diff --git a/fact/src/host_scanner.rs b/fact/src/host_scanner.rs
index 86658de2..d1f86a6a 100644
--- a/fact/src/host_scanner.rs
+++ b/fact/src/host_scanner.rs
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ use std::{
     io,
     ops::{Deref, DerefMut},
     os::linux::fs::MetadataExt,
-    path::{Path, PathBuf},
+    path::{Component, Path, PathBuf},
     sync::Arc,
     time::Duration,
 };
@@ -122,6 +122,41 @@ pub struct HostScanner {
     metrics: HostScannerMetrics,
 }
 
+/// Return the literal directory root of a glob pattern.
+///
+/// This is the run of components before the first glob metacharacter
+/// (`/host/root/**` -> `/host/root`). A fully literal pattern has no
+/// such boundary, so its leaf is dropped to yield the parent directory
+/// (`/etc/passwd` -> `/etc`). Pure path computation, no filesystem access.
+fn pattern_root(path: &Path) -> Option<PathBuf> {
+    let is_glob = |c: &Component| {
+        c.as_os_str()
+            .to_string_lossy()
+            .contains(['*', '?', '[', '{'])
+    };
+
+    if path.components().any(|c| is_glob(&c)) {
+        Some(path.components().take_while(|c| !is_glob(c)).collect())
+    } else {
+        path.parent().map(Path::to_path_buf)
+    }
+}
+
+/// Return the non-glob root of a pattern when it resolves to a symlink.
+///
+/// glob expansion skips the symlink root of a recursive pattern
+/// (e.g. `/host/root/**` where `/host/root -> var/roothome`), leaving the
+/// target directory inode untracked. Returning it here lets the scan loop
+/// process it like any other symlink entry so direct children are seen
+/// (ROX-36737).
+fn symlink_pattern_root(path: &Path) -> Option<PathBuf> {
+    let root = pattern_root(path)?;
+    root.symlink_metadata()
+        .ok()
+        .filter(Metadata::is_symlink)
+        .map(|_| root)
+}
+
 impl HostScanner {
     pub fn new(
         bpf: &mut Bpf,
@@ -192,7 +227,15 @@ impl HostScanner {
             bail!("invalid path {}", path.display());
         };
 
-        for entry in glob::glob(glob_str)? {
+        // glob does not return the non-glob root of a recursive pattern,
+        // so seed it explicitly to cover symlink roots (ROX-36737).
+        let symlink_root = symlink_pattern_root(path);
+
+        for entry in symlink_root
+            .map(Ok)
+            .into_iter()
+            .chain(glob::glob(glob_str)?)
+        {
             let path = match entry {
                 Ok(p) => p,
                 Err(e) => {
@@ -701,3 +744,33 @@ You can increase this limit with:
         });
     }
 }
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+
+    #[test]
+    fn pattern_root_extracts_literal_prefix() {
+        let cases = [
+            ("/host/root/**", Some("/host/root"), "recursive wildcard"),
+            ("/etc/*.conf", Some("/etc"), "single-star glob"),
+            ("/host/ro*t/x", Some("/host"), "mid-component wildcard"),
+            ("/data/[abc]/x", Some("/data"), "character class"),
+            ("/data/{a,b}/x", Some("/data"), "brace alternation"),
+            ("/data/f?le", Some("/data"), "question mark"),
+            ("/a/b/file", Some("/a/b"), "fully literal drops leaf"),
+            ("/foo", Some("/"), "literal under root"),
+            ("foo", Some(""), "relative literal single component"),
+            ("*.conf", Some(""), "wildcard in first component"),
+            ("/", None, "root has no parent"),
+        ];
+
+        for (pattern, expected, description) in cases {
+            assert_eq!(
+                pattern_root(Path::new(pattern)).as_deref(),
+                expected.map(Path::new),
+                "Failed for {description}: {pattern}"
+            );
+        }
+    }
+}
diff --git a/tests/test_path_symlink.py b/tests/test_path_symlink.py
index 94fb1afb..0712694b 100644
--- a/tests/test_path_symlink.py
+++ b/tests/test_path_symlink.py
@@ -3,9 +3,12 @@
 import os
 import re
 import subprocess
+from pathlib import Path
+from time import sleep
 
 import docker.models.containers
 import pytest
+import yaml
 
 from event import Event, EventType, Process
 from server import EventServer
@@ -312,6 +315,60 @@ def test_follow_symlink_to_dir_relative(
     )
 
 
+def test_configured_relative_symlink_root_tracks_direct_child(
+    tmp_path: Path,
+    fact: docker.models.containers.Container,
+    fact_config: tuple[dict, str],
+    server: EventServer,
+):
+    """
+    A relative symlink used as a recursive configured path should track files
+    created directly beneath its target.
+
+    This models an RHCOS node, where /root is a relative symlink to
+    var/roothome. With /root/** configured, a containerized Fact scans
+    /host/root/**, which resolves into /host/var/roothome. The scan must seed
+    the target directory inode so that a node process creating, for example,
+    /root/direct-child.txt is reported with the resolved file path
+    /var/roothome/direct-child.txt and the configured host path
+    /root/direct-child.txt. Without that inode, creation of a direct child is
+    missed even though it is within the configured recursive path.
+
+    This is distinct from test_follow_symlink_to_dir_relative: the symlink is
+    present when the host scanner reads the configuration, rather than being
+    created below a directory whose inode is already monitored.
+    """
+    symlink_parent = tmp_path / 'symlink-parent'
+    target = tmp_path / 'target'
+    symlink_parent.mkdir()
+    target.mkdir()
+
+    link = symlink_parent / 'watched'
+    link.symlink_to(os.path.relpath(target, symlink_parent))
+
+    config, config_file = fact_config
+    config['paths'] = [f'{link}/**']
+    with open(config_file, 'w') as f:
+        yaml.dump(config, f)
+    fact.kill('SIGHUP')
+    sleep(0.5)
+
+    file_via_link = link / 'direct-child.txt'
+    with open(file_via_link, 'w') as f:
+        f.write('This should be captured')
+
+    server.wait_events(
+        [
+            Event(
+                process=Process.from_proc(),
+                event_type=EventType.CREATION,
+                file=str(target / file_via_link.name),
+                host_path=str(file_via_link),
+            )
+        ]
+    )
+
+
 def test_overwrite_symlink(monitored_dir: str, server: EventServer):
     """
     Test overwriting a symlink in a monitored directory is properly captured.