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feat(workspace): the autonomy dial — what a companion may do unprompted (ent#641) - #2984
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…ed (ent#641) Autonomy was one boolean per agent. This adds the two scopes canon tandem-06 §2.3 actually needs: one instance LEVEL above it (L0 Continuity, L1 Companion, L2 Delegated classes, L3 Load-bearing judgment) as the fleet ceiling, and a state per (seat, ask class) below it, earned from #638's decision record. A graduated class means the companion acts and reports; every other class it asks first — and it is told which is which, in the same words the person reads. Promotion is earned, never granted: ≥3 non-expired records, ONE normalized criterion, no reversal in the window, no negative rating for that seat in the last 30 days, and a guard metric that is not capped. There is no promote control anywhere. A person may HOLD a class (a refusal — anyone, for their own seat); only the agent OWNER may RELEASE one (a grant). The verdict is a stored earned-state ANDed with three read-time conjuncts — the instance level, the agent's autonomy_enabled, and now <= evidence_expires_at (the earliest review_by of the window). Materialised instead, each fails silently: records lapse at UTC midnight with no event to hook, and re-evaluating the fleet inside a level change is an unbounded fan-out with no fleet-wide seat query to drive it. As conjuncts a level drop needs zero writes and raising it back restores exactly what each class had earned. Reads persist nothing; writes happen only on a real event and are CAS'd on an evidence hash, so an unchanged verdict writes no row and emits no event. Reversals are counted over the WINDOW, not over all history. effective_status returns `reversed` unconditionally — a reversed record never becomes `expired` — so history-counting would let one reversal block a class forever and make on_request the only reachable steady state. _has_lapsed retires a reversed record at its own review_by like any other. The rating query's three shapes were each a defect first: it matches operator:<email> as well as workspace:<email> (on a single-operator install the seat person IS the platform principal, so their thumbs-down lands under the other prefix and the class could never demote); it orders by COALESCE(updated_at, created_at) (an up→down flip touches only updated_at, and that flip is exactly a demotion); and the window is a fixed 30 days, not "since the oldest surviving record", which would let a blocking rating fall out by attrition — promotion by the clock, which R25 forbids. Every block is named (level_below_L2, agent_autonomy_off, evidence_expired, insufficient_records, criterion_not_settled, reversal_in_window, negative_rating_30d, guard_capped, held_by_person), each with the sentence the panel and the companion both show. The level is a grant: GET/PUT /api/settings/autonomy-dial is require_admin AND interactive-only (an agent's injected key can read the dial, never raise it — the ent#293/#297 line), validated, audited as autonomy_dial_change, and blocklisted on the generic PUT /api/settings/{key} catch-all. Mounted before generic.router (Invariant #4). Surfaces: MCP get_autonomy (seat from execution_id, never a parameter, no email in the answer) → GET /api/agents/{name}/autonomy; the person reads and holds/releases in Agent details (PortalAgentAutonomy.vue); the model reads the same verdict through the seat's existing memory block. Storage: seat_ask_class_state, both tracks (SQLite + Alembic 0072 ← 0071), cleanup CASCADE. The level is one validated system_settings key, not a table. Tests: tests/unit/test_ent641_autonomy_dial.py (44) — the rule as a table, each conjunct demoting without a write, the reversal window, the rating window's three shapes, the CAS, the portal gates, the level's two guards, both tracks, facade parity, the MCP surface. Six mutations each red. Frontend portalAgentAutonomy.spec.js (10, mounted); decisions.test.ts (7). Fixes Abilityai/trinity-enterprise#641 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
…(ent#641) The requirement, the flow and the registry entry each spelled five of the nine blocker ids differently from autonomy_dial_service — insufficient_records / criterion_not_settled / negative_rating_30d / guard_capped / held_by_person against the emitted too_few_records / criterion_not_stable / negative_rating_in_window / guard_metric_capped / held_by_operator. A reader greps the doc for the id they saw in the payload; a near-miss reads as a different field. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
…l toggle (ent#641)
`GET /api/agents/{name}/autonomy` was already taken — `routers/agent_config`
owns it (the agent-level `autonomy_enabled` toggle) and `main.py` includes
that router first. Both carry `prefix="/api/agents"`, so the seat read
declared the identical path and FastAPI simply served the first one: the
new handler was never reached. Nothing raised, nothing warned, /docs showed
a plausible entry, the unit tests passed (they call the service and read
the router's source text), tsc was clean, and the MCP tool's tests passed
because they assert the outgoing URL rather than what answers it.
Calling it against the dev instance is what found it — the seat read
returned {"autonomy_enabled": true, "total_schedules": 3}, the toggle's
payload, where an ask-class list should have been.
The seat read is a different noun, so it gets one: `/{agent_name}/seat-autonomy`.
The MCP client, both docs and the requirement follow.
Pinned by test_the_seat_read_is_not_shadowed_by_the_agent_level_autonomy_toggle,
which asserts the property rather than the spelling: across `agent_config`
and `seat_decisions`, no two endpoints may share a (path, method), and the
seat read must be what `/seat-autonomy` resolves to. Red on the restored
collision ("GET /api/agents/{agent_name}/autonomy: get_agent_autonomy_status
vs get_seat_autonomy"), green on the fix. Invariant #4 is usually cited for
ordering within one router; the same mechanism eats a duplicate path across
two, where no single diff shows both declarations.
Also: the docs named five of the nine blocker ids differently from the
service (learnings entry added for the route class).
Related to Abilityai/trinity-enterprise#641
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
…n endpoint (ent#641) The dial shipped with `GET/PUT /api/settings/autonomy-dial` and no UI, so the one thing an admin actually sets — the ceiling on everything the fleet may do unprompted — was reachable by curl alone. The Workspace panel displayed the level as a badge and no surface could change it. AutonomyDialPanel.vue on Settings → Retention, beside the session policy and room budgets for the reason they are there: all three bound what an engagement does on its own. One option per level, with the single fact that changes behaviour said on the row (`unprompted possible` / `always asks first`) rather than inferred from the ordering. The panel argues for itself, because both things an admin fears about a ceiling are false and neither is obvious: raising the level promotes nothing (a seat's classes are still earned from its decision record), and lowering it destroys nothing (what each seat earned is kept and comes back exactly as it was). That is true precisely because the earned half is stored and the level is ANDed at read time — the shape this issue chose — so the panel states it instead of leaving an operator to guess. Load failure, save failure and unentitled are three different states with three different next actions, kept apart (the ent#375 shape one panel over), and `adopt` MERGES because the PUT response carries no `levels` — a replace would blank the option list on the first successful save. Gated on `viewState` (#1927), not a bare `v-if="loading"`: a retry with the dial already on screen keeps the dial and flags it stale. Tests: src/frontend/tests/unit/autonomyDialPanel.spec.js (5, mounted) — the options and their unprompted marks, both halves of the safety claim, the PUT plus the merge that keeps the options, save inert until the choice differs, and load-vs-save failure told apart. Frontend suite 165 files / 3566 passed, both ratchets included. Related to Abilityai/trinity-enterprise#641 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Demo — run against the local dev instanceEvery state below was produced by driving the product's own endpoints on the dev stack (agent 📸 Walkthrough with screenshots (light + dark): https://claude.ai/artifact/9uzS9FDfKoGmo4ou9zMTPh What it shows
One defect the live run found (fixed in 14625eb)The companion's read was declared at Nothing raised, nothing warned, One gap the demo also found (fixed in 090b2a8)The level had an endpoint and no UI, so the one thing an admin sets was reachable by VerificationFour failures in the full backend unit run ( |
…641) `npm run check:tokens` — the design-token gate in frontend-build.yml — rejects an unknown `status-*` family, and AutonomyDialPanel used `status-error-*` for its two failure blocks. There is no such family: the taxonomy is success / warning / danger / info / urgent, exactly as BaseBadge's VARIANT_CLASSES spells it. Nothing renders for an unresolvable token, so both error states would have been unstyled text on the page ground in every theme. Mine, and it should have been caught before the push: check:tokens is one of the four steps the frontend job runs and I ran only two of them. Related to Abilityai/trinity-enterprise#641 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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merge-train note — rides the next train, not today's. Validation came back READY (validate-pr + review, lane B+schema; no criticals; the graduation rule is executed end to end on real SQLite, the portal capability channel is the roster payload, both migration tracks are consistent, raw-color ratchet unchanged). It was held off this train for one reason: Alembic parent. Worth fixing while the branch is open:
For your intent, not a block: |
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/validate-pr — ❌ REQUEST CHANGESBlocking
Warnings
Clean:
Run:
Read only: the new endpoints over live HTTP, the PostgreSQL path beyond CI, and the |
…evision dev landed 0072_agent_capability_grants on the same parent (0071), which forked the Alembic graph into two heads. Renumber this branch's revision to 0073_seat_ask_class_state with down_revision 0072_agent_capability_grants; SQLite list keeps dev's entry first. Resolve learnings.md and migrations.py as a union of both sides. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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merge-train (2026-09-24): not on this train — Alembic fork plus two findings, rides a later train. Held back because Two findings from validation to fix before it rides (the graduation rule itself is executed end to end and is fine):
Minor: |
Renumbers this branch's Alembic revision to 0075 on top of dev's 0074_role_readiness_rollout_seed so the version-line keeps a single head. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The merge-from-dev commit renamed the revision to 0075 but left its down_revision (and the tests/docs naming it) at the 0072 fork point, so the graph still had two heads. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Resolve by running |
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Resolve by merging |
