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DO NOT MERGE — merge train: 4402,4401 - #4430
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… settings (ent#1174 A) - manifest: person_seats entries accept holder: member (primary only, one per agent); an email still refused, the refusal now names holder: member (T1, T6) - dependencies.can_seat_member: a person (JWT or own user key) who passes the admin gate (operator ruling T2) - services/reserved_settings: a module-owned settings key is refused on the generic PUT/DELETE and hidden from a key caller's GET/list (E3); OSS names no key Refs abilityai/trinity-enterprise#1174 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
… (ent#1174 B) - assignment_provider: optional member_seat_status / seat_member hooks and their wrappers; neither carries a person (S1) - seats: holder: member planned as op member_seat_set (seat_missing) when the caller may write it, else seat_filled / member_seat_differs / member_not_recorded / seat_requires_interactive_admin reports; partial is written again; landed writes audited (action share, via apply_member_seat, no address) - system_service: snapshot reads the member seat for members to create too (E1); member_writer = can_seat_member; a key writes it only on a member this run creates or one its owner owns (E4); op ordered after seat_set Refs abilityai/trinity-enterprise#1174 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…text, docs (ent#1174 C) - tests/unit/test_ent1174_journey.py: AC4 + AC2 end to end with the real assignments module on the real seam — apply with an admin-owned user key seats and shares the recorded member, the Workspace roster lists the agent, the door mints a code and hands the account to /login; admin-role and user-role members keep their role (operator ruling R31). Skips on OSS. - MCP apply_system manifest parameter names holder: member (description budget unchanged, 77/77 MCP tests) - requirements roadmap/mcp + system-manifest flow; tests/registry.json Refs abilityai/trinity-enterprise#1174 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
… destination shape (abilityai/trinity-enterprise#1158)
Checkpoint 1 of 5.
- The Workspace answer path refuses 409 `destination_unreadable` when a
credential ask names a destination `destination_of` cannot read. Before
this, such a row fell through to a write into the asking agent's own
`.env`. New predicate `credential_destination.carries_destination`.
- `credential_destination.validate` accepts a second shape,
`{instance, agent_name}`: the name or id of an outbound A2A registry
entry. It is resolved through `a2a_outbound.resolve_endpoint` for the
asking agent and reduced to metadata (`instance_entry`). It is stored as
`{instance, endpoint_id, instance_url (origin), agent_name}`.
- Raise refusals: `destination_invalid` (`ambiguous_shape`/`missing_field`),
`destination_instance_invalid`, `destination_not_approved`/`instance_unknown`,
`destination_instance_no_credential` (`no_credential`/`aauth`/`payment_token`).
- `_origin` no longer checks the path. The base-URL check stays in
`validate_instance_url`, and the new `origin_of` normalises an entry's
A2A URL to its origin. The userinfo message no longer names key_env.
Delivery for the instance shape lands in checkpoint 2.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
… one audit row per delivery (abilityai/trinity-enterprise#1158) Checkpoint 2 of 5. - `credential_sink._resolve_instance_key` is the resolve point: the registry entry by its STORED id, through `a2a_outbound.resolve_endpoint` for the asking agent, every delivery (a rotation applies to the next one). Refusals in order: `destination_not_approved`/`instance_unknown`, `destination_not_approved`/`instance_moved` (the entry's origin changed since the ask), `destination_instance_no_credential` (`no_credential`/`aauth`/`payment_token`, the raise's own `entry_problem`), `destination_key_invalid` (not header-safe). Carries the ent#1200 grant seam comment. - `_deliver_remote` branches on `instance`: the switch, then the resolve point (it subsumes the origin-registry check for this shape, so a moved entry is named `instance_moved`, not `not_registered`). The asking agent's `.env` is never read. - One `credential_instance_delivery` audit row in a `finally` over the whole instance path, with the outcome (`delivered` or the refusal code) and `may_have_written`; never a value or key. The ent#1109 `credential_delivery_attempt`/`credential_delivered` rows stay for `key_env` only. A names-only log line is written before the send. - `destination_key_refused` names "the key registered for that Trinity" on the instance path. - ent#1066 AST guard: `_deliver_remote_once` joins the value's allowed delivery steps; a new key guard covers `_resolve_instance_key`, `_read_key_by_name` and the send (names `key`/`found`/`credential`/ `headers`/`item` and any `.credential`), with a planted-leak self-test; `asdict`/`vars`/`astuple` are refused in the sink and destination modules. - `credential_destination._metadata` is now public as `entry_metadata`. Mutation check: disabling the `instance_moved` branch turns 4 tests red; disabling the audit row in the `finally` turns 10 red. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…ai/trinity-enterprise#1158) A credential ask whose destination names key_env failed only at delivery, after a person had typed the secret. The raise route now reads the asking agent's own .env first: - credential_sink.classify_key is the one ok/missing/invalid decision for both the raise check and delivery (_read_key_by_name), so they cannot drift. Whitespace-only or header-unsafe is "invalid" on both sides (T7). - credential_sink.key_env_state returns only the label, never the key: the Docker lookup runs off the event loop, the whole read sits inside a 5 s budget, and anything it cannot tell is None (T2: fail open, delivery re-checks). _agent_client gains a timeout= parameter. - raise_my_ask reads key_env only for a credential ask with a shape-valid key_env destination (never an instance destination) and passes the label as raise_ask(destination_key_state=), default None for gate/file callers. - raise_ask applies it after the replay and every earlier refusal (caps, rate, deadline, re-ask, replace, no_person), before the chat attachment and the create: 422 destination_key_env_missing / destination_key_invalid, naming destination.instance as the way forward. Delivery change from the shared classifier: a quoted whitespace-only key is now destination_key_invalid at delivery (was destination_key_missing). Red first: tests/unit/test_ent1158_key_env_raise_check.py (44 tests). With the raise_ask call and the route passthrough removed, three go red. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…MCP tool (abilityai/trinity-enterprise#1158)
- file-guardrail: a .env / .env.* denial now names ask_for_credential with
destination.instance as the way to hand a credential to an agent on another
Trinity; other protected paths keep their reason. Ships in the base image, so
running agents show the old text until rebuilt and recreated.
