+Cross-Origin Resource Sharing (CORS) lets a server relax the browser's same-origin policy by
+naming the origins that are allowed to read its responses in the
+Access-Control-Allow-Origin response header. A policy that allows any origin, for
+example by sending Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *, reflecting the request origin, or
+using a framework's "allow any origin" or "permissive" CORS configuration, lets every website
+read the responses of this service from a victim's browser.
+
+This is harmless for truly public, unauthenticated data, but it exposes any sensitive data the +service returns (now or in the future), including data served to clients on a local or private +network that the attacker cannot reach directly. +
+
+This query recognizes, among others: allow_any_origin() (warp, actix-cors),
+Cors::permissive() (actix-cors), CorsLayer::permissive(),
+CorsLayer::very_permissive() and allow_origin with Any,
+"*", AllowOrigin::any() or AllowOrigin::mirror_request()
+(tower-http), AllowedOrigins::all() (rocket_cors),
+AccessControlAllowOrigin::Any (iron / hyper 0.10), and setting the
+Access-Control-Allow-Origin header to "*" directly.
+
+Allow only an explicit list of trusted origins. If the endpoint really serves only public data +that every website may read, the alert can be dismissed. +
+
+In the following example, an axum application uses a tower-http CorsLayer that
+allows the wildcard origin, so any website can read the JSON responses:
+
+The fix is to allow only the trusted front-end origin: +
+