diff --git a/Translations/Language.ar.xml b/Translations/Language.ar.xml index 3e3de1afbc..7e1617a318 100644 --- a/Translations/Language.ar.xml +++ b/Translations/Language.ar.xml @@ -1740,6 +1740,8 @@ ‮يشمل هذا الفحص مدير إقلاع ويندوز النشط فقط. قبل الإبطال، تحقق أيضا من توافق خيار الاسترداد بفك التعمية والنسخ الاحتياطية للإنقاذ. قد تؤدي عملية إنشاء قرص إنقاذ ڤيراكربت جديد إلى إعادة استخدام نسخة احتياطية أقدم محفوظة من مدير الإقلاع؛ فمجرد إنشاء القرص لا يثبت توافق تلك النسخة مع الإبطال. ‮النسخة الاحتياطية من مدير إقلاع ويندوز Windows Boot Manager المضمنة في قرص الإنقاذ هذا موقّعة من Microsoft Windows Production PCA 2011. يحتوي البرنامج الثابت لديك بالفعل على Windows UEFI CA 2023.\n\nبعد إبطال PCA 2011 (البت 0x80 من AvailableUpdates، بما في ذلك القيمة المجمّعة 0x280)، قد تؤدي استعادة هذه النسخة الاحتياطية إلى تعذر بدء ويندوز مع تفعيل Secure Boot. يعيد إنشاء قرص إنقاذ جديد استخدام هذه النسخة الاحتياطية المحفوظة، ولا يحدّث توقيعها.\n\nقبل تطبيق الإبطال، جهّز وسائط استرداد ويندوز محدّثة ومتوافقة، وتحقق من خيار الاسترداد بفك التعمية. لا تعتمد على قرص الإنقاذ هذا لاستعادة مدير إقلاع ويندوز متوافق. يظل مفيدا لمهام استرداد ڤيراكربت الأخرى. ‮تعذر على ڤيراكربت فحص النسخة الاحتياطية من مدير إقلاع ويندوز Windows Boot Manager الموجودة في قرص الإنقاذ هذا وفق سياسة Secure Boot في البرنامج الثابت.\n\nإنشاء هذا القرص أو التحقق منه لا يثبت توافق مدير إقلاع ويندوز المحفوظ فيه مع إبطال PCA 2011 (البت 0x80 من AvailableUpdates، بما في ذلك القيمة المجمّعة 0x280). قبل تطبيق الإبطال، تحقق من نسخك الاحتياطية للاسترداد، وجهّز وسائط استرداد ويندوز محدّثة ومتوافقة. + Do you also want to prevent this option from being disabled until Windows restarts?\n\nIf you answer Yes, the option cannot be turned off in VeraCrypt or in the registry, and the VeraCrypt system service cannot be stopped, until Windows restarts. If you need to connect a new device before then, you will have to restart Windows first.\n\nNote: this does not protect against someone who has administrator privileges on this computer, who can, for example, terminate the VeraCrypt system service. + VeraCrypt could not prevent the option "Clear encryption keys from memory if a new device is inserted" from being disabled until Windows restarts.\n\nThe option is enabled, but it can still be disabled. diff --git a/Translations/Language.be.xml b/Translations/Language.be.xml index bf400a6994..07d70a842a 100644 --- a/Translations/Language.be.xml +++ b/Translations/Language.be.xml @@ -1740,6 +1740,8 @@ This check covers only the active Windows boot manager. Before revocation, also verify that decryption fallback and rescue backups are compatible. Creating a new VeraCrypt Rescue Disk can reuse an older stored boot-manager backup; creating the disk alone does not establish that backup's compatibility with the revocation. The Windows Boot Manager backup included in this Rescue Disk is signed by Microsoft Windows Production PCA 2011. Your firmware already contains Windows UEFI CA 2023.\n\nAfter PCA 2011 revocation (AvailableUpdates bit 0x80, including combined value 0x280), restoring this backup can leave Windows unable to start with Secure Boot enabled. Creating a new Rescue Disk reuses this stored backup; it does not update its signature.\n\nBefore applying the revocation, prepare compatible, updated Windows recovery media and verify the decryption fallback. Do not rely on this Rescue Disk to restore a compatible Windows Boot Manager. It remains useful for other VeraCrypt recovery tasks. VeraCrypt could not check the Windows Boot Manager backup in this Rescue Disk against the firmware Secure Boot policy.\n\nCreating or verifying this disk does not establish that its stored Windows Boot Manager is compatible with PCA 2011 revocation (AvailableUpdates bit 0x80, including combined value 0x280). Before applying the revocation, verify your recovery backups and prepare compatible, updated Windows recovery media. + Do you also want to prevent this option from being disabled until Windows restarts?\n\nIf you answer Yes, the option cannot be turned off in VeraCrypt or in the registry, and the VeraCrypt system service cannot be stopped, until Windows restarts. If you need to connect a new device before then, you will have to restart Windows first.\n\nNote: this does not protect against someone who has administrator privileges on this computer, who can, for example, terminate the VeraCrypt system service. + VeraCrypt could not prevent the option "Clear encryption keys from memory if a new device is inserted" from being disabled until Windows restarts.\n\nThe option is enabled, but it can still be disabled. diff --git a/Translations/Language.bg.xml b/Translations/Language.bg.xml index 9250b75fcf..4d262cdbc0 100644 --- a/Translations/Language.bg.xml +++ b/Translations/Language.bg.xml @@ -1740,6 +1740,8 @@ This check covers only the active Windows boot manager. Before revocation, also verify that decryption fallback and rescue backups are compatible. Creating a new VeraCrypt Rescue Disk can reuse an older stored boot-manager backup; creating the disk alone does not establish that backup's compatibility with the revocation. The Windows Boot Manager backup included in this Rescue Disk is signed by Microsoft Windows Production PCA 2011. Your firmware already contains Windows UEFI CA 2023.\n\nAfter PCA 2011 revocation (AvailableUpdates bit 0x80, including combined value 0x280), restoring this backup can leave Windows unable to start with Secure Boot enabled. Creating a new Rescue Disk reuses this stored backup; it does not update its signature.\n\nBefore applying the revocation, prepare compatible, updated Windows recovery media and verify the decryption fallback. Do not rely on this Rescue Disk to restore a compatible Windows Boot Manager. It remains useful for other VeraCrypt recovery tasks. VeraCrypt could not check the Windows Boot Manager backup in this Rescue Disk against the firmware Secure Boot policy.\n\nCreating or verifying this disk does not establish that its stored Windows Boot Manager is compatible with PCA 2011 revocation (AvailableUpdates bit 0x80, including combined value 0x280). Before applying the revocation, verify your recovery backups and prepare compatible, updated Windows recovery media. + Do you also want to prevent this option from being disabled until Windows restarts?\n\nIf you answer Yes, the option cannot be turned off in VeraCrypt or in the registry, and the VeraCrypt system service cannot be stopped, until Windows restarts. If you need to connect a new device before then, you will have to restart Windows first.\n\nNote: this does not protect against someone who has administrator privileges on this computer, who can, for example, terminate the VeraCrypt system service. + VeraCrypt could not prevent the option "Clear encryption keys from memory if a new device is inserted" from being disabled until Windows restarts.\n\nThe option is enabled, but it can still be disabled. diff --git a/Translations/Language.ca.xml b/Translations/Language.ca.xml index 7dc5a164c1..244799ebb6 100644 --- a/Translations/Language.ca.xml +++ b/Translations/Language.ca.xml @@ -1740,6 +1740,8 @@ This check covers only the active Windows boot manager. Before revocation, also verify that decryption fallback and rescue backups are compatible. Creating a new VeraCrypt Rescue Disk can reuse an older stored boot-manager backup; creating the disk alone does not establish that backup's compatibility with the revocation. The Windows Boot Manager backup included in this Rescue Disk is signed by Microsoft Windows Production PCA 2011. Your firmware already contains Windows UEFI CA 2023.\n\nAfter PCA 2011 revocation (AvailableUpdates bit 0x80, including combined value 0x280), restoring this backup can leave Windows unable to start with Secure Boot enabled. Creating a new Rescue Disk reuses this stored backup; it does not update its signature.\n\nBefore applying the revocation, prepare compatible, updated Windows recovery media and verify the decryption fallback. Do not rely on this Rescue Disk to restore a compatible Windows Boot Manager. It remains useful for other VeraCrypt recovery tasks. VeraCrypt could not check the Windows Boot Manager backup in this Rescue Disk against the firmware Secure Boot policy.\n\nCreating or verifying this disk does not establish that its stored Windows Boot Manager is compatible with PCA 2011 revocation (AvailableUpdates bit 0x80, including combined value 0x280). Before applying the revocation, verify your recovery backups and prepare compatible, updated Windows recovery media. + Do you also want to prevent this option from being disabled until Windows restarts?\n\nIf you answer Yes, the option cannot be turned off in VeraCrypt or in the registry, and the VeraCrypt system service cannot be stopped, until Windows restarts. If you need to connect a new device before then, you will have to restart Windows first.\n\nNote: this does not protect against someone who has administrator privileges on this computer, who can, for example, terminate the VeraCrypt system service. + VeraCrypt could not prevent the option "Clear encryption keys from memory if a new device is inserted" from being disabled until Windows restarts.\n\nThe option is enabled, but it can still be disabled. diff --git a/Translations/Language.co.xml b/Translations/Language.co.xml index 9846136222..51f5282dba 100644 --- a/Translations/Language.co.xml +++ b/Translations/Language.co.xml @@ -1763,6 +1763,8 @@ Information about Corsican localization: Stu cuntrollu copre solu u ghjestiunariu di piccera Windows attivu. Prima a revucazione, verificà dinù chì a suluzione alternativa di dicifratura è chì e salvaguardie di succorsu sianu cumpatibile. A creazione d’un discu di succorsu VeraCrypt novu pò rimpiegà una salvaguardia anziana arregistrata di u ghjestiunariu di piccera ; a creazione di u discu solu ùn stabilisce micca a cumpatibilità di quella salvaguardia cù a revucazione. A salvaguardia di u ghjestiunariu di piccera Windows inclusa in stu discu di succorsu hè firmata da Microsoft Windows Production PCA 2011. U vostru microprugramma cuntene dighjà Windows UEFI CA 2023.\n\nDopu a revucazione di PCA 2011 (AvailableUpdates bit 0x80, includendu u valore cumbinatu 0x280), a risturazione di sta salvaguardia pò rende impussibule u lanciu di Windows cù a piccera sicurizata attivata. A creazione d’un discu di succorsu novu rimpiegheghja sta salvaguardia arregistrata ; ùn mudificheghja micca a so segnatura.\n\nPrima d’appiecà a revucazione, appruntà un medià di ricuperazione Windows cumpatibile è messu à livellu è verificà a suluzione alternativa di dicifratura. Ùn vi fidate micca à stu discu di succorsu per risturà un ghjestiunariu di piccera Windows cumpatibile. Ma stà ghjuvevule per d’altre tacche di ricuperazione VeraCrypt. VeraCrypt ùn hà pussutu verificà a salvaguardia di u ghjestiunariu di piccera Windows in stu discu di succorsu secondu à a pulitica di a piccera sicurizata di u microprugramma.\n\nA creazione o a verificazione di stu discu ùn vole micca dì chì u so ghjestiunariu di piccera Windows arregistratu hè cumpatibile cù a revucazione PCA 2011 (AvailableUpdates bit 0x80, includendu u valore cumbinatu 0x280). Prima d’appiecà a revucazione, verificà e vostre salvaguardie di ricuperazione è appruntà un medià di ricuperazione Windows cumpatibile è messu à livellu. + Do you also want to prevent this option from being disabled until Windows restarts?\n\nIf you answer Yes, the option cannot be turned off in VeraCrypt or in the registry, and the VeraCrypt system service cannot be stopped, until Windows restarts. If you need to connect a new device before then, you will have to restart Windows first.\n\nNote: this does not protect against someone who has administrator privileges on this computer, who can, for example, terminate the VeraCrypt system service. + VeraCrypt could not prevent the option "Clear encryption keys from memory if a new device is inserted" from being disabled until Windows restarts.\n\nThe option is enabled, but it can still be disabled. diff --git a/Translations/Language.cs.xml b/Translations/Language.cs.xml index 304bdd69aa..c9d2968e11 100644 --- a/Translations/Language.cs.xml +++ b/Translations/Language.cs.xml @@ -1740,6 +1740,8 @@ This check covers only the active Windows boot manager. Before revocation, also verify that decryption fallback and rescue backups are compatible. Creating a new VeraCrypt Rescue Disk can reuse an older stored boot-manager backup; creating the disk alone does not establish that backup's compatibility with the revocation. The Windows Boot Manager backup included in this Rescue Disk is signed by Microsoft Windows Production PCA 2011. Your firmware already contains Windows UEFI CA 2023.\n\nAfter PCA 2011 revocation (AvailableUpdates bit 0x80, including combined value 0x280), restoring this backup can leave Windows unable to start with Secure Boot enabled. Creating a new Rescue Disk reuses this stored backup; it does not update its signature.\n\nBefore applying the revocation, prepare compatible, updated Windows recovery media and verify the decryption fallback. Do not rely on this Rescue Disk to restore a compatible Windows Boot Manager. It remains useful for other VeraCrypt recovery tasks. VeraCrypt could not check the Windows Boot Manager backup in this Rescue Disk against the firmware Secure Boot policy.\n\nCreating or verifying this disk does not establish that its stored Windows Boot Manager is compatible with PCA 2011 revocation (AvailableUpdates bit 0x80, including combined value 0x280). Before applying the revocation, verify your recovery backups and prepare compatible, updated Windows recovery media. + Do you also want to prevent this option from being disabled until Windows restarts?\n\nIf you answer Yes, the option cannot be turned off in VeraCrypt or in the registry, and the VeraCrypt system service cannot be stopped, until Windows restarts. If you need to connect a new device before then, you will have to restart Windows first.\n\nNote: this does not protect against someone who has administrator privileges on this computer, who can, for example, terminate the VeraCrypt system service. + VeraCrypt could not prevent the option "Clear encryption keys from memory if a new device is inserted" from being disabled until Windows restarts.\n\nThe option is enabled, but it can still be disabled. diff --git a/Translations/Language.da.xml b/Translations/Language.da.xml index eec9f3a31d..41f68e8c12 100644 --- a/Translations/Language.da.xml +++ b/Translations/Language.da.xml @@ -1740,6 +1740,8 @@ This check covers only the active Windows boot manager. Before revocation, also verify that decryption fallback and rescue backups are compatible. Creating a new VeraCrypt Rescue Disk can reuse an older stored boot-manager backup; creating the disk alone does not establish that backup's compatibility with the revocation. The Windows Boot Manager backup included in this Rescue Disk is signed by Microsoft Windows Production PCA 2011. Your firmware already contains Windows UEFI CA 2023.\n\nAfter PCA 2011 revocation (AvailableUpdates bit 0x80, including combined value 0x280), restoring this backup can leave Windows unable to start with Secure Boot enabled. Creating a new Rescue Disk reuses this stored backup; it does not update its signature.\n\nBefore applying the revocation, prepare compatible, updated Windows recovery media and verify the decryption fallback. Do not rely on this Rescue Disk to restore a compatible Windows Boot Manager. It remains useful for other VeraCrypt recovery tasks. VeraCrypt could not check the Windows Boot Manager backup in this Rescue Disk against the firmware Secure Boot policy.\n\nCreating or verifying this disk does not establish that its stored Windows Boot Manager is compatible with PCA 2011 revocation (AvailableUpdates bit 0x80, including combined value 0x280). Before applying the revocation, verify your recovery backups and prepare compatible, updated Windows recovery media. + Do you also want to prevent this option from being disabled until Windows restarts?\n\nIf you answer Yes, the option cannot be turned off in VeraCrypt or in the registry, and the VeraCrypt system service cannot be stopped, until Windows restarts. If you need to connect a new device before then, you will have to restart Windows first.\n\nNote: this does not protect against someone who has administrator privileges on this computer, who can, for example, terminate the VeraCrypt system service. + VeraCrypt could not prevent the option "Clear encryption keys from memory if a new device is inserted" from being disabled until Windows restarts.