes into the answering person's Workspace chat records no link, so it keeps the Workspace rating (share, person, None) instead of the asking turn's owner tier; - keeps_shared_auto_memory: a linked continuation keeps auto-memory only when the continued turn is the owner's own; - /task's own gate call freezes continues_execution_id like /chat's. Tests: three new cases in test_ent1225_continuation_tier.py; each goes red with its fix reverted. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(access): an ask's wake follows the asking turn only for an answerer who may stand as it (Abilityai/trinity-enterprise#1225) - operator_resume_service._continuation_of: the answer and ending wakes follow the link only when the answerer or canceller is owner tier on the agent or rates exactly as the asking turn (turn_tier_service.person_may_continue). Anyone else, or an unknown answerer, records NO_SINGLE_ORIGIN and rates (share, person, None). A platform ending with no person follows the link. - claim_next_queued RETURNING carries continues_execution_id, so a pulled continuation judges auto-memory as the push path does. - Tests through ask_service.answer / cancel and the wake filer; pull claim; file-channel strip of the platform key. - Docs: auth.md §2.12 answerer rule and Workspace wording; security.md §5d answerer rule and the cost of a fail-closed continuation. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(access): resolve an ask's answerer by user id for the continuation tier (Abilityai/trinity-enterprise#1225) The resume of an answered or cancelled ask checks the person who ended it with person_may_continue. That check matched on email only, so the admin provisioned from ADMIN_PASSWORD, who has no email on record, failed it on its own agent and the resume ran as a shared person with no shell. person_may_continue now takes the user id when the caller has one. The answer path reads it from the row's responded_by_id; cancel, dismiss and bulk cancel carry it on EndingEvent.actor_user_id into maybe_dispatch_ending. Workspace clients have no users row and keep the email path. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * test(ent1225): drop the _complete_idempotency stub removed on dev by #4536 The caller wake no longer has _complete_idempotency (#4545), so patching it raised AttributeError in six continuation-tier tests after merging dev. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…nd Slack (Abilityai/trinity-enterprise#1253) (#4543) * fix(channels): rate-limit sign-in code emails on Telegram, WhatsApp and Slack Telegram `/login <email>`, WhatsApp `/login <email>` and the Slack require_email email step sent a verification email on every request. Commands reach handle_command straight from the transports, so the router's per-sender message limit never saw them. services/channel_login_limit.py caps code requests over 10 minutes: 5 per sender ({channel}:{sender_id}), 3 per address (shared across channels) and 20 per Telegram bot / WhatsApp binding / Slack workspace, counted with rate_limiter.check keyed on the input. Adapters call it after the email-format check and before the ent#849 membership branch. Over the limit the bot says so, mints no code and sends no email. The cap never reads email_login_codes: the web login writes rows only for whitelisted addresses, so a reply derived from them would reveal whitelist membership. Logs carry a hash of the sender id (a WhatsApp sender id is a phone number). tests/unit/conftest.py empties the limiter's in-process buckets before each test; several files send /login from the same fake sender. Fixes Abilityai/trinity-enterprise#1253 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * test(whatsapp): give each /login integration test its own sender number The module sent /login six times from one number, past the per-sender cap of 5 per 10 minutes, and the cap lives in Redis, so re-runs within the window failed sooner. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(auth): share the sign-in code address budget across web, MCP and channels - Web login and MCP inline auth charge the per-address rate_limiter bucket the channels use (login_code_email:<email>), before their whitelist / known-address check, so the budget is one budget and its refusal reveals no membership. - A channel request refused by a later cap no longer spends the earlier ones: rate_limiter.refund removes the recorded hit. - The in-process fallback is capped at 10,000 keys; keys here are user input. - Accepted risk documented: one sender can keep a named address from receiving a code on every surface (module docstring, security.md, flow doc). - Current consumers list in security.md updated. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(auth): bound the shared sign-in address key and the in-process fallback - The per-address limiter key holds a sha256 of the stripped, lowercased address, so its size is fixed for any input. Web, MCP and the channels build it in one function and share the same key for the same address. - The web login model caps email at 254 characters; a longer address gets the route's usual 422 before any budget is charged. - The in-process fallback caps each key prefix at 10k keys and evicts the oldest key of the same prefix, so a flood of login addresses while Redis is down cannot evict another limiter's bucket. - Log the anonymous address with %r on the web and MCP suppression lines. - Unit test for check + refund through the Redis branch (fakeredis). Refs Abilityai/trinity-enterprise#1253 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