…etails, store and docs Conflicts resolved (dev's entries first, then this PR's): - src/backend/db/migrations.py: MIGRATIONS tail keeps dev's four new entries, then seat_ask_class_state_table. - src/frontend/src/components/portal/PortalAgentDetails.vue: keeps dev's decisionsEl wrapper around PortalAgentDecisions, then PortalAgentAutonomy; both imports (PortalSuggestions, PortalAgentAutonomy). - src/frontend/src/stores/clientPortal.js: suggestions state + actions (dev), then autonomy state + actions (this PR). - docs/memory/feature-flows.md: both index rows. - docs/memory/requirements/core-agent.md: both sections; dev's suggestions keeps 5.39, the autonomy dial is renumbered 5.40 (and its pointer in architecture/workspace.md). tests/registry.json auto-merged cleanly (no duplicates, no entry lost). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…ot per record (ent#641) The companion writes its own decision records (MCP record_decision stores the seat as decided_by_person and its execution as source_execution_id), so three record() calls inside ONE execution graduated a class the agent had just invented, and the prompt then told it "graduated — you may act without being asked". A class now graduates only when its qualifying records come from at least STABLE_MIN_COUNT distinct sources: each distinct non-null source_execution_id is one source, and every person-written record (no execution) is its own. The count is exposed as evidence.sources (and folded into the evidence hash); short of it the class is blocked with the new named reason too_few_conversations, whose sentence the panel and the prompt both read. Everything else in the rule is unchanged. RULE_VERSION bumped to 2026-09-27. Tests (real SQLite through the real service): one execution x3 does not graduate; three executions do; mixed person + agent records count correctly; the reviewer's invented-class repro stays on-request and the prompt no longer says graduated. Requirement §5.40 states the rule. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
… and speaks the service's words (ent#641) - client_portal/autonomy.py: act() and set_guard() now validate ask_class against seat_decision_service._SLUG_RE (422 invalid_ask_class) and check that the seat has decisions in the class (404 class_not_found) BEFORE set_seat_ask_class_hold / set_seat_ask_class_guard. Previously the row was upserted first and the request then 404'd — a persisted write answered "not found", and a roster member could mint rows for any path string on their own seat. The router passes the path value straight through, so the service is the single validation point for both routes. - blocker_text is now returned: page() sets it from autonomy_dial_service.BLOCKER_TEXT and PortalAutonomyDial declares it, so the panel shows the same sentence as the companion's prompt. PortalAgentAutonomy.vue drops its local sentence copy (which disagreed for agent_autonomy_off / guard_metric_capped); a code with no server sentence falls back to the code made readable. - portalAgentAutonomy.spec.js uses the service's exact sentences as its payload instead of an invented map, and pins the server-text and fallback behaviour. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…am_group_context (ent#641) dev's version line now runs 0074 -> 0075_auto_sync_enabled_backfill -> ... -> 0078_workspace_suggestion_feedback, and #2728 adds 0079_telegram_group_context on top. This PR's revision chained off 0074, a second head (the #2068 fork: `upgrade head` would apply zero revisions). Renamed 0075_seat_ask_class_state.py -> 0080_seat_ask_class_state.py, revision 0080_seat_ask_class_state, down_revision 0079_telegram_group_context; docstring, the SQLite migration's pointer, the ent641 test that reads the revision by path, and the architecture/requirements/flow docs updated. The SQLite entry is name-keyed and unchanged. Depends on #2728 landing first: on this branch alone the heads check reports a missing parent until 0079 is on dev. Verified with 0079 copied into a scratch copy of the versions directory: 81 revisions, 1 head (0080_seat_ask_class_state). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…y-dial # Conflicts: # src/backend/db/migrations.py
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merge-train (2026-09-27): five commits pushed, agreed with the operator.
Locally: 508 passed across the autonomy, seat-decision, migration and Alembic files. Frontend Not done: the missing loading and error state in |
Conflicts: - docs/memory/architecture/mcp-server.md: kept dev's ent#419 memory.ts note and this PR's decisions.ts (3) row with get_autonomy. - tests/unit/_route_census.py: kept dev's 3-tuple AGENT_CALLABLE_ANY (sibling answer) for git pull-sync; get_autonomy_dial re-added with a sibling answer (names no agent). Semantic: dev replaced seat_decisions._self_gate with assert_own_agent (ent#840). get_seat_autonomy now uses assert_own_agent too, so its census entry moves to AGENT_CALLABLE_SELF. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…ate_git_stats_at dev's head moved to 0104 while this PR's revision forked from 0101_held_gate_turns, leaving two Alembic heads (upgrade head would apply nothing). Re-chain down_revision onto 0104 and renumber 0102 -> 0105 (0102 is already taken by nevermined_delegations), updating every reference. The SQLite entry moves after dev's entries at the list end. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Brought this branch up to date with Text conflicts
Semantic conflict (no text conflict) Migrations
Checks
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obasilakis
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Re-checked at 2afef53. My approval stands; the rechain and the dev merge are clean (check_alembic_heads.py on head merged with dev: 1 head; SQLite order matches; --remerge-diff of b3f7623 resolves mcp-server.md and _route_census.py correctly, and all three seat_decisions.py handlers self-gate at 121, 190, 218).
Low
docs/memory/architecture/database.md:628still says(← 0079)for0105_seat_ask_class_state; it is(← 0104)now.- PR body line 87 still says "§5.40" and "four
learnings.mdentries".
The product calls for vybe from my earlier review are still open.
Migration chain
#3921, #3918 and #3954 also revise 0104_agent_sync_state_git_stats_at, so whichever of these lands after the first needs re-parenting.
…y-dial # Conflicts: # src/backend/db/migrations.py
…t_session_id dev's head moved to 0106 (0105_idempotency_claim_token, 0106_execution_chat_session_id), both revising 0104 like this PR did — two heads again. Renumber 0105 -> 0107, chain onto 0106, update every reference; the SQLite entry stays last. database.md's parent note now says 0106 (it still read 0079 — review low). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
… in the chain Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Re @obasilakis's re-check:
The product calls for vybe are still open. |
# Conflicts: # src/backend/db/migrations.py
…_follow_bundled_pin #4091 took 0107 on dev; renumber 0107 -> 0108, chain onto it, and update the parent named in database.md and the requirement. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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merge-train (2026-11-01): blocked on a product ruling, not on code. Validated at head a95e14f (lane B+schema): tests execute the changed path, the wiring is pinned, the CI red was the ent419 wall-clock flake (re-run green). What remains before it can ride is the author's open fit question, which only the operator can answer, so it stays out of this train and is not a needs-fix:
Mechanics ready for when it is ruled: three keep-both conflicts vs dev ( |
…y-dial Re-chains the Alembic revision as 0113_seat_ask_class_state on dev's 0112_loop_runs_stale_duplicates (it forked at 0107, leaving two heads). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…unt get_autonomy in the MCP docs (ent#641) Fallout from merging dev: - test_ent719_self_gate_identity drives every assert_own_agent route with a well-formed request. The new GET /seat-autonomy needs an execution_id query parameter, like its seat-decision siblings. - tool-count-docs (ent#991 T5) reads the registered total from the user docs. dev's search_memory plus this PR's get_autonomy make 177 tools (172 operator), and decisions.ts now has 3 tools. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Re-chains the Alembic revision as 0114_room_participant_visible_from on dev's 0113_seat_ask_class_state (#2984), and orders the SQLite migration after it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Conflicts with #2984 (the platform turn header on decision records): - seat_decisions.py: both helpers kept (_agent_only, _require_running_turn); the new seat-autonomy read takes _agent_only like the other decision doors. - decisions.ts: the body carries the resolved turn, and the platform turn is still sent as the header (renamed so it no longer shadows `turn`). - tests: fixtures that called these doors as a person, or without the platform turn header or a running execution, now make the call an agent makes in its live turn (test_2157, test_ent638, test_ent641, test_ent814, test_ent839, test_ent1062). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…sus (#4206) #2984 added GET /api/agents/{agent_name}/seat-autonomy and #3778 added the census that requires every agent-naming route to declare a tier. They merged one after the other without seeing each other, so dev fails test_ent926_agent_route_census::test_every_agent_route_is_declared. Declared accessor, with a reason, matching its sibling decision routes' gates (assert_own_agent, then assert_agent_access). Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…4622) * feat(agents): a tag in github:owner/repo@ref pins the clone; purge_agent_now removes an agent at once, audit first (#4183) * feat(subscriptions): admission policy seam for a per-agent usage share (A) One edition-agnostic point where a registered policy may stop an agent's turn before it is admitted, on every door. With no policy registered nothing changes. The first intended policy is an agent's share of its subscription's usage, registered through this seam by an optional module. - services/admission_policy.py: register / enforce / notice. A policy refuses with chat_signals.AdmissionRefused (code, plain-words message, frees_at); any other policy error is logged and the turn is admitted. - /chat (admit_chat_request) and /task (dispatch_parallel_task) call it after the skill gate, before the idempotency claim: a refused request claims, uploads, writes and acquires nothing. - execute_task step 1c covers every other door: the row closes SKIPPED with the message (not FAILED: no schedule failure count, no breaker), error_code usage_share, and the refusal on the result. - routers/chat.py maps it to 429 + X-Trinity-Error-Code + Retry-After; a sync /task refused inside execute_task releases its claim and gets the same answer; the Workspace shows the message as category `limit`, not retryable. - ExecutionContext.usage_notice renders the policy's notice as a `- **Usage**:` line via compose_system_prompt's auto-fill. Tests: tests/unit/test_ent1059_admission_policy_seam.py (18). Each seam call, the SKIPPED write, the router mapping, the Workspace branch, the notice fill and the fail-open re-raise were removed one at a time and a named test went red each time. test_2638's pre-dispatch allowlist gains `policy_denied` with its reason. Refs