\n\nThe option is enabled, but it can still be disabled. diff --git a/Translations/Language.de.xml b/Translations/Language.de.xml index a89101955b..58258c3897 100644 --- a/Translations/Language.de.xml +++ b/Translations/Language.de.xml @@ -1743,6 +1743,8 @@ Diese Prüfung erfasst nur den aktiven Windows-Bootmanager. Überprüfen Sie vor dem Widerruf auch, ob die Möglichkeit zur Wiederherstellung durch Entschlüsselung und die Sicherungen auf Rettungsdatenträgern kompatibel sind. Beim Erstellen eines neuen VeraCrypt-Rettungsdatenträgers kann eine ältere gespeicherte Sicherung des Bootmanagers wiederverwendet werden. Das Erstellen des Datenträgers allein bestätigt nicht, dass diese Sicherung mit dem Widerruf kompatibel ist. Die auf diesem Rettungsdatenträger enthaltene Sicherung des Windows-Bootmanagers ist von Microsoft Windows Production PCA 2011 signiert. Ihre Firmware enthält bereits Windows UEFI CA 2023.\n\nNach dem Widerruf von PCA 2011 (Bit 0x80 in AvailableUpdates, einschließlich des kombinierten Werts 0x280) kann die Wiederherstellung dieser Sicherung dazu führen, dass Windows bei aktiviertem Secure Boot nicht mehr startet. Beim Erstellen eines neuen Rettungsdatenträgers wird diese gespeicherte Sicherung wiederverwendet. Ihre Signatur wird dabei nicht aktualisiert.\n\nBereiten Sie vor dem Anwenden des Widerrufs kompatible, aktuelle Windows-Wiederherstellungsmedien vor und überprüfen Sie die Möglichkeit zur Wiederherstellung durch Entschlüsselung. Verlassen Sie sich nicht auf diesen Rettungsdatenträger, um einen kompatiblen Windows-Bootmanager wiederherzustellen. Er bleibt für andere Wiederherstellungsaufgaben von VeraCrypt nützlich. VeraCrypt konnte die Sicherung des Windows-Bootmanagers auf diesem Rettungsdatenträger nicht anhand der Secure-Boot-Richtlinie der Firmware überprüfen.\n\nDas Erstellen oder Überprüfen dieses Datenträgers bestätigt nicht, dass der darauf gespeicherte Windows-Bootmanager mit dem Widerruf von PCA 2011 (Bit 0x80 in AvailableUpdates, einschließlich des kombinierten Werts 0x280) kompatibel ist. Überprüfen Sie vor dem Anwenden des Widerrufs Ihre Sicherungen für die Wiederherstellung und bereiten Sie kompatible, aktuelle Windows-Wiederherstellungsmedien vor. + Do you also want to prevent this option from being disabled until Windows restarts?\n\nIf you answer Yes, the option cannot be turned off in VeraCrypt or in the registry, and the VeraCrypt system service cannot be stopped, until Windows restarts. If you need to connect a new device before then, you will have to restart Windows first.\n\nNote: this does not protect against someone who has administrator privileges on this computer, who can, for example, terminate the VeraCrypt system service. + VeraCrypt could not prevent the option "Clear encryption keys from memory if a new device is inserted" from being disabled until Windows restarts.\n\nThe option is enabled, but it can still be disabled. diff --git a/Translations/Language.el.xml b/Translations/Language.el.xml index 09b7fd0ab4..2fe13484c0 100644 --- a/Translations/Language.el.xml +++ b/Translations/Language.el.xml @@ -1740,6 +1740,8 @@ This check covers only the active Windows boot manager. Before revocation, also verify that decryption fallback and rescue backups are compatible. Creating a new VeraCrypt Rescue Disk can reuse an older stored boot-manager backup; creating the disk alone does not establish that backup's compatibility with the revocation. The Windows Boot Manager backup included in this Rescue Disk is signed by Microsoft Windows Production PCA 2011. Your firmware already contains Windows UEFI CA 2023.\n\nAfter PCA 2011 revocation (AvailableUpdates bit 0x80, including combined value 0x280), restoring this backup can leave Windows unable to start with Secure Boot enabled. Creating a new Rescue Disk reuses this stored backup; it does not update its signature.\n\nBefore applying the revocation, prepare compatible, updated Windows recovery media and verify the decryption fallback. Do not rely on this Rescue Disk to restore a compatible Windows Boot Manager. It remains useful for other VeraCrypt recovery tasks. VeraCrypt could not check the Windows Boot Manager backup in this Rescue Disk against the firmware Secure Boot policy.\n\nCreating or verifying this disk does not establish that its stored Windows Boot Manager is compatible with PCA 2011 revocation (AvailableUpdates bit 0x80, including combined value 0x280). Before applying the revocation, verify your recovery backups and prepare compatible, updated Windows recovery media. + Do you also want to prevent this option from being disabled until Windows restarts?\n\nIf you answer Yes, the option cannot be turned off in VeraCrypt or in the registry, and the VeraCrypt system service cannot be stopped, until Windows restarts. If you need to connect a new device before then, you will have to restart Windows first.\n\nNote: this does not protect against someone who has administrator privileges on this computer, who can, for example, terminate the VeraCrypt system service. + VeraCrypt could not prevent the option "Clear encryption keys from memory if a new device is inserted" from being disabled until Windows restarts.\n\nThe option is enabled, but it can still be disabled. diff --git a/Translations/Language.es.xml b/Translations/Language.es.xml index 9aad9fa76e..20262eda46 100644 --- a/Translations/Language.es.xml +++ b/Translations/Language.es.xml @@ -1740,6 +1740,8 @@ Esta comprobación sólo cubre el Administrador de arranque de Windows activo. Antes de aplicar la revocación, compruebe también que la alternativa de descifrado y las copias de seguridad de rescate sean compatibles. Al crear un nuevo Disco de Rescate VeraCrypt se puede reutilizar una copia de seguridad antigua del administrador de arranque; crear el disco por sí solo no permite confirmar la compatibilidad de esa copia con la revocación. La copia de seguridad del Administrador de arranque de Windows incluida en este Disco de Rescate está firmada por Microsoft Windows Production PCA 2011. Su firmware ya contiene Windows UEFI CA 2023.\n\nTras la revocación de PCA 2011 (bit 0x80 de AvailableUpdates, incluido el valor combinado 0x280), restaurar esta copia de seguridad puede impedir que Windows arranque con Secure Boot habilitado. Crear un nuevo Disco de Rescate reutiliza esta copia de seguridad almacenada; no actualiza su firma.\n\nAntes de aplicar la revocación, prepare un medio de recuperación de Windows compatible y actualizado y compruebe la alternativa de descifrado. No confíe en este Disco de Rescate para restaurar un Administrador de arranque de Windows compatible. Sigue siendo útil para otras tareas de recuperación de VeraCrypt. VeraCrypt no pudo comprobar la copia de seguridad del Administrador de arranque de Windows de este Disco de Rescate frente a la política de Secure Boot del firmware.\n\nCrear o verificar este disco no permite confirmar que el Administrador de arranque de Windows que contiene sea compatible con la revocación de PCA 2011 (bit 0x80 de AvailableUpdates, incluido el valor combinado 0x280). Antes de aplicar la revocación, verifique sus copias de seguridad de recuperación y prepare un medio de recuperación de Windows compatible y actualizado. + Do you also want to prevent this option from being disabled until Windows restarts?\n\nIf you answer Yes, the option cannot be turned off in VeraCrypt or in the registry, and the VeraCrypt system service cannot be stopped, until Windows restarts. If you need to connect a new device before then, you will have to restart Windows first.\n\nNote: this does not protect against someone who has administrator privileges on this computer, who can, for example, terminate the VeraCrypt system service. + VeraCrypt could not prevent the option "Clear encryption keys from memory if a new device is inserted" from being disabled until Windows restarts.\n\nThe option is enabled, but it can still be disabled. diff --git a/Translations/Language.et.xml b/Translations/Language.et.xml index ca7932fc85..e0e062ddab 100644 --- a/Translations/Language.et.xml +++ b/Translations/Language.et.xml @@ -1740,6 +1740,8 @@ This check covers only the active Windows boot manager. Before revocation, also verify that decryption fallback and rescue backups are compatible. Creating a new VeraCrypt Rescue Disk can reuse an older stored boot-manager backup; creating the disk alone does not establish that backup's compatibility with the revocation. The Windows Boot Manager backup included in this Rescue Disk is signed by Microsoft Windows Production PCA 2011. Your firmware already contains Windows UEFI CA 2023.\n\nAfter PCA 2011 revocation (AvailableUpdates bit 0x80, including combined value 0x280), restoring this backup can leave Windows unable to start with Secure Boot enabled. Creating a new Rescue Disk reuses this stored backup; it does not update its signature.\n\nBefore applying the revocation, prepare compatible, updated Windows recovery media and verify the decryption fallback. Do not rely on this Rescue Disk to restore a compatible Windows Boot Manager. It remains useful for other VeraCrypt recovery tasks. VeraCrypt could not check the Windows Boot Manager backup in this Rescue Disk against the firmware Secure Boot policy.\n\nCreating or verifying this disk does not establish that its stored Windows Boot Manager is compatible with PCA 2011 revocation (AvailableUpdates bit 0x80, including combined value 0x280). Before applying the revocation, verify your recovery backups and prepare compatible, updated Windows recovery media. + Do you also want to prevent this option from being disabled until Windows restarts?\n\nIf you answer Yes, the option cannot be turned off in VeraCrypt or in the registry, and the VeraCrypt system service cannot be stopped, until Windows restarts. If you need to connect a new device before then, you will have to restart Windows first.\n\nNote: this does not protect against someone who has administrator privileges on this computer, who can, for example, terminate the VeraCrypt system service. + VeraCrypt could not prevent the option "Clear encryption keys from memory if a new device is inserted" from being disabled until Windows restarts.\n\nThe option is enabled, but it can still be disabled. diff --git a/Translations/Language.eu.xml b/Translations/Language.eu.xml index 19d735d6cd..b64ef0acd3 100644 --- a/Translations/Language.eu.xml +++ b/Translations/Language.eu.xml @@ -1740,6 +1740,8 @@ This check covers only the active Windows boot manager. Before revocation, also verify that decryption fallback and rescue backups are compatible. Creating a new VeraCrypt Rescue Disk can reuse an older stored boot-manager backup; creating the disk alone does not establish that backup's compatibility with the revocation. The Windows Boot Manager backup included in this Rescue Disk is signed by Microsoft Windows Production PCA 2011. Your firmware already contains Windows UEFI CA 2023.\n\nAfter PCA 2011 revocation (AvailableUpdates bit 0x80, including combined value 0x280), restoring this backup can leave Windows unable to start with Secure Boot enabled. Creating a new Rescue Disk reuses this stored backup; it does not update its signature.\n\nBefore applying the revocation, prepare compatible, updated Windows recovery media and verify the decryption fallback. Do not rely on this Rescue Disk to restore a compatible Windows Boot Manager. It remains useful for other VeraCrypt recovery tasks. VeraCrypt could not check the Windows Boot Manager backup in this Rescue Disk against the firmware Secure Boot policy.\n\nCreating or verifying this disk does not establish that its stored Windows Boot Manager is compatible with PCA 2011 revocation (AvailableUpdates bit 0x80, including combined value 0x280). Before applying the revocation, verify your recovery backups and prepare compatible, updated Windows recovery media. + Do you also want to prevent this option from being disabled until Windows restarts?\n\nIf you answer Yes, the option cannot be turned off in VeraCrypt or in the registry, and the VeraCrypt system service cannot be stopped, until Windows restarts. If you need to connect a new device before then, you will have to restart Windows first.\n\nNote: this does not protect against someone who has administrator privileges on this computer, who can, for example, terminate the VeraCrypt system service. + VeraCrypt could not prevent the option "Clear encryption keys from memory if a new device is inserted" from being disabled until Windows restarts.\n\nThe option is enabled, but it can still be disabled. diff --git a/Translations/Language.fa.xml b/Translations/Language.fa.xml index a24d94232e..444bcf453d 100644 --- a/Translations/Language.fa.xml +++ b/Translations/Language.fa.xml @@ -1740,6 +1740,8 @@ This check covers only the active Windows boot manager. Before revocation, also verify that decryption fallback and rescue backups are compatible. Creating a new VeraCrypt Rescue Disk can reuse an older stored boot-manager backup; creating the disk alone does not establish that backup's compatibility with the revocation. The Windows Boot Manager backup included in this Rescue Disk is signed by Microsoft Windows Production PCA 2011. Your firmware already contains Windows UEFI CA 2023.\n\nAfter PCA 2011 revocation (AvailableUpdates bit 0x80, including combined value 0x280), restoring this backup can leave Windows unable to start with Secure Boot enabled. Creating a new Rescue Disk reuses this stored backup; it does not update its signature.\n\nBefore applying the revocation, prepare compatible, updated Windows recovery media and verify the decryption fallback. Do not rely on this Rescue Disk to restore a compatible Windows Boot Manager. It remains useful for other VeraCrypt recovery tasks. VeraCrypt could not check the Windows Boot Manager backup in this Rescue Disk against the firmware Secure Boot policy.\n\nCreating or verifying this disk does not establish that its stored Windows Boot Manager is compatible with PCA 2011 revocation (AvailableUpdates bit 0x80, including combined value 0x280). Before applying the revocation, verify your recovery backups and prepare compatible, updated Windows recovery media. + Do you also want to prevent this option from being disabled until Windows restarts?\n\nIf you answer Yes, the option cannot be turned off in VeraCrypt or in the registry, and the VeraCrypt system service cannot be stopped, until Windows restarts. If you need to connect a new device before then, you will have to restart Windows first.\n\nNote: this does not protect against someone who has administrator privileges on this computer, who can, for example, terminate the VeraCrypt system service. + VeraCrypt could not prevent the option "Clear encryption keys from memory if a new device is inserted" from being disabled until Windows restarts.\n\nThe option is enabled, but it can still be disabled. diff --git a/Translations/Language.fi.xml b/Translations/Language.fi.xml index ae960149cb..f851e82da0 100644 --- a/Translations/Language.fi.xml +++ b/Translations/Language.fi.xml @@ -1740,6 +1740,8 @@ This check covers only the active Windows boot manager. Before revocation, also verify that decryption fallback and rescue backups are compatible. Creating a new VeraCrypt Rescue Disk can reuse an older stored boot-manager backup; creating the disk alone does not establish that backup's compatibility with the revocation. The Windows Boot Manager backup included in this Rescue Disk is signed by Microsoft Windows Production PCA 2011. Your firmware already contains Windows UEFI CA 2023.\n\nAfter PCA 2011 revocation (AvailableUpdates bit 0x80, including combined value 0x280), restoring this backup can leave Windows unable to start with Secure Boot enabled. Creating a new Rescue Disk reuses this stored backup; it does not update its signature.\n\nBefore applying the revocation, prepare compatible, updated Windows recovery media and verify the decryption fallback. Do not rely on this Rescue Disk to restore a compatible Windows Boot Manager. It remains useful for other VeraCrypt recovery tasks. VeraCrypt could not check the Windows Boot Manager backup in this Rescue Disk against the firmware Secure Boot policy.\n\nCreating or verifying this disk does not establish that its stored Windows Boot Manager is compatible with PCA 2011 revocation (AvailableUpdates bit 0x80, including combined value 0x280). Before applying the revocation, verify your recovery backups and prepare compatible, updated Windows recovery media. + Do you also want to prevent this option from being disabled until Windows restarts?\n\nIf you answer Yes, the option cannot be turned off in VeraCrypt or in the registry, and the VeraCrypt system service cannot be stopped, until Windows restarts. If you need to connect a new device before then, you will have to restart Windows first.