) (#4561) A Workspace person who had not accepted the terms got the in-place terms screen, accepted, and was then told "Couldn't load your agents — Accept the current terms to continue." beside "No agents shared with you yet". The accept was recorded (200, created:true), but no roster or chat read followed it, so every new portal client hit this on their first sign-in. The cause is an ordering one. `acceptTerms()` cleared `termsRefusal`, the state `Portal.vue` mounts `PortalTerms` under. The scheduler flush that ran before `PortalTerms.onAccept()` resumed from its `await` unmounted the screen, and Vue's `emit()` returns early for an unmounted instance, so the `accepted` event never reached `bootstrap()`. The roster's refusal message stayed in `error`, and the chat reads that the gate had refused kept their failure flag; "Try again" re-read only the roster, so the Inbox still said it could not refresh the chats until a reload. The store no longer clears the refusal on accept. The screen stays mounted until it has emitted, the shell re-bootstraps, and the roster read clears the refusal on success, so the roster, the thread list and the chat state are all read again with the accept in place. The existing specs drove `PortalTerms` alone, or emitted `accepted` by hand right after clearing the refusal, so none saw the unmount-before-emit order; three of them asserted the clear itself and now assert the contract instead. The new mount spec drives `Portal.vue` with the real `PortalTerms` through a click on Accept against a stub server that refuses every gated call until the accept is recorded.
* fix(deps): bump Pillow to 13.0.0 in the backend image (Abilityai/trinity-enterprise#1124) The backend image pinned Pillow 11.1.0. OSV lists 90 advisories against that version, several of them Critical heap overflows in decoders that Image.open() reaches with default settings. Every 11.x and 12.x release is affected: 12.3.0 still carries 62 open advisories, including the bundled-OpenJPEG write overflow that has been present since 11.1.0. 13.0.0 is the first release that fixes all of them, and OSV lists none against it. The exposure matters because the backend now decodes avatar images taken from template repositories (local templates and GitHub templates), so the bytes handed to Pillow come from whoever wrote the template. 13.0.0 ships cp313 manylinux_2_28 wheels for both x86_64 and aarch64, which the trixie base image (glibc 2.41) installs. The only Pillow calls the backend makes are Image.open, .width/.height, thumbnail with Image.LANCZOS, and a WebP save; none of them is removed or changed in 12.0 or 13.0 (Image.LANCZOS is one of the constants Pillow restored for good in 9.4). The test requirements floor moves with it so CI never resolves an older Pillow than the image ships. * test(avatar): decode a real PNG and WebP through the template avatar install The tests for _install_bundled_avatar_bytes stub both Image.open and optimize_avatar, so a Pillow upgrade that broke the header read, the resize or the WebP encoder would leave them green. This test passes real PNG and WebP bytes (the two formats a template may bundle) through the function with nothing mocked on the image path, and checks that the file written is a 512x384 WebP with the source colour. Checked that it fails when the decoder cannot read the input: restricting optimize_avatar's Image.open to JPEG turns both cases red with UnidentifiedImageError.
…e slice (#4505) (#4552) * fix(rooms): a short gated request is held whatever others wrote in the slice (#4505) The room wake handed the skill gate one text for the scan, the approver's card, the 6,000-byte check and the approved run. A long post by another participant in the unread slice made a short gated request a standing request_too_long refusal on every wake. The scan still reads the whole shown slice. The card, the size check and the approved run now read the posts that themselves invoke a gated skill, plus the ask answer, passed as gate_replay. enforce cards the scanned text when that replay misses a skill the scan matched. A too-long refusal whose gated post is someone else's names that author. Room requesters read "A person in a room" on the card; the requester kind is unchanged. Fixes #4505 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(rooms): the gate card names each post's sender; the replay fallback is room-only (#4505) - The room card holds the gated posts and the requester's latest post, each line prefixed with its sender as the transcript writes it. An agent's gated line reads as the agent's, and the person's own line is on the card and in the approved run. - Room requesters read "A room conversation" on the card. - enforce drops a replay that misses a matched skill only when triggered_by is "room". A /task whose gated name is only in user_message keeps its message and system prompt apart. - A too-long refusal naming another author says to ask again: that post is held and the next wake runs without it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(rooms): a post's own newlines cannot forge a sender line on the gate card (#4505) The room's gate card renders posts with _format_card: each post's first line carries its sender label, and every further line of the post, on any line break a renderer honours, starts with " | ". A participant who writes "\n<person> (human): /pay-invoice ..." inside a post no longer produces a line that reads as the person's. The card is still the approved run's message. The agent transcript keeps _format_delta unchanged. A too-long refusal names another author's gated post only when the requester's own post is not what overflows: when the others' posts fit by themselves, the notice says to shorten the request. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(rooms): an ask answer's own newlines cannot forge a sender line on the gate card (#4505) The answer to an agent's ask goes on the gate card under the label `(ask reply): `, and each further line of it carries the ` | ` continuation prefix through `_format_card`, the same path posts take. No agent name or email starts with "(", so no sender line reads as it. The responder stays withheld from the agent's message (ent#715); the approved run equals the card text. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(rooms): a gated name only in an ask answer gets the labelled gate card (#4505) When no post names a gated skill and only the ask answer does, _room_gate_card now builds the card from the answer under "(ask reply): " plus the requester's latest post, through _format_card. A newline in the answer cannot forge a sender line, and the approved run equals the card. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(rooms): a room card missing a scanned gated name raises no card (#4505) When the gate map changes between the room's read and enforce's read, the room's card text can miss a gated name the scan matched. enforce now refuses gate_unavailable on that mismatch and raises no approval card, since the raw scanned text has no sender labels and a post's newline could forge a sender line on it. The refusal is transient, so the room delivers the post again and the next wake builds a labelled card. /task replay behaviour is unchanged. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(rooms): gate card wraps cannot forge a sender line; a redacted name cannot refuse every wake (#4505) - GatedSkillRequest draws each input line as its own block with a hanging indent. A wrapped segment (a long line, a run of spaces) is indented; only a real line start sits at the left edge. - The room card check scans the request through the credential sanitizer, as the card is. A gated name the sanitizer redacts is carded redacted and the post is held; later asks run. - A room wake that sends no card text (its own gate-map read failed) is refused gate_unavailable, so no card carries the raw unlabelled slice. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(rooms): each post is sanitised by itself on the gate card; a card mismatch holds the post (#4505) - The room card sanitises each post and the ask answer on its own before labelling, and is not sanitised again: a credential pattern can no longer reach across a line into the next post or its sender label, and Approve runs what the approver read. - The coverage check reads the scanned parts (`REQUEST_PARTS`, popped by the backstop) and requires, per gated part, the names that part keeps once sanitised by itself (`room_card_misses`). - A card that misses a required name refuses `room_card_incomplete`, a standing refusal, so the room holds the gated posts. A failed room map read still refuses `gate_unavailable`. - Every post of the requester's in the slice is on the card. - Gate card input lines use a 4ch hanging indent. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(rooms): the requester's old context leaves the gate card first; a context-only gated name is carded (#4505) - The requester's ungated posts on a room gate card are context. While the card is over 6,000 bytes the oldest of them are dropped; gated posts and the requester's latest post stay. An old long post to another agent no longer makes every short gated ask request_too_long. - A room wake whose only gated match is in the context text (the waker's email) goes to the normal card path, which cards the context lines. A room wake that sent no card text while a post names a gated skill still refuses gate_unavailable. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
#4533) Pairs trinity#4493 and trinity#4496 with their enterprise halves: task shape (ent#1232) and project mode (ent#1235). Co-authored-by: trinity-ability <309458136+trinity-ability@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.2 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…ilityai/trinity-enterprise#1163) (#4494) * feat(projects): GitHubService.get_issue and GitHub ref fields on the task tools (Abilityai/trinity-enterprise#1240) Checkpoint B (platform). GitHubService.get_issue: one GET to /repos/{o}/{r}/issues/{n} over a bounded client (5 s, one redirect), GitHubError carries status, reset and rate_limited; network errors never carry httpx's text. create_project_task gains refs, update_project_task gains refs_add/refs_remove, and both now forward only the keys they declare. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(projects): task modal GitHub refs block, read-owners setting, store and docs (Abilityai/trinity-enterprise#1240) Checkpoint C (platform). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(github): issue reads refuse a redirect off the API origin (Abilityai/trinity-enterprise#1240) C1: GitHubService.issue_client adds a request hook that raises GitHubError (status None -> the refs read records "unreachable") when a redirect hop's scheme, host or port differs from API_BASE's, before that hop is sent, so the platform token never leaves the API host. I2: the Projects GitHub owners setting says removing an owner stops new reads and titles already read stay as last read. Bumps src/backend/enterprise to 6925b6e (C2 + I1). Tests: test_redirect_to_another_origin_is_refused_before_it_is_sent and test_redirect_changing_scheme_or_port_is_refused[x2] — red with the hook removed, green restored. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(projects): GitHubService.list_sub_issues, a GET-only read of an issue's sub-issues (ent#1163) One paged GET /repos/{o}/{r}/issues/{n}/sub_issues on the bounded issue client: 100 per page, the next page requested by number only while GitHub sends rel="next" (no URL from a response is requested), capped at limit. Non-200s share get_issue's error mapping (status, reset, rate_limited), now one helper; a network error never carries httpx's text (#4284). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(projects): import a GitHub epic from the project import dialog (ent#1163) ProjectImportModal gets one source switch, a radio group: 'From an agent' (the folder import, unchanged, the default) and 'From a GitHub epic' (one field for owner/repo#N or the issue link, pre-validated with a named error and an example, and a note that it is a one-time copy that writes nothing back to GitHub). A clean import opens the project; one that left sub-issues out, hit the 100 cap, could not link a task or met nested sub-issues names them first. Server refusals show inline in their own words. store.importEpic posts { epic } to /import/epic and refreshes the list. The projects user guide gains a paragraph. Mounted vitest spec workspaceProjectsEnt1163.mount.spec.js (10 tests, all red against the previous modal and store). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(github): a non-JSON 200 from an issue read raises GitHubError(status=200) (ent#1163 review I2) get_issue and list_sub_issues called response.json() bare, so a proxy's HTML page answering 200 surfaced as a ValueError no caller maps, and the import route answered a bare 500. Both now raise GitHubError with status=200, which callers already map to 'unreachable'. Red before the fix: test_a_non_json_200_is_a_github_error_with_status_200 (both parametrizations, JSONDecodeError). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore(enterprise): pin the submodule to the ent#1163 branch tip f8bd5a2 (Abilityai/trinity-enterprise#1163) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(projects): an imported epic begins Not started, its open sub-issues to do (ent#1163) Review C2/W1 on the user doc: the import creates a not_started project and open sub-issues import as todo. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Trinity Agent (trinity) <trinity-agent@ability.ai> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: trinity-ability <309458136+trinity-ability@users.noreply.github.com>
A github: template that ships avatar.png/webp had the file installed but never stamped as the agent's avatar, so avatar_url stayed null and every surface showed initials. After a successful install, record it as a default avatar seeded with the template's own avatar_prompt (from the template.yaml the create already reads), or a generic prompt when it declares none. A failed install is not stamped.
…yai/trinity-enterprise#1105) (#4492) * feat(executions): attribution seam — record at every creation site, explicit project_id checked first (Abilityai/trinity-enterprise#1105) An edition may attribute an execution to a project. The platform side is an inert seam, services/execution_attribution.py: - every create_task_execution( site offers its row to record_row right after it exists: /chat, /task, execute_task, both Workspace turn sites, loop iterations, fan-out children (project resolved once at request time and carried, since children are created when a slot frees), the skill-gate replay, and the scheduler's row in the internal execute-task route; - the public link, external A2A and brain-orb postprocess turns are untagged by design, allowlisted with a reason; - a request naming project_id on /chat, /task or /fan-out is checked via dependencies.check_requested_project before admission, any claim or row; with no attributor registered it is 422 project_attribution_unavailable; - GET /api/agents/{name}/executions/{id} carries project_id from annotate; record and annotate fail open; - MCP chat_with_agent and fan_out take an optional project_id, forwarded and keyed only when set; get_execution_result passes project_id through when present. Census guard tests/unit/test_1105_execution_attribution.py walks the platform backend (rglob) and fails on an unrecorded creation site or a stale allowlist entry. