diff --git a/receiver.c b/receiver.c
index 28d663acc..a28a16e60 100644
--- a/receiver.c
+++ b/receiver.c
@@ -119,24 +119,35 @@ static int secure_basis_open(const char *basedir, const char *relpath, int flags
 		return do_open(relpath, flags, mode);
 	}
 
-	/* A peer-supplied --partial-dir basis/staging path (operator_path_resolve set
-	 * by recv_files) may be absolute (module_dir-prefixed on a non-chroot daemon)
-	 * and traverse a symlink the secure_relative_open path can't confine: resolve
-	 * it with the ownership walk, which follows a uid0/euid-owned symlink but
-	 * refuses a foreign one AND (via abspath_excluded_by_module) refuses a target
-	 * the module's exclude hides -- closing the partial-dir exclude bypass. */
-	if (operator_path_resolve) {
-		char fullpath[MAXPATHLEN];
-		const char *p = relpath;
-		if (basedir) {
-			if (pathjoin(fullpath, sizeof fullpath, basedir, relpath) >= sizeof fullpath) {
-				errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
-				return -1;
-			}
+    /* A path with operator_path_resolve set (e.g. an absolute --partial-dir or alt-dest
+     * basis) may traverse a symlink the secure_relative_open path can't confine. We
+     * resolve the operator path with the ownership walk, which safely follows
+     * subdirectory and parent components if they are trusted (uid0/euid-owned) symlinks,
+     * but refuses a foreign one AND (via abspath_excluded_by_module) refuses a target
+     * the module's exclude hides -- closing the partial-dir exclude bypass.
+     * However, we strictly refuse to follow a leaf symlink coming from an operator
+     * path by enforcing O_NOFOLLOW, aligning it on operator-path behavior. */
+    if (operator_path_resolve) {
+        char fullpath[MAXPATHLEN];
+		const char* p = relpath;
+        int dfd, fd, e;
+        const char *leaf;
+        if (basedir) {
+            if (pathjoin(fullpath, sizeof fullpath, basedir, relpath) >= sizeof fullpath) {
+                errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
+                return -1;
+            }
 			p = fullpath;
-		}
-		return open_no_attacker_symlinks(p, flags, mode);
-	}
+        }
+        dfd = owner_walk_parent(p, &leaf);
+        if (dfd < 0)
+            return -1;
+        fd = openat(dfd, leaf, flags | O_NOFOLLOW, mode);
+        e = errno;
+        close(dfd);
+        errno = e; 
+        return fd;
+    }
 
 	/* The confined resolver is needed for the sanitizing daemon
 	 * (am_daemon && !am_chrooted) and for a /./ inner-module chroot
@@ -1085,7 +1096,7 @@ int recv_files(int f_in, int f_out, char *local_name)
 				 * stronger confinement branch in secure_basis_open(), so only
 				 * route the alt-dest basedir read through the walk off-daemon. */
 				if ((basedir && !am_daemon) || fnamecmp_type == FNAMECMP_PARTIAL_DIR)
-					operator_path_resolve = 1;
+				    operator_path_resolve = 1;
 				fd1 = secure_basis_open(basedir, fnamecmp, O_RDONLY, 0);
 				operator_path_resolve = 0;
 			}
@@ -1133,8 +1144,9 @@ int recv_files(int f_in, int f_out, char *local_name)
 		}
 
 		/* A peer's basis selector cannot enable direct output through a path
-		 * that the confined basis open did not validate. */
-		one_inplace = inplace_partial && fnamecmp_type == FNAMECMP_PARTIAL_DIR
+		 * that the confined basis open did not validate. We also explicitly
+         * require partial_dir to be configured by the client */
+		one_inplace = inplace_partial && partial_dir && fnamecmp_type == FNAMECMP_PARTIAL_DIR
 			   && fd1 != -1;
 		updating_basis_or_equiv = one_inplace
 		    || (inplace && (fnamecmp == fname || fnamecmp_type == FNAMECMP_BACKUP));
diff --git a/testsuite/strict-basis_test.py b/testsuite/strict-basis_test.py
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..ba350f45b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/testsuite/strict-basis_test.py
@@ -0,0 +1,216 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""TCP receiver edge-cases.
+
+Test 1: Ensures O_NOFOLLOW correctly blocks leaf symlinks in operator paths.
+Test 2: Ensures unexpected FNAMECMP_PARTIAL_DIR tokens cannot cause an 
+        unintended in-place overwrite.