\n\nNote: this does not protect against someone who has administrator privileges on this computer, who can, for example, terminate the VeraCrypt system service. + VeraCrypt could not prevent the option "Clear encryption keys from memory if a new device is inserted" from being disabled until Windows restarts.\n\nThe option is enabled, but it can still be disabled. diff --git a/Translations/Language.fr.xml b/Translations/Language.fr.xml index 7f1ccffe30..dc801e97b9 100644 --- a/Translations/Language.fr.xml +++ b/Translations/Language.fr.xml @@ -1740,6 +1740,8 @@ Cette vérification porte uniquement sur le Gestionnaire de démarrage Windows actif. Avant la révocation, vérifiez également la compatibilité de la solution de repli pour le déchiffrement et des sauvegardes de secours. La création d’un nouveau disque de secours VeraCrypt peut réutiliser une ancienne sauvegarde du Gestionnaire de démarrage ; la création du disque à elle seule ne permet pas de confirmer la compatibilité de cette sauvegarde avec la révocation. La sauvegarde du Gestionnaire de démarrage Windows incluse dans ce disque de secours est signée par Microsoft Windows Production PCA 2011. Votre firmware contient déjà Windows UEFI CA 2023.\n\nAprès la révocation de PCA 2011 (bit 0x80 d’AvailableUpdates, y compris la valeur combinée 0x280), la restauration de cette sauvegarde peut empêcher Windows de démarrer lorsque Secure Boot est activé. La création d’un nouveau disque de secours réutilise cette sauvegarde existante ; elle ne met pas à jour sa signature.\n\nAvant d’appliquer la révocation, préparez un support de récupération Windows compatible et à jour et vérifiez la solution de repli pour le déchiffrement. Ne comptez pas sur ce disque de secours pour restaurer un Gestionnaire de démarrage Windows compatible. Il reste utile pour les autres opérations de récupération de VeraCrypt. VeraCrypt n’a pas pu vérifier la sauvegarde du Gestionnaire de démarrage Windows contenue dans ce disque de secours par rapport à la politique Secure Boot du firmware.\n\nLa création ou la vérification de ce disque ne permet pas de confirmer que le Gestionnaire de démarrage Windows qu’il contient est compatible avec la révocation de PCA 2011 (bit 0x80 d’AvailableUpdates, y compris la valeur combinée 0x280). Avant d’appliquer la révocation, vérifiez vos sauvegardes de récupération et préparez un support de récupération Windows compatible et à jour. + Do you also want to prevent this option from being disabled until Windows restarts?\n\nIf you answer Yes, the option cannot be turned off in VeraCrypt or in the registry, and the VeraCrypt system service cannot be stopped, until Windows restarts. If you need to connect a new device before then, you will have to restart Windows first.\n\nNote: this does not protect against someone who has administrator privileges on this computer, who can, for example, terminate the VeraCrypt system service. + VeraCrypt could not prevent the option "Clear encryption keys from memory if a new device is inserted" from being disabled until Windows restarts.\n\nThe option is enabled, but it can still be disabled. diff --git a/Translations/Language.he.xml b/Translations/Language.he.xml index 129d95ad93..9ad5339d2b 100644 --- a/Translations/Language.he.xml +++ b/Translations/Language.he.xml @@ -1740,6 +1740,8 @@ בדיקה זו כוללת רק את מנהל האתחול הפעיל של Windows. לפני ביטול האמון, ודא גם שאפשרות השחזור באמצעות פענוח וגיבויי ההצלה תואמים. יצירת דיסק הצלה חדש של VeraCrypt עשויה להשתמש שוב בגיבוי ישן יותר של מנהל האתחול שנשמר; יצירת הדיסק בלבד אינה מוכיחה שגיבוי זה תואם לביטול האמון. הגיבוי של מנהל האתחול של Windows הכלול בדיסק הצלה זה חתום על ידי Microsoft Windows Production PCA 2011. הקושחה שלך כבר מכילה את Windows UEFI CA 2023.\n\nלאחר ביטול האמון ב-PCA 2011 (הסיבית 0x80 של AvailableUpdates, כולל הערך המשולב 0x280), שחזור גיבוי זה עלול למנוע מ-Windows לפעול כאשר Secure Boot מופעל. יצירת דיסק הצלה חדש משתמשת שוב בגיבוי שמור זה; היא אינה מעדכנת את חתימתו.\n\nלפני החלת ביטול האמון, הכן מדיית שחזור עדכנית ותואמת של Windows וודא שאפשרות השחזור באמצעות פענוח תקינה. אל תסתמך על דיסק הצלה זה לשחזור מנהל אתחול תואם של Windows. הוא עדיין שימושי למשימות שחזור אחרות של VeraCrypt. VeraCrypt לא הצליח לבדוק את הגיבוי של מנהל האתחול של Windows בדיסק הצלה זה מול מדיניות Secure Boot של הקושחה.\n\nיצירת דיסק זה או אימותו אינם מוכיחים שמנהל האתחול של Windows השמור בו תואם לביטול האמון ב-PCA 2011 (הסיבית 0x80 של AvailableUpdates, כולל הערך המשולב 0x280). לפני החלת ביטול האמון, בדוק את גיבויי השחזור שלך והכן מדיית שחזור עדכנית ותואמת של Windows. + Do you also want to prevent this option from being disabled until Windows restarts?\n\nIf you answer Yes, the option cannot be turned off in VeraCrypt or in the registry, and the VeraCrypt system service cannot be stopped, until Windows restarts. If you need to connect a new device before then, you will have to restart Windows first.\n\nNote: this does not protect against someone who has administrator privileges on this computer, who can, for example, terminate the VeraCrypt system service. + VeraCrypt could not prevent the option "Clear encryption keys from memory if a new device is inserted" from being disabled until Windows restarts.\n\nThe option is enabled, but it can still be disabled. diff --git a/Translations/Language.hu.xml b/Translations/Language.hu.xml index 71f023df22..beffeaa2a6 100644 --- a/Translations/Language.hu.xml +++ b/Translations/Language.hu.xml @@ -1740,6 +1740,8 @@ This check covers only the active Windows boot manager. Before revocation, also verify that decryption fallback and rescue backups are compatible. Creating a new VeraCrypt Rescue Disk can reuse an older stored boot-manager backup; creating the disk alone does not establish that backup's compatibility with the revocation. The Windows Boot Manager backup included in this Rescue Disk is signed by Microsoft Windows Production PCA 2011. Your firmware already contains Windows UEFI CA 2023.\n\nAfter PCA 2011 revocation (AvailableUpdates bit 0x80, including combined value 0x280), restoring this backup can leave Windows unable to start with Secure Boot enabled. Creating a new Rescue Disk reuses this stored backup; it does not update its signature.\n\nBefore applying the revocation, prepare compatible, updated Windows recovery media and verify the decryption fallback. Do not rely on this Rescue Disk to restore a compatible Windows Boot Manager. It remains useful for other VeraCrypt recovery tasks. VeraCrypt could not check the Windows Boot Manager backup in this Rescue Disk against the firmware Secure Boot policy.\n\nCreating or verifying this disk does not establish that its stored Windows Boot Manager is compatible with PCA 2011 revocation (AvailableUpdates bit 0x80, including combined value 0x280). Before applying the revocation, verify your recovery backups and prepare compatible, updated Windows recovery media. + Do you also want to prevent this option from being disabled until Windows restarts?\n\nIf you answer Yes, the option cannot be turned off in VeraCrypt or in the registry, and the VeraCrypt system service cannot be stopped, until Windows restarts. If you need to connect a new device before then, you will have to restart Windows first.\n\nNote: this does not protect against someone who has administrator privileges on this computer, who can, for example, terminate the VeraCrypt system service. + VeraCrypt could not prevent the option "Clear encryption keys from memory if a new device is inserted" from being disabled until Windows restarts.\n\nThe option is enabled, but it can still be disabled. diff --git a/Translations/Language.id.xml b/Translations/Language.id.xml index 484f66970e..40a8812582 100644 --- a/Translations/Language.id.xml +++ b/Translations/Language.id.xml @@ -1740,6 +1740,8 @@ This check covers only the active Windows boot manager. Before revocation, also verify that decryption fallback and rescue backups are compatible. Creating a new VeraCrypt Rescue Disk can reuse an older stored boot-manager backup; creating the disk alone does not establish that backup's compatibility with the revocation. The Windows Boot Manager backup included in this Rescue Disk is signed by Microsoft Windows Production PCA 2011. Your firmware already contains Windows UEFI CA 2023.\n\nAfter PCA 2011 revocation (AvailableUpdates bit 0x80, including combined value 0x280), restoring this backup can leave Windows unable to start with Secure Boot enabled. Creating a new Rescue Disk reuses this stored backup; it does not update its signature.\n\nBefore applying the revocation, prepare compatible, updated Windows recovery media and verify the decryption fallback. Do not rely on this Rescue Disk to restore a compatible Windows Boot Manager. It remains useful for other VeraCrypt recovery tasks. VeraCrypt could not check the Windows Boot Manager backup in this Rescue Disk against the firmware Secure Boot policy.\n\nCreating or verifying this disk does not establish that its stored Windows Boot Manager is compatible with PCA 2011 revocation (AvailableUpdates bit 0x80, including combined value 0x280). Before applying the revocation, verify your recovery backups and prepare compatible, updated Windows recovery media. + Do you also want to prevent this option from being disabled until Windows restarts?\n\nIf you answer Yes, the option cannot be turned off in VeraCrypt or in the registry, and the VeraCrypt system service cannot be stopped, until Windows restarts. If you need to connect a new device before then, you will have to restart Windows first.\n\nNote: this does not protect against someone who has administrator privileges on this computer, who can, for example, terminate the VeraCrypt system service. + VeraCrypt could not prevent the option "Clear encryption keys from memory if a new device is inserted" from being disabled until Windows restarts.\n\nThe option is enabled, but it can still be disabled. diff --git a/Translations/Language.it.xml b/Translations/Language.it.xml index 7c61032853..bb91ae5408 100644 --- a/Translations/Language.it.xml +++ b/Translations/Language.it.xml @@ -1740,6 +1740,8 @@ Questo controllo riguarda solo il boot manager di Windows attivo. Prima della revoca, verificare anche che la soluzione di ripiego per la decrittografia e i backup di ripristino siano compatibili. La creazione di un nuovo disco di ripristino di VeraCrypt può riutilizzare un vecchio backup del boot manager già archiviato; la sola creazione del disco non dimostra la compatibilità di quel backup con la revoca. Il backup del Windows Boot Manager incluso in questo disco di ripristino è firmato da Microsoft Windows Production PCA 2011. Il firmware contiene già Windows UEFI CA 2023.\n\nDopo la revoca di PCA 2011 (bit 0x80 di AvailableUpdates, incluso il valore combinato 0x280), il ripristino di questo backup può impedire l'avvio di Windows con Secure Boot abilitato. La creazione di un nuovo disco di ripristino riutilizza questo backup archiviato; non ne aggiorna la firma.\n\nPrima di applicare la revoca, preparare supporti di ripristino di Windows compatibili e aggiornati e verificare la soluzione di ripiego per la decrittografia. Non fare affidamento su questo disco di ripristino per ripristinare un Windows Boot Manager compatibile. Rimane utile per le altre operazioni di ripristino di VeraCrypt. VeraCrypt non è riuscito a controllare il backup del Windows Boot Manager in questo disco di ripristino rispetto ai criteri di Secure Boot del firmware.\n\nLa creazione o la verifica di questo disco non dimostra che il Windows Boot Manager in esso archiviato sia compatibile con la revoca di PCA 2011 (bit 0x80 di AvailableUpdates, incluso il valore combinato 0x280). Prima di applicare la revoca, verificare i backup di ripristino e preparare supporti di ripristino di Windows compatibili e aggiornati. + Do you also want to prevent this option from being disabled until Windows restarts?\n\nIf you answer Yes, the option cannot be turned off in VeraCrypt or in the registry, and the VeraCrypt system service cannot be stopped, until Windows restarts. If you need to connect a new device before then, you will have to restart Windows first.\n\nNote: this does not protect against someone who has administrator privileges on this computer, who can, for example, terminate the VeraCrypt system service. + VeraCrypt could not prevent the option "Clear encryption keys from memory if a new device is inserted" from being disabled until Windows restarts.\n\nThe option is enabled, but it can still be disabled. diff --git a/Translations/Language.ja.xml b/Translations/Language.ja.xml index 58e2199577..a4eaa04828 100644 --- a/Translations/Language.ja.xml +++ b/Translations/Language.ja.xml @@ -1740,6 +1740,8 @@ この確認の対象は、現在使用中の Windows ブートマネージャーのみです。失効を適用する前に、復号時の代替手段とレスキュー用バックアップにも互換性があることを確認してください。新しい VeraCrypt レスキューディスクを作成しても、保存されている古いブートマネージャーのバックアップが再利用される場合があります。ディスクを作成しただけでは、そのバックアップに失効との互換性があることは確認できません。 このレスキューディスクに含まれる Windows Boot Manager のバックアップは、Microsoft Windows Production PCA 2011 によって署名されています。ファームウェアには、すでに Windows UEFI CA 2023 が含まれています。\n\nPCA 2011 の失効(AvailableUpdates のビット 0x80、およびこれを含む組み合わせ値 0x280)を適用した後でこのバックアップを復元すると、Secure Boot が有効な状態では Windows を起動できなくなる可能性があります。新しいレスキューディスクを作成しても、保存済みのこのバックアップが再利用され、署名は更新されません。\n\n失効を適用する前に、互換性のある最新の Windows 回復メディアを用意し、復号時の代替手段を確認してください。互換性のある Windows Boot Manager を復元するために、このレスキューディスクを当てにしないでください。このディスクは、VeraCrypt の他の復旧作業には引き続き役立ちます。 VeraCrypt は、このレスキューディスクに含まれる Windows Boot Manager のバックアップを、ファームウェアの Secure Boot ポリシーに照らして確認できませんでした。\n\nこのディスクを作成または検証しただけでは、保存されている Windows Boot Manager に PCA 2011 の失効(AvailableUpdates のビット 0x80、およびこれを含む組み合わせ値 0x280)との互換性があることは確認できません。失効を適用する前に、復旧用バックアップを確認し、互換性のある最新の Windows 回復メディアを用意してください。 + Do you also want to prevent this option from being disabled until Windows restarts?\n\nIf you answer Yes, the option cannot be turned off in VeraCrypt or in the registry, and the VeraCrypt system service cannot be stopped, until Windows restarts. If you need to connect a new device before then, you will have to restart Windows first.\n\nNote: this does not protect against someone who has administrator privileges on this computer, who can, for example, terminate the VeraCrypt system service. + VeraCrypt could not prevent the option "Clear encryption keys from memory if a new device is inserted" from being disabled until Windows restarts.\n\nThe option is enabled, but it can still be disabled. diff --git a/Translations/Language.ka.xml b/Translations/Language.ka.xml index 25e910e7c3..6b32acf819 100644 --- a/Translations/Language.ka.xml +++ b/Translations/Language.ka.xml @@ -1740,6 +1740,8 @@ This check covers only the active Windows boot manager. Before revocation, also verify that decryption fallback and rescue backups are compatible. Creating a new VeraCrypt Rescue Disk can reuse an older stored boot-manager backup; creating the disk alone does not establish that backup's compatibility with the revocation. The Windows Boot Manager backup included in this Rescue Disk is signed by Microsoft Windows Production PCA 2011. Your firmware already contains Windows UEFI CA 2023.\n\nAfter PCA 2011 revocation (AvailableUpdates bit 0x80, including combined value 0x280), restoring this backup can leave Windows unable to start with Secure Boot enabled. Creating a new Rescue Disk reuses this stored backup; it does not update its signature.\n\nBefore applying the revocation, prepare compatible, updated Windows recovery media and verify the decryption fallback. Do not rely on this Rescue Disk to restore a compatible Windows Boot Manager. It remains useful for other VeraCrypt recovery tasks. VeraCrypt could not check the Windows Boot Manager backup in this Rescue Disk against the firmware Secure Boot policy.\n\nCreating or verifying this disk does not establish that its stored Windows Boot Manager is compatible with PCA 2011 revocation (AvailableUpdates bit 0x80, including combined value 0x280). Before applying the revocation, verify your recovery backups and prepare compatible, updated Windows recovery media. + Do you also want to prevent this option from being disabled until Windows restarts?\n\nIf you answer Yes, the option cannot be turned off in VeraCrypt or in the registry, and the VeraCrypt system service cannot be stopped, until Windows restarts. If you need to connect a new device before then, you will have to restart Windows first.\n\nNote: this does not protect against someone who has administrator privileges on this computer, who can, for example, terminate the VeraCrypt system service. + VeraCrypt could not prevent the option "Clear encryption keys from memory if a new device is inserted" from being disabled until Windows restarts.