- platform prompt: one sentence beside the protected-paths line carries the
same pointer, on every runtime and tier (environment block stays under its cap).
- MCP ask_for_credential: destination accepts exactly {instance, agent_name}
(instance 1..200) or {instance_url, agent_name, key_env} via superRefine; the
handler forwards only the matched shape's declared fields; the description
leads with instance and lists the raise refusals.
Red first: test_ent792 .env reason, test_ent945 protected-paths sentence,
operator_queue.test.ts schema/forwarding/description (4 failing) — all green now.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…rinity-enterprise#1158) Journey test (tests/unit/test_ent1158_credential_key_journey.py): an admin registers an instance with its key through the real upsert_endpoint and a real encrypted envelope, the asking agent raises over the real raise_my_ask route naming destination.instance (201), the person answers through provide_credential, the remote instance receives one merge inject under the entry key, the ask is provided, one credential_instance_delivery row, the asking agent's .env byte-identical. Variants: the entry key cleared before the answer (destination_instance_no_credential, nothing sent) and a key_env destination without the variable (destination_key_env_missing at raise). Red at base 13d32e2 with the six backend files reverted (3 failed: the instance shape refused missing_field; the key_env raise not refused), and with only credential_sink.py reverted (3 failed: KeyError key_env at delivery; no key_env_state). Green on this branch. Docs: the credential-in-chat flow, requirements/credentials.md 3.11, requirements/security.md, architecture/mcp-server.md and backend.md lead with the instance form, keep key_env as the older form, list the named refusals, state both key-reuse cases and that the entry key needs inject rights on the receiving instance, and the rollback caveat. The ent#1109 "its own credential is never used" / "asking agent's own key" wording is corrected. tests/registry.json registers the three ent#1158 files. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
M1: the delivery-key AST guard now watches classify_key {key, found} and
key_env_state {env_text}, and a second pass scans
credential_destination.entry_metadata for any carried .credential. A
logger.info("leak %s", key) planted in classify_key turns
test_the_sink_module_never_interpolates_a_delivery_key red; it was green
before.
L1: the ask_for_credential destination description names the delivery-time
refusals (instance_moved, destination_unreadable, destination_key_refused),
pinned in operator_queue.test.ts; mcp-server.md says what it lists.
L2: credential-in-chat.md says the instance delivery runs check_switch plus
resolve-by-id and origin equality, not check_deliverable.
I3: set_env_value docstring covers the instance shape.
No behaviour change.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…nt_shared (ent#1174)
- assignment_provider: `entitlement_missing` is a member-seat state; the
provider's own entitlement name rides on it as `entitlement_missing:<name>`
(id-shaped only), so OSS names no module's entitlement.
- seats._plan_member_seat reports `entitlement_missing` with a note naming it,
instead of `seat_unobserved`.
- seats.run_member broadcasts the share route's `agent_shared` event through
routers.sharing.manager when the write shared the agent — identifiers only
({name}, #918), so rosters and sharing panels refresh.
- Tests: named/unnamed/malformed entitlement, the broadcast (and none without
a new share), create mode (deploy_system) never reads or writes
`holder: member` under a session, a user key or an agent key.
- docs: flow notes; mcp.md's stale apply_system length (1,983 -> 2,033).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…telegram backfill load (ent#1174) test_telegram_webhook_backfill loads routers/settings/generic.py by file spec over stub modules. ent#1174 made generic.py import `is_interactive_principal` from `dependencies` and `reserved_settings` from `services` inside the settings routes; the stubs had neither, so all four tests failed with ImportError (reproduced at 6f90345, seed 12345). Add `is_interactive_principal` to the dependencies stub and stub `services.reserved_settings` (managed_by -> None). Fixing that exposed a second, pre-existing gap: generic.py's module-level `from services.terms_service import SETTING_KEYS` resolved only by borrowing a real module an earlier file had imported, and fails when the file runs alone. Stub it too. Both go in _STUBBED_MODULE_NAMES so they are restored after each test. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…i/trinity-enterprise#1158) The raise path caps an agent's pending asks at 25 (`_max_pending`), counted in the session's DB through `ask_service.db`. Every raise in this file leaves a pending ask for ASKER and none is ended, so under a shuffled order the count passes 25 and the next raise is `queue_full` — red on the file ALONE with `-p randomly --randomly-seed=12345` (the exact 7 CI failures), not only with neighbours. The `ask` fixture now ends ASKER's pending asks in `svc.db`, the store the raise counts in, before each test. Test-only, no product change. Red before (seed 12345, with ent1109/ent611/the other ent1158 files): the 7 named tests; green after; 0 failures in this file across 20 seeds. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Integration surface for #4402, #4401. Never merged; members merge individually once green.
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