diff --git a/.github/actions/install-pinned-binary/action.yml b/.github/actions/install-pinned-binary/action.yml new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8fcc93a --- /dev/null +++ b/.github/actions/install-pinned-binary/action.yml @@ -0,0 +1,79 @@ +name: install-pinned-binary +description: >- + Put one binary from a release tarball on PATH, at a pinned version whose + SHA-256 is pinned too. The archive is kept in the Actions cache (keyed on + name, version and checksum), so a job downloads it only on a cache miss; + a download retries transient failures for up to four minutes. The + checksum is checked on every run, cached archive or fresh download: it, + not the cache or the release host, decides what runs. A cached archive + that fails the check is discarded and downloaded again. + + Why: GitHub's release-asset host answered 504 for minutes at a time on + 2026-11-09 (the Fly deploy twice, the secret scan six retries in a row), + and an unpinned setup action (`setup-flyctl@master`, flyctl `latest`) + let both the action's code and the CLI change under the production + deploy. To move a version: change `version`, `url` and `sha256` together + at the call site (the publisher's checksums file, checked against the + archive's own hash). + +inputs: + name: + description: Short name, used in the cache key and the step names (e.g. flyctl). + required: true + version: + description: The pinned version (e.g. 0.5.5). + required: true + url: + description: The release tarball for that version (linux x86_64). + required: true + sha256: + description: The tarball's SHA-256 (hex). + required: true + binary: + description: The file inside the tarball to put on PATH. + required: true + +runs: + using: composite + steps: + - name: Restore the ${{ inputs.name }} ${{ inputs.version }} archive + uses: actions/cache@55cc8345863c7cc4c66a329aec7e433d2d1c52a9 # v6.1.0 + with: + path: ~/.cache/pinned-binaries/${{ inputs.name }}-${{ inputs.version }}.tar.gz + key: pinned-binary-${{ inputs.name }}-${{ inputs.version }}-${{ inputs.sha256 }} + + - name: Install ${{ inputs.name }} ${{ inputs.version }} (checksum-pinned) + shell: bash + env: + NAME: ${{ inputs.name }} + VERSION: ${{ inputs.version }} + URL: ${{ inputs.url }} + SHA256: ${{ inputs.sha256 }} + BINARY: ${{ inputs.binary }} + run: | + set -euo pipefail + archive="$HOME/.cache/pinned-binaries/${NAME}-${VERSION}.tar.gz" + mkdir -p "$(dirname "$archive")" + download() { + echo "downloading ${NAME} ${VERSION}" + curl --fail --silent --show-error --location \ + --retry 8 --retry-all-errors --retry-delay 10 --retry-max-time 240 \ + "$URL" --output "$archive" + } + verified() { echo "${SHA256} ${archive}" | sha256sum --check --status; } + if [ -s "$archive" ] && verified; then + echo "${NAME} ${VERSION}: cached archive, checksum ok" + else + [ -s "$archive" ] && echo "::warning::cached ${NAME} archive failed its checksum; downloading again" + rm -f "$archive" + download + if ! verified; then + echo "::error::${NAME} ${VERSION}: the download does not match the pinned SHA-256" + exit 1 + fi + echo "${NAME} ${VERSION}: downloaded, checksum ok" + fi + dest="$RUNNER_TEMP/pinned-bin/${NAME}" + mkdir -p "$dest" + tar -xzf "$archive" -C "$dest" "$BINARY" + echo "$dest" >> "$GITHUB_PATH" diff --git a/.github/workflows/ci.yml b/.github/workflows/ci.yml index 67480e3..05fe60a 100644 --- a/.github/workflows/ci.yml +++ b/.github/workflows/ci.yml @@ -98,3 +98,51 @@ jobs: exit 1 fi python -m pytest -q tests/test_smoke_live.py + + # Secret scan of the new commits only: the pull request's range, or the + # push's. The default gitleaks rules plus the AgentChat API key rule + # (.gitleaks.toml). + secret-scan: + runs-on: ubuntu-latest + permissions: + contents: read + steps: + - uses: actions/checkout@11d5960a326750d5838078e36cf38b85af677262 # v4.4.0 + with: + fetch-depth: 0 + + # Checksum-pinned, cached: a download happens only on a cache miss + # (.github/actions/install-pinned-binary). + - uses: ./.github/actions/install-pinned-binary + with: + name: gitleaks + version: 8.30.1 + url: https://github.com/gitleaks/gitleaks/releases/download/v8.30.1/gitleaks_8.30.1_linux_x64.tar.gz + sha256: 551f6fc83ea457d62a0d98237cbad105af8d557003051f41f3e7ca7b3f2470eb + binary: gitleaks + + - name: Select commits to scan + id: commits + env: + EVENT_NAME: ${{ github.event_name }} + BEFORE_SHA: ${{ github.event.before }} + BASE_SHA: ${{ github.event.pull_request.base.sha }} + HEAD_SHA: ${{ github.sha }} + run: | + if [[ "$EVENT_NAME" == "pull_request" ]]; then + echo "range=${BASE_SHA}..${HEAD_SHA}" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT" + # A new branch (all-zero before) or a manual dispatch (no before): + # the head commit. + elif [[ "$BEFORE_SHA" =~ ^0*$ ]]; then + echo "range=${HEAD_SHA}^..${HEAD_SHA}" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT" + else + echo "range=${BEFORE_SHA}..${HEAD_SHA}" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT" + fi + + - name: Scan new commits for secrets + run: >- + gitleaks git + --redact + --no-banner + --log-opts="${{ steps.commits.outputs.range }}" + . diff --git a/.gitleaks.toml b/.gitleaks.toml new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1b2afe0 --- /dev/null +++ b/.gitleaks.toml @@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +# gitleaks configuration: the default rules plus the AgentChat API key rule, +# kept identical to the one the core repository scans with, and one allowlist +# for the exact, documented synthetic values of the contract conformance +# fixture. The allowlist patterns match only those specific values, never a +# shape a real credential could take. CI scans only the new commits of a pull +# request or a push (.github/workflows/ci.yml, job secret-scan). Every default +# rule stays active everywhere else. + +[extend] +useDefault = true + +[[allowlists]] +description = "Contract v1 conformance fixture: made-up test secrets shared byte-identically by the contract and both SDKs" +regexTarget = "line" +regexes = [ + # conformance/v1/wake-webhook.cases.json + '''"secret":\s*"wks_conformance_0123456789abcdef"''', + # base64 of the made-up Standard Webhooks key "conformance-key-0123456789abcdef" + '''"standard_webhooks_secret_base64":\s*"Y29uZm9ybWFuY2Uta2V5LTAxMjM0NTY3ODlhYmNkZWY="''', +] + +# AgentChat API keys: `ac_` + 32 random bytes as unpadded base64url. +# 32 bytes = 43 characters, and the last character carries only 4 data bits, +# so it is one of 16 letters/digits. +# Bounded on both sides by a non-base64url character (RE2 has no lookaround), +# so identifiers such as `ac_status` and 42- or 44-character runs never match; +# on the left an escape (`\n`, `\t`) or a percent-encoding (`Bearer%20`) also +# counts as a boundary. +# No keyword is needed next to it: a key pasted bare or in +# `Authorization: Bearer ac_…` is caught. Test code must build keys at run +# time from random bytes, never as a literal. +[[rules]] +id = "agentchat-api-key" +description = "AgentChat API key" +regex = '''(?:^|[^A-Za-z0-9_-]|\\[nrt]|%[0-9A-Fa-f]{2})(ac_[A-Za-z0-9_-]{42}[AEIMQUYcgkosw048])(?:[^A-Za-z0-9_-]|$)''' +secretGroup = 1 +keywords = ["ac_"]