diff --git a/docs/config-reference.md b/docs/config-reference.md
index 5ac594f3..3a1c63ce 100644
--- a/docs/config-reference.md
+++ b/docs/config-reference.md
@@ -3114,7 +3114,7 @@ These flags override config file settings:
 | `--no-idle-logout`            | Keep authenticated sessions alive past the idle timeout for long-running agents                |
 | `--yolo [pattern]`            | Auto-approve tool calls matching pattern (e.g., `allow:read,write` or `deny:delete`)           |
 | `--allowed-tools <patterns>`  | Only offer and authorize these tools this run; comma-separated or repeated (e.g. `read_file,run_command(git:*)`). A run-only restriction on top of every configured policy: never saved, never widened by a local or extension allowlist |
-| `--disallowed-tools <patterns>` | Never offer or authorize these tools this run. Matched on the tool the model names, before capability mapping, so `delete_path` stays blocked even when unrestricted. Applies to MCP and delegated tools too |
+| `--disallowed-tools <patterns>` | Never offer or authorize these tools this run. A bare `*` denies every tool, including automatic specialist dispatch. Matched on the tool the model names, before capability mapping, so `delete_path` stays blocked even when unrestricted. Applies to MCP and delegated tools too |
 | `--timeout <seconds>`         | Time window for `--yolo` auto-approval; when it ends, the permission settings from before `--yolo` return and normal approval resumes |
 | `--max-requests <n>`          | Stop the run after this many model requests, sub-agents included; the turn fails with the limit named and exit code 1 in command mode |
 | `--max-tokens <n>`            | Stop the run once reported token usage reaches this total, sub-agents included                  |
diff --git a/src/core/agent.ts b/src/core/agent.ts
index 99e875e9..04aa2712 100644
--- a/src/core/agent.ts
+++ b/src/core/agent.ts
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
  * Copyright 2025 Autohand AI LLC
  * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
  */
+import { checkRunToolScopeByName, resolveRunToolScope } from '../permissions/runToolScope.js';
 import chalk from 'chalk';
 import { areProviderBackgroundCallsEnabled } from './agent/AutohandOrchestration.js';
 import { selectCodeModeTools } from './agent/CodeModeRunner.js';
@@ -1527,6 +1528,7 @@ export class AutohandAgent {
   }
 
   private async prepareSpecialists(instruction: string): Promise<string | undefined> {
+    if (!checkRunToolScopeByName(resolveRunToolScope(this.runtime.options), 'orchestrate_specialists').allowed) return undefined;
     if (getFeatureState(this.runtime.config, 'automatic_specialists')?.enabled !== true) {
       return undefined;
     }
diff --git a/src/modes/acp/adapter.ts b/src/modes/acp/adapter.ts
index cda1e9fd..205e4e2a 100644
--- a/src/modes/acp/adapter.ts
+++ b/src/modes/acp/adapter.ts
@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ import { FileActionManager } from '../../actions/filesystem.js';
 import { ProviderFactory } from '../../providers/ProviderFactory.js';
 import { loadConfig } from '../../config.js';
 import { prepareBareModeConfig } from '../../runtime/bareMode.js';
+import { resolveRunToolScope } from '../../permissions/runToolScope.js';
 import type { AgentOutputEvent, AgentRuntime, CLIOptions, LoadedConfig, LLMToolCall } from '../../types.js';
 import type { McpServerConfig } from '../../mcp/types.js';
 import { cleanupSessionWorktree, isSessionWorktreeEnabled, prepareSessionWorktree, type SessionWorktreeInfo } from '../../utils/sessionWorktree.js';
@@ -633,6 +634,8 @@ export class AutohandAcpAdapter implements Agent {
 
     // Load config once for the lifetime of the connection
     this.config = await this.ensureConfig();
+    const scope = resolveRunToolScope(this.cliOptions);
+    const allToolsDeny = scope?.denied.some(pattern => pattern.kind === '*' && !pattern.argument) === true;
 