\n\nThe option is enabled, but it can still be disabled. diff --git a/Translations/Language.ko.xml b/Translations/Language.ko.xml index 4b8ed6e08d..8323a69c26 100644 --- a/Translations/Language.ko.xml +++ b/Translations/Language.ko.xml @@ -1740,6 +1740,8 @@ This check covers only the active Windows boot manager. Before revocation, also verify that decryption fallback and rescue backups are compatible. Creating a new VeraCrypt Rescue Disk can reuse an older stored boot-manager backup; creating the disk alone does not establish that backup's compatibility with the revocation. The Windows Boot Manager backup included in this Rescue Disk is signed by Microsoft Windows Production PCA 2011. Your firmware already contains Windows UEFI CA 2023.\n\nAfter PCA 2011 revocation (AvailableUpdates bit 0x80, including combined value 0x280), restoring this backup can leave Windows unable to start with Secure Boot enabled. Creating a new Rescue Disk reuses this stored backup; it does not update its signature.\n\nBefore applying the revocation, prepare compatible, updated Windows recovery media and verify the decryption fallback. Do not rely on this Rescue Disk to restore a compatible Windows Boot Manager. It remains useful for other VeraCrypt recovery tasks. VeraCrypt could not check the Windows Boot Manager backup in this Rescue Disk against the firmware Secure Boot policy.\n\nCreating or verifying this disk does not establish that its stored Windows Boot Manager is compatible with PCA 2011 revocation (AvailableUpdates bit 0x80, including combined value 0x280). Before applying the revocation, verify your recovery backups and prepare compatible, updated Windows recovery media. + Do you also want to prevent this option from being disabled until Windows restarts?\n\nIf you answer Yes, the option cannot be turned off in VeraCrypt or in the registry, and the VeraCrypt system service cannot be stopped, until Windows restarts. If you need to connect a new device before then, you will have to restart Windows first.\n\nNote: this does not protect against someone who has administrator privileges on this computer, who can, for example, terminate the VeraCrypt system service. + VeraCrypt could not prevent the option "Clear encryption keys from memory if a new device is inserted" from being disabled until Windows restarts.\n\nThe option is enabled, but it can still be disabled. diff --git a/Translations/Language.lv.xml b/Translations/Language.lv.xml index b67107a724..bc94f903e1 100644 --- a/Translations/Language.lv.xml +++ b/Translations/Language.lv.xml @@ -1740,6 +1740,8 @@ This check covers only the active Windows boot manager. Before revocation, also verify that decryption fallback and rescue backups are compatible. Creating a new VeraCrypt Rescue Disk can reuse an older stored boot-manager backup; creating the disk alone does not establish that backup's compatibility with the revocation. The Windows Boot Manager backup included in this Rescue Disk is signed by Microsoft Windows Production PCA 2011. Your firmware already contains Windows UEFI CA 2023.\n\nAfter PCA 2011 revocation (AvailableUpdates bit 0x80, including combined value 0x280), restoring this backup can leave Windows unable to start with Secure Boot enabled. Creating a new Rescue Disk reuses this stored backup; it does not update its signature.\n\nBefore applying the revocation, prepare compatible, updated Windows recovery media and verify the decryption fallback. Do not rely on this Rescue Disk to restore a compatible Windows Boot Manager. It remains useful for other VeraCrypt recovery tasks. VeraCrypt could not check the Windows Boot Manager backup in this Rescue Disk against the firmware Secure Boot policy.\n\nCreating or verifying this disk does not establish that its stored Windows Boot Manager is compatible with PCA 2011 revocation (AvailableUpdates bit 0x80, including combined value 0x280). Before applying the revocation, verify your recovery backups and prepare compatible, updated Windows recovery media. + Do you also want to prevent this option from being disabled until Windows restarts?\n\nIf you answer Yes, the option cannot be turned off in VeraCrypt or in the registry, and the VeraCrypt system service cannot be stopped, until Windows restarts. If you need to connect a new device before then, you will have to restart Windows first.\n\nNote: this does not protect against someone who has administrator privileges on this computer, who can, for example, terminate the VeraCrypt system service. + VeraCrypt could not prevent the option "Clear encryption keys from memory if a new device is inserted" from being disabled until Windows restarts.\n\nThe option is enabled, but it can still be disabled. diff --git a/Translations/Language.my.xml b/Translations/Language.my.xml index ed76af3b2f..3b57eb8641 100644 --- a/Translations/Language.my.xml +++ b/Translations/Language.my.xml @@ -1742,6 +1742,8 @@ This check covers only the active Windows boot manager. Before revocation, also verify that decryption fallback and rescue backups are compatible. Creating a new VeraCrypt Rescue Disk can reuse an older stored boot-manager backup; creating the disk alone does not establish that backup's compatibility with the revocation. The Windows Boot Manager backup included in this Rescue Disk is signed by Microsoft Windows Production PCA 2011. Your firmware already contains Windows UEFI CA 2023.\n\nAfter PCA 2011 revocation (AvailableUpdates bit 0x80, including combined value 0x280), restoring this backup can leave Windows unable to start with Secure Boot enabled. Creating a new Rescue Disk reuses this stored backup; it does not update its signature.\n\nBefore applying the revocation, prepare compatible, updated Windows recovery media and verify the decryption fallback. Do not rely on this Rescue Disk to restore a compatible Windows Boot Manager. It remains useful for other VeraCrypt recovery tasks. VeraCrypt could not check the Windows Boot Manager backup in this Rescue Disk against the firmware Secure Boot policy.\n\nCreating or verifying this disk does not establish that its stored Windows Boot Manager is compatible with PCA 2011 revocation (AvailableUpdates bit 0x80, including combined value 0x280). Before applying the revocation, verify your recovery backups and prepare compatible, updated Windows recovery media. + Do you also want to prevent this option from being disabled until Windows restarts?\n\nIf you answer Yes, the option cannot be turned off in VeraCrypt or in the registry, and the VeraCrypt system service cannot be stopped, until Windows restarts. If you need to connect a new device before then, you will have to restart Windows first.\n\nNote: this does not protect against someone who has administrator privileges on this computer, who can, for example, terminate the VeraCrypt system service. + VeraCrypt could not prevent the option "Clear encryption keys from memory if a new device is inserted" from being disabled until Windows restarts.\n\nThe option is enabled, but it can still be disabled. diff --git a/Translations/Language.nb.xml b/Translations/Language.nb.xml index 5a9ef97596..b0941e7834 100644 --- a/Translations/Language.nb.xml +++ b/Translations/Language.nb.xml @@ -1740,6 +1740,8 @@ This check covers only the active Windows boot manager. Before revocation, also verify that decryption fallback and rescue backups are compatible. Creating a new VeraCrypt Rescue Disk can reuse an older stored boot-manager backup; creating the disk alone does not establish that backup's compatibility with the revocation. The Windows Boot Manager backup included in this Rescue Disk is signed by Microsoft Windows Production PCA 2011. Your firmware already contains Windows UEFI CA 2023.\n\nAfter PCA 2011 revocation (AvailableUpdates bit 0x80, including combined value 0x280), restoring this backup can leave Windows unable to start with Secure Boot enabled. Creating a new Rescue Disk reuses this stored backup; it does not update its signature.\n\nBefore applying the revocation, prepare compatible, updated Windows recovery media and verify the decryption fallback. Do not rely on this Rescue Disk to restore a compatible Windows Boot Manager. It remains useful for other VeraCrypt recovery tasks. VeraCrypt could not check the Windows Boot Manager backup in this Rescue Disk against the firmware Secure Boot policy.\n\nCreating or verifying this disk does not establish that its stored Windows Boot Manager is compatible with PCA 2011 revocation (AvailableUpdates bit 0x80, including combined value 0x280). Before applying the revocation, verify your recovery backups and prepare compatible, updated Windows recovery media. + Do you also want to prevent this option from being disabled until Windows restarts?\n\nIf you answer Yes, the option cannot be turned off in VeraCrypt or in the registry, and the VeraCrypt system service cannot be stopped, until Windows restarts. If you need to connect a new device before then, you will have to restart Windows first.\n\nNote: this does not protect against someone who has administrator privileges on this computer, who can, for example, terminate the VeraCrypt system service. + VeraCrypt could not prevent the option "Clear encryption keys from memory if a new device is inserted" from being disabled until Windows restarts.\n\nThe option is enabled, but it can still be disabled. diff --git a/Translations/Language.nl.xml b/Translations/Language.nl.xml index ae80329bd9..92693ebcbf 100644 --- a/Translations/Language.nl.xml +++ b/Translations/Language.nl.xml @@ -1740,6 +1740,8 @@ This check covers only the active Windows boot manager. Before revocation, also verify that decryption fallback and rescue backups are compatible. Creating a new VeraCrypt Rescue Disk can reuse an older stored boot-manager backup; creating the disk alone does not establish that backup's compatibility with the revocation. The Windows Boot Manager backup included in this Rescue Disk is signed by Microsoft Windows Production PCA 2011. Your firmware already contains Windows UEFI CA 2023.\n\nAfter PCA 2011 revocation (AvailableUpdates bit 0x80, including combined value 0x280), restoring this backup can leave Windows unable to start with Secure Boot enabled. Creating a new Rescue Disk reuses this stored backup; it does not update its signature.\n\nBefore applying the revocation, prepare compatible, updated Windows recovery media and verify the decryption fallback. Do not rely on this Rescue Disk to restore a compatible Windows Boot Manager. It remains useful for other VeraCrypt recovery tasks. VeraCrypt could not check the Windows Boot Manager backup in this Rescue Disk against the firmware Secure Boot policy.\n\nCreating or verifying this disk does not establish that its stored Windows Boot Manager is compatible with PCA 2011 revocation (AvailableUpdates bit 0x80, including combined value 0x280). Before applying the revocation, verify your recovery backups and prepare compatible, updated Windows recovery media. + Do you also want to prevent this option from being disabled until Windows restarts?\n\nIf you answer Yes, the option cannot be turned off in VeraCrypt or in the registry, and the VeraCrypt system service cannot be stopped, until Windows restarts. If you need to connect a new device before then, you will have to restart Windows first.\n\nNote: this does not protect against someone who has administrator privileges on this computer, who can, for example, terminate the VeraCrypt system service. + VeraCrypt could not prevent the option "Clear encryption keys from memory if a new device is inserted" from being disabled until Windows restarts.\n\nThe option is enabled, but it can still be disabled. diff --git a/Translations/Language.nn.xml b/Translations/Language.nn.xml index c66fbfae33..a29c1093c6 100644 --- a/Translations/Language.nn.xml +++ b/Translations/Language.nn.xml @@ -1740,6 +1740,8 @@ This check covers only the active Windows boot manager. Before revocation, also verify that decryption fallback and rescue backups are compatible. Creating a new VeraCrypt Rescue Disk can reuse an older stored boot-manager backup; creating the disk alone does not establish that backup's compatibility with the revocation. The Windows Boot Manager backup included in this Rescue Disk is signed by Microsoft Windows Production PCA 2011. Your firmware already contains Windows UEFI CA 2023.\n\nAfter PCA 2011 revocation (AvailableUpdates bit 0x80, including combined value 0x280), restoring this backup can leave Windows unable to start with Secure Boot enabled. Creating a new Rescue Disk reuses this stored backup; it does not update its signature.\n\nBefore applying the revocation, prepare compatible, updated Windows recovery media and verify the decryption fallback. Do not rely on this Rescue Disk to restore a compatible Windows Boot Manager. It remains useful for other VeraCrypt recovery tasks. VeraCrypt could not check the Windows Boot Manager backup in this Rescue Disk against the firmware Secure Boot policy.\n\nCreating or verifying this disk does not establish that its stored Windows Boot Manager is compatible with PCA 2011 revocation (AvailableUpdates bit 0x80, including combined value 0x280). Before applying the revocation, verify your recovery backups and prepare compatible, updated Windows recovery media. + Do you also want to prevent this option from being disabled until Windows restarts?\n\nIf you answer Yes, the option cannot be turned off in VeraCrypt or in the registry, and the VeraCrypt system service cannot be stopped, until Windows restarts. If you need to connect a new device before then, you will have to restart Windows first.\n\nNote: this does not protect against someone who has administrator privileges on this computer, who can, for example, terminate the VeraCrypt system service. + VeraCrypt could not prevent the option "Clear encryption keys from memory if a new device is inserted" from being disabled until Windows restarts.\n\nThe option is enabled, but it can still be disabled. diff --git a/Translations/Language.pl.xml b/Translations/Language.pl.xml index 6b639ab383..38a93886bb 100644 --- a/Translations/Language.pl.xml +++ b/Translations/Language.pl.xml @@ -1740,6 +1740,8 @@ To sprawdzenie obejmuje tylko aktywny Menedżer rozruchu systemu Windows. Przed unieważnieniem certyfikatu sprawdź również zgodność awaryjnego programu rozruchowego używanego po odszyfrowaniu systemu oraz kopii zapasowych na nośnikach ratunkowych. Utworzenie nowego dysku ratunkowego VeraCrypt może ponownie wykorzystać starszą kopię zapasową menedżera rozruchu; samo utworzenie dysku nie gwarantuje zgodności kopii zapasowej z odwołaniem. Kopia zapasowa Menedżera rozruchu systemu Windows zawarta na tym dysku ratunkowym jest podpisana przez Microsoft Windows Production PCA 2011. Oprogramowanie układowe zawiera już Windows UEFI CA 2023.\n\nPo odwołaniu PCA 2011 (bit AvailableUpdates 0x80, łącznie z wartością łączną 0x280), przywrócenie tej kopii zapasowej może uniemożliwić uruchomienie systemu Windows z włączonym Secure Boot. Utworzenie nowego dysku ratunkowego powoduje ponowne wykorzystanie tej zapisanej kopii zapasowej; nie aktualizuje ona jej podpisu.\n\nPrzed odwołaniem przygotuj zgodny, zaktualizowany nośnik odzyskiwania systemu Windows i zweryfikuj awaryjny program rozruchowy używany po odszyfrowaniu systemu. Nie należy polegać na tym dysku ratunkowym w celu przywrócenia zgodnego Menedżera rozruchu systemu Windows. Nadal będzie on przydatny do innych zadań odzyskiwania VeraCrypt. VeraCrypt nie był w stanie zweryfikować kopii zapasowej Menedżera rozruchu systemu Windows, znajdującej się na tym dysku ratunkowym, pod kątem zgodności z zasadami Secure Boot w oprogramowaniu układowym.\n\nUtworzenie lub zweryfikowanie tego dysku nie stanowi potwierdzenia, że zapisany na nim Menedżer rozruchu systemu Windows jest zgodny z mechanizmem unieważniania certyfikatów PCA 2011 (bit 0x80 w parametrze AvailableUpdates, w tym wartość łączna 0x280). Przed zastosowaniem unieważnienia należy zweryfikować posiadane kopie zapasowe służące do odzyskiwania systemu oraz przygotować zgodne, zaktualizowane nośniki odzyskiwania systemu Windows. + Do you also want to prevent this option from being disabled until Windows restarts?\n\nIf you answer Yes, the option cannot be turned off in VeraCrypt or in the registry, and the VeraCrypt system service cannot be stopped, until Windows restarts. If you need to connect a new device before then, you will have to restart Windows first.\n\nNote: this does not protect against someone who has administrator privileges on this computer, who can, for example, terminate the VeraCrypt system service. + VeraCrypt could not prevent the option "Clear encryption keys from memory if a new device is inserted" from being disabled until Windows restarts.