abilityai/trinity-enterprise#1059 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(subscriptions): usage-share refusal survives the task backlog drain (B) A share that ran out while a sync /task waited in the backlog: the drain closes the row SKIPPED, and a long-poll that reads the terminal back from the row (another worker drained it, or the wait timed out) rebuilt a success-shaped result from a SKIPPED row. It now answers the seam's own refusal. - execute_task's policy gate stores the row error as `[usage_share] text` (the #3114 pull-sink shape), so a reconstruct can tell a share stop from any other SKIPPED; the in-memory result keeps the plain message. - _dispatch_sync_backlog's reconstruct branch rebuilds AdmissionRefused from a SKIPPED row carrying that code; _map_task_failure then releases the claim and the router answers 429 usage_share (no Retry-After: the row has no frees_at, the message says when). Tests: test_ent1059_admission_policy_seam.py +2 (20). The reconstruct removed -> the drain test red; the prefix removed -> the SKIPPED-row test red; each restored from a copy. Refs abilityai/trinity-enterprise#1059 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(subscriptions): usage share card and breakdown column (C) An agent's share of its subscription's usage, as its owner reads and changes it. Both surfaces render only when the instance is entitled to `usage_share`; an unentitled build calls nothing. - Settings > Guardrails gains a "Usage share" section (UsageShareCard): the rolling 7-day and 5-hour windows as used / budget with a meter, the warning line drawn at warn_pct, Warning / Stopped badges in words, when a stopped window frees, whether a stop ask is pending, the line the agent reads on its next turn, and where each number comes from. The owner changes it inline through the PUT; an empty field is the platform default and all three empty clears the override. Bounds are named client-side before a request; a refused PUT keeps the form open with an InlineError. Applies from the next turn, no restart. - Settings > Subscriptions per-agent breakdown gains "Share used (7d · 5h)": each agent's own percent, warning/danger tone from the share's own threshold; a share the reader cannot see renders a dash, never 0%. - stores/agents.js: getUsageShare / setUsageShare (single API client). stores/subscriptions.js: fetchAgentShares, per-agent isolated. Tests: src/frontend/tests/unit/usageShareCard.spec.js (22, mounted under jsdom). Mutations each turned it red and were restored from a copy: breakdown ungated (1 red), at_budget ignored (2), client validation bypassed (5), Guardrails section ungated (1). Raw-colour ratchet: no existing file grew; the new card carries 0 raw non-gray. Refs abilityai/trinity-enterprise#1059 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(execution): every door answers an admission-policy refusal; a refused loop iteration is skipped, not failed (abilityai/trinity-enterprise#1059 fix) Review C2, H1, the test_3274 sweep red and I5 on the pre-admission policy seam. C2: a turn an admission policy stopped inside `execute_task` is a SKIPPED row `[usage_share] <sentence>`, and `_admission_policy_gate` returned it as a result rather than raising — so every `dispatch_and_await_terminal` caller that branched on failed/cancelled only answered success-shaped with an empty reply. On the paid door that attached the execution to the claim, logged verify-ok and SETTLED a charge for a turn that never ran. - `chat_signals.admission_refusal_of(result, agent_name)` is the one rule: the in-memory attribute when the gate ran in this process, else a rebuild from the row's `skipped` + code shape. `result_from_execution_row` attaches it, so a turn refused on another worker (the backlog drain, a long-poll reading the row back) carries the same refusal; the separate rebuild in `_dispatch_sync_backlog` is that call now. - One branch per door, before failed/cancelled: paid releases the claim and neither attaches nor settles (no charge; `payment.reason` is the sentence); MCP inline chat answers 429 with the sentence and `X-Trinity-Error-Code`; a channel sends the sentence and returns before step 12 so no empty assistant turn is persisted; the public link answers 429 (sync) or stores the sentence as the reply (async); `portal_chat` reads status + code as well as the attribute; a room posts the policy's sentence and keeps its resume handle and cursor; A2A maps `skipped` to `rejected` with the message on the inline path as `_ROW_STATE` already did for the row; a refused validation turn is an ERROR verdict. The scheduler (`internal.py`), fan-out and operator-resume doors already record the skipped row with its message and need no branch; voice and the brain orb call `execute_task` directly and close SKIPPED. H1: `loop_service._close_run` counted a policy-refused SKIPPED as a failed run (only a gate-held SKIPPED was exempt), so `failed_runs` rose, `on_failure` applied, and an at-budget loop kept ticking to `max_runs`. It now reads the refusal off the row (`_split_error_code` + the predicate), closes the run `skipped`, counts nothing, and stops the loop with the code as `stop_reason`. Sweep: `usage_notice` joins the platform-controlled list in `test_3274_gate_context` — the line is composed by a policy from platform numbers and never reads requester text. I5: `fetchAgentShares` runs at most six reads in flight. Docs: `requirements/security.md` §20.5d and `architecture/execution.md` state the result-not-worker rule and each door's branch. Red before the fix, with the door code reverted and the predicate kept: all ten door tests in `test_ent1059_refusal_doors.py` (the paid one read `settled`, the Workspace one DID NOT RAISE, A2A read `failed`) and both loop variants beside the ent#751 hold test (`('failed', 'error')`); restored byte-identical. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(completion-report): a refused turn's report shows the policy's sentence, not its [usage_share] code (abilityai/trinity-enterprise#1059 re-review N1) An admission-policy refusal closes the row SKIPPED with `[usage_share] <sentence>`, and the completion report (Workspace, Slack, Telegram) posted that text as-is. The report now strips a known `[code]` prefix from a non-success terminal before sanitising; an unknown `[...]` and any success text stay as the agent wrote them. `_split_error_code` moves to the cycle-free `execution_envelope` leaf as `split_error_code` so the report uses the same parser; the old names stay importable from `task_execution_service`. Also adds an executing spec for `fetchAgentShares`' six-lane cap (re-review N3): a deferred `getUsageShare` over 15 names, high-water mark 6, every name written, a failed read as `{ error: true }`. Mutation-checked: with the cap at 100 it fails (expected 15 to be 6). Red before the fix: test_the_workspace_report_shows_the_sentence_without_the_code, test_the_channel_report_shows_the_sentence_without_the_code. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(agents): a dotted tag in github:owner/repo@ref pins the clone The ref after `@` was checked against [A-Za-z0-9_-/] only, so a release tag such as v1.2.0 failed the check and was dropped without a word: the agent was created on main while the caller believed it pinned. The ref is now taken whole when it is a valid branch or tag name (dots allowed, minus the git ref-format shapes '..', a leading-dot component, a trailing '.' or '.lock'), and an unusable ref is a named 400 instead of a silent fall-back to main. The charset stays a shell-safety barrier for startup.sh's eval-built clone. Red first: tests/unit/test_4165_github_ref_tag.py — the five dotted refs returned url_branch=None and the ten unusable refs did not raise. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(agents): purge_agent_now removes an agent at once, audit first (abilityai/trinity-enterprise#1055) Agent delete is a soft delete (#834): rows, volumes and the MCP key stay for the retention window. Removing an invited member's agent, or rolling back a half-created one, must leave nothing but the audit trail, so the retention sweep's hard purge becomes an immediate, edition-agnostic primitive with no route of its own: - the agent_lifecycle:purge audit row is written while the agent still exists and outlives it; if it cannot be written nothing is destroyed (503) - a person caller must pass assert_admin (an agent key carrying an admin owner's role is refused); actor=None is the platform itself - container, queued and in-flight work, Redis state, the #816 cascade (sharing, permissions both ways, MCP key) and the data volumes under both identities of a renamed agent (#1664) go; a base another agent claims stays; a Docker fault never stops the row purge - system agents (403) and ephemeral agents (409) are refused; no row is a no-op Red first: tests/unit/test_ent1055_purge_agent_now.py (module absent). Each of five mutations turns it red: admin gate removed (2), fail-closed removed (1), soft-delete-before-purge removed (7), base-claim guard removed (1), audit moved after the container removal (2). Docs: requirements/core-agent.md §1.4.1 and §4.2 ref pinning (trinity#4165); architecture/agent-lifecycle.md pointer. Registry: both new test files. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(agents): a tag in github:owner/repo@ref survives the three ref-existence checks (trinity#4165, abilityai/trinity-enterprise#1055 review C1) The parser accepted a dotted tag and stored it in `source_branch`, but every check that consumed that value before the clone asked for a BRANCH of that name: `provisioning.check_remote_branch_exists` ran `ls-remote --heads refs/heads/<ref>`, `ref_probes._ref_arg` prefixed `refs/heads/`, and the PAT path asked `GET /repos/{repo}/branches/{ref}`. So a tag passed the parser and was refused with "Branch 'v1.2.0' not found" on every path; the public doc claimed it pinned the clone. Now all three accept a branch or a tag, the ref still a value after the URL and never an option: the anonymous check asks for `refs/heads/<ref> refs/tags/<ref>` with no `--heads`; the probes ask for both and take the branch first (as `git clone -b` does), peeling an annotated tag to its commit; the REST path answers a 404 on `/branches/{ref}` with `/git/ref/tags/{ref}` before calling the ref missing. The refusal names both: "Branch or tag '…' not found". Red first: `tests/unit/test_4165_ref_existence_checks.py` drives the real `check_remote_branch_exists`, `probe_anonymous_ref`, `probe_tokened_repo_access` and `_validate_github_access` on all three paths against a fake `ls-remote` that filters like git (so a check that asks for heads only cannot see the tag) — 9 of 15 red before the change, all green after. Three pins on the old branch-only contract moved with it (`test_3725_*`: the argv now carries both refs and a same-named tag answers when no branch does; `test_ent123_tokenless_clone`: the wording). Docs: `requirements/core-agent.md` §4.2 names the three checks and the precedence; the two flow rows that quoted `--heads` / the old wording follow. Registry entry added. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(agents): a ref in github:owner/repo@ref may not begin with '-' (trinity#4165, abilityai/trinity-enterprise#1055 review I5) `_GITHUB_REF_RE` admitted `-foo`. Safe today — every live site passes the ref as a value (`git clone -b <ref>` takes the next token whatever it starts with; the probes prefix `refs/…`) — but `startup.sh` also runs `git checkout "${SOURCE_BRANCH}"`, where a leading `-` IS parsed as an option, benign only because the clone already checked the ref out. One shell edit away from not. The regex gains `(?!