     return {
       protocolVersion: PROTOCOL_VERSION,
@@ -665,6 +668,7 @@ export class AutohandAcpAdapter implements Agent {
         // Context a host prepends to a prompt (`<autohand_*>`, `<*_context>` blocks) is
         // not read as the user asking for specialists; see userAuthoredInstruction.
         hostContext: { version: 1 },
+        autohandRunToolScope: { version: 1, allToolsDeny },
         ...(this.config.sessions?.communication?.enabled && this.clientCapabilities?._meta?.autohandPeerEvents === 1
           ? { peerCommunication: { version: 1 } } : {}),
       },
diff --git a/src/permissions/runToolScope.ts b/src/permissions/runToolScope.ts
index 4c1d9bfe..efb229d7 100644
--- a/src/permissions/runToolScope.ts
+++ b/src/permissions/runToolScope.ts
@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ export function checkRunToolScopeByName(
     const decision = checkRunToolScopeByName(child, toolName);
     if (!decision.allowed) return decision;
   }
-  if (scope.denied.some((pattern) => pattern.kind === toolName && !pattern.argument)) return { allowed: false, reason: 'run_scope_denied' };
+  if (scope.denied.some((pattern) => (pattern.kind === toolName || pattern.kind === '*') && !pattern.argument)) return { allowed: false, reason: 'run_scope_denied' };
   if (scope.allowed.length > 0 && !scope.allowed.some((pattern) => pattern.kind === toolName)) {
     return { allowed: false, reason: 'run_scope_not_allowed' };
   }
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ export function checkRunToolScope(
     const decision = checkRunToolScope(child, call);
     if (!decision.allowed) return decision;
   }
-  if (scope.denied.some((pattern) => matchesToolPattern(pattern, call))) return { allowed: false, reason: 'run_scope_denied' };
+  if (scope.denied.some((pattern) => (pattern.kind === '*' && !pattern.argument) || matchesToolPattern(pattern, call))) return { allowed: false, reason: 'run_scope_denied' };
   if (scope.allowed.length > 0 && !scope.allowed.some((pattern) => matchesToolPattern(pattern, call))) {
     return { allowed: false, reason: 'run_scope_not_allowed' };
   }
diff --git a/tests/modes/acp/adapter.test.ts b/tests/modes/acp/adapter.test.ts
index 0aa59e71..7d028d1a 100644
--- a/tests/modes/acp/adapter.test.ts
+++ b/tests/modes/acp/adapter.test.ts
@@ -352,12 +352,20 @@ describe("AutohandAcpAdapter", () => {
   });
 
   describe("initialize()", () => {
+    it("reports whether the process activated an all-tools denial", async () => {
+      const scoped = new AutohandAcpAdapter(connection, { disallowedTools: ['*'] });
+      const initialized = await scoped.initialize(makeInitRequest());
+      expect(initialized._meta).toMatchObject({ autohandRunToolScope: { version: 1, allToolsDeny: true } });
+      const partial = new AutohandAcpAdapter(connection, { disallowedTools: ['read_file'] });
+      expect((await partial.initialize(makeInitRequest()))._meta).toMatchObject({ autohandRunToolScope: { version: 1, allToolsDeny: false } });
+    });
+
     it("tells the client that host context blocks are not read as user intent", async () => {
       // Clients gate context they prepend to a prompt (response modes, user profile)
       // on this: an agent that does not advertise it would scan that text for
       // specialist requests. Advertised to every client, with or without peer events.
       const result = await adapter.initialize(makeInitRequest());
-      expect(result._meta).toMatchObject({ hostContext: { version: 1 } });
+      expect(result._meta).toMatchObject({ hostContext: { version: 1 }, autohandRunToolScope: { version: 1, allToolsDeny: false } });
 
       config.sessions = { communication: { enabled: true } };
       const withPeers = await adapter.initialize(makeInitRequest({
@@ -368,6 +376,7 @@ describe("AutohandAcpAdapter", () => {
         autohandWorkflowSkillHooks: 1,
         autohandWorkflowExecution: 2,
         hostContext: { version: 1 },
+        autohandRunToolScope: { version: 1, allToolsDeny: false },
         peerCommunication: { version: 1 },
       });
     });
diff --git a/tests/permissions/toolAdvertising.spec.ts b/tests/permissions/toolAdvertising.spec.ts
index 5f567c85..ab5aefd3 100644
--- a/tests/permissions/toolAdvertising.spec.ts
+++ b/tests/permissions/toolAdvertising.spec.ts
@@ -43,6 +43,25 @@ describe('filterAdvertisedTools', () => {
 });
 
 describe('run tool scope', () => {
+  it('denies every advertised and fabricated tool with the bare all-tools pattern', () => {
+    const scope = resolveRunToolScope({ disallowedTools: ['*'], allowedTools: ['read_file'] });
+    const manager = new PermissionManager({ mode: 'unrestricted' });
+    manager.setRunToolScope(scope);
+    expect(manager.filterAdvertisedTools(tools)).toEqual([]);
+    for (const kind of ['read_file', 'run_command', 'mcp__future__tool', 'orchestrate_specialists']) {
+      expect(isToolAdvertisedByScope(scope, kind)).toBe(false);
+      expect(checkRunToolScope(scope, { kind, target: 'anything' })).toEqual({ allowed: false, reason: 'run_scope_denied' });
+    }
+  });
+
+  it('keeps a parent all-tools denial when a child allows a tool', () => {
+    const parent = resolveRunToolScope({ disallowedTools: ['*'] });
+    const child = resolveRunToolScope({ allowedTools: ['read_file'] });
+    const scope = { allowed: [], denied: [], allOf: [parent!, child!] };
+    expect(isToolAdvertisedByScope(scope, 'read_file')).toBe(false);
+    expect(checkRunToolScope(scope, { kind: 'read_file', target: 'a.ts' }).allowed).toBe(false);
+  });
+
   it('collects repeated and comma-separated values', () => {
     const collected = collectToolPatternOption('read_file,write_file', collectToolPatternOption('run_command(git:*)'));
     expect(collected).toEqual(['run_command(git:*)', 'read_file,write_file']);