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(projects-ui): Runs tab and list_project_executions MCP tool (Abilityai/trinity-enterprise#1105) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(executions): gate replay carries the frozen project; a failed explicit attribution says so (Abilityai/trinity-enterprise#1105) Review I1, (b) and (c) of the planned attribution paths (plan §2.2 rules 2-3). (b) Skill-gate replay. A hold on /chat (admit_chat_request), on /task (dispatch_parallel_task) and on a fan-out subtask (via gate_replay) now freezes the project resolved while the requesting turn runs into the gate record's `dispatch` (`skill_gate_service.frozen_project`: `project_id`, plus `project_requested` when the request named it). `_dispatch_approved` records the approved run with it: as the explicit claim when the request named it, otherwise as inherited. Inert in OSS, where resolve returns None and nothing is frozen. (c) Honest status. `record_row` now reports FAILED for a named project that passed `check` and was then not recorded (the write raised, or the record-time re-assert no longer held). /chat and /task record inline, so the outcome rides a per-request ContextVar (reset by `check`) to the router, which answers `project_attribution: "failed"` (`execution_attribution.report`). Fan-out answers it on `FanOutResponse` when the named project did not resolve at request time, or when a sync batch's subtask record failed. (a) Loop iterations are NOT built. The loop record (`agent_loops`) has no project column and no free-form field, so storing the project resolved at loop start needs an OSS schema migration, which has not been ruled. Iterations still record from their own row only. Mutation check: each wiring line was reverted on its own and a named test went red: - the chat/task router `report` → test_{chat,task}_route_answers_failed_…[False]; - the chat/task hold `frozen_project` → test_a_held_{chat,task}_freezes_…; - the fan-out gate_replay project → test_a_fan_out_subtask_hands_its_project_to_the_gate; - the child failure append → test_a_fan_out_subtask_whose_record_failed_marks_the_batch; - the router FAILED → test_fan_out_answers_failed_when_the_named_project_did_not_resolve; - the replay `requested` → test_the_approved_replay_records_the_frozen_project[frozen1]; - the seam's unrecorded → FAILED → test_an_explicit_request_that_was_not_recorded_is_failed. Known gap: an Idempotency-Key replay of /chat or /task returns the stored snapshot, which does not carry the field. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(mcp): list_project_executions task_id takes up to 64 chars, the backend's bound (Abilityai/trinity-enterprise#1105) Review I4. The tool had `max(16)` while the route has `Query(max_length=64)`. The new test (64 accepted, 65 refused) went red against max(16). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * test(ent875): census the internal execute_task attribution read (ent#1105) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore(1105): pin enterprise to b01cee0c7 (#1247 head re-pin) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Trinity Agent (trinity) <trinity-agent@ability.ai> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: trinity-ability <309458136+trinity-ability@users.noreply.github.com>
…o a card waits for (Abilityai/trinity-enterprise#1096) (#4559) * feat(asks): admin decider seat on gate approvals + stamped re-address (Abilityai/trinity-enterprise#1096, C1) The decider order (primary → owner → instance admin) had no answering path for its third arm: a gate approval with an empty snapshot waited on nobody. OSS sink half: - R1: a gate raise may address nobody only with the platform's new `workspace_decider_seat = admin` stamp (a `_PLATFORM_CONTEXT_KEYS` member, stripped from agent content). - R8: `may_end`'s admin arm decides a stamped, empty gate approval only for a principal passing the admin gate and the person rule; `addressed_view` reports the same answer plus `waiting_on_seat` on stamped rows. - R4: `readdress_item` compares stamps, a None stamp removes its key; an `actor` makes the audit row carry the admin and `has_reason`. `ADMIN_READDRESSED` joins the readdress reasons. - R5: answer/cancel on a seat-fenced row compare the stored address in the CAS; a lost compare is `AskConflict("readdressed")`. - R6: `bulk_cancel` skips fenced rows the actor is not addressed on (`Ending.skipped_fenced`). - R7: `AskNotAddressee` carries `waiting_on`/`seat`; the message names the person for gate approvals only; role refusals stay person-free. - R9: the admin arm records `admin:<username>` for an admin with no email. - Resolver registry (`register_readdress_resolver`) for platform families under `gate-`; R12 docstring on `readdress_role`. Tests: tests/unit/test_1096_admin_seat_fence.py (62); the ent#715 reader table classifies the two new row readers. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(operator-queue): admin /readdress, reason-required cancel, named refusals (Abilityai/trinity-enterprise#1096, C2) - POST /api/operator-queue/{id}/readdress {to: rule|admin, reason}: require_admin + require_person (grant-vs-use: human-only), row visibility as the read's, `ask_service.admin_readdress` re-runs the rule that raised the card (registered family resolver, or the role) or takes a registered family's gate approval to the admin seat (R2/T2, no person picker; a skill-gate approval is refused the admin seat, T3). 