-)`; the 400 names it. Red first: `TestRefRefused[-foo]` — DID NOT RAISE. Upgrade-safe: the parser has one caller (creation); no stored `source_branch` is re-parsed on boot, pull or reset, so existing agents are untouched. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(agents): an annotated tag in @ref resolves to its commit, not the tag object (trinity#4165) `ref_probes` asked `ls-remote` for `refs/heads/<r>` and `refs/tags/<r>` and took a peeled `refs/tags/<r>^{}` line when one was listed. git never listed one: it shows a ref only when a pattern names it, and the peeled line's name ends in `^{}`. So an annotated tag resolved to the TAG OBJECT, and the raw template read was pinned to an id that is not the commit the clone checks out. The probe now also asks for `refs/tags/<r>^{}` by name. The unit fake listed `^{}` lines for a bare tag pattern, which is why the old test passed. It now lists a ref only when a pattern names it, and a new file runs the probes against a real bare repository over file:// (a lightweight tag, an annotated tag, a branch and an annotated tag sharing a name). Red first: test_4165_ref_probes_real_git.py — the annotated-tag and tokened cases returned the tag object id; 4 others passed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(agent-server): a tag-pinned agent's pull cycle is a named skip, not a failure every tick (trinity#4165) `github:owner/repo@<tag>` clones with `git clone -b <tag>` in source mode, which leaves the agent on a detached HEAD: pinned to that release, by design. Pull sync is on for every `github:` agent, and `_run_pull_once` recorded `failed: detached HEAD: nothing to pull onto` on every cycle, a failure streak for an agent doing what it was asked to. A detached HEAD now records `skipped` with the reason named. A detached HEAD left by a rebase stopped part-way (its rebase-merge/rebase-apply directory exists) stays `failed`, so a stuck tree still shows. The push cycle is unchanged: it is off by default for a source-mode agent, and an owner who turns it on for a pinned agent gets an honest failure. Red first: test_4165_pull_cycle_pinned_tag.py::test_every_cycle_is_a_named_skip_not_a_failure — 'failed' == 'skipped'. Real repos, the agent cloned -b v1.0.0 (annotated). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Trinity Agent (trinity) <trinity-agent@ability.ai> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: trinity-ability <309458136+trinity-ability@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(credentials): keep the credential read inside the agent home and make the paste guard linear (#4191) * fix(agent-server): the credential read stays inside the agent home (trinity-enterprise#1066) CodeQL flagged the `os.lstat` this branch added to `GET /api/credentials/read` (path depends on a user-provided value). The finding is real at the guard, not at any current caller: - the guard (`lstrip("/").lstrip(".")`, a `".." in` test on the stripped string, `str(resolved).startswith(str(home))`) let a single leading `../` through, and its prefix compare had no separator, so `../home2/.env` READ a file in a sibling directory whose name extends the home's; - the new `lstat` ran before any containment check, so `../<anything>` came back in `missing` — an existence probe one level above the home. Not reachable before this fix through the platform: the route sits behind the agent's per-agent auth middleware (#1159) and every backend caller sends fixed relative paths (`.env`, `.mcp.json`, `.credentials.enc`) or the agent's own `/list` output. Fixed at the root with one helper, `_contained_read_target`: refuse absolute paths and any `..` component, then require both the normalised lexical path and the link-resolved path to sit under the home with a trailing separator. `lstat` runs on the contained lexical path (the absence proof); the read goes through the contained resolved path, so a link is followed only to a target that is itself inside. Red first: tests/unit/test_ent1066_credential_read_containment.py — 5 of 13 red at the previous guard (sibling read, `../` oracle, absolute path, link to a sibling file, linked parent directory), all green with the fix; the fix reverted from a scratch copy turns the same 5 red. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(sanitizer): the paste guard's KEY=value walk is linear by construction (trinity-enterprise#1066) CodeQL flagged the two regex calls in `secret_shape` (py/polynomial-redos, "may run slow on many repetitions of '!'"). Origin: the patterns pre-exist on dev — `_KV_LINE_RE` / `_KV_PAIR_RE` are the redaction's #1661/#3311 walk — but these two alerts are introduced by this branch, which feeds them a Workspace chat message (user-provided text) through the new guard. Measured before the change, CPython was already linear on every shape tried (`!`*n, `=`+`!`*n, `!`*n+`=`, `!=`*n, `k=!`*n, an unclosed quote, sensitive keys with short values): 1M characters took 0.04-1.1 s, scaling ~10x per 10x. The lookbehind pins each key to the start of its run — the engine detail CodeQL's model does not see (#1661 says the same). The route caps a message at 100k characters. The guard no longer rests on that detail. It finds each `=` with `str.find`, walks back to the key start (never past the previous `=`, so no character is visited twice), and checks the value with one fixed-width match — an optional opening quote and eight non-space, non-quote characters. No length cap, so nothing at the end of a long message is dropped. One deliberate widening: the closing quote is no longer required, because a truncated paste is still the secret. The redaction path is unchanged. Red first: tests/unit/test_ent1066_secret_guard_linear.py — red before the change on the no-unbounded-regex pin and the unclosed-quote case (2 of 43); the timing bound (1M < 3 s, 10x input < 30x time) and both-way detection were green before and after. The change reverted from a scratch copy turns the same 2 red. The 1661/2208/2398/3840 sanitizer suites and the paste-guard suite stay green (608 passed). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Trinity Agent (trinity) <trinity-agent@ability.ai> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore(enterprise): bump the submodule pointer to main (448cdbc -> f347a02) (#4193) Picks up abilityai/trinity-enterprise#1072 (member_agents module, ent#1055), which composes the purge_agent_now primitive from #4183. Co-authored-by: trinity-ability <309458136+trinity-ability@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * revert: an agent's share of a subscription (#4180) (#4199) * Revert "feat(subscriptions): an agent's share of a subscription, enforced at every door (#4180)" This reverts commit 9eedbbb6e0be8d5b73ccb5e8f0217a33a987b089. * chore(enterprise): bump the gitlink to the ent#1070 revert (trinity-enterprise#1076) Lands with the #4180 revert so dev never carries the usage_share module without the admission_policy seam it imports. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: trinity-ability <309458136+trinity-ability@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(sub-003): the agent's auth answer outranks a prompt-length mention, and the turn-limit anchor is pinned (#4123) (#4197) * fix(workspace): keep a room's content inside the Inbox reading pane (#4160) (#4169) Every agent bubble renders PortalMarkdown's sr-only live region, which is position:absolute. The reading pane's scroll box was not positioned, so those regions resolved against the page, escaped the overflow box, and a long room stretched the document: the wheel scrolled the whole Workspace. Make the scroll box `relative`, as the list column's already is. Adds a mount spec pinning the containment structure for a long room, a room with many messages, and a thread. Fixes #4160 Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor(operator-queue): the listing engine moves to listing.py, and the poller core into PollerCoreMixin (#3785, PR 2 of 4) (#4037) * fix(operator-queue): the #1677 helper delegates to the platform-alert seam create_bounded_alert(_outcome) keep their signatures and outcome contract and become a thin delegate of platform_alerts.observe, which already composes the per-(agent, type) budget inside its one locked create. The registered type names its kind; the key is read back from the item's id and context by derive_legacy_subject and must resolve to that same kind, else ALERT_FAILED_CREATE. The two kinds whose ids carry no subject (gitignore, problem report) are keyed by the request id minus the kind's prefix. observe's "updated" and "snoozed" pass through; "failed" maps to ALERT_FAILED_CREATE; every refused or failed arm logs [#1677 budget]. ALERT_FAILED_COUNT stays importable and is no longer returned. The budget episode reports through observe as kind alert_budget keyed by the budgeted type: one alert_budget:<type> row per agent, re-read by a later refusal outside the cooldown, ended by its 14-day lifetime. The bucketed id and its own operator_queue_new broadcast are gone; observe sends the thin operator_queue_sync trigger. Ratchet: create_bounded_alert_outcome and _maybe_emit_alert_budget_episode leave EMITTERS_NOT_YET_ON_SEAM; alert_budget gets a NO_CLEAR_SITE reason. Census: both leave _ALLOWED_CALLERS (no direct create left in either). #3254 re-pins (asserted outcomes unchanged): - test_1677_operator_alert_budget: write-observation point. The harness stands in for the seam's create with the same budget arithmetic and runs what observe spawns. Id shape in test_deterministic_bucketed_id_with_reserved_prefix, test_cooldown_knob_zero_never_raises (the subject replaces the bucket) and test_under_cap_creates_item_and_notification (the seam's id). The episode raise now stays in its spawned task, so test_episode_helper_raise_swallowed_refusal_stands reads the delegate's WARNING marker; test_ws_broadcast_failure_swallowed checks the thin operator_queue_sync payload. - test_3130_flood_guard, test_1632_operator_queue_caps: write-observation point. The flood alert still rides the delegate, so its writes, the typed budget read and the I1 fault injection move to the seam's create. - test_3243_atomic_asks::test_a_cap_hold_never_fires_the_flood_alert: write-observation point. Watched at observe, since the oqs.db assertion alone would now pass whether or not the alert fired. Known until the problem report moves in its own commit: nine test_3521_problem_report_comment cases are red here. The delegate files an event-kind row under the seam's id, which the old _attach_comment (keyed on the pre-seam request id) cannot find. New: tests/unit/test_3254_budgeted_alerts.py (registry parity, reach-back imports, the delegate's outcome table over all five budgeted types, the episode's seam properties, R1 for alert_budget). Part of #3254 * fix(operator-queue): the flood alarm reports through the seam and ends with its episode OperatorQueueSyncService._maybe_emit_flood_alert reports through platform_alerts.observe as kind queue_flood keyed by the reason: one pending row per (agent, reason), rewritten in place, budgeted by the seam. #3130's outcome rule is kept on observe's strings: a failed write releases the episode and is retried after the cooldown (I1); created, updated, snoozed and refused consume it. While an