\n\nThe option is enabled, but it can still be disabled. diff --git a/Translations/Language.pt-br.xml b/Translations/Language.pt-br.xml index ff8d9bdf3b..3ac78df5a9 100644 --- a/Translations/Language.pt-br.xml +++ b/Translations/Language.pt-br.xml @@ -1740,6 +1740,8 @@ This check covers only the active Windows boot manager. Before revocation, also verify that decryption fallback and rescue backups are compatible. Creating a new VeraCrypt Rescue Disk can reuse an older stored boot-manager backup; creating the disk alone does not establish that backup's compatibility with the revocation. The Windows Boot Manager backup included in this Rescue Disk is signed by Microsoft Windows Production PCA 2011. Your firmware already contains Windows UEFI CA 2023.\n\nAfter PCA 2011 revocation (AvailableUpdates bit 0x80, including combined value 0x280), restoring this backup can leave Windows unable to start with Secure Boot enabled. Creating a new Rescue Disk reuses this stored backup; it does not update its signature.\n\nBefore applying the revocation, prepare compatible, updated Windows recovery media and verify the decryption fallback. Do not rely on this Rescue Disk to restore a compatible Windows Boot Manager. It remains useful for other VeraCrypt recovery tasks. VeraCrypt could not check the Windows Boot Manager backup in this Rescue Disk against the firmware Secure Boot policy.\n\nCreating or verifying this disk does not establish that its stored Windows Boot Manager is compatible with PCA 2011 revocation (AvailableUpdates bit 0x80, including combined value 0x280). Before applying the revocation, verify your recovery backups and prepare compatible, updated Windows recovery media. + Do you also want to prevent this option from being disabled until Windows restarts?\n\nIf you answer Yes, the option cannot be turned off in VeraCrypt or in the registry, and the VeraCrypt system service cannot be stopped, until Windows restarts. If you need to connect a new device before then, you will have to restart Windows first.\n\nNote: this does not protect against someone who has administrator privileges on this computer, who can, for example, terminate the VeraCrypt system service. + VeraCrypt could not prevent the option "Clear encryption keys from memory if a new device is inserted" from being disabled until Windows restarts.\n\nThe option is enabled, but it can still be disabled. diff --git a/Translations/Language.ro.xml b/Translations/Language.ro.xml index e5a14af1cb..a034f5ce2f 100644 --- a/Translations/Language.ro.xml +++ b/Translations/Language.ro.xml @@ -1740,6 +1740,8 @@ This check covers only the active Windows boot manager. Before revocation, also verify that decryption fallback and rescue backups are compatible. Creating a new VeraCrypt Rescue Disk can reuse an older stored boot-manager backup; creating the disk alone does not establish that backup's compatibility with the revocation. The Windows Boot Manager backup included in this Rescue Disk is signed by Microsoft Windows Production PCA 2011. Your firmware already contains Windows UEFI CA 2023.\n\nAfter PCA 2011 revocation (AvailableUpdates bit 0x80, including combined value 0x280), restoring this backup can leave Windows unable to start with Secure Boot enabled. Creating a new Rescue Disk reuses this stored backup; it does not update its signature.\n\nBefore applying the revocation, prepare compatible, updated Windows recovery media and verify the decryption fallback. Do not rely on this Rescue Disk to restore a compatible Windows Boot Manager. It remains useful for other VeraCrypt recovery tasks. VeraCrypt could not check the Windows Boot Manager backup in this Rescue Disk against the firmware Secure Boot policy.\n\nCreating or verifying this disk does not establish that its stored Windows Boot Manager is compatible with PCA 2011 revocation (AvailableUpdates bit 0x80, including combined value 0x280). Before applying the revocation, verify your recovery backups and prepare compatible, updated Windows recovery media. + Do you also want to prevent this option from being disabled until Windows restarts?\n\nIf you answer Yes, the option cannot be turned off in VeraCrypt or in the registry, and the VeraCrypt system service cannot be stopped, until Windows restarts. If you need to connect a new device before then, you will have to restart Windows first.\n\nNote: this does not protect against someone who has administrator privileges on this computer, who can, for example, terminate the VeraCrypt system service. + VeraCrypt could not prevent the option "Clear encryption keys from memory if a new device is inserted" from being disabled until Windows restarts.\n\nThe option is enabled, but it can still be disabled. diff --git a/Translations/Language.ru.xml b/Translations/Language.ru.xml index 03f58e4da5..ac2d0eb5c0 100644 --- a/Translations/Language.ru.xml +++ b/Translations/Language.ru.xml @@ -1740,6 +1740,8 @@ This check covers only the active Windows boot manager. Before revocation, also verify that decryption fallback and rescue backups are compatible. Creating a new VeraCrypt Rescue Disk can reuse an older stored boot-manager backup; creating the disk alone does not establish that backup's compatibility with the revocation. The Windows Boot Manager backup included in this Rescue Disk is signed by Microsoft Windows Production PCA 2011. Your firmware already contains Windows UEFI CA 2023.\n\nAfter PCA 2011 revocation (AvailableUpdates bit 0x80, including combined value 0x280), restoring this backup can leave Windows unable to start with Secure Boot enabled. Creating a new Rescue Disk reuses this stored backup; it does not update its signature.\n\nBefore applying the revocation, prepare compatible, updated Windows recovery media and verify the decryption fallback. Do not rely on this Rescue Disk to restore a compatible Windows Boot Manager. It remains useful for other VeraCrypt recovery tasks. VeraCrypt could not check the Windows Boot Manager backup in this Rescue Disk against the firmware Secure Boot policy.\n\nCreating or verifying this disk does not establish that its stored Windows Boot Manager is compatible with PCA 2011 revocation (AvailableUpdates bit 0x80, including combined value 0x280). Before applying the revocation, verify your recovery backups and prepare compatible, updated Windows recovery media. + Do you also want to prevent this option from being disabled until Windows restarts?\n\nIf you answer Yes, the option cannot be turned off in VeraCrypt or in the registry, and the VeraCrypt system service cannot be stopped, until Windows restarts. If you need to connect a new device before then, you will have to restart Windows first.\n\nNote: this does not protect against someone who has administrator privileges on this computer, who can, for example, terminate the VeraCrypt system service. + VeraCrypt could not prevent the option "Clear encryption keys from memory if a new device is inserted" from being disabled until Windows restarts.\n\nThe option is enabled, but it can still be disabled. diff --git a/Translations/Language.sk.xml b/Translations/Language.sk.xml index 7f1de3adae..361ff54d7d 100644 --- a/Translations/Language.sk.xml +++ b/Translations/Language.sk.xml @@ -1740,6 +1740,8 @@ This check covers only the active Windows boot manager. Before revocation, also verify that decryption fallback and rescue backups are compatible. Creating a new VeraCrypt Rescue Disk can reuse an older stored boot-manager backup; creating the disk alone does not establish that backup's compatibility with the revocation. The Windows Boot Manager backup included in this Rescue Disk is signed by Microsoft Windows Production PCA 2011. Your firmware already contains Windows UEFI CA 2023.\n\nAfter PCA 2011 revocation (AvailableUpdates bit 0x80, including combined value 0x280), restoring this backup can leave Windows unable to start with Secure Boot enabled. Creating a new Rescue Disk reuses this stored backup; it does not update its signature.\n\nBefore applying the revocation, prepare compatible, updated Windows recovery media and verify the decryption fallback. Do not rely on this Rescue Disk to restore a compatible Windows Boot Manager. It remains useful for other VeraCrypt recovery tasks. VeraCrypt could not check the Windows Boot Manager backup in this Rescue Disk against the firmware Secure Boot policy.\n\nCreating or verifying this disk does not establish that its stored Windows Boot Manager is compatible with PCA 2011 revocation (AvailableUpdates bit 0x80, including combined value 0x280). Before applying the revocation, verify your recovery backups and prepare compatible, updated Windows recovery media. + Do you also want to prevent this option from being disabled until Windows restarts?\n\nIf you answer Yes, the option cannot be turned off in VeraCrypt or in the registry, and the VeraCrypt system service cannot be stopped, until Windows restarts. If you need to connect a new device before then, you will have to restart Windows first.\n\nNote: this does not protect against someone who has administrator privileges on this computer, who can, for example, terminate the VeraCrypt system service. + VeraCrypt could not prevent the option "Clear encryption keys from memory if a new device is inserted" from being disabled until Windows restarts.\n\nThe option is enabled, but it can still be disabled. diff --git a/Translations/Language.sl.xml b/Translations/Language.sl.xml index 5c938042d3..45d7fcea1e 100644 --- a/Translations/Language.sl.xml +++ b/Translations/Language.sl.xml @@ -1740,6 +1740,8 @@ This check covers only the active Windows boot manager. Before revocation, also verify that decryption fallback and rescue backups are compatible. Creating a new VeraCrypt Rescue Disk can reuse an older stored boot-manager backup; creating the disk alone does not establish that backup's compatibility with the revocation. The Windows Boot Manager backup included in this Rescue Disk is signed by Microsoft Windows Production PCA 2011. Your firmware already contains Windows UEFI CA 2023.\n\nAfter PCA 2011 revocation (AvailableUpdates bit 0x80, including combined value 0x280), restoring this backup can leave Windows unable to start with Secure Boot enabled. Creating a new Rescue Disk reuses this stored backup; it does not update its signature.\n\nBefore applying the revocation, prepare compatible, updated Windows recovery media and verify the decryption fallback. Do not rely on this Rescue Disk to restore a compatible Windows Boot Manager. It remains useful for other VeraCrypt recovery tasks. VeraCrypt could not check the Windows Boot Manager backup in this Rescue Disk against the firmware Secure Boot policy.\n\nCreating or verifying this disk does not establish that its stored Windows Boot Manager is compatible with PCA 2011 revocation (AvailableUpdates bit 0x80, including combined value 0x280). Before applying the revocation, verify your recovery backups and prepare compatible, updated Windows recovery media. + Do you also want to prevent this option from being disabled until Windows restarts?\n\nIf you answer Yes, the option cannot be turned off in VeraCrypt or in the registry, and the VeraCrypt system service cannot be stopped, until Windows restarts. If you need to connect a new device before then, you will have to restart Windows first.\n\nNote: this does not protect against someone who has administrator privileges on this computer, who can, for example, terminate the VeraCrypt system service. + VeraCrypt could not prevent the option "Clear encryption keys from memory if a new device is inserted" from being disabled until Windows restarts.\n\nThe option is enabled, but it can still be disabled. diff --git a/Translations/Language.sv.xml b/Translations/Language.sv.xml index 50a473dec3..e25fed50ee 100644 --- a/Translations/Language.sv.xml +++ b/Translations/Language.sv.xml @@ -1740,6 +1740,8 @@ This check covers only the active Windows boot manager. Before revocation, also verify that decryption fallback and rescue backups are compatible. Creating a new VeraCrypt Rescue Disk can reuse an older stored boot-manager backup; creating the disk alone does not establish that backup's compatibility with the revocation. The Windows Boot Manager backup included in this Rescue Disk is signed by Microsoft Windows Production PCA 2011. Your firmware already contains Windows UEFI CA 2023.\n\nAfter PCA 2011 revocation (AvailableUpdates bit 0x80, including combined value 0x280), restoring this backup can leave Windows unable to start with Secure Boot enabled. Creating a new Rescue Disk reuses this stored backup; it does not update its signature.\n\nBefore applying the revocation, prepare compatible, updated Windows recovery media and verify the decryption fallback. Do not rely on this Rescue Disk to restore a compatible Windows Boot Manager. It remains useful for other VeraCrypt recovery tasks. VeraCrypt could not check the Windows Boot Manager backup in this Rescue Disk against the firmware Secure Boot policy.\n\nCreating or verifying this disk does not establish that its stored Windows Boot Manager is compatible with PCA 2011 revocation (AvailableUpdates bit 0x80, including combined value 0x280). Before applying the revocation, verify your recovery backups and prepare compatible, updated Windows recovery media. + Do you also want to prevent this option from being disabled until Windows restarts?\n\nIf you answer Yes, the option cannot be turned off in VeraCrypt or in the registry, and the VeraCrypt system service cannot be stopped, until Windows restarts. If you need to connect a new device before then, you will have to restart Windows first.\n\nNote: this does not protect against someone who has administrator privileges on this computer, who can, for example, terminate the VeraCrypt system service. + VeraCrypt could not prevent the option "Clear encryption keys from memory if a new device is inserted" from being disabled until Windows restarts.\n\nThe option is enabled, but it can still be disabled. diff --git a/Translations/Language.th.xml b/Translations/Language.th.xml index cf2d9c0fe8..c6b71a75ad 100644 --- a/Translations/Language.th.xml +++ b/Translations/Language.th.xml @@ -1740,6 +1740,8 @@ This check covers only the active Windows boot manager. Before revocation, also verify that decryption fallback and rescue backups are compatible. Creating a new VeraCrypt Rescue Disk can reuse an older stored boot-manager backup; creating the disk alone does not establish that backup's compatibility with the revocation. The Windows Boot Manager backup included in this Rescue Disk is signed by Microsoft Windows Production PCA 2011. Your firmware already contains Windows UEFI CA 2023.\n\nAfter PCA 2011 revocation (AvailableUpdates bit 0x80, including combined value 0x280), restoring this backup can leave Windows unable to start with Secure Boot enabled. Creating a new Rescue Disk reuses this stored backup; it does not update its signature.\n\nBefore applying the revocation, prepare compatible, updated Windows recovery media and verify the decryption fallback. Do not rely on this Rescue Disk to restore a compatible Windows Boot Manager. It remains useful for other VeraCrypt recovery tasks. VeraCrypt could not check the Windows Boot Manager backup in this Rescue Disk against the firmware Secure Boot policy.\n\nCreating or verifying this disk does not establish that its stored Windows Boot Manager is compatible with PCA 2011 revocation (AvailableUpdates bit 0x80, including combined value 0x280). Before applying the revocation, verify your recovery backups and prepare compatible, updated Windows recovery media. + Do you also want to prevent this option from being disabled until Windows restarts?\n\nIf you answer Yes, the option cannot be turned off in VeraCrypt or in the registry, and the VeraCrypt system service cannot be stopped, until Windows restarts. If you need to connect a new device before then, you will have to restart Windows first.\n\nNote: this does not protect against someone who has administrator privileges on this computer, who can, for example, terminate the VeraCrypt system service. + VeraCrypt could not prevent the option "Clear encryption keys from memory if a new device is inserted" from being disabled until Windows restarts.\n\nThe option is enabled, but it can still be disabled. diff --git a/Translations/Language.tr.xml b/Translations/Language.tr.xml index a17791a4b0..a2d1926390 100644 --- a/Translations/Language.tr.xml +++ b/Translations/Language.tr.xml @@ -1740,6 +1740,8 @@ Bu denetim yalnızca etkin Windows başlatma yöneticisini kapsar. İptali uygulamadan önce, şifre çözme yoluyla kurtarma seçeneğinin ve kurtarma yedeklerinin de uyumlu olduğunu doğrulayın. Yeni bir VeraCrypt kurtarma diski oluşturulurken, saklanmış daha eski bir başlatma yöneticisi yedeği yeniden kullanılabilir; yalnızca diskin oluşturulması, bu yedeğin iptal işlemiyle uyumlu olduğunu kanıtlamaz. Bu kurtarma diskinde bulunan Windows Başlatma Yöneticisi yedeği Microsoft Windows Production PCA 2011 tarafından imzalanmış. Makine yazılımınız zaten Windows UEFI CA 2023 öğesini içeriyor.