409 audience_unchanged names who it waits for; 422 unknown_family. - /cancel: an admin ending a fenced card they are not on must give a reason (422 reason_required, `AskReasonRequired` in the sink). - /bulk-cancel returns `skipped_fenced` (R6). - 403 not_addressee on Operations and Workspace carries `seat` and, except on role refusals (the ent#1042/#1053 "never a person" contract), `waiting_on`; admin verbs on Operations only (R11). An ending that lost to a re-address is 409 `readdressed` (people named on Operations only). - R14: `# mcp:` header names readdress as a human-only admin verb. Re-pinned in this checkpoint: test_ent751_gate_dispatch (admin cancel now needs a reason), test_ent611_ask_endings (bulk body gains skipped_fenced), test_ent715_queue_person_fields (new door + readers classified). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(operator-queue): the not-addressee notice shows who the card waits for (Abilityai/trinity-enterprise#1096, C3) The server's 403 `not_addressee` now names the seat and the person (C2). `notAddresseeMessage(err)` prefers `detail.message` and keeps the generic line when the server sends none (an older backend); the desktop store keeps it beside `notAddresseeItemId` for QueueCard, and /m uses it directly. One string path, no new component; raw-color counts unchanged (QueueCard 28/59/0, MobileAdmin 0/4/130 — equal to the baseline). Re-pinned: mobileAdminNotAddressee.spec (the server's message, plus the fallback case); queueCardNotAddressee.spec gains the named and fallback mount cases; new operatorQueueNotAddressee.spec for the helper. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(asks): a role row's 409 readdressed body names its role, never a person (Abilityai/trinity-enterprise#1096, M1) readdressed_detail built its message from waiting_on for every seat-fenced row, so a role, approver or project row's 409 named people and carried waiting_on, while the same row's 403 stays person-free. It now returns the AskNotAddressee.detail shape for those rows: the role message and seat, no waiting_on, no email. New role:cfo case in test_1096_admin_seat_fence was red before the change (waiting_on present, email in the message). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * test(operator-queue): pin the address clause of the ending compare-and-set (Abilityai/trinity-enterprise#1096, S1) No test reached the window the CAS exists for: a re-address landing after the service read the address and before the ending's UPDATE. Two db-level tests take the expectation the service builds, move resolved_to while addressed_to_email stays NULL ([alice,bob] -> [alice,carol]), then call respond_to_operator_queue_item / cancel_operator_queue_item with expect_address: each returns _status_conflict and the row stays pending. Mutation: dropping resolved_to from the respond CAS turns test_an_answer_read_before_the_move_does_not_land red; dropping it from the cancel CAS turns test_a_cancel_read_before_the_move_does_not_land red. Both reverted byte-identical. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(asks): a re-address resolver prefix that could start a skill-gate id is refused (Abilityai/trinity-enterprise#1096, L1) admin_readdress looks a registered resolver up before the skill-gate shape, so a prefix of hex digits only (gate-a...) would match gate-<40 hex> ids and let to: admin put a skill-gate approval on the admin seat. The registration now raises ValueError for any prefix fully matching gate-[0-9a-f]*. New parametrized test was red (DID NOT RAISE) before. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(asks): admin re-address refuses a failing or empty rule with 409 rule_refused (Abilityai/trinity-enterprise#1096, L3) admin_readdress trusted the registered family rule: a resolver that raised surfaced as a 500, and one that returned a primary or owner seat with no people wrote a card nobody could decide. Both now return 409 rule_refused and leave the row untouched; only the admin seat may be empty. Two new route tests (raising rule; primary/owner seat with nobody) were red before (an uncaught RuntimeError, and 200 instead of 409). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * merge-train: shorten the decider-seat key comment so operator_queue_service/__init__.py is back at the 800-line cap (#4559) test_3785's size threshold failed the regression diff at 804 lines. Comment only; no code change. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.2 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Trinity Agent (trinity) <trinity-agent@ability.ai> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: trinity-ability <309458136+trinity-ability@users.noreply.github.com>
…rinity-enterprise#1098) (#4581) Co-authored-by: trinity-ability <309458136+trinity-ability@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.2 <noreply@anthropic.com>
… the primary, else the owner, else refused by name (#4579) (#4580) A credential ask is addressed to a person who can open its secret field: the primary when they are on the agent's roster, else the owner, else a named refusal (role_cannot_open_agent). Both re-address arms follow the same rule. Fixes #4579
Delta sync of docs/user-docs/ against dev since the last full review (2026-10-20): one new page (agents/agent-memory.md), 78 pages updated, FAQ index regenerated. Docs only.
