Merge pull request #386 from corbitsdev/cl-5662-project-grants-never-match-subagent-worktree

Fix project-scoped grants never matching sub-agent worktree requests

Author: TheGreatAxios

src/permission/authz-grants.ts

@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ import { evaluateGrants, type GrantRule } from "@intx/authz";
 
 import type { Approval } from "./types.js";
 import { matchesPattern } from "./matcher.js";
+import { realpathOr } from "./worktree-roots.js";
 
 // Exact-escaped patterns (backslash before metacharacters) cannot round-trip
 // through @intx/authz matchPattern, so those grants are filtered out of the
@@ -25,12 +26,48 @@ export function approvalToGrantRule(approval: Approval, index: number): GrantRul
   };
 }
 
+// The gate's own project boundary: the session root it was constructed with,
+// plus every git worktree registered against that root (which, per CL-4929,
+// may live outside the root entirely — a sibling directory, not a
+// subdirectory). Built once per gate from its closed-over resolvedCwd and
+// rootsProvider and threaded through — never accept one built anywhere else,
+// or "same project" quietly stops meaning "same gate's project."
+export type GrantWorkspace = { resolvedCwd: string; roots: readonly string[] };
+
+// A project-scoped grant (Approval.cwd set) is confined to the session that
+// minted it: it may replay only for a request whose cwd is that same session
+// root, or one of the root's registered worktrees. A worktree cwd never
+// equals the session root by string identity (that's the bug this closes),
+// so membership is resolved through `workspace` instead of a bare `===`.
+//
+// `grantCwd !== workspace.resolvedCwd` is the boundary: a grant stamped with
+// some OTHER project's root is rejected before roots are ever consulted, so
+// a request cwd that happens to coincide with a different project's worktree
+// can never match. Membership within a matching project is exact equality
+// against the resolved roots, never a path-prefix — a prefix check would let
+// a maliciously named sibling directory (`/repo/wt-1-evil`) match a
+// legitimate root (`/repo/wt-1`). `workspace.roots` already comes back
+// realpath-resolved (see worktree-roots.ts); `requestCwd` is realpath'd here
+// so a symlinked checkout (macOS /tmp vs /private/tmp) still compares equal.
+export function cwdMatchesGrant(
+  grantCwd: string | undefined,
+  requestCwd: string | undefined,
+  workspace: GrantWorkspace,
+): boolean {
+  if (grantCwd === undefined) return true;
+  if (requestCwd === undefined) return false;
+  if (grantCwd === requestCwd) return true;
+  if (grantCwd !== workspace.resolvedCwd) return false;
+  return workspace.roots.includes(realpathOr(requestCwd));
+}
+
 export type EvaluateApprovalsInput = {
   tool: string;
   subject: string;
   approvals: readonly Approval[];
   activeProviderModel?: string | undefined;
   requestCwd?: string | undefined;
+  workspace: GrantWorkspace;
 };
 
 // Grant-store evaluation via @intx/authz. Filters provider-model and cwd the
@@ -39,12 +76,12 @@ export type EvaluateApprovalsInput = {
 // matchesPattern (equality after unescape) first so a stored exact command is
 // never lost.
 export async function evaluateApprovals(input: EvaluateApprovalsInput): Promise<boolean> {
-  const { tool, subject, approvals, activeProviderModel, requestCwd } = input;
+  const { tool, subject, approvals, activeProviderModel, requestCwd, workspace } = input;
   const scoped = approvals.filter(
     (a) =>
       a.tool === tool &&
       (a.providerModel === undefined || a.providerModel === activeProviderModel) &&
-      (a.cwd === undefined || a.cwd === requestCwd),
+      cwdMatchesGrant(a.cwd, requestCwd, workspace),
   );
   if (scoped.length === 0) return false;
 

src/permission/gate.test.ts

@@ -60,7 +60,9 @@ describe("preGrantGuardReason / isRequestCoveredByGrant guard parity", () => {
         cwd,
       };
       const grant: Approval = { tool: "run_shell", pattern: command };
-      expect(isRequestCoveredByGrant(request, grant, undefined, isRestricted)).toBe(false);
+      expect(
+        isRequestCoveredByGrant(request, grant, undefined, isRestricted, { resolvedCwd: cwd, roots: [] }),
+      ).toBe(false);
     });
 
     test(`${name}: evaluate() never allows outright`, async () => {
@@ -85,7 +87,9 @@ describe("preGrantGuardReason / isRequestCoveredByGrant guard parity", () => {
     };
     expect(preGrantGuardReason(request, isRestricted)).toBeUndefined();
     const grant: Approval = { tool: "run_shell", pattern: "npm test" };
-    expect(isRequestCoveredByGrant(request, grant, undefined, isRestricted)).toBe(true);
+    expect(
+      isRequestCoveredByGrant(request, grant, undefined, isRestricted, { resolvedCwd: cwd, roots: [] }),
+    ).toBe(true);
   });
 });
 