\n\nPCA 2011 iptalinden sonra (0x280 birleşik değeri de dahil olmak üzere AvailableUpdates değerinin 0x80 biti), bu yedeğin geri yüklenmesi Windows'un Secure Boot etkinken başlatılamamasına neden olabilir. Yeni bir kurtarma diski oluşturulurken saklanmış bu yedek yeniden kullanılır; imzası güncellenmez.\n\nİptali uygulamadan önce, uyumlu ve güncel bir Windows kurtarma ortamı hazırlayın ve şifre çözme yoluyla kurtarma seçeneğini doğrulayın. Uyumlu bir Windows Başlatma Yöneticisini geri yüklemek için bu kurtarma diskine güvenmeyin. Bu disk, diğer VeraCrypt kurtarma işlemleri için kullanılmaya devam edilebilir. VeraCrypt, bu kurtarma diskindeki Windows Başlatma Yöneticisi yedeğini makine yazılımının Secure Boot ilkesine göre denetleyemedi.\n\nBu diskin oluşturulması ya da doğrulanması, içinde saklanan Windows Başlatma Yöneticisinin PCA 2011 iptaliyle (0x280 birleşik değeri de dahil olmak üzere AvailableUpdates değerinin 0x80 biti) uyumlu olduğunu kanıtlamaz. İptali uygulamadan önce kurtarma yedeklerinizi doğrulayın ve uyumlu, güncel bir Windows kurtarma ortamı hazırlayın. + Do you also want to prevent this option from being disabled until Windows restarts?\n\nIf you answer Yes, the option cannot be turned off in VeraCrypt or in the registry, and the VeraCrypt system service cannot be stopped, until Windows restarts. If you need to connect a new device before then, you will have to restart Windows first.\n\nNote: this does not protect against someone who has administrator privileges on this computer, who can, for example, terminate the VeraCrypt system service. + VeraCrypt could not prevent the option "Clear encryption keys from memory if a new device is inserted" from being disabled until Windows restarts.\n\nThe option is enabled, but it can still be disabled. diff --git a/Translations/Language.uk.xml b/Translations/Language.uk.xml index 913836b8c7..d11ed97653 100644 --- a/Translations/Language.uk.xml +++ b/Translations/Language.uk.xml @@ -1740,6 +1740,8 @@ This check covers only the active Windows boot manager. Before revocation, also verify that decryption fallback and rescue backups are compatible. Creating a new VeraCrypt Rescue Disk can reuse an older stored boot-manager backup; creating the disk alone does not establish that backup's compatibility with the revocation. The Windows Boot Manager backup included in this Rescue Disk is signed by Microsoft Windows Production PCA 2011. Your firmware already contains Windows UEFI CA 2023.\n\nAfter PCA 2011 revocation (AvailableUpdates bit 0x80, including combined value 0x280), restoring this backup can leave Windows unable to start with Secure Boot enabled. Creating a new Rescue Disk reuses this stored backup; it does not update its signature.\n\nBefore applying the revocation, prepare compatible, updated Windows recovery media and verify the decryption fallback. Do not rely on this Rescue Disk to restore a compatible Windows Boot Manager. It remains useful for other VeraCrypt recovery tasks. VeraCrypt could not check the Windows Boot Manager backup in this Rescue Disk against the firmware Secure Boot policy.\n\nCreating or verifying this disk does not establish that its stored Windows Boot Manager is compatible with PCA 2011 revocation (AvailableUpdates bit 0x80, including combined value 0x280). Before applying the revocation, verify your recovery backups and prepare compatible, updated Windows recovery media. + Do you also want to prevent this option from being disabled until Windows restarts?\n\nIf you answer Yes, the option cannot be turned off in VeraCrypt or in the registry, and the VeraCrypt system service cannot be stopped, until Windows restarts. If you need to connect a new device before then, you will have to restart Windows first.\n\nNote: this does not protect against someone who has administrator privileges on this computer, who can, for example, terminate the VeraCrypt system service. + VeraCrypt could not prevent the option "Clear encryption keys from memory if a new device is inserted" from being disabled until Windows restarts.\n\nThe option is enabled, but it can still be disabled. diff --git a/Translations/Language.uz.xml b/Translations/Language.uz.xml index c2548477b1..fbdea3d04b 100644 --- a/Translations/Language.uz.xml +++ b/Translations/Language.uz.xml @@ -1740,6 +1740,8 @@ This check covers only the active Windows boot manager. Before revocation, also verify that decryption fallback and rescue backups are compatible. Creating a new VeraCrypt Rescue Disk can reuse an older stored boot-manager backup; creating the disk alone does not establish that backup's compatibility with the revocation. The Windows Boot Manager backup included in this Rescue Disk is signed by Microsoft Windows Production PCA 2011. Your firmware already contains Windows UEFI CA 2023.\n\nAfter PCA 2011 revocation (AvailableUpdates bit 0x80, including combined value 0x280), restoring this backup can leave Windows unable to start with Secure Boot enabled. Creating a new Rescue Disk reuses this stored backup; it does not update its signature.\n\nBefore applying the revocation, prepare compatible, updated Windows recovery media and verify the decryption fallback. Do not rely on this Rescue Disk to restore a compatible Windows Boot Manager. It remains useful for other VeraCrypt recovery tasks. VeraCrypt could not check the Windows Boot Manager backup in this Rescue Disk against the firmware Secure Boot policy.\n\nCreating or verifying this disk does not establish that its stored Windows Boot Manager is compatible with PCA 2011 revocation (AvailableUpdates bit 0x80, including combined value 0x280). Before applying the revocation, verify your recovery backups and prepare compatible, updated Windows recovery media. + Do you also want to prevent this option from being disabled until Windows restarts?\n\nIf you answer Yes, the option cannot be turned off in VeraCrypt or in the registry, and the VeraCrypt system service cannot be stopped, until Windows restarts. If you need to connect a new device before then, you will have to restart Windows first.\n\nNote: this does not protect against someone who has administrator privileges on this computer, who can, for example, terminate the VeraCrypt system service. + VeraCrypt could not prevent the option "Clear encryption keys from memory if a new device is inserted" from being disabled until Windows restarts.\n\nThe option is enabled, but it can still be disabled. diff --git a/Translations/Language.vi.xml b/Translations/Language.vi.xml index e6a937cccf..d8171abdbe 100644 --- a/Translations/Language.vi.xml +++ b/Translations/Language.vi.xml @@ -1740,6 +1740,8 @@ This check covers only the active Windows boot manager. Before revocation, also verify that decryption fallback and rescue backups are compatible. Creating a new VeraCrypt Rescue Disk can reuse an older stored boot-manager backup; creating the disk alone does not establish that backup's compatibility with the revocation. The Windows Boot Manager backup included in this Rescue Disk is signed by Microsoft Windows Production PCA 2011. Your firmware already contains Windows UEFI CA 2023.\n\nAfter PCA 2011 revocation (AvailableUpdates bit 0x80, including combined value 0x280), restoring this backup can leave Windows unable to start with Secure Boot enabled. Creating a new Rescue Disk reuses this stored backup; it does not update its signature.\n\nBefore applying the revocation, prepare compatible, updated Windows recovery media and verify the decryption fallback. Do not rely on this Rescue Disk to restore a compatible Windows Boot Manager. It remains useful for other VeraCrypt recovery tasks. VeraCrypt could not check the Windows Boot Manager backup in this Rescue Disk against the firmware Secure Boot policy.\n\nCreating or verifying this disk does not establish that its stored Windows Boot Manager is compatible with PCA 2011 revocation (AvailableUpdates bit 0x80, including combined value 0x280). Before applying the revocation, verify your recovery backups and prepare compatible, updated Windows recovery media. + Do you also want to prevent this option from being disabled until Windows restarts?\n\nIf you answer Yes, the option cannot be turned off in VeraCrypt or in the registry, and the VeraCrypt system service cannot be stopped, until Windows restarts. If you need to connect a new device before then, you will have to restart Windows first.\n\nNote: this does not protect against someone who has administrator privileges on this computer, who can, for example, terminate the VeraCrypt system service. + VeraCrypt could not prevent the option "Clear encryption keys from memory if a new device is inserted" from being disabled until Windows restarts.\n\nThe option is enabled, but it can still be disabled. diff --git a/Translations/Language.zh-cn.xml b/Translations/Language.zh-cn.xml index f05beb2242..5d37ab07ed 100644 --- a/Translations/Language.zh-cn.xml +++ b/Translations/Language.zh-cn.xml @@ -1741,6 +1741,8 @@ This check covers only the active Windows boot manager. Before revocation, also verify that decryption fallback and rescue backups are compatible. Creating a new VeraCrypt Rescue Disk can reuse an older stored boot-manager backup; creating the disk alone does not establish that backup's compatibility with the revocation. The Windows Boot Manager backup included in this Rescue Disk is signed by Microsoft Windows Production PCA 2011. Your firmware already contains Windows UEFI CA 2023.\n\nAfter PCA 2011 revocation (AvailableUpdates bit 0x80, including combined value 0x280), restoring this backup can leave Windows unable to start with Secure Boot enabled. Creating a new Rescue Disk reuses this stored backup; it does not update its signature.\n\nBefore applying the revocation, prepare compatible, updated Windows recovery media and verify the decryption fallback. Do not rely on this Rescue Disk to restore a compatible Windows Boot Manager. It remains useful for other VeraCrypt recovery tasks. VeraCrypt could not check the Windows Boot Manager backup in this Rescue Disk against the firmware Secure Boot policy.\n\nCreating or verifying this disk does not establish that its stored Windows Boot Manager is compatible with PCA 2011 revocation (AvailableUpdates bit 0x80, including combined value 0x280). Before applying the revocation, verify your recovery backups and prepare compatible, updated Windows recovery media. + Do you also want to prevent this option from being disabled until Windows restarts?\n\nIf you answer Yes, the option cannot be turned off in VeraCrypt or in the registry, and the VeraCrypt system service cannot be stopped, until Windows restarts. If you need to connect a new device before then, you will have to restart Windows first.\n\nNote: this does not protect against someone who has administrator privileges on this computer, who can, for example, terminate the VeraCrypt system service. + VeraCrypt could not prevent the option "Clear encryption keys from memory if a new device is inserted" from being disabled until Windows restarts.\n\nThe option is enabled, but it can still be disabled. diff --git a/Translations/Language.zh-hk.xml b/Translations/Language.zh-hk.xml index 566bce156c..d739721667 100644 --- a/Translations/Language.zh-hk.xml +++ b/Translations/Language.zh-hk.xml @@ -1740,6 +1740,8 @@ This check covers only the active Windows boot manager. Before revocation, also verify that decryption fallback and rescue backups are compatible. Creating a new VeraCrypt Rescue Disk can reuse an older stored boot-manager backup; creating the disk alone does not establish that backup's compatibility with the revocation. The Windows Boot Manager backup included in this Rescue Disk is signed by Microsoft Windows Production PCA 2011. Your firmware already contains Windows UEFI CA 2023.\n\nAfter PCA 2011 revocation (AvailableUpdates bit 0x80, including combined value 0x280), restoring this backup can leave Windows unable to start with Secure Boot enabled. Creating a new Rescue Disk reuses this stored backup; it does not update its signature.\n\nBefore applying the revocation, prepare compatible, updated Windows recovery media and verify the decryption fallback. Do not rely on this Rescue Disk to restore a compatible Windows Boot Manager. It remains useful for other VeraCrypt recovery tasks. VeraCrypt could not check the Windows Boot Manager backup in this Rescue Disk against the firmware Secure Boot policy.\n\nCreating or verifying this disk does not establish that its stored Windows Boot Manager is compatible with PCA 2011 revocation (AvailableUpdates bit 0x80, including combined value 0x280). Before applying the revocation, verify your recovery backups and prepare compatible, updated Windows recovery media. + Do you also want to prevent this option from being disabled until Windows restarts?\n\nIf you answer Yes, the option cannot be turned off in VeraCrypt or in the registry, and the VeraCrypt system service cannot be stopped, until Windows restarts. If you need to connect a new device before then, you will have to restart Windows first.\n\nNote: this does not protect against someone who has administrator privileges on this computer, who can, for example, terminate the VeraCrypt system service. + VeraCrypt could not prevent the option "Clear encryption keys from memory if a new device is inserted" from being disabled until Windows restarts.\n\nThe option is enabled, but it can still be disabled. diff --git a/Translations/Language.zh-tw.xml b/Translations/Language.zh-tw.xml index e739ef654d..e495486353 100644 --- a/Translations/Language.zh-tw.xml +++ b/Translations/Language.zh-tw.xml @@ -1740,6 +1740,8 @@ This check covers only the active Windows boot manager. Before revocation, also verify that decryption fallback and rescue backups are compatible. Creating a new VeraCrypt Rescue Disk can reuse an older stored boot-manager backup; creating the disk alone does not establish that backup's compatibility with the revocation. The Windows Boot Manager backup included in this Rescue Disk is signed by Microsoft Windows Production PCA 2011. Your firmware already contains Windows UEFI CA 2023.\n\nAfter PCA 2011 revocation (AvailableUpdates bit 0x80, including combined value 0x280), restoring this backup can leave Windows unable to start with Secure Boot enabled. Creating a new Rescue Disk reuses this stored backup; it does not update its signature.\n\nBefore applying the revocation, prepare compatible, updated Windows recovery media and verify the decryption fallback. Do not rely on this Rescue Disk to restore a compatible Windows Boot Manager. It remains useful for other VeraCrypt recovery tasks. VeraCrypt could not check the Windows Boot Manager backup in this Rescue Disk against the firmware Secure Boot policy.\n\nCreating or verifying this disk does not establish that its stored Windows Boot Manager is compatible with PCA 2011 revocation (AvailableUpdates bit 0x80, including combined value 0x280). Before applying the revocation, verify your recovery backups and prepare compatible, updated Windows recovery media. + Do you also want to prevent this option from being disabled until Windows restarts?\n\nIf you answer Yes, the option cannot be turned off in VeraCrypt or in the registry, and the VeraCrypt system service cannot be stopped, until Windows restarts. If you need to connect a new device before then, you will have to restart Windows first.\n\nNote: this does not protect against someone who has administrator privileges on this computer, who can, for example, terminate the VeraCrypt system service. + VeraCrypt could not prevent the option "Clear encryption keys from memory if a new device is inserted" from being disabled until Windows restarts.\n\nThe option is enabled, but it can still be disabled. diff --git a/doc/html/en/VeraCrypt RAM Encryption.html b/doc/html/en/VeraCrypt RAM Encryption.html index 26a92816ec..7fe55a46f8 100644 --- a/doc/html/en/VeraCrypt RAM Encryption.html +++ b/doc/html/en/VeraCrypt RAM Encryption.html @@ -144,7 +144,8 @@

Additional Security Measures

Starting from version 1.24, VeraCrypt has integrated a mechanism that detects the insertion of new devices into the system when System Encryption is active. If a new device is inserted, master keys are immediately purged from memory, resulting in a Windows BSOD. This protects against attacks using specialized devices to extract memory from running systems. However, for maximum efficiency, this feature should be paired with RAM encryption.