episode lasts it is re-read at most every 6 hours, so the kind's 14-day lifetime ends only a row nobody re-read, never a condition that still holds. The refresh time per (agent, reason) is a dict the method creates on the instance for itself; __init__ is unchanged. The flood's own operator_queue_new broadcast (which carried the title) is gone; observe sends the thin operator_queue_sync trigger. The two _sync_agent statements where an episode ends (_flood_episodes.discard for oversize_file and ingestion_cap) become calls to the new _end_flood_episode, which ends the episode and, only when one was running, ends its alert as the platform through platform_alerts.clear. A cycle with no episode costs no read. Ratchet: _maybe_emit_flood_alert leaves EMITTERS_NOT_YET_ON_SEAM; queue_flood's clear site is _end_flood_episode. No re-pin in this commit: the #3130 and #1632 harnesses were moved to the seam's create in the previous commit and keep their results. Tests: the flood through the real _sync_agent poll for 30 simulated days with the real expiry sweep (one row, re-read every 6 hours, ended as the platform when nothing is held), no read without an episode, two reasons two subjects, I1 on the real seam, a person's ending standing through the re-read and the clear, the thin trigger, R1 for queue_flood. Part of #3254 * fix(execution): the effect guard and missing-skill alarms report through the seam _on_unguarded_effect reports a refused effect through platform_alerts.observe as kind effect_unguarded keyed "<effect_type>:<reason>": one row per agent, effect and reason, rewritten by each further refusal, ended by its lifetime (nothing observes an agent starting to send ids). The send is refused whatever the alarm's outcome. _alert_skill_not_found reports through observe as kind skill_not_found keyed by the truncated command: one row per agent and command, re-read by each scheduled run. The paired notification is sent only on "created": a repeat of a pending command is an "updated" reading and already had one; refused, failed and snoozed wrote no new row. The pre-create dedup read stays and now matches only a pending pre-#3246 row (no subject), which keeps standing for its command until the upgrade sweep stamps it; a seam row is re-read through observe, where a repeat is never refused at the cap. task_execution_service.py: only _alert_skill_not_found changes. Its module-level utc_now_iso import is now unused and is left in place. Ratchet: _on_unguarded_effect and _alert_skill_not_found leave EMITTERS_NOT_YET_ON_SEAM; skill_not_found gets a NO_CLEAR_SITE reason (only the dispatch path could see a command resolve, and there the detector cannot tell "resolved" from "not a slash command"). #3254 re-pins (asserted outcomes unchanged): - test_1677_operator_alert_emitters:: test_skill_not_found_emitter_is_routed_not_allowlisted: the module must call platform_alerts.observe naming "skill_not_found" (AST), the seam that composes the budget, instead of mentioning create_bounded_alert. - test_2392_effect_guard_fail_closed: write-observation point and id shape. The alarm is recorded at platform_alerts.observe instead of a sys.modules stub of operator_queue_service, which lacks the names the seam reaches back for. The id prefix is asserted on the kind; the at-budget case returns the seam's refused_at_budget. - test_ent879_aauth_resource_route (the refused-call case): the dead create_bounded_alert patch moves to platform_alerts.observe. Tests: the effect refusal's seam properties and lifetime; the missing skill's one row per command, no notification on a repeat, a pre-seam row still standing, no notification at the cap; R1 for both kinds; the other shape, the clock 30 days ahead: a full skill_not_found budget frees itself through the real expiry sweep and a new command files. Part of #3254 * fix(git-sync): the gitignore sweep's alert is one row per change set _emit_gitignore_untracked_alert reports through platform_alerts.observe as kind gitignore_untracked, which stops being an event kind (platform_alerts.py: event=True dropped). It is a must-act kind: no lifetime, never ended by the platform. It is keyed by the change itself: a 32-hex digest of the canonical, direction-tagged set of paths the Push untracked and newly un-ignored (sorted removed paths, the exact removed count, sorted un-ignored paths). A repeat of the same set collapses onto one row; a different set, a different total behind a capped list, or the same path in the other direction is a different row. Keying per agent would let a later Push overwrite an earlier Push's path list on a pending must-act alert, which #2529 calls the surface that outlives the session. The legacy prefix keeps its _no_subject parser, so pre-existing rows stay pending until a person acts. Ratchet: _emit_gitignore_untracked_alert leaves EMITTERS_NOT_YET_ON_SEAM. #3254 re-pins (asserted outcomes unchanged): - test_2529_gitignore_precedence: write-observation point and id shape. The alert is watched at platform_alerts.observe (the two create.await_count == 0 checks would otherwise have gone vacuous); the per-agent id prefix is asserted on the kind, with the 32-hex key. - test_3246_platform_alerts_leaf::test_event_kind_has_no_subject: gitignore_untracked is a condition now, so it is asserted keyed and the problem report stays the event example. Tests: a repeated set is one row that never expires; distinct sets and a capped list with another total stay distinct; the direction tag holds; a person's ending stands; the 30-day case now also shows the gitignore row still pending. Part of #3254 * fix(workspace): the problem report is one seam row per person, target and day raise_problem_report reports through platform_alerts.observe as kind workspace_problem_report, which stops being an event kind (event=True dropped). It is keyed by the 32-hex digest _problem_report_id already computes: one row per person per target per UTC day, the "never duplicates" rule its docstring states. A person must act on it, so it never expires and the platform never ends it. The workspace-problem- id prefix is kept, so ent#866's owner-only rule and the machine-key "about a person" exclusion still hold. It returns True when the row was created or updated, False when snoozed, refused or failed. #3521's words-only rule moves under the seam's lock. observe gains keep_text (passed through database.create_platform_operator_queue_item to create_platform_item and _touch): with keep_text and a pending row, the reading only counts (last_seen_at, seen_count, expires_at) and the title, question, priority and context stand. The bare click passes keep_text, a reading with words does not. The click and the comment are two background requests that meet on one row inside the per-agent lock, so either order ends with the words. With no pending row the reading files as usual. update_pending_problem_report (database.py, db/operator_queue.py) and the nested _attach_comment are removed: one write path. Ratchet: raise_problem_report leaves EMITTERS_NOT_YET_ON_SEAM, which fixes the nine test_3521 cases the delegate commit left red. #3254 re-pins (asserted outcomes unchanged): - test_3521_problem_report_comment: the acknowledgement fixture goes through ask_service.answer (fixture shape; a raw status UPDATE carries no person ending for the snooze to read); the accessor test asserts the same type guard at the seam (a foreign row under the report's old id is never written); the lost-race test injects the bare click's whole reading, in its own thread, before the comment's locked create. - test_ent499_problem_report: write-observation point. The fake moves from create_bounded_alert to platform_alerts.observe; the routing AST test asserts the call to observe. - test_ent715_queue_person_fields: update_pending_problem_report leaves _NON_ROW_ACCESSORS (the accessor census forbids a stale entry). - test_3246_platform_alerts_leaf::test_event_kind_has_no_subject: no built-in kind is an event any more, so the property is pinned on a kind registered for the test, and both former events are asserted keyed. test_ent866_problem_report_owner_only is unchanged. Tests: keep_text at the sink, both interleavings keeping the words, one must-act row per person, target and day, the owner-only prefix, the delegate and the emitter landing on one subject, a person's ending not rewritten or reopened; the 30-day case now also shows the report still pending; the five-type admission test asserts every kind keyed. Part of #3254 * fix(operator-queue): decide a platform alert's snooze under the create's lock observe checks the snooze before the create's lock. Two moments let a person's ending slip past that check: an acknowledgement after observe read the pending row but before the locked create (the locked find then misses), and one between the locked find and _touch's compare-and-set (the lock covers creates, not respond_to_item, so the CAS loses). Either way the create fell through to an insert, and the alert a person had just ended was back at once. Before this batch most of the moved writers had a deterministic id that could not re-file after an ending, so the moves would otherwise ship that regression. create_platform_item gains snooze_since and a snoozed predicate. On the insert path, after a missed find or a lost CAS and inside the same locked transaction, it reads the newest person-ended row for the subject through the transaction's own connection (the public lookup opens another one) and returns {"outcome": "snoozed"} without inserting when the predicate says so. observe passes the standard 7-day window, computed on its own rather than from the pre-lock check's conditionally assigned cutoff, and lambda ended: _snoozed_by(kind, ended, priority, context). The pre-lock check stays as the fast path. A caller that passes neither keeps the old behaviour. The statement behind the public find_person_ended_by_subject becomes _find_person_ended_by_subject(conn, ...), shared by both reads. Tests: a person's acknowledgement through ask_service.answer, landed (a) between observe's read and the locked create and (b) between the locked find and the CAS, yields "snoozed" and no new row, for the problem report, an inbox collision as registered on dev, and the flood alarm's 6-hourly re-read. All six cases were red before this commit (a fresh row was created) and pass with it. On SQLite, BEGIN IMMEDIATE holds every other writer, so moment (b) lands the ending first and hands both finds the row as it stood just before it; two real workers are not exercised. Review fixes carried here (the earlier commits are left as they are): - OperatorQueueSyncService._maybe_emit_flood_alert: the cooldown is stamped before every reading, the 6-hourly re-read included. A failed re-read released the episode with the cooldown stamp still 6 hours old, so it was retried on the next 5-second cycle. New test: a failed re-read is retried no sooner than the cooldown (red before the fix). - test_3521_problem_report_comment (the lost-race re-pin): asserts the bare click's own request returned True and left a pending, comment-free row before the comment's locked create ran, so the test cannot pass without the interleaving it claims. - gitignore_sweep: states that past the probe's 2,000-line cap the key is the capped list plus the exact total (a full-set digest needs the in-container probe, outside this change). - test_1677_operator_alert_emitters: the census's guidance for an agent-influenceable emitter now points at platform_alerts.observe, not the delegate the #3246 ratchet counts as off the seam. - test_3254_budgeted_alerts: the frozen clock also covers db.operator_queue's ent#815 commit-lag check, which logged spurious errors against the real clock. Part of #3254 * fix(operator-queue): a failed flood re-read keeps the episode, so its end still clears the alert Fresh review of the #3254 budgeted slice (two findings): - A failed 6-hourly re-read of a persisting flood released the episode. If the condition then cleared before the retry, `_end_flood_episode` found no episode and the pending alert waited out its 14-day lifetime, although the code had seen the condition clear (AC 2). A failed re-read now keeps the episode, whose alert an earlier reading filed, and the re-read is retried once the cooldown has passed. A failed first reading still releases the episode (#3130 I1). New test: test_a_failed_reread_keeps_the_episode_so_its_end_still_clears_the_alert (red with the old release branch put back). - AC 8 for two kinds had no "a person's ending is never overwritten" test: `skill_not_found` (the next run is snoozed and sends no notification) and `alert_budget` (a later refusal re-reads the episode and the acknowledgement stands). Both added. * test(operator-queue): the budgeted-alert suite freezes the clock its running methods read In the full serial unit tier, test_1595_sync_health_signals evicts `database` and every `db.