Open a private security advisory on this repository (https://github.com/0DukePan/stoolie/security/advisories/new) or email the maintainer listed on the GitHub profile. Please do not open a public issue for anything that could help someone misuse the tool against another person's machine.
A read-only reader of four local sources, plus a SQLite database it writes itself:
| Reads | Writes |
|---|---|
HKCU/HKLM capability access store |
%LOCALAPPDATA%\stoolie\stoolie.db |
Microsoft-Windows-Privacy-Auditing/Operational (via wevtutil) |
receipt.html when asked |
%LOCALAPPDATA%\ConnectedDevicesPlatform\*\ActivitiesCache.db (copy) |
It contains no network code: no HTTP client, no sockets, no update check, no telemetry. The
--network flag runs netstat and counts sockets owned by the process, so the claim is measured
rather than asserted.
- Another person on the same machine. The archive is plain SQLite readable by anything running as the user. This is deliberate — a receipt nobody can audit is not a receipt — but it means two people sharing an account share the archive.
- A hostile application name or path. Every string interpolated into the HTML receipt is escaped;
there is a test for it (
receipt_escapes_hostile_app_names). The receipt loads no remote content and runs no JavaScript. - Command execution. The only child processes are
wevtutil(fixed arguments) andnetstat(fixed argument). No shell, no user-supplied command line. - Elevation. The tool never requests it. A capability the user cannot read is reported as unavailable, not as empty.
- Anything requiring a kernel driver, packet capture or TLS interception. Those are refusals, not missing features.
- Protecting a user from someone who already has their account.