@@ -122,7 +126,12 @@ describe("grant coverage rebinds relative paths to the request process cwd", ()
       cwd: agentCwd,
     };
     const grant: Approval = { tool: "run_shell", pattern: "cat *" };
-    expect(isRequestCoveredByGrant(request, grant, undefined, sessionRestricted)).toBe(false);
+    expect(
+      isRequestCoveredByGrant(request, grant, undefined, sessionRestricted, {
+        resolvedCwd: sessionCwd,
+        roots: [],
+      }),
+    ).toBe(false);
   });
 
   test("a relative path inside the registered worktree is not forced-restricted", () => {
@@ -135,6 +144,11 @@ describe("grant coverage rebinds relative paths to the request process cwd", ()
       cwd: agentCwd,
     };
     const grant: Approval = { tool: "run_shell", pattern: "cat *" };
-    expect(isRequestCoveredByGrant(request, grant, undefined, sessionRestricted)).toBe(true);
+    expect(
+      isRequestCoveredByGrant(request, grant, undefined, sessionRestricted, {
+        resolvedCwd: sessionCwd,
+        roots: [],
+      }),
+    ).toBe(true);
   });
 });

src/permission/gate.ts

@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ import { autoShellRuleForCall } from "./auto-shell-policy.js";
 import { commandReferencesSensitivePath } from "../plugins/secret-guard-plugin.js";
 import { runShellAuthzBlockReason } from "../shell/run-shell-authz.js";
 import { matchesPattern, escapeGlobLiteral } from "./matcher.js";
-import { evaluateApprovals } from "./authz-grants.js";
+import { evaluateApprovals, cwdMatchesGrant, type GrantWorkspace } from "./authz-grants.js";
 import { splitChainedCommand, tokenize, isShellCommentOnly, stripCommentLines } from "./command.js";
 import { createPathRestriction } from "./path-restriction.js";
 import { createWorktreeRootsProvider, type RootsProvider } from "./worktree-roots.js";
@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ function hasExactFullCommandGrant(
   approvals: readonly Approval[],
   activeProviderModel: string | undefined,
   requestCwd: string | undefined,
+  workspace: GrantWorkspace,
 ): boolean {
   // Comment-insensitive: a model-authored "# why" line prepended to an
   // otherwise-identical command must still replay against a grant minted
@@ -62,7 +63,7 @@ function hasExactFullCommandGrant(
       a.tool === tool &&
       a.pattern === normalized &&
       (a.providerModel === undefined || a.providerModel === activeProviderModel) &&
-      (a.cwd === undefined || a.cwd === requestCwd),
+      cwdMatchesGrant(a.cwd, requestCwd, workspace),
   );
 }
 
@@ -142,9 +143,10 @@ export function isRequestCoveredByGrant(
   approval: Approval,
   activeProviderModel: string | undefined,
   isRestricted: (path: string, isWrite: boolean) => boolean,
+  workspace: GrantWorkspace,
 ): boolean {
   if (request.tool !== approval.tool) return false;
-  if (approval.cwd !== undefined && approval.cwd !== request.cwd) return false;
+  if (!cwdMatchesGrant(approval.cwd, request.cwd, workspace)) return false;
   if (
     approval.providerModel !== undefined &&
     approval.providerModel !== activeProviderModel
@@ -268,11 +270,15 @@ export function createPermissionGate(options: PermissionGateOptions): Permission
   const { requestApproval, persist, interactive, skipPermissions, providerName, model, cwd } = options;
   const mcpTiers = options.mcpTiers ?? createMcpToolPermissionRegistry();
   const resolvedCwd = cwd ?? process.cwd();
-  const pathRestriction = createPathRestriction(
-    resolvedCwd,
-    options.rootsProvider ?? createWorktreeRootsProvider(resolvedCwd),
-  );
+  const rootsProvider = options.rootsProvider ?? createWorktreeRootsProvider(resolvedCwd);
+  const pathRestriction = createPathRestriction(resolvedCwd, rootsProvider);
   const isRestricted = pathRestriction.isRestricted;
+  // This gate's project boundary for grant matching (see cwdMatchesGrant):
+  // this session's root plus its currently-known registered worktrees. Built
+  // fresh per read from the same rootsProvider the gate already uses for
+  // path containment, so "same project" for a grant and "inside the
+  // workspace" for a path share one authority.
+  const grantWorkspace = (): GrantWorkspace => ({ resolvedCwd, roots: rootsProvider() });
   let auto = options.auto;
   // Own a private copy so evaluating a grant never mutates the caller's array.
   const approvals: Approval[] = [...options.approvals];
@@ -309,7 +315,7 @@ export function createPermissionGate(options: PermissionGateOptions): Permission
       persist?.(approval, grant);
     }
     options.onGrant?.(approval, (request) =>
-      isRequestCoveredByGrant(request, approval, activeProviderModel, isRestricted),
+      isRequestCoveredByGrant(request, approval, activeProviderModel, isRestricted, grantWorkspace()),
     );
   };
 
@@ -405,7 +411,14 @@ export function createPermissionGate(options: PermissionGateOptions): Permission
           !fullReferencesSecret &&
           !commandTargetsRestricted(fullCommand, isRestrictedHere) &&
           segments.length > 1 &&
-          hasExactFullCommandGrant(request.tool, fullCommand, approvals, activeProviderModel, effectiveCwd)
+          hasExactFullCommandGrant(
+            request.tool,
+            fullCommand,
+            approvals,
+            activeProviderModel,
+            effectiveCwd,
+            grantWorkspace(),
+          )
         ) {
           continue;
         }
@@ -432,6 +445,7 @@ export function createPermissionGate(options: PermissionGateOptions): Permission
               approvals,
               activeProviderModel,
               requestCwd: effectiveCwd,
+              workspace: grantWorkspace(),
             })
           ) {
             continue;
@@ -502,6 +516,7 @@ export function createPermissionGate(options: PermissionGateOptions): Permission
         approvals,
         activeProviderModel,
         requestCwd: effectiveCwd,
+        workspace: grantWorkspace(),
       });
       if (alreadyApproved) {
         continue;