*` module from sys.modules and restores only some of them. Afterwards `database.db` and `ask_service.db` run on an older `db.operator_queue` module than the one this suite's clock fixture imports and patches, so the seam's create, the expiry sweep and the answer's compare-and-set read the real clock: rows filed at the frozen T0 read as long expired (five cases red, `AskConflict: expired`, a second flood row). The fixture now also freezes `utc_now_iso` and `datetime` in the globals of the live operations class (R6: patch what the running method reads). Red before: test_1595 followed by this file, 7 failed; green after: 66 passed; the file alone: 55 passed. * refactor(operator-queue): operator_queue_service becomes a package, content unchanged (#3785) The 2,840-line module moves to services/operator_queue_service/__init__.py byte for byte (100% similarity), the first step of the Invariant #1 split. Every `from services.operator_queue_service import X` and `from services import operator_queue_service` resolves as before. Six path-keyed guards name the file by its path, so their key moves with it (the PR #2487 precedent): _NOT_EMITTERS (test_3246), _ALLOWED_CALLERS (test_1677), _ALLOWED (test_1920), _OQS (test_ent715), FLEET_LEVEL_ALLOWLIST (test_ent467), and the source read in test_ent499. Only the key changes; the rule, the reason text and every assertion are untouched. Part of #3785 * test(operator-queue): pin the package's one-binding rules before the split (#3785) tests/unit/test_3785_operator_queue_package.py pins what S2–S6 must keep while they move code out of __init__, each property derived from the tree so no later slice edits it: modules under 800 lines (__init__ exempt, with a staleness check); the import surface src/backend and tests/ read still resolves; no from-import between package modules; one top-level binding per name; import-time reads defined first and the _MARKER_UNCHANGED default the owner's object; a patch of a re-exported name lands where its readers read; one logger identity; owner-exact qualified reads; no submodule named like a package attribute; one rate_limiter; no method on two classes of the composed service; external imports before the first submodule import, and a failed first import, injected at that line, leaves no stale submodule. The AST scans live in _oqs_package_scan.py (pure stdlib, never imports src). The other shape, a fresh install: each consumer imported first in its own interpreter on an empty database raises a bounded alert (created; only main binds a WebSocket manager, and then exactly one thin operator_queue_sync trigger goes out). Outcomes equal on the base. Part of #3785 * refactor(operator-queue): bind the service's collaborators once, in deps.py (#3785) db, _queue_db, principal_reach, get_breaker_redis, ask_service, AgentClient and the audit sink _audit_sync move to services/operator_queue_service/deps.py, bound once and read as deps.X everywhere in the package. They are no longer attributes of the package, so a stale monkeypatch.setattr(oqs, "db", ...) raises AttributeError instead of patching a copy nothing reads (Invariant #1(a), the PR #2487 rule). rate_limiter stays on the package: ask_service reads oqs.rate_limiter.check. Tests that patched a collaborator on the package now patch oqs.deps.X; no assertion, expected value, fixture or control flow changes. The package guard gains G4 (deps binds exactly the collaborators, no other module imports one from its source under any alias or holds one by identity, the package has none) and refuses any reach of a package function's __globals__. Part of #3785 * refactor(operator-queue): the queue listing engine moves to listing.py (#3785) QueueListError, narrow_to_agent_key, the cursor and walk-snapshot helpers and list_for_principal (trinity-enterprise#815) move whole from __init__ to services/operator_queue_service/listing.py. The two package-owned prefix tuples are read as _oq.X, collaborators as deps.X. The package re-exports exactly the six names read from outside (the router's list_for_principal and QueueListError; narrow_to_agent_key, encode_cursor, decode_cursor and CURSOR_MAX_BYTES, which tests call or compare). test_ent715's row-reader census re-keys list_for_principal to listing.py; no assertion changes. Part of #3785 * refactor(operator-queue): the poller core moves into PollerCoreMixin (#3785) The instance state, start/stop, the Redis leader lease, _poll_loop, _poll_cycle and _broadcast_sync move into PollerCoreMixin in services/operator_queue_service/poller.py. OperatorQueueSyncService is now composed in __init__ from the mixin and keeps its singleton there (the db/schedules shape). Package-owned names (DEFAULT_POLL_INTERVAL, _LEADER_KEY, _RESERVED_ID_PREFIXES, _websocket_manager) are read as _oq.X; the default poll_interval still binds 5 at import. Three path-keyed censuses re-key their poller entries to poller.py (test_1920's lease, test_ent467's operator_queue_sync trigger, test_ent715's _poll_cycle); no assertion changes. Part of #3785 * fix(operator-queue): a new flood, budget or untracking episode files after an acknowledgement (#3254) A person's ending of a `queue_flood`, `alert_budget` or `gitignore_untracked` row snoozed every later reading of the subject for 7 days, because none of the three kinds had a material key, so `_snoozed_by` was vacuously true. A runaway agent's second flood, a second budget-full episode and a second untracking Push of the same paths were all silent (review C1; dolho on operator_queue_service.py:2800 and gitignore_sweep.py:335). Each reading now carries an episode marker that the kind lists in its `material_keys`: - queue_flood: `episode_started_at`, stamped when the in-memory episode starts. Re-reads of one episode share it; an episode that starts after the condition cleared does not. - alert_budget: `filled_by`, a digest of the ids of the pending rows filling the budget. Re-reads of the same full budget share it; once a slot frees and a new row fills it, it differs. - gitignore_untracked: `push_id`, one per call. The emitter runs once per Push, so every untracking Push after an acknowledgement files; repeats still collapse onto a pending row. So the snooze silences re-reads of the acknowledged episode for the snooze window and a new episode files at once, which makes the `_maybe_emit_flood_alert` docstring's #3130 edge-trigger claim true again. The budget episode's read of the filling rows is classified in the ent#780 row-reader census as internal. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HWna79vVmnezQdhpaGRKbw * fix(operator-queue): a flood re-read no longer stamps the per-agent cooldown; the oversize end is pinned (#3254) Review follow-ups on the flood alarm: - dolho on operator_queue_service.py:2778 (webmixgamer agreed): the 6-hourly re-read of one reason's episode stamped the per-agent `_flood_alert_cooldown`, so the other reason's first alert could wait up to one cooldown. The cooldown spaces episodes and a re-read is not one, so it is now stamped only before an episode's first reading. A failed re-read's retry spacing already comes from its refresh time. - webmixgamer I3: the 6-hour re-read spacing is one constant, `OPERATOR_QUEUE_FLOOD_REREAD_SECONDS`, read by the gate and by the failed re-read's retry arithmetic, so the two cannot drift. - webmixgamer I1: a `_sync_loop` case serves an oversized file and then a sane one and asserts the row ends as the platform. It goes red when `_sync_agent`'s `_end_flood_episode(agent_name, "oversize_file")` is replaced by a bare episode discard. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HWna79vVmnezQdhpaGRKbw * docs(operator-queue): state the fail-open double-leader bound on the flood episode marker (#3254) The episode marker is worker-local. With Redis down the leader lease fails open, so each worker stamps its own episode_started_at and another worker's re-read can file past a person's ending, at most one extra row per extra worker per re-read window. Docstring only; no behaviour change (review L1). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HWna79vVmnezQdhpaGRKbw * lint(operator-queue): __init__ drops its file-level F401 waiver (#3785) Review I1 (dolho): the file-level `# ruff: noqa: F401` switched off unused-import detection for all of `__init__`, so a dead import left behind by a later slice or feature would go unflagged. At this PR's head `__init__` still reads every name in its import block, so the waiver hid nothing: `ruff check --select F401` gives 0 findings with it removed. It is dropped, and the block's comment now says that a name `__init__` stops reading keeps its line with a per-line waiver naming why (G13, or read as `oqs.X` from outside). PR2, PR3 and PR4 add those per-line waivers where their moves leave a name unread. `deps.py` keeps its file-level waiver: it is a binding module whose imports are its bindings, so there is no import there F401 could rightly flag. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HWna79vVmnezQdhpaGRKbw * lint(operator-queue): per-line F401 waivers for what __init__ stops reading (#3785) Review I1 on #4036: PR1 dropped `__init__`'s file-level F401 waiver. This slice's moves leave four of its imports unread in `__init__`; each now carries its own `noqa: F401` with the reason, so F401 keeps checking every other line: - `asyncio`, `base64`, `uuid`: kept for G13, because `listing` and `poller` import them at module level. - `from . import listing`: loads the submodule at its G6 point; the names callers read come from the re-export block. `ruff check --select F services/operator_queue_service/` is clean. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HWna79vVmnezQdhpaGRKbw --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor(frontend): useVoiceSession goes through the single API client (#2720) (#4185) The last bare axios call in the composable, voice stop, built its own auth header. It now uses the shared client, so it follows the interceptor's token and 401 handling (Invariant #7). The WebSocket URL still takes the store token, which is a different path. Closes #2720 Co-authored-by: trinity-ability <309458136+trinity-ability@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * test(memory): stub last_error in the remaining memory_on fixtures (#4187) The memory_on fixtures in test_ent1022_retrieval_memory and test_ent1027_model_gateway stubbed is_loaded and availability but not last_error, so an embedder error left by an earlier test on the same worker made status() report memory unavailable. The 1028 fixture got the same stub in #4145. Fixes #4137 * docs(readme): link the Trinity 1.0 complete course (#4063) * docs(readme): link the Trinity 1.0 complete course Add the 39-chapter complete course video as the first entry under "Watch more" so new visitors find the end-to-end walkthrough first. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(readme): update Complete Course link to new YouTube id and chapter count Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(readme): update Complete Course YouTube link to re-published video Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Trinity Agent (trinity) <trinity-agent@ability.ai> Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore(metrics): code-health dashboard 2026-11-03 @ 93658be60 (#4198) Co-authored-by: Trinity Agent (trinity) <trinity-agent@ability.ai> Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(auth): terms acceptance gate and invite door (trinity-enterprise#1054) (#4195) OSS half of trinity-enterprise#1054: the terms-gate seam (services/terms_gate.py, consulted in resolve_platform_user_unfloored; @terms_route exemptions), EmailService.send_html on one HTML shell, the /terms SPA view + interceptor, and the entitlement-gated InvitesPanel. Refs abilityai/trinity-enterprise#1054 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(workspace): a Direct call — every spoken turn goes to the agent and you hear its own reply (trinity-enterprise#1046) (#4194) * feat(workspace): a Direct call, where every spoken turn goes to the agent and you hear its own reply (trinity-enterprise#1046) A second call mode beside Live, chosen from the Call control's menu (remembered per browser; Live stays the default). No model sits in the conversation: the browser endpoints an utterance, the backend transcribes it, and the browser sends the text through the same POST .../chat/stream a typed message uses, carrying the call's vd_ id. The bridge then speaks the agent's reply sentence by sentence. - Harness-agnostic: every reply is spoken from the persisted row; a runtime whose stream carries messages (Claude Code, Codex) only starts sooner, and the unspoken tail is reconciled so nothing repeats. Gemini CLI agents work, with a line saying replies take about 10 s. - Agent approvals by voice: an ask the turn raises is read aloud, and a whole-utterance yes/no after the prompt has played is posted by the browser on the person's own answer route. The socket never answers an ask and never starts a turn. - Gates: socket owner only (no admin attach); a turn may carry only the caller's own live Direct call on this agent and thread (uniform 404); a spoken run must be the caller's own execution, including one reached through an approval; one call per thread, claimed atomically when the socket opens; a vd_ id never bypasses the Live call guard; 30 utterances/min per person. - Speech providers behind services/speech (Gemini REST STT/TTS, ElevenLabs), chosen in Settings (GET/PUT /api/settings/direct-voice, admin, audit-logged). - The #2694 delta cursor treats a Direct reply as the agent's own session answering. Measured end to end with real speech: first spoken word 3.4-4.4 s after send on Claude Code, 10.7-12.0 s on Gemini CLI; STT 1.1-1.9 s. The speech providers and the bridge were written before their tests. Every gate was then mutation-checked: 16 backend gates go red when removed, run with bytecode caching off. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(workspace): two call buttons, and the Live orb in the Direct call's strip (trinity-enterprise#1046) Operator review of the first build: - The Call control's mode menu is gone. The composer has two buttons, one per call: the Live call (waveform) and the Direct call (handset). Each carries its own reason when it is off; while one call is on, its button ends it and the other says "Another call is on". Nothing is remembered per browser any more (`CALL_MODE_KEY`, `loadCallMode`, `saveCallMode` and `CallModeMenu.vue` are removed; `callButtons` is the pure rule). - The Direct strip's flat pulsing disc is replaced by the Live call's orb in a 48px disc. The overlay's smoke and core move into `chat/voiceOrbField.js` (one renderer, an instance per orb, no module state) and `VoiceOverlay.vue` draws through it unchanged. `chat/VoiceOrb.vue` draws the same field clipped to a circle on the orb's black ground, so it reads in both themes: 80 particles, a DPR-capped bitmap, the first frame drawn on mount, one still frame under reduced motion, and the core tinted with the state — green listening, amber working, blue speaking — because at this size the smoke is a rim and cannot carry it. `directOrbState` maps the Direct statuses onto the orb's vocabulary. - While the person talks, the orb moves with their voice: the composable feeds the mic RMS into `amplitude` whenever nothing is playing (`rmsOf` is exported from the endpointer). PortalConversation's raw_gray count stays at its baseline: the two buttons share one class recipe (#2662 arms) instead of repeating it. Tests: `portalDirectCall.spec.js` covers the button rule, the status→orb map and the mounted orb (draws, animates, stops on unmount, still under reduced motion); `portalDirectCall.mount.spec.js` drives both buttons in the real conversation. Verified in the browser on the local stack, light and dark, Live and Direct. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(workspace): the Direct call's strip shows four call bars, not a canvas orb (trinity-enterprise#1046) The strip's mark is now `portal/CallBars.vue`: four rounded bars in a disc tinted with the status tokens, sitting on the theme's own surface. Green bars follow the person's mic while it listens, amber bars run a slow wave while the turn is worked on, blue bars follow the agent's voice while it speaks, and muted is four flat gray dots. Four elements and no canvas; under prefers-reduced-motion it holds one still frame per state. The canvas orb and the field extracted to share with it are gone, so the Live call's VoiceOverlay.vue is back to dev's version and this PR no longer touches it. Tests mount the bars. Each of three mutations turns a test red: ignoring the sound, ignoring mute, and starting the loop under reduced motion. `portalUndefinedCalls` now lists `cancelAnimationFrame` as a browser global, next to `requestAnimationFrame`. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(workspace): a Direct call answers a reply it cannot read aloud, and its strip is one quiet row (trinity-enterprise#1046) A reply that is only code, a table or links had no speakable sentence, so the call said nothing and looked dead. test-echo's fenced echo hit this on every turn. A successful reply with nothing to read aloud now gets "The reply is in the chat." (LINE_REPLY_IN_CHAT); a reply with any spoken sentence does not. The strip is now one fixed-height row, so the thread below it no longer moves when the state changes: 32px bars, one short word (Listening, Got it, Thinking, Speaking, Yes or no?), one detail line (a notice, what was heard, the tool at work, or the slow-runtime wait), a mic icon that shows a slash when muted, and a red hang-up handset. The "Direct call · runtime · speech by …" line and the first-word timing are gone; Esc moves to the hang-up's tooltip. Tests written red first: two backend (the in-chat line, and no line when something was spoken) and four frontend (the detail order, short words, and the mounted row with icon buttons and a danger-token hang-up). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(workspace): a Direct call reads a reply that is only a code block, instead of pointing at the chat (trinity-enterprise#1046) test-echo answers with nothing but a fenced block. The previous fix spoke "The reply is in the chat." for it, which is no answer. When a reply has no prose outside its code blocks, the text inside the blocks is the reply and is now read (fence markers and the language tag dropped). Code beside prose stays unsaid. The in-chat line remains only for a reply with nothing to read at all, such as a table alone. The rule lives in spoken_text.speakable, so the streamed speech and the reconciled tail agree and nothing is said twice. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * Revert "fix(workspace): a Direct call reads a reply that is only a code block, instead of pointing at the chat (trinity-enterprise#1046)" This reverts commit c214c9e4d. Operator ruling: a reply that is only a code block is correctly answered with "The reply is in the chat." Code is not read aloud, whether or not prose sits beside it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(voice): a Direct call speaks an execution once (trinity-enterprise#1046) Each speak frame built a fresh SpokenBudget, and only utterances were rate-limited, so re-sending speak for the same run bought its synthesis again, up to the call's 30 minutes and across calls. The bridge now claims an execution before speaking it: Redis SET NX across calls and workers, plus a per-socket set that holds when Redis cannot answer. Also pins the store<->backend contract of a Direct call (mode on start, voice_call_id on a spoken turn, the roster's direct_voice), each of which could be deleted with every test green. merge-train 2026-11-02, mechanical per operator ruling at Gate 1. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * test(voice): stub the Live capability in the one-call-per-thread test (trinity-enterprise#1046) The live case reached realtime_voice_capability before the cross-kind 409 and got a 503 on a host with no realtime provider key (CI). merge-train. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: trinity-ability <309458136+trinity-ability@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore(enterprise): bump submodule — invite door and terms acceptance (trinity-enterprise#1054) (#4200) src/backend/enterprise 47cb75a → 452ea04 (abilityai/trinity-enterprise#1074). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(auth): a grant's use leaves an audit row, and grant changes share one verb (abilityai/trinity-enterprise#871) (#4174) An agent key a grant admits now writes one `capability_used` audit row: the agent as actor, its key id, the capability, the target, the method and the endpoint. It is written inside `enforce_agent_capability`, after the owner bound, so it means the grant cleared the call, not that the change landed, and a refused call writes only `capability_refused` (a holder aiming outside its owner's agents included, code `capability_target_not_owned`, same 404). People, `user` and `system` keys write none. One row per capability and target per request; manifest deploys and an honoured skill-set probe record their own use. `skills.manage` grant changes log `capability_grant` / `capability_revoke` through every door; earlier rows keep `skill_manager_*`. Security fixes found by `/cso --diff` and review (docs/security-reports/cso-diff-2026-11-02-871-capability-used.md): - `owner_owns_agent` now refuses the system agent. Owned by the admin, it was reachable by any holder an admin owns, and what lands there runs under a key that bypasses every permission check. - The file routes apply the owner bound, so an edge to another user's agent no longer lets a holder write its instructions or skills (now 404). - The skill-gate map read uses the same bound. - The create row names the slug the agent would get, not the raw body. Also: `request_id` on the agent `delete` row; `test_ent1030_gates.py` no longer reaches the host's Docker. Out of scope: issue item 3 (outcome rows for schedule writes and the timeout PUT); `trinity_prompt` via create-mode deploy stays #4025. Fixes abilityai/trinity-enterprise#871 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * test(autonomy): declare get_seat_autonomy in the self-gate census; count get_autonomy in the MCP docs (ent#641) Fallout from merging dev: - test_ent719_self_gate_identity drives every assert_own_agent route with a well-formed request. The new GET /seat-autonomy needs an execution_id query parameter, like its seat-decision siblings. - tool-count-docs (ent#991 T5) reads the registered total from the user docs. dev's search_memory plus this PR's get_autonomy make 177 tools (172 operator), and decisions.ts now has 3 tools. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * test(gemini): dev's wall-clock and usage-statistics tests run as the owner's turn (ent#926) test_ent1003_gemini_wall_clock and test_ent986_gemini_usage_statistics came in with the dev merge and drive the Gemini runtime with an execution id. This branch's tier check asks the platform whose turn it is, and with no platform to ask it fails closed (503). These tests are about the CLI, not the turn, so they take the same owner-turn stub the branch's other Gemini tests use (turn_scope.fetch_turn). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(skills): find a skill and see what Save would do, on bounded lists (abilityai/trinity-enterprise#660) (#4178) - Assign skills dialog: text, source and category filters narrow the rows and both bulk buttons, never the draft. Each row and a footer count say what Save would do: "to add", "to remove", or "kept by set" for a skill an assigned set still holds. The list keeps one height while the filter narrows, in a panel capped to the window. - Library and the agent's Skills tab: the lists scroll in a BoundedRegion that fills the window, so the page no longer grows with the library. The Library gets the same filters and a stated total. On the tab, Own and Shared share one box, a total sits in the header, and Shared's heading docks to the box from 640 px up. - BoundedRegion is now `relative`: unpositioned, the cards' sr-only labels escaped the box and Chrome counted them in the page height. - Backend: `category` on SkillInfo, from the skill's frontmatter. No migration, no new route, no base-image or MCP change. - e2e/skills-bounded-lists.spec.js (Chromium, @smoke, hermetic) pins the geometry that jsdom and Firefox cannot see. ent#660 was re-scoped because its text predates ent#754. Edition: OSS-core, ungated (confirmed on ent#660). Fixes abilityai/trinity-enterprise#660 Fixes #3448 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * test(access): declare get_seat_autonomy's tier in the agent route census (#4206) #2984 added GET /api/agents/{agent_name}/seat-autonomy and #3778 added the census that requires every agent-naming route to declare a tier. They merged one after the other without seeing each other, so dev fails test_ent926_agent_route_census::test_every_agent_route_is_declared. Declared accessor, with a reason, matching its sibling decision routes' gates (assert_own_agent, then assert_agent_access). Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(slack): fall back to Public URL for OAuth callback redirect (#4167) Motivation: with FRONTEND_URL empty (the .env.example default), the Slack OAuth callback redirect fell straight to http://localhost, so after Install to Workspace the admin landed on a dead page even though the install succeeded. The redirect URI for the same flow is already built from the Public URL setting. Approach: get_oauth_callback_redirect now uses FRONTEND_URL if set (unchanged precedence), else the Public URL setting, and only then the localhost fallback with the existing error log. This covers the platform and per-agent success and error redirects, since they share the function. Validation: ran tests/unit/test_slack_*.py plus the new tests/unit/test_3563_slack_oauth_redirect_base.py: 227 passed. With the fix reverted, te…
What
Autonomy in Trinity was one boolean per agent — scheduled runs on or off. This adds the two scopes canon
tandem-06-operations.md§2.3 (ruling P12) actually needs.Above the agent: one instance level —
L0Continuity ·L1Companion ·L2Delegated classes ·L3Load-bearing judgment — the ceiling on the whole fleet.Below it: a state per (seat, ask class) —
on_requestorgraduated— earned from that seat's own decision record (#638). A graduated class means the companion acts and reports; every other class it asks first, and it is told which is which in the same words the person reads.Promotion is earned; there is no promote control
A class graduates when its records say so: ≥3 non-expired records · exactly ONE normalized criterion · no reversal in the window, AND no negative rating for that seat in the last 30 days, AND a guard metric that is not
capped. No endpoint anywhere setsgraduated.A person can only move it down and let it back up:
holdreleaseThe shape: stored earned-state × three read-time conjuncts
The row holds only what was earned. The instance level, the agent's
autonomy_enabled, andnow <= evidence_expires_at(the earliestreview_byof the window) are ANDed where the verdict is read.Materialised instead, each fails silently. Records lapse at UTC midnight and fire no event, so a stored verdict outlives its own evidence with nobody watching. Re-evaluating the fleet inside a level change is an unbounded fan-out with no fleet-wide seat query to drive it, on a write path that must stay O(1). As conjuncts, a level drop needs zero writes, and raising it back restores exactly what each class had earned.
Reads persist nothing. Writes happen only on a real event (a decision recorded or acted on, a rating by the seat, a hold/release/guard) and are CAS'd on an evidence hash — an unchanged verdict writes no row and emits no event, so the event stream carries transitions, not heartbeats.
Three things that were defects first
Reversals are counted over the window, not over all history.
effective_statusreturnsreversedunconditionally — a reversed record never becomesexpired. Counted over history, one reversal ever would block its ask class forever andon_requestwould be the only reachable steady state: a dial that can only go down._has_lapsedretires a reversed record at its ownreview_by, like every other row.The rating query matches
operator:as well asworkspace:. On a single-operator install the seat person is the platform principal, so their thumbs-down is filed under the other prefix and the class could never demote.…and it orders by
COALESCE(updated_at, created_at)over a fixed 30 days. Flipping a rating up→down touches onlyupdated_at, and that flip is precisely a demotion. A window derived from the surviving records (rather than a fixed span) would let a blocking rating fall out by attrition — promotion by the clock, which R25 forbids.Every block is named
level_below_l2·agent_autonomy_off·evidence_expired·too_few_records·criterion_not_stable·reversal_in_window·negative_rating_in_window·guard_metric_capped·held_by_operator— each carrying the sentence the panel and the companion both show. A bare "not autonomous yet" teaches nobody what to do next, and the companion needs the reason so it can say why it is asking instead of inventing one.Surfaces
get_autonomy→GET /api/agents/{name}/seat-autonomy. Seat fromexecution_id(the MEM-001 rule), never a parameter; no email in the answer. (/autonomyis the agent-level toggle andagent_configregisters first, so a second route on that path is silently never reached — see the live-run note below.)PortalAgentAutonomy.vuein Agent details:GET …/agents/{name}/autonomy,POST …/autonomy/actions,POST …/autonomy/guard.AutonomyDialPanel.vueon Settings → Retention, overGET/PUT /api/settings/autonomy-dial:require_adminand interactive-only (an agent's injected MCP key can read the dial, never raise it — the ent#293/feat: Telegram group chat support — agents as community managers (TGRAM-GROUP) #297 line), validated against the four levels, audited asautonomy_dial_change, and blocklisted on the genericPUT /api/settings/{key}catch-all — the one door that can address any key. Mounted beforegeneric.router(Invariant fix: add missing logging_config.py to backend Dockerfile #4).prompt_linesrides the seat's existing memory block (fix(security): voice WS + stop endpoint missing ownership check (#600) #638's composer), so no caller can forget it and the model cannot believe it is more autonomous than the panel says.Storage
seat_ask_class_state, both tracks (SQLiteseat_ask_class_state_table+ Alembic0107_seat_ask_class_state←0106_execution_chat_session_id),AgentRef(..., CASCADE). The level is one validatedsystem_settingskey, not a table.#638's contract is unchanged: it shippedstats().reversalsas this issue's input and deferred the verdict.autonomy_dial_service.class_evidenceis the verdict and reads #638's rows without altering them.Tests
Frontend suite whole (ratchets included): 165 files / 3566 passed. MCP suite: 518 passed,
tsc --noEmitclean.scripts/ci/check_alembic_heads.py: 73 revisions, 1 head.The backend test is written as a table over time, not over a fixture. Six mutations, each red:
autonomy_enabled=falseignoredreleasenot owner-gatedworkspace:onlyFour failures in the full backend unit run (
test_ent435_secret_settings,test_mcp_validatorCGNAT,test_ent582_platform_keys,test_ent14_registry_url_ssrf) reproduce on an unrelated branch — local py3.12 vs the 3.13 image and IPv4-mappedipaddresshandling. None of those files are in this diff.Run against the dev instance
Seeded through the product's own endpoints and walked end to end — screenshots, API traces and the model's own prompt lines in the demo comment. It found two things a green suite could not:
GET /api/agents/{name}/autonomy, a pathrouters/agent_configalready owns andmain.pyregisters first, so FastAPI served the toggle and the new handler was never reached. Nothing raised, nothing warned, the unit tests passed (they call the service and read the router's source text),tscwas clean. Fixed in14625eb(/{agent_name}/seat-autonomy) and pinned by a test asserting the property rather than the spelling: across the two routers no two endpoints may share a(path, method).curlalone.AutonomyDialPanel.vueadded in090b2a8.Docs
requirements/core-agent.md§5.44 ·feature-flows/workspace-autonomy-dial.md(+ index) ·architecture/{workspace,database,api-endpoints,mcp-server}.md· fourdocs/memory/learnings/entries (the monotone-input ratchet, earned-vs-ambient verdicts, surface-namespaced identity, the silent cross-router path collision) ·tests/registry.json.Not in scope
Per-agent or per-seat levels (the instance level is the only ceiling in v1); auto-feeding
guard_metricfrom the §49 declared-metric registry (the owner sets it explicitly for now). Both in DEBT_INBOX 2026-09-23.Fixes abilityai/trinity-enterprise#641
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