- To enable this feature, navigate to the menu System -> Settings and check the "Clear encryption keys from memory if a new device is inserted" option. + To enable this feature, navigate to the menu System -> Settings and check the "Clear encryption keys from memory if a new device is inserted" option.
+ When enabling it, you can also choose to prevent the option from being disabled until Windows restarts (if the option is already enabled, uncheck it and check it again to be offered this choice). VeraCrypt then keeps clearing the keys when a new device is inserted, even if the registry value of the option is changed, and its system service cannot be stopped until Windows restarts. This does not protect against someone with administrator privileges, who can for example terminate the VeraCrypt system service.

Technical Limitations with Hibernation and Fast Startup

diff --git a/src/Common/Apidrvr.h b/src/Common/Apidrvr.h index bf9f56a707..358c568acc 100644 --- a/src/Common/Apidrvr.h +++ b/src/Common/Apidrvr.h @@ -130,6 +130,12 @@ #define TC_IOCTL_ABORT_MOUNT_VOLUME TC_IOCTL (44) +// Keeps "clear encryption keys from memory if a new device is inserted" enabled until Windows restarts (cannot be undone) +#define VC_IOCTL_LOCK_CLEAR_KEYS_ON_NEW_DEVICE_INSERTION TC_IOCTL (45) + +// OUT - int (non-zero if VC_IOCTL_LOCK_CLEAR_KEYS_ON_NEW_DEVICE_INSERTION was used since Windows started) +#define VC_IOCTL_IS_CLEAR_KEYS_ON_NEW_DEVICE_INSERTION_LOCKED TC_IOCTL (46) + // Undocumented IOCTL sent by Windows 10 when handling EFS data on volumes #define IOCTL_UNKNOWN_WINDOWS10_EFS_ACCESS 0x455610D8 @@ -448,5 +454,6 @@ typedef struct #define VC_DRIVER_CONFIG_ENABLE_CPU_RNG 0x800 #define VC_DRIVER_CONFIG_ENABLE_RAM_ENCRYPTION 0x1000 #define VC_DRIVER_CONFIG_ENABLE_ORDERED_FLUSH_BARRIERS 0x2000 +#define VC_DRIVER_CONFIG_LOCK_CLEAR_KEYS_ON_NEW_DEVICE_INSERTION 0x4000 #endif /* _WIN32 */ diff --git a/src/Common/BootEncryption.h b/src/Common/BootEncryption.h index 4ce5309db6..0c6096970f 100644 --- a/src/Common/BootEncryption.h +++ b/src/Common/BootEncryption.h @@ -444,6 +444,7 @@ namespace VeraCrypt #define VC_SYSTEM_FAVORITES_SERVICE_CONFIG_FORCE_SET_BOOTNEXT 0x2 #define VC_SYSTEM_FAVORITES_SERVICE_CONFIG_DONT_SET_BOOTENTRY 0x4 #define VC_SYSTEM_FAVORITES_SERVICE_CONFIG_DONT_FORCE_FIRST_BOOTENTRY 0x8 +#define VC_SYSTEM_FAVORITES_SERVICE_CONFIG_SUPERSEDED 0x10 #define VC_WINDOWS_UPGRADE_POSTOOBE_CMDLINE_OPTION L"/PostOOBE" diff --git a/src/Common/Dlgcode.c b/src/Common/Dlgcode.c index f245d693dc..43e6a21413 100644 --- a/src/Common/Dlgcode.c +++ b/src/Common/Dlgcode.c @@ -16735,10 +16735,15 @@ bool OneOfKBsInstalled (const wchar_t* szKBs[], int count) DWORD SendServiceNotification (DWORD dwNotificationCmd) { DWORD dwRet = ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER; + DWORD dwServiceControlCode = 0; // We only support clearing keys on new device insertion if (VC_DRIVER_CONFIG_CLEAR_KEYS_ON_NEW_DEVICE_INSERTION == dwNotificationCmd) + dwServiceControlCode = VC_SERVICE_CONTROL_BUILD_DEVICE_LIST; + else if (VC_SERVICE_CONTROL_LOCK_CLEAR_KEYS_ON_NEW_DEVICE_INSERTION == dwNotificationCmd) + dwServiceControlCode = VC_SERVICE_CONTROL_LOCK_CLEAR_KEYS_ON_NEW_DEVICE_INSERTION; + + if (dwServiceControlCode) { - DWORD dwServiceControlCode = VC_SERVICE_CONTROL_BUILD_DEVICE_LIST; // send this control code to VeraCrypt SystemFavorites service SC_HANDLE hSCManager = OpenSCManager (NULL, NULL, SC_MANAGER_CONNECT); if (hSCManager != NULL) @@ -16764,6 +16769,17 @@ DWORD SendServiceNotification (DWORD dwNotificationCmd) return dwRet; } +BOOL IsClearKeysOnNewDeviceInsertionLocked () +{ + int locked = 0; + DWORD dwResult; + + if (!DeviceIoControl (hDriver, VC_IOCTL_IS_CLEAR_KEYS_ON_NEW_DEVICE_INSERTION_LOCKED, NULL, 0, &locked, sizeof (locked), &dwResult, NULL)) + return FALSE; + + return locked ? TRUE : FALSE; +} + DWORD FastResizeFile (const wchar_t* filePath, __int64 fileSize) { DWORD dwRet = ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER; diff --git a/src/Common/Dlgcode.h b/src/Common/Dlgcode.h index 82e99287cd..a7686fb3eb 100644 --- a/src/Common/Dlgcode.h +++ b/src/Common/Dlgcode.h @@ -116,6 +116,9 @@ enum /* customer service control code to build device list */ #define VC_SERVICE_CONTROL_BUILD_DEVICE_LIST 128 +/* customer service control code to apply VC_DRIVER_CONFIG_LOCK_CLEAR_KEYS_ON_NEW_DEVICE_INSERTION. Every local user can send + custom controls to the service: the action is authorized by the flag, which only an administrator can set */ +#define VC_SERVICE_CONTROL_LOCK_CLEAR_KEYS_ON_NEW_DEVICE_INSERTION 129 #ifndef USER_DEFAULT_SCREEN_DPI #define USER_DEFAULT_SCREEN_DPI 96 @@ -645,6 +648,7 @@ void SafeOpenURL (LPCWSTR szUrl); BitLockerEncryptionStatus GetBitLockerEncryptionStatus(WCHAR driveLetter); BOOL IsTestSigningModeEnabled (); DWORD SendServiceNotification (DWORD dwNotificationCmd); +BOOL IsClearKeysOnNewDeviceInsertionLocked (); DWORD FastResizeFile (const wchar_t* filePath, __int64 fileSize); #if !defined(SETUP) && !defined(VCSDK_DLL) void GetAppRandomSeed (unsigned char* pbRandSeed, size_t cbRandSeed); diff --git a/src/Common/Language.xml b/src/Common/Language.xml index a7e7839747..65c3c37843 100644 --- a/src/Common/Language.xml +++ b/src/Common/Language.xml @@ -1740,6 +1740,8 @@ This check covers only the active Windows boot manager. Before revocation, also verify that decryption fallback and rescue backups are compatible. Creating a new VeraCrypt Rescue Disk can reuse an older stored boot-manager backup; creating the disk alone does not establish that backup's compatibility with the revocation. The Windows Boot Manager backup included in this Rescue Disk is signed by Microsoft Windows Production PCA 2011. Your firmware already contains Windows UEFI CA 2023.\n\nAfter PCA 2011 revocation (AvailableUpdates bit 0x80, including combined value 0x280), restoring this backup can leave Windows unable to start with Secure Boot enabled. Creating a new Rescue Disk reuses this stored backup; it does not update its signature.\n\nBefore applying the revocation, prepare compatible, updated Windows recovery media and verify the decryption fallback. Do not rely on this Rescue Disk to restore a compatible Windows Boot Manager. It remains useful for other VeraCrypt recovery tasks. VeraCrypt could not check the Windows Boot Manager backup in this Rescue Disk against the firmware Secure Boot policy.\n\nCreating or verifying this disk does not establish that its stored Windows Boot Manager is compatible with PCA 2011 revocation (AvailableUpdates bit 0x80, including combined value 0x280). Before applying the revocation, verify your recovery backups and prepare compatible, updated Windows recovery media. + Do you also want to prevent this option from being disabled until Windows restarts?\n\nIf you answer Yes, the option cannot be turned off in VeraCrypt or in the registry, and the VeraCrypt system service cannot be stopped, until Windows restarts. If you need to connect a new device before then, you will have to restart Windows first.\n\nNote: this does not protect against someone who has administrator privileges on this computer, who can, for example, terminate the VeraCrypt system service. + VeraCrypt could not prevent the option "Clear encryption keys from memory if a new device is inserted" from being disabled until Windows restarts.\n\nThe option is enabled, but it can still be disabled. diff --git a/src/Driver/Ntdriver.c b/src/Driver/Ntdriver.c index 5b32992ec1..facea16ad5 100644 --- a/src/Driver/Ntdriver.c +++ b/src/Driver/Ntdriver.c @@ -136,6 +136,7 @@ BOOL CacheBootPassword = FALSE; BOOL CacheBootPim = FALSE; BOOL NonAdminSystemFavoritesAccessDisabled = FALSE; BOOL BlockSystemTrimCommand = FALSE; +static BOOL ClearKeysOnNewDeviceInsertionLocked = FALSE; // set once, cleared only by a restart BOOL AllowWindowsDefrag = FALSE; BOOL EraseKeysOnShutdown = TRUE; // by default, we erase encryption keys on system shutdown static size_t EncryptionThreadPoolFreeCpuCountLimit = 0; @@ -3146,6 +3147,27 @@ NTSTATUS ProcessMainDeviceControlIrp (PDEVICE_OBJECT DeviceObject, PEXTENSION Ex } break; + case VC_IOCTL_LOCK_CLEAR_KEYS_ON_NEW_DEVICE_INSERTION: + if (UserCanAccessDriveDevice()) + { + ClearKeysOnNewDeviceInsertionLocked = TRUE; + Irp->IoStatus.Status = STATUS_SUCCESS; + } + else + Irp->IoStatus.Status = STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED; + + Irp->IoStatus.Information = 0; + break; + + case VC_IOCTL_IS_CLEAR_KEYS_ON_NEW_DEVICE_INSERTION_LOCKED: + if (ValidateIOBufferSize (Irp, sizeof (int), ValidateOutput)) + { + *(int *) Irp->AssociatedIrp.SystemBuffer = ClearKeysOnNewDeviceInsertionLocked ? 1 : 0; + Irp->IoStatus.Information = sizeof (int); + Irp->IoStatus.Status = STATUS_SUCCESS; + } + break; + case VC_IOCTL_ENCRYPTION_QUEUE_PARAMS: if (ValidateIOBufferSize (Irp, sizeof (EncryptionQueueParameters), ValidateOutput)) { @@ -3581,6 +3603,8 @@ LPWSTR TCTranslateCode (ULONG ulCode) TC_CASE_RET_NAME (VC_IOCTL_EMERGENCY_CLEAR_ALL_KEYS); TC_CASE_RET_NAME (VC_IOCTL_IS_RAM_ENCRYPTION_ENABLED); TC_CASE_RET_NAME (VC_IOCTL_ENCRYPTION_QUEUE_PARAMS); + TC_CASE_RET_NAME (VC_IOCTL_LOCK_CLEAR_KEYS_ON_NEW_DEVICE_INSERTION); + TC_CASE_RET_NAME (VC_IOCTL_IS_CLEAR_KEYS_ON_NEW_DEVICE_INSERTION_LOCKED); TC_CASE_RET_NAME (IOCTL_VOLUME_GET_VOLUME_DISK_EXTENTS); @@ -4963,10 +4987,10 @@ NTSTATUS ReadRegistryConfigFlags (BOOL driverEntry) if (flags & VC_DRIVER_CONFIG_BLOCK_SYS_TRIM) BlockSystemTrimCommand = TRUE; - /* clear VC_DRIVER_CONFIG_CLEAR_KEYS_ON_NEW_DEVICE_INSERTION if it is set */ - if (flags & VC_DRIVER_CONFIG_CLEAR_KEYS_ON_NEW_DEVICE_INSERTION) + /* clear VC_DRIVER_CONFIG_CLEAR_KEYS_ON_NEW_DEVICE_INSERTION and its lock request if they are set */ + if (flags & (VC_DRIVER_CONFIG_CLEAR_KEYS_ON_NEW_DEVICE_INSERTION | VC_DRIVER_CONFIG_LOCK_CLEAR_KEYS_ON_NEW_DEVICE_INSERTION)) { - flags ^= VC_DRIVER_CONFIG_CLEAR_KEYS_ON_NEW_DEVICE_INSERTION; + flags &= ~(VC_DRIVER_CONFIG_CLEAR_KEYS_ON_NEW_DEVICE_INSERTION | VC_DRIVER_CONFIG_LOCK_CLEAR_KEYS_ON_NEW_DEVICE_INSERTION); WriteRegistryConfigFlags (flags); } diff --git a/src/Mount/Mount.c b/src/Mount/Mount.c index 400b4e164f..fbc2d4dc25 100644 --- a/src/Mount/Mount.c +++ b/src/Mount/Mount.c @@ -11172,6 +11172,13 @@ static void SystemFavoritesServiceUpdateSetupConfigFile () static void SystemFavoritesServiceUpdateLoaderProcessing (BOOL bForce, const GUID *requestId = NULL) { SystemFavoritesServiceLogInfo (L"SystemFavoritesServiceUpdateLoaderProcessing called"); + // Set by Setup if it could not stop the service (for example while clearing keys on new device insertion is locked): + // this executable is replaced when Windows restarts and must not reinstall its own, older boot loader until then. + if (BootEncObj->ReadServiceConfigurationFlags () & VC_SYSTEM_FAVORITES_SERVICE_CONFIG_SUPERSEDED) + { + SystemFavoritesServiceLogInfo (L"SystemFavoritesServiceUpdateLoaderProcessing skipped: a new version is installed and replaces this executable when Windows restarts"); + return; + } GUID notificationGeneration = {}; DWORD notifications = ReadSetupNotifications (¬ificationGeneration); BootLoaderUpdateResult result = {}; @@ -11307,6 +11314,13 @@ static void SystemFavoritesServiceUpdateLoaderProcessing (BOOL bForce, const GUI // Global vector containing all devices previsouly knwon to the system std::vector g_Devices; +// Once locked, the option stays enabled until Windows restarts, whatever the registry says +static BOOL IsClearKeysOnNewDeviceInsertionEnabled () +{ + return (ReadDriverConfigurationFlags() & VC_DRIVER_CONFIG_CLEAR_KEYS_ON_NEW_DEVICE_INSERTION) + || IsClearKeysOnNewDeviceInsertionLocked (); +} + static DWORD WINAPI SystemFavoritesServiceCtrlHandler ( DWORD dwControl, DWORD dwEventType, LPVOID lpEventData, @@ -11314,8 +11328,16 @@ static DWORD WINAPI SystemFavoritesServiceCtrlHandler ( DWORD dwControl, { switch (dwControl) { - case SERVICE_CONTROL_PRESHUTDOWN: case SERVICE_CONTROL_STOP: + if (IsClearKeysOnNewDeviceInsertionLocked ()) + { + /* the service clears the keys when a new device is inserted: it is stopped only when Windows shuts down */ + SystemFavoritesServiceLogInfo (L"SERVICE_CONTROL_STOP ignored: clearing keys on new device insertion is locked until Windows restarts"); + SystemFavoritesServiceSetStatus (SystemFavoritesServiceStatus.dwCurrentState); + break; + } + // fall through + case SERVICE_CONTROL_PRESHUTDOWN: SystemFavoritesServiceSetStatus (SERVICE_STOP_PENDING); SystemFavoritesServiceUpdateLoaderProcessing (FALSE); @@ -11348,7 +11370,7 @@ static DWORD WINAPI SystemFavoritesServiceCtrlHandler ( DWORD dwControl, { /* build a list of all devices currently connected to the system */ /* ignore if clear keys configuration is already set */ - if (!(ReadDriverConfigurationFlags() & VC_DRIVER_CONFIG_CLEAR_KEYS_ON_NEW_DEVICE_INSERTION)) + if (!IsClearKeysOnNewDeviceInsertionEnabled ()) { SystemFavoritesServiceLogInfo (L"VC_SERVICE_CONTROL_BUILD_DEVICE_LIST received"); g_Devices.clear (); @@ -11356,13 +11378,40 @@ static DWORD WINAPI SystemFavoritesServiceCtrlHandler ( DWORD dwControl, } } break; + case VC_SERVICE_CONTROL_LOCK_CLEAR_KEYS_ON_NEW_DEVICE_INSERTION: + { + /* keep clearing keys on new device insertion enabled, and the service running, until Windows restarts. + Every local user can send this control: an administrator must have requested it in the registry */ + const uint32 required = VC_DRIVER_CONFIG_CLEAR_KEYS_ON_NEW_DEVICE_INSERTION | VC_DRIVER_CONFIG_LOCK_CLEAR_KEYS_ON_NEW_DEVICE_INSERTION; + uint32 flags = ReadDriverConfigurationFlags(); + if ((flags & required) == required) + { + DWORD cbBytesReturned = 0; + if (DeviceIoControl (hDriver, VC_IOCTL_LOCK_CLEAR_KEYS_ON_NEW_DEVICE_INSERTION, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, &cbBytesReturned, NULL)) + { + SystemFavoritesServiceLogInfo (L"Clearing keys on new device insertion is locked until Windows restarts"); + SystemFavoritesServiceStatus.dwControlsAccepted &= ~SERVICE_ACCEPT_STOP; + } + else + SystemFavoritesServiceLogError (L"VC_SERVICE_CONTROL_LOCK_CLEAR_KEYS_ON_NEW_DEVICE_INSERTION failed"); + + try + { + SetDriverConfigurationFlag (VC_DRIVER_CONFIG_LOCK_CLEAR_KEYS_ON_NEW_DEVICE_INSERTION, FALSE); + } + catch (...) { } + } + + SystemFavoritesServiceSetStatus (SystemFavoritesServiceStatus.dwCurrentState); + } + break; case SERVICE_CONTROL_DEVICEEVENT: if (DBT_DEVICEARRIVAL == dwEventType) { DEV_BROADCAST_HDR* pHdr = (DEV_BROADCAST_HDR *) lpEventData; - if (pHdr->dbch_devicetype != DBT_DEVTYP_VOLUME && pHdr->dbch_devicetype != DBT_DEVTYP_HANDLE) + if (pHdr->dbch_devicetype != DBT_DEVTYP_VOLUME && pHdr->dbch_devicetype != DBT_DEVTYP_HANDLE) { - if (ReadDriverConfigurationFlags() & VC_DRIVER_CONFIG_CLEAR_KEYS_ON_NEW_DEVICE_INSERTION) + if (IsClearKeysOnNewDeviceInsertionEnabled ()) { BOOL bClearKeys = TRUE; SystemFavoritesServiceLogInfo (L"SERVICE_CONTROL_DEVICEEVENT - DBT_DEVICEARRIVAL received"); @@ -11469,6 +11518,8 @@ static VOID WINAPI SystemFavoritesServiceMain (DWORD argc, LPTSTR *argv) SystemFavoritesServiceStatus.dwServiceType = SERVICE_WIN32_OWN_PROCESS; SystemFavoritesServiceStatus.dwControlsAccepted = SERVICE_ACCEPT_STOP; SystemFavoritesServiceStatus.dwControlsAccepted |= SERVICE_ACCEPT_PRESHUTDOWN | SERVICE_ACCEPT_SESSIONCHANGE | SERVICE_ACCEPT_POWEREVENT; + if (IsClearKeysOnNewDeviceInsertionLocked ()) + SystemFavoritesServiceStatus.dwControlsAccepted &= ~SERVICE_ACCEPT_STOP; for (i = 1; i < argc; i++) { @@ -11497,6 +11548,14 @@ static VOID WINAPI SystemFavoritesServiceMain (DWORD argc, LPTSTR *argv) SetUnhandledExceptionFilter (SystemFavoritesServiceExceptionHandler); _set_invalid_parameter_handler (SystemFavoritesServiceInvalidParameterHandler); + // The flag concerned the executable that was running when Setup could not stop it + try + { + if (BootEncObj && (BootEncObj->ReadServiceConfigurationFlags () & VC_SYSTEM_FAVORITES_SERVICE_CONFIG_SUPERSEDED)) + BootEncObj->SetServiceConfigurationFlag (VC_SYSTEM_FAVORITES_SERVICE_CONFIG_SUPERSEDED, false); + } + catch (...) { } + if (bUpdateLoader) { SystemFavoritesServiceSetStatus (SERVICE_START_PENDING, 120000); @@ -13954,10 +14013,12 @@ static BOOL CALLBACK BootLoaderPreferencesDlgProc (HWND hwndDlg, UINT msg, WPARA static std::string platforminfo; static uint8 currentUserConfig; static string currentCustomUserMessage; + static BOOL bLockClearKeys; switch (msg) { case WM_INITDIALOG: + bLockClearKeys = FALSE; { BootEncryptionStatus bootEncStatus = BootEncObj->GetStatus(); if (!bootEncStatus.DriveMounted) @@ -14045,6 +14106,12 @@ static BOOL CALLBACK BootLoaderPreferencesDlgProc (HWND hwndDlg, UINT msg, WPARA EnableWindow (GetDlgItem (hwndDlg, IDC_BOOT_LOADER_CACHE_PIM), bPasswordCacheEnabled); CheckDlgButton (hwndDlg, IDC_BOOT_LOADER_CACHE_PIM, (bPasswordCacheEnabled && bPimCacheEnabled)? BST_CHECKED : BST_UNCHECKED); CheckDlgButton (hwndDlg, IDC_CLEAR_KEYS_ON_NEW_DEVICE_INSERTION, bClearKeysEnabled? BST_CHECKED : BST_UNCHECKED); + if (IsClearKeysOnNewDeviceInsertionLocked ()) + { + // locked until Windows restarts: the option cannot be disabled + CheckDlgButton (hwndDlg, IDC_CLEAR_KEYS_ON_NEW_DEVICE_INSERTION, BST_CHECKED); + EnableWindow (GetDlgItem (hwndDlg, IDC_CLEAR_KEYS_ON_NEW_DEVICE_INSERTION), FALSE); + } if (bIsHiddenOS) { @@ -14186,6 +14253,8 @@ static BOOL CALLBACK BootLoaderPreferencesDlgProc (HWND hwndDlg, UINT msg, WPARA BOOL bPimCacheEnabled = IsDlgButtonChecked (hwndDlg, IDC_BOOT_LOADER_CACHE_PIM); BOOL bBlockSysEncTrimEnabled = IsDlgButtonChecked (hwndDlg, IDC_BLOCK_SYSENC_TRIM); BOOL bClearKeysEnabled = IsDlgButtonChecked (hwndDlg, IDC_CLEAR_KEYS_ON_NEW_DEVICE_INSERTION); + // when locked, the option cannot be changed and the service needs no notification + BOOL bClearKeysLocked = IsClearKeysOnNewDeviceInsertionLocked (); BOOL bAutoFixBootloader = IsDlgButtonChecked (hwndDlg, IDC_UPDATE_BOOTLOADER_ON_SHUTDOWN); BOOL bForceVeraCryptNextBoot = FALSE; @@ -14205,7 +14274,8 @@ static BOOL CALLBACK BootLoaderPreferencesDlgProc (HWND hwndDlg, UINT msg, WPARA std::string techInfo = SRC_POS; techInfo += "\nIsSystemFavoritesServiceRunning = False."; ReportUnexpectedState (techInfo.c_str()); - return 1; + if (!bClearKeysLocked) + return 1; } // only write boot configuration if something changed @@ -14215,7 +14285,7 @@ static BOOL CALLBACK BootLoaderPreferencesDlgProc (HWND hwndDlg, UINT msg, WPARA SetDriverConfigurationFlag (TC_DRIVER_CONFIG_CACHE_BOOT_PASSWORD, bPasswordCacheEnabled); SetDriverConfigurationFlag (TC_DRIVER_CONFIG_CACHE_BOOT_PIM, (bPasswordCacheEnabled && bPimCacheEnabled)? TRUE : FALSE); SetDriverConfigurationFlag (TC_DRIVER_CONFIG_DISABLE_EVIL_MAID_ATTACK_DETECTION, IsDlgButtonChecked (hwndDlg, IDC_DISABLE_EVIL_MAID_ATTACK_DETECTION)); - if (bClearKeysEnabled) + if (bClearKeysEnabled && !bClearKeysLocked) NotifyService (VC_DRIVER_CONFIG_CLEAR_KEYS_ON_NEW_DEVICE_INSERTION); SetDriverConfigurationFlag (VC_DRIVER_CONFIG_CLEAR_KEYS_ON_NEW_DEVICE_INSERTION, bClearKeysEnabled); SetServiceConfigurationFlag (VC_SYSTEM_FAVORITES_SERVICE_CONFIG_DONT_UPDATE_LOADER, bAutoFixBootloader? FALSE : TRUE); @@ -14242,6 +14312,30 @@ static BOOL CALLBACK BootLoaderPreferencesDlgProc (HWND hwndDlg, UINT msg, WPARA return 1; } + // last, so that a failure does not prevent the other settings from being saved + if (bLockClearKeys && IsDlgButtonChecked (hwndDlg, IDC_CLEAR_KEYS_ON_NEW_DEVICE_INSERTION) + && !IsClearKeysOnNewDeviceInsertionLocked ()) + { + try + { + SetDriverConfigurationFlag (VC_DRIVER_CONFIG_LOCK_CLEAR_KEYS_ON_NEW_DEVICE_INSERTION, TRUE); + NotifyService (VC_SERVICE_CONTROL_LOCK_CLEAR_KEYS_ON_NEW_DEVICE_INSERTION); + } + catch (Exception &) { } + + if (!IsClearKeysOnNewDeviceInsertionLocked ()) + { + // The request must not stay for a later control to the service + try + { + SetDriverConfigurationFlag (VC_DRIVER_CONFIG_LOCK_CLEAR_KEYS_ON_NEW_DEVICE_INSERTION, FALSE); + } + catch (Exception &) { } + + Error ("CLEAR_KEYS_ON_DEVICE_INSERTION_LOCK_FAILED", hwndDlg); + } + } + EndDialog (hwndDlg, lw); return 1; } @@ -14291,8 +14385,13 @@ static BOOL CALLBACK BootLoaderPreferencesDlgProc (HWND hwndDlg, UINT msg, WPARA CheckDlgButton (hwndDlg, IDC_CLEAR_KEYS_ON_NEW_DEVICE_INSERTION, BST_UNCHECKED); } else + { Warning ("CLEAR_KEYS_ON_DEVICE_INSERTION_WARNING", hwndDlg); + bLockClearKeys = (AskWarnNoYes ("CLEAR_KEYS_ON_DEVICE_INSERTION_LOCK_PROMPT", hwndDlg) == IDYES); + } } + else + bLockClearKeys = FALSE; break; diff --git a/src/Setup/Setup.c b/src/Setup/Setup.c index 23ed2b40b2..0785aa2a23 100644 --- a/src/Setup/Setup.c +++ b/src/Setup/Setup.c @@ -993,7 +993,11 @@ BOOL DoFilesInstall (HWND hwndDlg, wchar_t *szDestDir) #endif // The executable of a service that cannot be stopped is replaced when Windows restarts. if (!StartStopService (hwndDlg, TC_SYSTEM_FAVORITES_SERVICE_NAME, FALSE, 0, NULL)) + { bRestartRequired = TRUE; // The previous executable runs until then + // and must not reinstall its own, older boot loader + try { BootEncObj.SetServiceConfigurationFlag (VC_SYSTEM_FAVORITES_SERVICE_CONFIG_SUPERSEDED, true); } catch (...) { } + } DWORD copyError = SetupService::UpdateExecutable (szTmp, servicePath); if (copyError == ERROR_SUCCESS) { diff --git a/src/SetupDLL/Setup.c b/src/SetupDLL/Setup.c index 2e65bef3ce..a5d48fbb67 100644 --- a/src/SetupDLL/Setup.c +++ b/src/SetupDLL/Setup.c @@ -2924,6 +2924,9 @@ EXTERN_C UINT STDAPICALLTYPE VC_CustomAction_PostInstall(MSIHANDLE hInstaller) bootLoaderServiceError = GetLastError () ? GetLastError () : ERROR_GEN_FAILURE; MSILog (hInstaller, MSI_WARNING_LEVEL, L"VC_CustomAction_PostInstall: failed to stop %s. Error 0x%.8X", TC_SYSTEM_FAVORITES_SERVICE_NAME, bootLoaderServiceError); bRestartRequired = TRUE; // The previous executable runs until then + // and must not reinstall its own, older boot loader + try { BootEncObj.SetServiceConfigurationFlag (VC_SYSTEM_FAVORITES_SERVICE_CONFIG_SUPERSEDED, true); } + catch (...) { MSILog (hInstaller, MSI_WARNING_LEVEL, L"VC_CustomAction_PostInstall: failed to mark the previous service executable as superseded"); } } DWORD copyError = SetupService::UpdateExecutable (szTmp, servicePath); bootLoaderResultError = copyError;