VERSION 1.0.5-rc2 -> 1.0.5-rc3; trinity-do-create.sh default TRINITY_IMAGE_TAG -> v1.0.5-rc3. Not a release: no issues close on this tag.
main carries 7 commits that are not ancestors of dev: the ent#1117 security back-ports (#4291, #4294, #4314, #4315, #4399, #4400) and the llms.txt refresh (#4287). Every one of them is already on dev in its original form, so this is a merge with dev's tree kept as-is (strategy ours). It records main as a parent so the dev -> main release PR no longer conflicts. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.2 <noreply@anthropic.com>
… image (#4483) (#4602) After an upgrade, agents keep the image they were started from until their next cold start (#1809, unchanged), and only trinity-system said so. Agent-side fixes in a release were silently inert on every agent nobody stopped. - services/fleet_image_service.py: reads the fleet through the tri-state agent_container_states(), compares each running, non-ephemeral agent with check_base_image_state, and keeps ONE platform alert (fleet_base_image_stale:fleet) naming the stale agents. It updates as the set changes and ends when a pass proves every agent current. The same alert is raised when trinity-agent-base:latest's version label is older than the backend, with the command for a source and for a hosted install. - Docker unreadable, a failed comparison or a base image with no parseable version label is "could not check": nothing is filed and nothing is ended. - Read-only: no container is stopped, started or recreated. Leader-leased (fleetimage:leader, fail-open), first pass 25s after boot, then every 10 min. - 409 env_unreadable (credential sink, Nevermined delegation) names the older agent image and the restart when the agent's read answer has no `missing` list. - upgrading.md: agents must be restarted to receive agent-side changes; the base image is rebuilt when anything under docker/base-image/ changed. Mutation check: with each of these reverted, tests in tests/unit/test_4483_fleet_base_image_check.py went red and were restored byte-identical — Docker-unreadable read as an empty fleet (test_docker_unreadable_is_could_not_check), ephemeral or system agent not excluded (test_ephemeral_stopped_and_system_agents_are_left_out), unknown readings allowed to clear (test_an_agent_whose_comparison_failed_is_neither_ stale_nor_current), the main.py start call removed (test_main_starts_the_loop_with_the_watch_loops), the lease ignored (test_a_worker_that_does_not_hold_the_lease_runs_nothing), the old-image wording dropped (test_env_unreadable_on_an_old_image_names_the_image_and_the_ restart). Fixes #4483 Co-authored-by: trinity-ability <309458136+trinity-ability@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.2 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Moves src/backend/enterprise from dd84ab4 to a26e522, which adds the Abilityai/trinity-enterprise#1091 fix (enterprise PR #1273): a person's task events share one pending Inbox item. Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Bumps VERSION and the DigitalOcean installer's default image tag to v1.0.5-rc4 so the release candidate tag can be cut from dev. Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…e project tools Two user-doc pages listed the Workspace project tools among the tools an admin's `user` key can call on behalf of an agent. That part is not in v1.0.5: act-as covers asks, reports, metrics, objectives and the canvas tools. The pages now say so, and say that a project-tool request carrying `agent_name` from an admin's key is refused. Docs only; no code or behaviour change. Refs abilityai/trinity-enterprise#1189 (row B10) Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.2 <noreply@anthropic.com>
docs(user-docs): an admin's key acting for an agent does not cover the project tools
chore: reconcile main into dev ahead of release v1.0.5
… README (#4615) * chore: set version to 1.0.5 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.2 <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(learnings): fold fragments into the ledger for 1.0.5 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.2 <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(releases): add v1.0.5 release notes, What's New page and llms.txt refresh Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.2 <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(releases): v1.0.5 README banner; SQLite move is a recommendation; private module items counted, not listed Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.2 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: trinity-ability <309458136+trinity-ability@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.2 <noreply@anthropic.com>
vybe
approved these changes
Nov 17, 2026
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Release v1.0.5 — cumulative changes since v1.0.0.
478 commits · 361 merged PRs · 162 public + 128 private-tracker issues · enterprise submodule 982735f → a26e522. Full record:
docs/releases/1.0.5.md· user-facing summary:docs/user-docs/whats-new/v1.0.5.md.Highlights
1.0 put an agent in a seat on the team. 1.0.5 makes the seat workable day to day: projects
people and agents run work from, agents that wake when the thing they were waiting for
happens, a memory that can be searched, and an install that is closed to the network until
an admin opens it.