+"""
+
+import hashlib
+import os
+import socket
+import struct
+import subprocess
+from pathlib import Path
+
+from rsyncfns import (
+    TMPDIR, TODIR, hands_setup, makepath, rmtree, rsync_argv, test_fail
+)
+import rsync_proto as rp
+
+hands_setup()
+
+CF_INPLACE_PARTIAL_DIR = 1 << 6
+FNAMECMP_BASIS_DIR_LOW = 0x00
+FNAMECMP_PARTIAL_DIR = 0x81
+ITEM_BASIS_TYPE_FOLLOWS = 1 << 11
+ITEM_XNAME_FOLLOWS = 1 << 12
+
+TEST_DATA = b"STRICT_NOFOLLOW_REQUIRED\n"
+ORIGINAL_DATA = b"ORIGINAL_DEST_BYTES_KEEP_ME\n"
+MODIFIED_DATA = b"MODIFIED_INPLACE_DESPITE_BAD_CHECKSUM\n"
+INVALID_MD5 = b"\x00" * 16
+MODTIME = 1_700_000_000
+
+# --- Protocol Helpers ---
+def drain_argv(peer):
+    nul_run = 0
+    while nul_run < 2:
+        b = peer._recv_exact(1)
+        nul_run = nul_run + 1 if b == b"\0" else 0
+
+def read_mux_bytes(peer, buf, n):
+    while len(buf) < n:
+        word = struct.unpack("<I", peer._recv_exact(4))[0]
+        payload = peer._recv_exact(word & 0xFFFFFF)
+        if (word >> 24) - rp.MPLEX_BASE == rp.MSG_DATA:
+            buf.extend(payload)
+    out = bytes(buf[:n])
+    del buf[:n]
+    return out
+
+def read_mux_int(peer, buf): return struct.unpack("<i", read_mux_bytes(peer, buf, 4))[0]
+def read_mux_short(peer, buf): return struct.unpack("<H", read_mux_bytes(peer, buf, 2))[0]
+def read_mux_byte(peer, buf): return read_mux_bytes(peer, buf, 1)[0]
+
+def read_mux_ndx(peer, buf):
+    b0 = read_mux_byte(peer, buf)
+    if b0 == 0: return rp.NDX_DONE
+    if b0 == 0xFF: raise RuntimeError("generator sent negative index")
+    if b0 == 0xFE:
+        b = read_mux_bytes(peer, buf, 2)
+        if b[0] & 0x80:
+            rest = read_mux_bytes(peer, buf, 2)
+            return ((b[0] & 0x7F) << 24) | b[1] | (rest[0] << 8) | (rest[1] << 16)
+        return (b[0] << 8) + b[1] - 1
+    return b0 - 1
+
+def drain_generator_request(peer, buf):
+    while True:
+        n = read_mux_int(peer, buf)
+        if n == 0: break
+        read_mux_bytes(peer, buf, n)
+
+    while True:
+        ndx = read_mux_ndx(peer, buf)
+        if ndx == rp.NDX_DONE: raise RuntimeError("generator sent NDX_DONE")
+        iflags = read_mux_short(peer, buf)
+        if iflags & ITEM_BASIS_TYPE_FOLLOWS: read_mux_byte(peer, buf)
+        if iflags & ITEM_XNAME_FOLLOWS:
+            ln = read_mux_byte(peer, buf)
+            if ln & 0x80: ln = (ln & 0x7F) * 0x100 + read_mux_byte(peer, buf)
+            if ln: read_mux_bytes(peer, buf, ln)
+        count = read_mux_int(peer, buf)
+        for _ in range(3): read_mux_int(peer, buf)
+        for _ in range(count): read_mux_int(peer, buf)
+        if iflags & rp.ITEM_TRANSFER: return ndx
+
+def run_synthetic_sender(client_args, uri_path, dest_path, test_logic, inject_fault=True): 
+    lsock = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
+    lsock.bind(("127.0.0.1", 0))
+    lsock.listen(1)
+    port = lsock.getsockname()[1]
+    cmd = rsync_argv("--protocol=30", "-r", "--no-whole-file") + client_args
+    cmd += [f"rsync://127.0.0.1:{port}/{uri_path}", f"{dest_path}/"]
+    proc = subprocess.Popen(cmd, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.STDOUT, text=True)
+    csock, _ = lsock.accept()
+    csock.settimeout(15)
+    peer = rp.DaemonReceiver(csock)
+
+    try:
+        test_logic(peer, inject_fault)
+    finally:
+        peer.drain(timeout=3)
+        peer.close()
+        lsock.close()
+
+    stdout, _ = proc.communicate(timeout=10)
+    return proc.returncode, stdout
+
+
+# --- Test 1: Operator Path Leaf Symlink Rejection (O_NOFOLLOW) --------------
+print("=== Test 1: Operator Path Leaf Symlink Rejection (O_NOFOLLOW) ===", flush=True)
+
+def test1_payload(peer, inject_fault, md5_hash):
+    peer.handshake(compat_flags=CF_INPLACE_PARTIAL_DIR, seed=0x12345678)
+    drain_argv(peer)
+    entry = rp.FileEntry("f", mode=rp.S_IFREG | 0o644, length=len(TEST_DATA), modtime=MODTIME)
+    peer.send_data(entry.encode() + rp.end_of_flist())
+    buf = bytearray()
+    ndx = drain_generator_request(peer, buf)
+    body = bytearray()
+    body += rp.w_shortint(rp.ITEM_TRANSFER | ITEM_BASIS_TYPE_FOLLOWS)