waits-on and an editable title, objective and definition of done, a Runs tab listing the
executions behind it with cost and queue age, and context an agent reads (a written or
uploaded brief). A task's run starts from the project. A steward agent is picked at
creation, proposes members and task owners for one approval, and works in a per-project
mode — Track, Propose or Auto — that the platform enforces. An existing GitHub epic can be
imported as a project, and a task can point at its issue or pull request (ent#957,
ent#1232, ent#1133, ent#1105, ent#1193, ent#1195, ent#1169, ent#980, ent#1235, ent#1236,
ent#1163, ent#1240, ent#867).
caller is woken when the run it delegated ends or asks — both on by default, with a missed
wake delivered on the next start and a per-hour budget on caller wakes. Platform-started
turns run on the agent's configured model (ent#790, ent#1108, ent#1102, bug(delegation): wake-on-ending and reminder turns inherit the chain depth, so an autonomous delegate→wake→delegate run stops after ~8 rounds #4357, bug(wake): a fast callee's ending is dropped by the 15 s wake window, so a delegate→wake loop stalls silently #4536,
bug: platform-started turns (wakes, reminders, operator answers) run on a different model than the agent's configured one #4442).
ask raised in a room comes back to that room, an agent on a project can address the
project's people, a changed primary re-addresses what is pending, and a refusal names who
a card is waiting for (ent#1135, ent#1134, ent#1095, ent#1096, ent#1042, ent#1053, bug(asks): an ask to: approver is filed for a seated approver who cannot open the agent, and then nobody can answer it #4501,
bug(asks): a credential ask is filed for an assigned primary who cannot open the agent, and then nobody can fill it #4579).
searchable by the owner and by the agent over MCP (
search_memory). Agent-written memoryabout a person passes anti-poisoning gates, and the owner sees a person's memory history
with undo (ent#1022, ent#1027, ent#1028, ent#419, ent#962).
with stop by voice or by hand;
send_voice_replycan address a person by role or email soa scheduled run can speak (ent#1046, ent#1087 in part, ent#700).
apply_systemreconciles a live instance to its manifest insteadof suffixing
_2, and a manifest states the whole target: skill assignments, admingrants, the approval map, role ids and catalog-only members (ent#695, ent#1030, ent#991,
System detail and export lose permissions and folders #4128–A system export cannot always be applied back unchanged #4132, apply_system drops a schedule's model field without a warning #4151).
switched on in Settings, agent SSH ports publish on loopback, hosted installs trust only
their own proxies for the client address, and
DO_NOT_TRACKis one switch after which theinstance contacts no vendor host. Agent runtimes stop sending usage fingerprints to their
vendors by default (ent#1101, ent#1168, ent#873, bug: per-IP rate limits likely see one client IP on Caddy-fronted (hosted) installs #3047, Privacy-strict installs: two outbound channels have no off switch, and the bug-report switch does not work on the published images #4499, ent#986, ent#1093).
accessor tier, the accessor tier is no longer the default for agent routes, a suspended
account is refused at every door and loses its live connections, and peer skill grants are
enforced inside the container (ent#875, ent#926, ent#1258, ent#863, ent#925).
trinity updateis one command with preflight, published-URLverification and rollback; the admin password can be changed in the app; every compose
file defaults to a bundled PostgreSQL, with SQLite still available behind an explicit
setting; an alert names the running agents still on an old base
image (feat(update): a self-hosted operator cannot complete an upgrade from the documented path — make
trinity updatea first-class command with preflight, published-URL verification and rollback #3007, No way to change the admin password after first-run setup — not in the API, not in the UI #3825, Remove the SQLite backend: end-of-support passed 2026-09-01 and no issue owns the code removal #4175 in part, SQLite→PostgreSQL guide and start.sh refusal: image step is incomplete (build backend only → mixed-version stack; rollback names no rebuild) #4479, bug(upgrade): agents stay on the old base image after an upgrade and nothing says which ones — agent-side fixes are silently inert #4483).agent from the Payments tab, backed by Nevermined widget sessions and per-agent delegation
binding (ent#966, ent#967; ent#965 stays open for step 3).
credential ask can name an agent on another Trinity as its destination (ent#862, feat(credentials): a credential ask can name a destination agent on another Trinity, delivered by merge under the asking agent's own key (abilityai/trinity-enterprise#1109) #4262,
feat(credentials): name a registered instance as a credential ask's destination (abilityai/trinity-enterprise#1158) #4401).
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Pre-release checklist passed 2026-11-17. Ready for squash-merge.
v1.0.5publish-images.yml,publish-cli.yml(src/cli/**changed) andsync-docs-to-vertex.yml🤖 Generated with Claude Code