+    body += rp.w_byte(FNAMECMP_BASIS_DIR_LOW)  
+    body += rp.w_sum_head(1, len(TEST_DATA), 16, len(TEST_DATA)) + rp.w_int(-1) + rp.w_int(0)
+    body += md5_hash
+    out_bytes = bytearray(peer.w_ndx(ndx))
+    out_bytes += body
+    out_bytes += peer.w_ndx(rp.NDX_DONE) * 4
+    peer.send_data(bytes(out_bytes))
+
+# 1A: Positive Control
+print("  Running 1A: Positive Control (Regular file basis)...", flush=True)
+rmtree(TODIR)
+dest = TODIR / "dest"
+linkdest = TODIR / "linkdest"
+makepath(dest, linkdest)
+(linkdest / "f").write_bytes(TEST_DATA)
+correct_md5 = hashlib.md5(TEST_DATA).digest()
+
+ret, out = run_synthetic_sender(
+    [f"--link-dest={linkdest}", "--partial"], "mod/", dest, 
+    lambda peer, inject_fault: test1_payload(peer, inject_fault, correct_md5), inject_fault=False
+)
+
+if not (dest / "f").exists() or (dest / "f").read_bytes() != TEST_DATA:
+    test_fail("BUG 1A (Control): Positive control failed! The patch accidentally blocked a regular basis file.\nOutput:\n" + out)
+
+# 1B: Negative Control (Testing the edge-case)
+print("  Running 1B: Negative Control (Symlink basis)...", flush=True)
+rmtree(TODIR)
+dest = TODIR / "dest"
+linkdest = TODIR / "linkdest"
+makepath(dest, linkdest)
+target_file = TMPDIR / "target"
+target_file.write_bytes(TEST_DATA)
+os.symlink(str(target_file), linkdest / "f")
+
+ret, out = run_synthetic_sender(
+    [f"--link-dest={linkdest}", "--partial"], "mod/", dest, 
+    lambda peer, inject_fault: test1_payload(peer, inject_fault, INVALID_MD5), inject_fault=True
+)
+# DIAGNOSTIC CHECK: Ensure rsync reached the patch and evaluated it, rather than segfaulting early
+if (dest / "f").exists() and (dest / "f").read_bytes() == TEST_DATA:
+    test_fail("BUG 1B (Negative Control): rsync incorrectly followed the operator-path fname leaf symlink!\nOutput:\n" + out)
+elif "got a block match with no basis file" not in out:
+    test_fail("BUG 1B (Negative Control): rsync crashed silently!\nOutput:\n" + out)
+
+# --- Test 2: In-place Override Verification (FNAMECMP_PARTIAL_DIR) ----------
+print("\n=== Test 2: In-place Override Verification (FNAMECMP_PARTIAL_DIR) ===", flush=True)
+
+def test2_payload(peer, inject_fault):
+    peer.handshake(compat_flags=CF_INPLACE_PARTIAL_DIR, seed=0x12345678)
+    drain_argv(peer)
+    entry = rp.FileEntry("keep", mode=rp.S_IFREG | 0o644, length=len(MODIFIED_DATA), modtime=MODTIME)
+    peer.send_data(entry.encode() + rp.end_of_flist())
+    buf = bytearray()
+    ndx = drain_generator_request(peer, buf)
+    body = bytearray()
+    
+    if inject_fault:
+        body += rp.w_shortint(rp.ITEM_TRANSFER | ITEM_BASIS_TYPE_FOLLOWS)
+        body += rp.w_byte(FNAMECMP_PARTIAL_DIR)
+    else:
+        body += rp.w_shortint(rp.ITEM_TRANSFER)
+        
+    body += rp.w_sum_head(0, 0, 0, 0)
+    body += rp.w_int(len(MODIFIED_DATA)) + MODIFIED_DATA
+    body += rp.w_int(0)
+    body += INVALID_MD5
+    out = bytearray(peer.w_ndx(ndx))
+    out += body
+    out += peer.w_ndx(rp.NDX_DONE) * 4
+    peer.send_data(bytes(out))
+
+# 2A: Negative Control
+print("  Running 2A: Negative Control (Synthetic Token)...", flush=True)
+rmtree(TODIR)
+dest2 = TODIR / "dest"
+makepath(dest2)
+keep_file = dest2 / "keep"
+keep_file.write_bytes(ORIGINAL_DATA)
+
+ret, out = run_synthetic_sender([], "mod/keep", dest2, test2_payload, inject_fault=True)
+
+if keep_file.exists():
+    got = keep_file.read_bytes()
+    if got == MODIFIED_DATA:
+        test_fail("BUG 2A (Negative Control): Synthetic FNAMECMP_PARTIAL_DIR caused rsync to incorrectly overwrite the file in-place!\nOutput:\n" + out)
+    elif got != ORIGINAL_DATA:
+        test_fail(f"BUG 2A (Negative Control): File modified to unknown state: {got}")
+elif "failed verification" not in out:
+    # If the file didn't leak, we MUST verify rsync actually ran to completion and failed safely.
+    test_fail("BUG 2A (Negative Control): rsync crashed silently!\nOutput:\n" + out)
+    
+print("\nSUCCESS: Both operator path parsing and forced-inplace overrides were correctly handled.", flush=True)
+